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Abstract 
Critics of user charges for government primary health care have 
focussed on the deterrent effect these charges might have on the poor, but 
there is little convincing empirical evidence that supports or contradicts 
these claims. The main research aims were to assess the equity effects of 
user charges for curative PHC services on households in 2 rural districts 
of Sierra Leone, a country that has suffered severe economic hardship in 
the last decade. Secondary objectives were to assess the feasibility of 
using objective means-testing to identify patients for exemption, and to 
recoimiend a simple methodology for acquiring the same information for 
local, operational purposes. 
A survey of 1156 households was carried out in the dry post-harvest 
season, and covered a range of household economic factors in addition to 
the actions taken in response to all reported illness episodes. A followup 
survey was made the following rainy season to assess seasonal effects. 
Supplementary information was obtained through focus groups and case 
studies. The data were analyzed within the framework of a conceptual model 
which assumed that preferences, access, and ability to pay were the main 
factors (or groups of factors) that determined which of several medical and 
non-medical treatment options would be used. Multiple regression models 
were used to assess the effects of each group of factors. 
The main findings were that, while wealthier households used cheap 
market drugs and expensive medical treatment options more than the poor, 
there was little difference in use of medium-priced PHC treatment. 
Household wealth and income factors correlated weakly with amounts actually 
paid for treatment. The immediate availability of money in the household 
appeared to be the economic factor most affecting utilization, with 
wealthier households nearly as likely = to have the amounts needed for 
PHC treatment on hand as poorer ones. Distance was a much more important 
determinant of choice of treatment than was income or assets, as were 
certain preference factors. However, the poor spent a much higher 
proportion of household income on treatment than the wealthy, so a way of 
limiting total expenditures for the poor would be more important than 
limiting their deterrence. Several readily-ascertained household factors 
correlated well with household income, but means-testing was concluded to 
be an inefficient way to accomplish the objective of selectively limiting 
expenditures unless incorporated into a prepayment scheme. 
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Chapter 1: 
Background to the research problem 
In 1985 the author encountered a problem while working 
an a feasibility study for local production of oral 
r& Bration salts (CR2) in Senegal. Several local 
ranufacturers fiere prepared to produce and market CRS sachets, 
at a price which would ensure than a modest profit. The 
Ministry of Health thought that the retail prices the 
cogwniea propomed (around tB$ 0.15) would be beyond the reach 
of poor people, and elected to continue buying CR2 through 
6KICIF at about $W 0.07 for= distribution through government 
clinics. This decision praeQted several questions: Do urban 
bureaiQats really know how much poor people, especially those 
in rural areas, can afford to pay? idly should there be a 
significant difference in affordability between 7 cents and 15 
cents? And, is there any objective iy to assess these 
factors and determine an 'affordable' price for CR5 and other 
essential drugs uoad in primary health care? 
These guestians were the kis of the research problems 
explored in this thesis. The topic mw a timely one, as user 
diargms aid cast-sharing have been strongly pz tad farad 
hotly debated) as a solution to the crisis in health financing 
in developing crow tries. The research approach -- 
developed 
at the Health Policy Lhi t of the L911! Yf in 1988/89, and the 
field research mw carried out in Sierra Leone in 1989/90. 
2hR research questions evolved Into a more general exploration 
of affordability of primary health care charge s, but still are 
closely related to the original 1e: how do the poor, 
particularly In subsistence farming areas, msoage to cope kd th 
sm71 emergencies; wist factors affect their ability to pay 
the Moderate sues associated with cast-recovery for curative 
PIJC services; what is a practical my of defining 
affordability that will take into amount the effects of 
payments on the overall welfare of the household aid aid 
policy makers in pricing PIC services; and how can this 
infaraatian be obtained and awed by policy kers to make 
informed decision about pricing. 
Among the problems inherent to the establishment and sustained 
operation of coxmunity-financing programres for primary health care (PHC) 
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in developing countries, those factors which relate prices to cornninity and 
household-level economics are perhaps the least adequately investigated. 
The prices set for services or drugs can affect access of patients to 
treatment, rational drug use, and utilization, but pricing has to date been 
mostly a subject of intuitive guesses. Guesswork has a place in planning, 
but carries with it the need for a trial-and-error approach. In an 
environment in which the health of many millions of people and the further 
support of international donors hinges on the outcome of primary health 
care (PHC) programms, a more objective basis for planning that would 
increase the chances of success would seem imperative. 
The aim of this research was to learn more about the factors that 
should be considered in decisions about pricing policy, by developing a 
framework for looking at local health and economic conditions that affect 
utilization and affordability of curative PHC services, to develop a set 
of practical assessment instruments for measuring them, and to show how the 
information obtained could be used. The approach would have a practical 
application in establishing pricing and exemption policies for 
community-based cost recovery programs. The major issues relevant to the 
research are outlined in this chapter, followed by a detailed review of the 
literature and antecedents to the research in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 
4 provides background information on Sierra Leone, where the field research 
was carried out, and the research approach and methodology are described 
in Chapter 5. The analysis of the results of the field study are described 
in Chapters 6 through 9, and conclusions, policy recommendations, and 
evaluation of the research methodology are presented in Chapters 10 and 11. 
Government expenditure in the health sector in most developing 
countries decreased in real terms over the past decades, due mainly to the 
deteriorating economic environment. As a condition for structural 
adjustment loans, governments were advised by international development 
agencies to improve the efficiency of social services. In the case of 
health services, the reconn ended strategies included reversing the trend 
toward concentrating resources on secondary and tertiary care in urban 
areas, reducing the initial cost and the wastage of drugs, and seeking 
12 
additional sources of financing, including establishing user charges to pay 
for and improve health services. 
User charges in government health services are considered feasible 
largely because people are now paying often substantial amounts for health 
care in the private sector. This care may not be of high quality, and 
drugs provided may be inappropriate or outdated. User fees, it is argued, 
can redirect this expenditure towards more effective government health 
services and better use of drugs. Even if people are not currently paying 
for care, the magnitude of household expenditure on non-essential 
consumption leads proponents of user fees to believe that some degree of 
purchasing power exists which could be exploited. Introducing fees for 
curative services may also promote more efficient use of resources by 
making both providers and users more are of the costs of services. User 
charges for preventive services are generally not suggested for efficiency 
reasons, namely to encourage consumption of services that confer benefits 
to society in excess of those to users. 
A hotly debated point concerns whether user charges potentially have 
a net positive effect on welfare. Revenues retained either locally or by 
the central Ministry of Health would in principle be used to provide better 
services through, for exanple, more reliable supplies of drugs, better 
supervision and training, improved staff morale, or even better 
geographical access through construction of facilities. Compared to the 
present situation in which government services are 'free' but rationed due 
to scarcity and of low quality, patients would pay more but would receive 
better care, getting better value for money than from the private sector. 
Medicines have been singled out as a component of health care for 
which people have a universal desire and willingness to pay. The 
inadequate supply of essential drugs is suggested as a major reason why 
government health facilities in developing countries are underutilized. 
It has been proposed that governments could overcome the financial 
constraint to providing adequate supplies by charging for drugs at health 
facilities rather than providing them for free, and using the proceeds to 
purchase replacement stocks. So-called revolving drug funds have been 
tested in many forms, at levels ranging from individual village health 
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workers to national chains of retail public pharmacies. The partial, 
conditional success of such schemes was directly responsible for the 
launching of the Bamako Initiative, which originally aimed to improve the 
supply of essential drugs in sub-Saharan African countries by establishing 
revolving drug funds. This plan called for drug prices to be set above the 
cost of replenishing supplies, with the 'profit' to be used to cover the 
cost of Improved PHC and Maternal/Child Health (MCH) care. Since its 
inception, the Bamako Initiative has shifted enphasis to the more general 
revival of PHC through decentralization and conmunity participation. 
Critics of user charges maintain that their effect is to improve 
efficiency at the expense of equity, and have focussed on problems of 
administrative complexity, the risk of policy distortions, and the need to 
protect the poor. Specific criticisms of the Bamako Initiative identified 
the danger of irrational drug prescribing, the failure to address the 
problem of the convertible currencies needed to make drug purchases, and 
the fact that the populations of sub-Saharan Africa are among the world's 
most impoverished. The irQlication of the latter point is that purchasing 
power may be too low for a significant percentage of costs to be recovered, 
and charges which would cover even the modest costs of PHC could exclude 
many people in need of services. 
Some of the problems identified above are embodied in health delivery 
and management systems, while others concern community and household 
economic behaviour. Management issues can indeed be a critical constraint 
to community-level cost recovery, but at the same time a need exists for 
more objective methods of setting prices that take into account community 
and household factors in addition to cost recovery goals. While proponents 
of user charges acknowledge the need to set realistic cost recovery targets 
and to maintain equity among users of health services, a wide gap exists 
between this statement of concern and practical ways of implementing it. 
Both cost recovery and equity are directly affected by the way prices are 
set for services. These relationships are one of the main subjects of the 
research reported here. 
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The price schedule for services is the link between a community's 
purchasing power and the recovery of costs. Purchasing power may be 
thought of as the input, the revenues recovered as the output, and the 
price schedule as an independent variable or combination of variables that 
describe the treatment provided, the health problem, the level of service, 
the consumer, the season, etc., which determine the relationship between 
input and output. 
If there are no economic externalities associated with a particular 
good, e. g., health care, given existing income levels, economic theory 
predicts that consumer welfare will be maximized by setting its price equal 
to the marginal cost of production. However, at this level, the 
distribution of income may well be such that certain individuals cannot 
afford the good. Social objectives may dictate that prices which deviate 
from this rule should be used to implement policies which compensate for 
inequality. A welfare-oriented pricing schedule may aim to simultaneously 
maximize revenues so services can be improved and minimize the negative 
effect of charges on all consumers. But given any functional objective, 
it is necessary to have certain economic information about the target 
population in order to devise such a pricing schedule. Good quality 
information at a local level about how much, and when, people can afford 
to pay for health care is mostly non-existent, and is often regarded as 
difficult to obtain. 
The introduction of significant user charges has been a source of 
political discontent in developing countries. For health planners, the 
consequences of a bad guess at any of these parameters can also be serious: 
an otherwise well-managed revolving fund may enter a downward spiral of 
revenues and can go bankrupt if prices are set either too low or too high. 
The level of cost recovery possible thus depends largely on the 
aggregate willingness and ability of the target population to pay for 
services. If the comnanity is seen as a monolithic body, there are no 
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further economic issues to be raised about user fees. Issues of equity and 
affordability arise because income and wealth are distributed unequally in 
populations, and because of the likelihood that, for poor households that 
already cannot afford sufficient basic needs, any incremental expenditures 
will have adverse health and social effects. 
Much research on ability to pay (ATP) has focussed on measuring the 
price elasticity of demand and willingness to pay for health care. This 
emphasis on demand stems from the goal of setting prices to maximize 
revenue but to not deter people in real need from seeking treatment. There 
is evidence that user fees are regressive in that the burden of fees falls 
relatively more on low income patients than on the better-off, exacerbating 
inequity which may already exist in taxation systems. 
Conventional studies of demand for, and utilization of, health 
services reveal little about the health-seeking behaviour of individuals, 
especially those who do not use health facilities, and they allow few 
conclusions to be made about the equity of a fee system. While the demand 
for health services generally decreases with increasing price, health care 
is not an ordinary commodity, and a con unity is far more complex than a 
multiple of the "average" individual. The meaning of an observed change 
or absence of change in utilization is ambiguous unless information about 
consumers is also known. The debate over equity continues largely because 
of the inherent complexity of the subject, and because many of the seminal 
studies can be faulted on technical grounds. The results of these studies 
are neither generalizable nor conclusive. 
To place the research reported here in the context of what is known 
to date (reviewed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3), most early studies showed 
that demand for health care tends to be inelastic with respect to price, 
but later studies found significant deterrent effects on the poor, 
especially at higher prices. Most of the few longitudinal studies showed 
that utilization decreased significantly when user fees were raised, even 
at the low prices associated with PHC, and it is usually inferred that it 
is mainly the poor who are deterred. Yet the evidence that demand is 
relatively inelastic at the low price levels associated with PHC cannot be 
dismissed, and there is also a largely unexplored question of the effect 
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on demand when cheaper services (specifically, i groved supply of basic 
drugs in public facilities) are made more accessible and the population can 
substitute them for private services of higher price and/or lesser quality. 
This is often the case when community-managed drug revolving funds are 
established, as under the Bamako Initiative. Overall, the results to date 
must be said to be inconclusive with respect to effects on equity. 
Demand is conventionally thought of as willingness to pay in 
conjunction with a range of preference factors. Little attention has been 
paid to ability to pay until quite recently. The inelastic demand observed 
for curative health care may be an effect of high willingness to pay for 
being cured of illness which may cause discomfort, loss of income, and risk 
of permanent disability or death. Under conventional pricing rules the 
price should be raised until demand drops off. If there are no household 
cash or liquid reserves, these amounts may be raised by mortgaging assets, 
incurring debt, disinvesting in capital, or reducing current consumption. 
If all options for curative treatment require fees, poorer households 
(which tend to have cash on hand infrequently) must decide whether to seek 
treatment, which source of treatment is likely to provide the most 
satisfaction at the least cost, and how to obtain the money in the least 
onerous manner. The true ability of a household to pay cannot be 
accurately assessed without an understanding of how these decisions are 
made and their various effects. 
There is no accepted definition of 'affordability' in economics. 
Current expenditure on health care in the private sector or on 'luxury' 
consumption such as cigarettes is often taken as evidence of ability to 
pay, but little is known about how consumption choices are made or the 
effect of these payments on household budgets. A rule of thumb that one 
day's agricultural wage is an 'affordable' fee for curative care has gained 
acceptance because it happens to correlate roughly with the average price 
of an outpatient visit in some countries. None of this really tells us if 
fees are affordable. It is not the goal of this study to define 
affordability, but rather to shed additional light on the impact of user 
charges on the poor. The operational definition of an affordable health 
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care expenditure used in this thesis is one which has no lasting adverse 
effects an the health, economic or social status of the household. Since 
some people paying a given price could not actually afford it under this 
definition, the 'affordable' demand for services is lower than when 
long-term welfare factors are not considered. Consumption can be increased 
to previous levels by means of selective subsidies (e. g., exenptions), but 
in order to plan an optimal pricing policy for drugs, consultations, or 
risk coverage that attempts to balance revenues and equity, the effects of 
health care fees on households and the distribution of ability to pay in 
the community must be known. 
Introducing affordability and equity considerations into the pricing 
schedule would give planners some ability to ensure that new fees are not 
regressive, protect the poor, and perhaps compensate for existing unequal 
access to health services. However, equity is very much a subjective 
concept, and in order to determine how it can be introduced into a fee 
schedule, or to evaluate the effect of different pricing or exemption 
strategies, it is necessary to have a unique and consistent definition of 
the meaning of equity. This is often left to policy-makers at the central 
level to decide, but a cost-recovery programs could be seriously impeded 
if, for example, direct subsidization of the poor by wealthier members of 
the community is locally unacceptable. 
Most proponents of user fees acknowledge that poor and 'vulnerable' 
(however defined) households should be exempt from health care charges, or 
protected from their effects to the same degree as the wealthy. This would 
require that prices are set very low to be 'affordable' by all, or that 
exenptions are granted for certain categories of users and/or a means-based 
sliding scale used. Setting prices for all very low Implies a low amount 
recovered through fees, possibly less than the cost of collection and 
management. The second approach, of protecting the poor through selective 
pricing, is not without critics even in information-rich industrialised 
countries. In most developing countries the implementation problems are 
serious, especially in rural areas where there is little wage employment. 
Income and wealth are difficult to measure, and there is a multitude of 
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reasons why both users and providers of health services will distort the 
truth. Singling out the poor, or even asking questions about means, may 
be socially unacceptable. Even if means-testing is acceptable and 
cost-effective, there are few recognized objective criteria for determining 
the income level at which exemptions should be made, or for reliably 
identifying those individuals or households which should be protected. The 
need to know about affordability of fees for setting prices applies equally 
to decisions about exemptions. 
Some argue that the pricing system need not be perfected to the point 
of exempting all who lack the means of paying because of the high level of 
solidarity in extended families and small conumnities in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The mostly anecdotal accounts of the existence of formal and 
informal social mechanisms say little about the degree of protection that 
can be expected. 
Proponents of government user charges often assume that whatever 
households are currently paying for health care in the private sector mast 
be an affordable amount, but logic suggests that this cannot be true for 
households unable to procure basic needs on a regular basis. The known 
effects of poverty on health and nutrition allow the classification of 
households by nutritional status and by the economic behaviour which is 
both a cause and an effect of this status. The working definition of the 
so-called ultra-poor (those who subsist on less than 80% of their dietary 
energy requirements and for whom any additional drain on their nutritional 
expenditures can have serious health consequences) may be useful as a 
general guide to a pricing policy, but is of limited use as a criterion for 
identifying individual households falling into this category. 
If means-based exemptions are not adopted, equity could be improved 
by incorporating into the pricing schedule indirect indicators of need and 
ability to pay. A frequently proposed example of an objective proxy for 
means is the geographical location of the patient's residence: a lower fee 
is suggested for rural households than for urban on the grounds that most 
urban residents have higher cash incomes than rural farmers. Or within a 
19 
given rural area, price preference in the form of lower fees might be given 
to people who travel greater distances since they incur costs even before 
reaching a health facility. Other possible objective (i. e., readily 
obtained and not easily manipulated) proxies related to ability to pay are 
family size, number of young children, material possessions, type of 
housing, or amount of land under cultivation. But any proxy measure is an 
imperfect substitute for actual assets, income, and credit. The degree to 
which they "leak" benefits to the non-poor, fail to provide the intended 
exemptions, or are costly to implement, are criteria which determine their 
suitability. This research attempts to evaluate proxies for ability to 
pay. 
Exemptions are also suggested for certain specific conditions such 
as tuberculosis and leprosy on the assunption that this improves the 
general welfare, and for specific economic groups such as students, 
prisoners, or civil servants, to compensate for low ability to pay. The 
principle of exempting specific health conditions or population subgroups 
also suggests a need to understand the population's own health priorities, 
expressed as their relative willingness to pay more for certain types of 
health services. Very poor people may be willing to pay more for relief 
from discoafort so they can go back to work, than for syrptoms perceived 
as minor but which may in fact be life-threatening. Setting prices to help 
influence these preferences could help improve health status. 
In mich of the developing world, illness may be highly seasonal, as 
are availability of money and food. Maintenance of access to health care 
may be improved by changing prices seasonally to compensate for these 
factors. Seasonality is also an argument in favour of a system which 
requires prepayment of a certain fee at the beginning of the coverage 
period, which then entitles the person or household to treatment at no 
further or reduced cost for the period. If the initial subscription period 
occurs during a time of peak cash availability, it may be easier for most 
households to make the prepayment. Prepayment or insurance schemes are 
regarded as more equitable than fee-for-service because they spread the 
financial risk of illness among the healthy members of a group, but the 
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slow spread of these systems in Africa has raised questions of their 
acceptability at the community level. Ways to assess seasonal changes in 
ability to pay and the feasibility of prepayment were included in the 
research design. 
One reason that general, practical rules for setting prices for PHC 
have not yet been developed is that there is a great degree of variation 
between the communities in which reliable experiments have been carried 
out, and between communities in general. Many of the factors mentioned 
above which affect household welfare and the ability to pay for health 
services, and the relationships between them, are likely to vary between 
countries, between regions within a country, and even between nearby 
villages. This fact has been primary in the formulation of the research 
objectives and methodology: first, to assess economic factors related to 
choice of type of care and expenditure in different regions of Sierra 
Leone, and second, by means of analysis of the data collected, to develop 
practical approaches for generally assessing criteria for affordability and 
exemption on a local basis. 
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Chapter 2: 
Review of Previous Work 
Part A: Demand and Financing for Health Care, 
User Charges, and Pricing 
The research described in this thesis was stimulated by a current 
debate over user fees and community financing as elements of health policy, 
which can be traced to the worldwide economic downturn of the 1970's. 
Multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental institutions joined in a 
search for solutions, drawing on experience in the industrialized world and 
sponsoring research in less developed countries. As is often true of 
research into social systems, much of the published material and the 
ensuing debate has had an ideological flavour, being "more characterized 
by argument than by evidence at present" (WHO 1988a). For example, the 
wider use of pricing policy in place of administrative controls to allocate 
resources was identified (World Bank 1984) as one of the themes of "a new 
vision of economic management. " 
The literature consists largely of 1) original papers published in 
health and economics journals, 2) economic studies on aspects of living 
standards and the demand for health care, most of which are widely- 
circulated internal documents of the institutions mentioned above, 3) 
policy statements and commentaries based on these studies, and 4) country 
and region-specific studies carried out by developing country governments 
and donor agencies, most of which are unpublished. This chapter a) traces 
the origins of the financial difficulties of health systems in developing 
countries and the solutions which have been proposed; b) reviews the 
antecedents of the current trend toward private financing of health care 
by means of user fees, including theoretical and empirical studies of 
demand for health care which have attempted to either justify the 
introduction of user fees or demonstrate that they can have a net harmful 
effect on equity and welfare; c) reviews pricing theory and actual 
experiences with user fees, and d) traces the development of the Bamako 
Initiative, which in its original conception as a continent-wide cost- 
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recovery scheme for essential drugs triggered a debate over the issues of 
affordability and equity. 
The trend of economic growth in most developing countries outside 
East Asia, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has been steeply negative 
in recent years. Africa's average per capita gross national product (GNP) 
shrank in the 1980's to barely over the level of 1967. The 3.4% average 
annual rate of growth from 1967 to 1988 just equalled the rate of 
population increase over the same period (World Bank 1989). Twenty-four 
countries, conprising 90% of the region's population, had lower levels of 
real per capita QIP in 1989 than at the beginning of the decade. 
This dramatic fall in living standards was a result of external and 
internal factors. The major external factors were balance of payments 
problems and debt. While the few oil-exporting countries benefitted from 
the sharp increase in oil prices, most of the rest suffered from increased 
import costs and reduced demand for their exports. Declines in terms of 
trade were most severe in the poorer countries of the region (World Bank 
1989). Many countries tried to cushion the sharp fall in balance of 
payments through international borrowing, in a period when world interest 
rates rose substantially (Abel-Smith 1986x), resulting in high levels of 
indebtedness and debt service payments for both the middle and low income 
countries of all developing regions. Africa's long-term debt rose 19-fold 
since 1970 and is now equal to its gross national product, making it the 
world's most indebted region. In 1983 debt service payments amounted to 
27t of export earnings for the region (UNICEF 1990). 
Internal factors have coapounded the deteriorating balance of trade 
and indebtedness. War, ethnic conflict, and drought have affected much of 
sub-Saharan Africa. Political balance in the nations constructed from 
colonial empires is often precarious, requiring governments to give 
priority to maintaining stability through high military expenditures, to 
the detriment of social and economic policy. 
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Governments attempting to deal with macroeconomic crisis have had 
three strategies available to them. They could finance their current 
account deficits by international commercial borrowing and concessional 
import support by donors. Second, they could attempt to achieve their 
balance of payments and inflation objectives through demand management, 
with IMF-supported stabilization measures such as currency devaluation to 
encourage exports and discourage imports, and cuts in public spending and 
borrowing to reduce government budget deficits and inflation. Third, 
structural adjustment programmes to strengthen economies emphasized policy 
reforms to alter exchange rates, state-controlled prices and interest 
rates, and to support investment in key sectors (World Bank 1988). 
The option of borrowing Hore as constrained by conditionalities 
imposed by potential lenders requiring the ligplementation of stabilization 
and adjustment policies, and economic problems in developed countries and 
altered donor policies meant that donors were unlikely to significantly 
increase their levels of assistance (Hoare and Mills 1986). The IMF 
promoted stabilization policies, arguing that short-term austerity would 
achieve the internal and external balance essential for restoring long term 
growth. Critics replied that the expansion of output of exports and import 
substitutes generally takes auch longer in poorer countries which are 
mainly producers of primary commodities, subjecting the population to 
longer terms of austerity, and may undermine the prospects for long term 
growth by discouraging investment (Cornia et al 1987). The World Bank 
encouraged adjustment policies through structural adjustment loans, but a 
debate continues over whether the countries can bear the short-term 
dislocations while waiting for the anticipated positive results in the long 
term. 
Some modest economic successes have been attributed by some to 
structural adjustment program a: chana increased its GDP from negative 
growth in the early 1980s to positive, and Senegal increased food 
production and industrial output and reduced its deficit (United Nations 
1988). Zmabia, whose economy was anang the worst in the region in the 
early 1980's, managed briefly to reverse its shrinking output and GDP, 
until riots protesting against the loss of jobs and subsidies forced the 
government to cancel the programme in 1987. 
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Criticism of these externally-imposed measures has centred on the 
unemployment and lower incomes while markets adjust, and on the reduced 
public spending which tends to remove any remaining "safety net" for the 
poor. The removal of subsidies has been an explicit element of Wbrld Hank 
policy: Bank public sector projects are expected to generate revenues which 
allow financial autonomy (Meerman 1983). The impact of adjustment policies 
has likely been hardest on urban waged workers because of the erosion of 
their purchasing power and the fact that urban populations have been the 
main beneficiaries of subsidized government services, but Cornia at al 
(1987) warned that all the poor could be affected. 
Although the truly subsistence economy is rare (Jolly 1988), rural 
farmers, generally the poorest classes in Africa, may be the best insulated 
from government policy due to their subsistence and barter economy, and may 
even benefit from higher prices for export crops (UNICEF 1990), but the 
shift to cash crops may also leave the farmer at the mercy of market prices 
for the household's nutrition (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988. ) In Zaire the 
traditional land surplus has been eaten away by population growth and the 
increased production of market crops (Cornell 1989), and in Kenya 
smallholders were considered vulnerable because of insufficient food 
production, and inadequate purchasing power (Wasonga 1988). 
There is some evidence of structural adjustment's direct impact on 
household health and welfare. Falls in income, rises in food and fuel 
prices, and cuts in government services have been associated with increased 
rates of malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa, and infant mortality rates 
declined in the 1980s less slowly than previously (Cornia 1989). Life 
expectancy declined in nine sub-Saharan African countries between 1979 and 
1983 (World Bank 1989). Food comprises the largest budget component of the 
poor, and the price elasticity of demand for nutritionally high quality 
foods such as rice is rauch higher for poor than better-off population 
groups. Declines in calorie consumption have been documented in countries 
including Uganda, where the number of minimum wages needed to purchase 
minimum calorie requirements went from 0.6 to 4.5 from 1972 to 1984 
(Pinstrup-Andersen 1988). 
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Reduced access to government health services in some developing 
countries has also been identified as a cause of declining health 
indicators. Low per capita incomes and correspondingly low revenue bases 
yield inadequate recurrent budgets, so many governments were unable to 
provide essential services to more than a small minority of their 
population. Abel-Smith (1986) concluded that most African countries 
experienced moderate decreases in real per capita government expenditure 
on health from 1979 to 1985, and that the shortage of funds seriously 
disrupted services in many countries. Average per capita total private and 
public expenditure on health in 1981/82 in low income countries (most of 
which are in Africa) weis only US $8.84, compared to $30.93 for middle- 
income countries and $670 for industrialized countries (World Bank 1987. ) 
In general, countries with per capita GDPs higher than the median of $350 
increased their budget share going to health, and those below decreased it 
(UNICEF 1990). 
As health budgets have declined, the efficiency of investment in 
facilities and the quantity and the quality of services have suffered due 
to decreases in the real value of health workers' salaries, reduction of 
budgets for fuel and vehicle maintenance that limit the ability to reach 
rural areas, reduced maintenance of physical plant, and cuts in drug 
budgets leading to shortages, ineffective treatment and decreased demand 
for services (UNICEF 1990). The gap between what is now spent on health 
care in LDCs and what is required to meet the estimated needs and make 
efficient use of resources was estimated in 1984 at US$50 billion, and the 
estimated cost of full primary care coverage at $15 per capita, versus the 
average $2.30 spent on PHC by governments in less developed countries 
(Jiminez 1987). 
Health sector financing options in the face of shortfalls in 
government revenues can be classed as public or quasi-public, or private 
(Zschock 1979). This is irrespective of whether the actual provider of 
services is the private or the public sector; this choice is largely based 
on historical precedent, demand for, and the ability of the sectors to 
supply, different kinds of services, and the relative efficiency of the two 
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sectors We Ferranti 1984). Whether health care should be financed through 
private or public resources involves questions of how effectively the 
resources can be mobilized, of equity, and of allocative efficiency. A 
further, non-exclusive, option is to increase the efficiency with which 
existing resources are utilized, although it has been observed that 
significant additional resources may be required to accomplish this (Gray 
1986). 
2.3.1 Public and quasi-public financing 
Options for public and quasi-public funding sources include taxation, 
external donor assistance, and social insurance schemes. Sources of 
general revenue in developing countries are often narrowly based, 
consisting largely of indirect taxes such as import and export duties. 
Receipts from direct taxes are typically low in sub-Saharan Africa (Mills 
1983), as are other sources of revenue such as sales tax revenues, 
lotteries and betting. De Ferranti (1985) concluded that, given the 
general pressure on government budgets, there is little chance of 
mobilizing additional public resources for health from outside the health 
sector. Donor assistance is constrained by political and economic factors 
and is unlikely to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. 
Further, few donor agencies like to finance recurrent costs, and much 
multilateral and bilateral aid comes in the form of technical assistance 
rather than hard currency, or is earmarked for highly visible capital 
projects (Mills and Gilson 1988), or specific interventions such as oral 
rehydration therapy and immunization, in selected countries which 
demonstrate need (REACH 1989; Brenzel 1987). Social insurance, which 
usually provides the benefits associated with risk-sharing and prepayment, 
is a quasi-public method of financing through a tax on workers' salaries 
and wages. Can= in Latin America, it is unusual in sub-Saharan Africa 
due to the smell size of the waged sector. 
2.3.2 Private and cmammity financing 
Institutions capable of influencing policy in developing countries, 
notably the World Hank and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), have thrown their support to shifting the balance of 
financial responsibility for individual health care to private sources, 
with governments to assume final responsibility for indigents, public 
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health canpaigns, and various regulatory functions (Hoare and Mills 1986). 
Wbile a significant amount of health care is financed through private 
charitable contributions, in sub-Saharan Africa at this time private 
financing means in effect considering whether households should pay 
directly for services, and if so, what form such payments should take We 
Ferranti 1985). 
Partly in response to the PHC themes of self-help, utilizing local 
resources, and developing affordable and culturally appropriate delivery 
systems, governments and organizations have turned to conmanities to help 
support health services. Community participation can include financing 
through personal service fees, drug sales, pre-payment, labour 
contribution, or ad hoc contributions and fund-raising (Stinson 1982). 
Hoare (1987) and de Ferranti (1985) agreed that in the end it is the 
household or individual that mast finance whatever services are provided; 
the community as a whole participates by finding solutions to problems 
which arise. Depending on the traditional form of social organization, a 
village health development committee may be the appropriate focus of 
decision making (Isely and Martin 1977). 
Opponents of private payments for health care often refer to an 
ideological commitment to free health care as a basic human right which 
therefore should be provided by the state, and until the economic crisis 
many developing countries held this view strongly and tried to remove or 
reduce charges at public facilities. In contrast, Barr (1987) found the 
view that basic rights should be provided by the state to be illogical, 
observing that food is equally a basic human right which is provided well 
enough by the private sector; poverty may Justify cash transfers but is not 
generally a Justification for public provision of services. Considering 
the practical problems, Reddin (1987) concluded that both taxation and user 
charges can be progressive, but favoured providing free or low-cost 
services for all, financed by selective taxation, as having greater promise 
of fair and efficient allocation of resources than the alternative of 
selectively subsidising low-income groups through discriminatory pricing. 
Vogel (1988) concluded that optimal policy would require both Income 
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redistribution gjXj discriminatory pricing, at some acceptable level of 
administrative cost. 
The theoretical foundation of the call for user charges by some 
economists is the view that government provision of free (zero-priced) 
health care harms personal welfare because government intervenes in the 
basically efficient distributional process of the market. Maximum 
efficiency in resource allocation will be achieved when goods and services 
are priced at the marginal cost of providing them. When external benefits 
are involved, the good or service should be consumed when its benefit to 
the individual plus its benefit to others are at least as large as those 
which could be produced alternatively with the same resources (Akin 1986). 
it is argued that individual and societal benefits would arise as user fees 
a) raise revenues for expanding and inproving services, particularly PHC, 
redirecting existing demand for expensive private services toward possibly 
more effective government health services; b) promote by means of 
differential pricing more efficient use of services by discouraging 
unnecessary use of expensive, higher level care; c) encourage more 
efficient provider behaviour as patients signal their cost-sensitivity; and 
d) promote the develops nt of insurance since without charges there is no 
incentive for patients to insure themselves. Noting that user charges have 
been reintroduced or extended in many industrialized countries, de Ferranti 
(1984) questioned how poor countries can provide free services when rich 
countries cannot afford to do so. 
Opponents of user charges say that many individuals in poor countries 
do not have the financial means to pay the cost of services and that the 
poor may decrease utilization of health services, to their own detriment 
and the entire population (Sorkin 1986). Some believe that fees may also 
introduce inappropriate provider incentives, encouraging unnecessary 
interventions. The complexity of planning and managing fee systems may 
place great demands on already under-resourced public health systems, and 
the net level of costs recovered may be insufficient to permit service 
improvements (Gilson 1988). 
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter, demand for a good can be 
thought of as a function of willingness to pay and ability to pay. Given 
that increased public spending on health services is unlikely, the argument 
for instituting selective charges for government health services is founded 
on economic theory and empirical evidence that individuals are generally 
willing and able to pay for private benefits. This evidence is reviewed 
in this section. 
The traditional theory of demand for health (Wagstaff 1986) follows 
neoclassical consumer theory, making explicit the relationships between 
consumer preferences for health versus other consumption, prices of health 
inputs, the production function for health from health inputs, and income. 
It predicts that the rational demander will increase consumption of a 
commodity until its marginal benefit is equal to its marginal cost, and 
that an increase in the price of health inputs should lead to a deteriora- 
tion in health status. The policy implication is that unrestricted free 
provision of health care to all, although equitable, will be inefficient 
in its allocation of resources by encouraging consumption up to the level 
at which the marginal utility to the consumer is zero. Akin (1986) 
identified the opportunity cost of seeking treatment as the fundamental 
determinant of how consumers allocate household income between health care 
and competing uses. Opportunity cost is the sun of the prices paid to get 
to the medical facility, to use the facility, and to buy any medicines 
required for treatment. All these prices have a direct money cost 
component and an indirect cost in terms of time. 
Models which assume differing degrees of consumers' knowledge and 
ability to make choices about the consumption of health inputs lead to 
different conclusions about the equity and efficiency of providing 'free' 
health care. The 'human capital' model of Grossman (1972) assumes 
consumers have perfect knowledge of their own state of health, its rate of 
depreciation and the production function, and make investment decisions 
which in effect choose their lifespans. The paradigm of a rational 
utility-maximizing consumer may be inappropriate for the health care 
market, however. Apart from the existence of consumption externalities, 
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the consumr's knowledge of his actual state of health and the effects of 
alternative treatments is likely to be imperfect: in practice demand is 
often generated by the provider rather than the consumer. 
The model of Phelps and Newhouse (1974) predicts that money price 
changes in the cost of care influence the quantity of care demanded, with 
time price effects also relevant. A reduction in the cost of care at the 
time of purchase (e. g., by public subsidy) will increase demand beyond the 
level that would be efficient in a pure market, requiring the rationing of 
supply. This theory therefore appears to support the call for user charges 
on efficiency grounds. 
To set prices and exemption levels objectively, the functional 
relationships between the amount and source of health care consumed by a 
given individual should ideally be known with respect to (1) the 
individual's attributes such as age, sex, income, education, beliefs, (2) 
the provider's attributes as perceived by the consumer such as quality, 
price, distance from home, (3) the price of alternative providers or modes 
of treatment, and (4) environmental variables such as the season and 
cultural norms. These are most often described in terms of demand 
elasticity. The application of pricing principles would seem to be 
providentially easy once these elasticities are known. For example, 
Shepard and Benjamin (1988) stated that if demand is price-elastic, low 
prices can be used to encourage especially beneficial services and 
discourage less inportant ones. Where price elasticity of demand is low, 
user fees could be applied to all services, generating revenues without 
affecting utilization. Yet, for reasons to be described, enQirical studies 
showing low price elasticity have not completely convinced those who advise 
caution in implementing user charges in developing countries. 
2.6.1 Cash price effects 
Data from the industrialized world have been used to suggest what the 
situation might be in less developed countries. Maynard (1979) concluded 
from developed country health service data that as prices rise the demand 
for the good or service priced decreases; the demand for substitute types 
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of medical care whose prices are unaltered rises; and the level of demand 
of lower socio-economic groups decreases. 
Estimates of price elasticity in the U. K. suggested that the more 
urgent the event the less elastic the demand, with elasticity for hospital 
admissions in the range of -0.03 to -0.5, for short-term admissions of - 
0.63, for dental visits of -1.43, (Roberts 1989), and for NHS prescriptions 
of from -0.1 to -0.2 (Birch 1986). In industrialized countries income 
elasticity of demand for individuals has been estimated at from 0.1 to 0.45 
(Roberts 1989), and close to 1.0 for aggregate national spending. 
The relevance of this type of study even in developed countries has 
been questioned: Ryan and Birch (1988) found most studies of price 
elasticity failed to clarify the concept of demand where care is provided 
free or is highly subsidized and where demand is different from utilization 
because the provider and consumer do not agree about at level of care is 
required. Roberts (1989) observed that few studies actually observed price 
changes and other variables which may affect demand, and suggested that the 
inelasticity seen reflects the effect of provider-induced dem". 
Most developing country studies have used household survey data in 
multiple regression models of demand. While not all studies agree, most 
confirm a fairly low cash price elasticity of denand for outpatient care. 
At public clinics in Malaysia (Heller 1982) it was estimated at -0.15, and 
for infant deliveries in the Philippines all =nay price effects were found 
to be in the inelastic range (Schwartz et al 1987). Kirigia et al (1989) 
found that demand weis "fairly inelastic" with respect to prices at both 
government and mission hospitals in Kenya. 
Later studies tried to incorporate income effects, since logic 
suggests that prices should have different effects on rich and poor. 
Heller (1982) found in Malaysia and Bitran (1988a) found in the Dominican 
Republic that higher income households were pes, more likely to purchase 
modern health care over traditional, and only a small positive association 
was found in the Philippines by Akin et al (1985). Schwartz et al (1987) 
found low income elasticity for deliveries. But income elasticity of 
denand for medical care in Indonesia was estimated at a relatively high 0.7 
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(Chernichovsky and Meesook 1986), with the authors concluding that low per 
capita income might be a barrier to access. Musgrove (1983) found income 
elasticity in Latin America to be high (average 1.17), with private care 
purchased only by high income households. Gertler et al (1987) used an 
innovative econometric technique with survey data from urban Peru, and 
found that demand became less price elastic as income rose, inplying that 
user fees would reduce the access to care proportionally more for the poor 
than for the rich. Similar effects were found in Cote d'ivoire, with price 
elasticities for clinic, hospital, and private doctor demand found to 
increase with decreasing income. Price elasticities in the higher price 
ranges approached -1.0 for the lowest income quartile in Peru (Gertler and 
van der Geag 1989), and in Cote d'Ivoire price elasticities for the lowest 
income quartile were two to three times higher than for the highest 
quartile (Dor et al 1987). However, Shepard et al (1987) found price 
elasticity to be low (-0.3) for the lowest income group at a price level 
close to the full cost of medications for aabulatory treatment at 
government clinics in Rwanda. The conflicting results of some of these 
studies demonstrate that price elasticity is strongly affected by both 
income levels and the price range under consideration, making it difficult 
to generalize about price effects. 
The price of alternatives is also an important determinant of demand. 
High cross-elasticity of demand for government services due to changes in 
private prices w®s found in Malaysia (Heller 1982). For adult outpatient 
care in the Philippines Akin at al (1986) found no important cross-price 
effects for public facilities, but higher drug prices in pharmacies 
increased the probability of using modern practitioners. 
in some cultures health facilities are thought to be of low quality 
if they do not charge a price. This was found in the Ivory Coast, where 
moat respondents said they felt better cared for if they paid money Masker 
1981), and for mobile health teams and mission services in Zaire (Akin at 
al 1985). In Tanzania people seemed to value drugs they paid for at 
mission hospitals over those received free at government facilities (WHO 
1988c), and in Sierra Leone compliance with TB treatment inproved after a 
small charge was instituted in mission hospitals for drugs which government 
had required to be given free (personal communication). In the 
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Philippines, methods sold at very low prices were apparently viewed with 
suspicion by purchasers, but once that price reached a 'sufficient' level, 
the behaviour was as predicted by price theory (Lewis 1986). 
2.6.2 Time and travel price effects 
An early study in Cate d'Ivoire concluded that accessibility was a 
major determinant of utilization of modern health services (Lasker 1981). 
Akin et al (1981) found in the Philippines that waiting time and distance 
costs strongly affected relative demand for child health services, but Akin 
et al (1985) changed this conclusion, finding that up to a rather high 
threshold, travel distances and costs were less of an obstacle than 
commonly thought, and suggested that waiting time often has a Mitive 
impact on use since a long queue may connote a high quality service. 
Griffin (1987) dismissed the effects of time and distance on demand, 
concluding that they are generally smaller than expected and more sensitive 
to local conditions than price. This conflicts with many findings, e. g., 
time price elasticities for clinic demand in Cote d'Ivoire exhibited a 
range from -0.29 to -1.49 over the range of zero to two hours travel time, 
which would be well under Akin's threshold (Dor et al 1987). A non-linear 
effect wes found in Swaziland, where it appeared that there was a threshold 
at 1.5 to 2 hours travel time, beyond which the costs of obtaining health 
care exceeded the benefits for most patients (Yoder and Herman 1985). The 
conflicting findings of studies not controlled for income were explained 
by Mwabu (1989) : time price elasticity declines with decreasing income, but 
money price elasticity increases. Because the opportunity cost of time 
rises along with income, when time costs are present, the positive 
influence of income on demand is overcome by the increasing negative 
effects of the time price as income rises. This is somewhat at odds with 
the finding of Gertler and van der Gaag (1989) in Peru and Cote d'Ivoire 
that the money-poor are also time-poor, suggesting that access is most 
improved by increasing the supply of facilities in poor areas. 
Clearly, cash price and incomes alone do not account for results such 
as Mwabu's (1986), who found in rural Kenya where there were several 
choices of providers that patients went first to free goverment clinics 
only 31% of the time. Quality, or users' perception of quality, is another 
determinant of utilization (Akin at al 1985), but has been the subject of 
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few studies because its nneasurenent is difficult in comparison to other 
factors. Perceived quality may be correlated with price (Bitran 1988a), 
results obtained (Mwabu 1986), staff attitudes, waiting time, or the 
availability of drugs (UNICEF 1989). Findings indicate that quality is 
moat likely to influence utilization when the user is wealthy and price is 
less important in determining demand, when the choice of provider is 
determined by illness-causation beliefs, when all options are cash-priced 
and equally accessible, and when the user knows from experience that there 
are substantial differences between available providers (Gilson 1988). 
2.6.3 Tilly elasticity studies are ix xnclusive 
wile some developing country demand studies found low price 
elasticity, they either failed to consider all relevant factors simul- 
taneously or did not distinguish between different price ranges as would 
be necessary when considering the effect of PHC costs, which are usually 
lower than hospital costs. The interplay of many factors makes it 
dangerous to apply general conclusions to particular cases. Griffin (1987) 
noted that none of the demand studies reviewed by him refer to actual field 
experiments in which user fees were introduced and their effects studied: 
"all are conputer exercises... which make deductions based on cross- 
sectional canQarisons among a saugle of households. " Deaton (1988) warned 
that using cross-sectional data for estimating price elasticities requires 
careful technique and advanced methods, and Bitran (1988c) criticized 
aspects of nearly every published demand study, including the appropriate- 
ness of definitions of important variables, the lack of price variation, 
inconsistency of the demand equations with economic theory, and the fact 
that many surveys were not designed for the specific goals of the study. 
He also critiqued the econometric models of Gertler and colleagues at the 
World Bank, which in the absence of user fees or using very low fee levels, 
used travel time to represent private costs. Shepard et al (1987) cited 
the inability to isolate the effect of the perceived different quality of 
services at various clinics as a possible source of error in their study. 
Shepard and Benjamin (1988) criticized demand studies simply because 
their results conflict. Since about half the reviewed studies indicated 
a price effect and half did not, they speculated that price matters more 
in low income populations, and that the effect may be culture-specific. 
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Helminiak and Andreano (1987) explained differences in estimated demand 
elasticities by the differential impact of many factors on groups having 
different degrees of poverty, ill health, and health perceptions in 
different areas, with resultant varying inpacts on demand, which will also 
vary through different price ranges. 
2.7.1 Aggregate dmo d 
mile purchasing power may be low, willingness and ability to pay for 
health is demonstrated by paying for traditional medicine and Western 
medicines of questionable value. Demand for modern care may be frustrated 
by shortage of supply, and people will pay for it if it is available and 
perceived as superior to traditional medicine (Carrin 1986a). 
Justification for user charges for government health services has been 
derived in this way from data showing that most people now pay for a large 
proportion of their health care either directly or indirectly. Shepard and 
Benjamin (1988) found that household spending on health averages 2.5% to 
3.0% of household expenditures in low and lower-middle income countries. 
Private expenditures account for 15% to 55% of total national health 
expenditure in sub-Saharan African countries (Carrin 1986a), and Diarra and 
Coulibaly (1990) estimated that households paid 74% of overall recurrent 
health costs in Mali. 
2.7.2 Psaspectivs willimness-to"-pay (WI) questions. 
Another way of assessing demand is to ask people how much they would 
be willing to pay for a particular service. This prospective type of 
questioning works well for services such as potable water, where 
consumption is regular and predictable, but it has been judged unreliable 
for health care, which tends to be of an emergency nature (Birdsall and 
Chuhan 1987). Prospective questioning wes seen as less desirable than the 
actual observation of utilization and expenditures in health care since 
intent and action often diverge (Lewis 1987). While some studies have 
yielded results that seem reasonable, on balance information obtained from 
hypothetical questions is unconvincing. A study in Rwanda found 76% of 
low-income families willing to pay for a pre-payment card which would 
entitle them to a 50% discount at the local clinic (Shepard et al 1987), 
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but this strains credibility since the amount for which such high 
willingness to pay was expressed was equivalent to 71% of mean annual per 
capita cash income. For full coverage in Niger, 63% of households 
expressed willingness to pay more than FCFA 500, with the rate decreasing 
with socioeconomic status (Tulane 1987). This seem reasonable, as the 
amount represents approximately 1% to 2% of average per capita income. 
Eipirical evidence of W1P also comes from Gertler and van der Gaag (1989), 
who derived independently from Peru and Cote d'ivoire data that people will 
pay up to 2 to 5 percent of their non-food budget for medical care, but are 
unwilling to pay more. This is roughly equal to 0.5% to 1.5% of total 
expenditures for poorer households. 
2.7.3 Other retrospective studies. 
Some researchers have justified charges for health care in poorer 
countries on grounds that most households have same discretionary income. 
Birdsall et al (1986) reasoned that because 40% of household expenditure 
in rural Mali was for social activities, durable goods, and loans to 
others, households should be able to afford 5% of their total expenditures 
for recurrent costs of health and water projects. Households with cash 
insane expressed greater willingness to pay for services, but the authors 
felt this to be an unreliable indicator because of large annual variations 
in income. 
Assumptions about an entire population's ability to pay based on mean 
income data can be seriously in error. For a hypothetical country with an 
average annual per capita income of $200,60% of the population would have 
an income below $200, and the lowest 20% would have a total income of only 
$60, with perhaps only $15 of this in cash (WHO 1988c). In the sam 
district in Mali where Birdsall et al (1986) found evidence of ability to 
pay based on average income and expenditures, in a year of poor harvests 
the mean cost of care per episode of illness represented 8.5% of average 
per capita income, but because of the skewed income distribution it was 
47.3% of the an per capita income. A significant percentage of all 
families had zero cash income and a large majority of families claimed to 
have difficulties financing their health care (Carrin et al 1988). A study 
in Senegal (WHO/DAP 1991a) demonstrated the contrast between overall and 
individual WI? by the fact that 66% of households bought the total of what 
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was prescribed at public clinics at an average cost of US$ 9.00, but 16% 
of prescriptions were not filled within three days and 36% did not buy all 
the prescribed drugs. Fewer than half the patients said they would be able 
to spend more than US$ 1.75 and only 23% more than US$ 3.50. 
Gilson (1988) observed that the population's willingness to pay for 
private health services in rural areas reflects the lack of government 
provision and the greater acceptability of the other services, but in 
neither case can it be assumed to reflect ability to pay, except for the 
wealthy. Striking evidence of apparent ability to pay cones from Zaire, 
where health zones establish fees independently and a high percentage of 
costs are recovered. Yet Bitran (1988b) found in two zones where 
collection of fees was rigorous that about one-third fewer lower-income 
households sought care outside the home than middle and high income 
households. Health center fees were significant conpared to incases 
(nearly 5% of annual per capita income) and while the proportion of health 
center patients who did not pay the full price of the services received was 
negligible, Bitran (1988d) implied that the interpretation of WI? data 
seems to depend heavily on the observer's predisposition toward user 
charges, cautioning that, 
"this should not necessarily be interpreted to man that all zone 
residents are willing and able to pay for services... health centers 
may get a biased sannple of patients, namely those who can pay for 
their care... others may not be willing or able to pay and either 
go without care or seek cheaper forms of treatment. " 
2.7.4 Longitudinal utilization studies 
Mile most studies of demand elasticity have relied on cross- 
sectional data, evidence of actual changes in utilization requires 
longitudinal data covering a period before and after the introduction of 
user charges, but studies of this nature are rare. Even when such data is 
available, the following examples demonstrate that pure price effects 
Any be difficult to interpret correctly because of the effect of quality 
changes and external factors, and counter-examples can often be found. 
In Ghana, utilization of government clinics dropped 
sharply after fees were raised (Waddington and Enyimayew 
1989). However, former levels were regained in urban areas 
after a year, and utilization of mission hospitals increased, 
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suggesting to the authors that consumers rated perceived 
quality of care even higher than cost as an element of the 
decision-waking process. 
A drop in curative care episodes correlated with an 
increase in fees wes reported in Zaire We Bethune et al 
1989), but the longitudinal data presented can also be 
interpreted as MQ showing any drop in utilization until the 
fourth year of price rises, when the increase was the 
sharpest. 
In Swaziland, a-nationwide fee increase was followed by 
a drop in utilization averaging 17%, and visits for important 
preventive and curative services showed higher than average 
decreases (Yoder 1989). The authors noted almost 
parenthetically that the price increase studied weis a drastic 
one-time rise of 300% (Yoder and Herman 1985). In the poorest 
region of Mali, fees were raised oradualiv over three years 
from 50 FC FA to 300 F(A and utilization rates increased 
(Mandl and Ofosu-Amaah 1988). 
In Mozambique, utilization of health services dropped by 
two-thirds after drug fees were raised to a level that covered 
costs plus a 70% markup (Kanji 1989). Drastic events were 
occurring in Mozambique at the same time as the price 
increases, including massive displacement of rural popula- 
tions, declines in agricultural production, and a tenfold 
devaluation of the currency, making it difficult to 
substantiate that the drop in utilization was due directly to 
the price increase. 
A fall of about 25% in outpatient visits was found in 
Kenya during the first month of cost-sharing, but there was no 
decline in inpatient admissions or utilization of free 
preventive services (REACH 1990). However, the authors could 
not explain these results, and recommended a household survey 
to include data on non-users. 
On the other hand, patient attendance increased dramatically in 
Guinea and Zaire after the inception of essential drugs progranmes which 
introduced charges but increased the supply of drugs and introduced charges 
(Jarrett and Of(xsu-Ansah 1992), demonstrating the effect of an inprovement 
in quality. It has also been suggested that the decrease in utilization 
in some countries after fees were introduced was a result of inadequate 
planning and public education (United Nations 1990). 
2.7.5 Demand fcK aedicines 
Drugs play a central role in cost recovery: not only is the adequate 
supply of medicines in government facilities a major criterion by which 
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quality of services is judged, but the availability of drugs for self- 
treatment on the private market is an important alternative to medical 
treatment. 
Drugs constitute a major component of recurrent costs and have been 
the focus of cost recovery efforts in many trials of user charges because 
of their financial significance, their importance in PHC, and people's high 
willingness to pay for them. A great but often irrational (by Western 
standards) demand for medicines is common to nearly all societies (Hall 
1986; Fabricant and Hirschhorn 1987). The demand for drugs and 
pharmaceuticals tends to be price-insensitive in developing countries. 
Litvack (1988) found high utilization of private pharmacies in rural health 
zones of Zaire. Since these are usually more expensive than health 
centers, it suggested that many people who do not attend health centres are 
willing and able to raise the resources required for health care, and that 
adequate drug supply is a more important factor in determining utilization 
than price. Use of government facilities in Nigeria decreased one-half to 
one-quarter when drugs were unavailable (Sokoto State 1988). 
Expenditure on drugs among the poor ranged from 0.7% to 1.6% of 
household expenditures in five countries (Mills and Walker 1983), but the 
low purchasing power of low income groups in poor countries makes them more 
dependent on government supplies which are usually inadequate (Hall 1986). 
Where this is the case the sick purchase drugs from private sellers, often 
for inappropriate and wasteful self-medication. Weekly family expenditure 
on drugs from pharmacies in two Brazilian villages ranged from a third to 
a full day of an individual's wages (Haak 1988), and prescriptions for 
Zairean workers without benefits (generally the poorest workers) often cost 
more than half a month's salary (Guimier 1988). 
Even when people are apparently able to pay relatively large amounts 
for drugs, it may be with considerable difficulty. Carrin (1986b) found 
that 99% of prescriptions written were filled in a community pharmacy 
project in Chad where full cost price of drugs was charged, but they cost 
from 0.6% to 116% of annual per capita income of the poorest farmers. In 
Nigeria many patients failed to fill prescriptions at a teaching hospital, 
apparently because of price: for prescriptions costing from 1 to 9 naira 
40 
(1 naira - US$ 1) the default rate was 17%, rising to 78% for prescriptions 
costing over 20 naira (Isenalunbe and Oviawe 1988). 
Equity (the quality of being equal or fair) in health care can be 
defined on levels which range from the conceptual to practical indicators. 
Mooney (1983) offered a hierarchy of ways to judge equity, starting with 
the indicator of equal expenditure per capita, progressing to the ideal of 
equal health status. Expenditure per person needing assistance may be the 
best measure of equity in spending, but this may be distorted by 
differences in efficiency (Musgrove 1986b). Gilson (1988) favoured equal 
utilization for equal need as a definition which incorporates equity 
between, as well as within, population groups. 
The debate over user charges centres around the apparently necessary 
tradeoff between efficiency goals and equity goals. Equity and efficiency 
are valued differently by societies, and therefore the goal can influence 
the mode of financing which is adopted (Brenzel 1987), and equity is itself 
a relative and subjective term. The various factors which contribute to 
health status meat be examined in relation to different sections of 
society, with the term 'horizontal' equity being used to describe equity 
between geographical areas or any groups with same common characteristics, 
and 'vertical' equity for equity between unlike socio-economic groups. 
Achieving equity through such methods as discriminatory pricing implies 
cross-subsidization of the poor by those better-off, which might not be 
acceptable to the community. Rather than imposing external equity 
standards on a community in the process of planning, more not be known 
about how the comwnity understands the concept. Carrin (1986) recommended 
that a community's own notions of equity should be taken into account in 
planning any community financing scheme, and the pitfalls in allowing 
economists alone to make decisions about setting health priorities in 
general were discussed by Green and Harker (1988). 
It is argued that user fees can promote equity rather than reduce it. 
Jiminez (1987) noted that financing "free" services through taxation is 
inequitable because most taxation schemes are regressive. However, he 
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presented data that showed that while most health subsidies go to the most 
costly (i. e., urban) services, subsidies by income group are closer to 
neutral. In countries where taxation is neutral in effect, or in the case 
of sub-Saharan Africa where central taxation barely touches rural 
communities, cross-subsidization of communities and individuals becomes the 
practical equity issue. Miller (1989) applied the cross-subsidy criterion 
to a study of effects on equity of user fees for preventive and curative 
care in Benin, where fees for curative services were used to finance 
preventive services. She found that vertical equity was possible to 
achieve without discriminatory pricing, but only if the lower group made 
relatively more use of preventive services than the higher group. 
Birdsall (1986) proposed that even if reducing subsidies means 
excluding some of the needy, user fees produce greater equity by allowing 
an expansion of the system as a whole, particularly those parts which are 
likely to serve large numbers of the poor. Mwabu and Mwangi (1986) found 
in Kenya that lower income households would gain proportionally more than 
higher income households if fees were charged and used to improve quality 
of services, provided the poorest households were exempted from fees. 
According to Shepard at al (1987), charging fees for drugs would also 
create equity between facilities that do and do not have drugs regularly 
available, and among patients who may or may not find needed drugs in 
stock. But the inherent inequity of having the sick, who are likely to be 
very willing to pay but also the least able, support the cost of a fee-for- 
service system was discussed by Brudon-Jakobowicz (1989). 
2.9 Pricing and MM=tior : NoWleeces with cost iý *y 
Despite conflicting evidence about the equity effects of user 
charges, by the end of the 1980's the World Bank's theorists and USAID and 
(14ICa+' field officers were reassuring policy makers in developing 
countries, advising them to proceed, but cautiously, with user charges: 
"The effects of price, income, and quality yield theoretical 
results that are unequivocably positive, if the improved 
quality causes outward shifts of the demand curve that are 
greater than the possibly lower income and higher price 
effects. (Birdsall 1987) 
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"User charges have a potential contribution to improving the 
financial base of the health sector. They also deter those 
people whose health needs are the greatest. Carefully 
discriminating fee systens are therefore necessary to ensure 
that revenue is provided only by those who can afford to pay, 
and that resulting income improves the quality and 
accessibility of health care targeted at the poor. (Creese 
1990) 
Undeterred by pleas that not enough was known about the specific 
effects of user charges, especially on equity (Gilson 1988), and despite 
evidence that the maximum proportion of costs generated by cost recovery 
in sub-Saharan African countries to date was only 12% (Vogel 1989) and was 
unlikely to exceed 20 to 25% in the next decades (Russell and Reynolds 
1985; Hoare and Mills 1986), donor agencies and national governments 
proceeded to experiment with user charges. It was argued that equity could 
be achieved through discriminatory pricing, and revenue levels such as the 
10% to 22% potential estimated for Kenya by Ellis (1987) were considered 
by some governments to be significant for their revenue value alone. By 
the late 1980's, many of these experiences had been documented, leading to 
tentative general principles of pricing, e. g., as outlined by Ellis: 
1. Fees should be consistent with patients' ability to pay, 
and should maintain access to health care. 
2. Fees should direct health care utilization in appropriate 
directions, i. e., away from inpatient treatment when outpatient 
treatment would be adequate. 
3. The revenue from fees should be used to improve the quality of 
health services provided. 
4. No fees should be charged for services with strong 'public good' 
characteristics. 
5. Limits should be placed on total out-of-pocket expenses for 
patients. 
6. A system of forgiving fees from those absolutely unable to pay 
them should be established. 
There has been general agreement on the criteria for types of health 
services to price, including social objectives and alternatives for 
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treatment in the private sector. Services most suitable are general 
outpatient services for ill patients at clinic and village level, inpatient 
services, urban water supply, and drug sales to individuals (except for 
preventive care). This latter group of services accounts for the largest 
share of total health expenditure, anounting to 50-80% in many countries 
(de Ferranti 1985). 
Most analysts agreed that it is irrational and inefficient p to 
begin recovering costs in urban areas. For example Stevens (1984) argued 
that in Kenya most rural health services are 'public goods', that even for 
curative care there is low ability and willingness to pay, and that high 
administrative costs would make it not worth the trouble. In Thailand, of 
those defined as poor by the official criterion, 841 lived in rural areas, 
or 93% in the case of those falling into the category of absolute poverty 
(Mills 1991). Bennett (1989) criticized starting cost recovery for drugs 
at co munity level while mid-level and tertiary level care remain free, but 
Crease (1990) questioned if it is realistic in poor countries to expect a 
transfer away of revenue collected from the hospitals which yield the bulk 
of the income, for quality inproveiaents to the PHC system. 
2.10.1 Prom M -I 
Abel-Smith (1989) found that all proposed fee-for-service schedules 
in Kenya would be unaffordable to much of the population, and suggested 
that prepayment by as many as possible would be preferable to trying to 
find a way of exenpting the poor once illness had already struck. Same 
evidence of acceptability of prepayment in sub-Saharan Africa does exist: 
a majority of urban and rural dwellers in Niger expressed willingness to 
peke annual payments for health (Tulane 1987), and actual systems have been 
implemented in Guinea-Bissau (Chabot 1989), and in Zaire (Carrin 1988). 
2.10.2 Fees for preventive and ancillary services 
Descriptions of efforts to apply cost recovery to non-curative 
services are rare, but an exception to the conventional wisdom that there 
is willingness to pay only for curative care comes from Zaire where Vian 
(1989) found that price did not influence enrollment in a well-baby 
programae. Rekele and Lewis (1986) compared cost recovery in several 
innovative trials in the Sudan. Quasi-public pharmacies, hospital visitor 
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charges, more convenient or luxurious hospital and clinic services, taxes 
on bus and cinema tickets, and improvements in hospital management, all 
generated more revenue than their costs and did not adversely affect 
utilization. Food cost containment generated the greatest revenue, 
followed by hospital visitor fees and a bus fare surcharge. Foster (1988) 
estimated the potential savings from improved management of drug supplies 
to be a large percentage of the cost of the drugs, emphasizing that such 
cost containment measures must be implemented before user fees. These 
examples illustrate the potential for achieving higher rates of cost 
recovery without necessarily burdening the poor and the sick. 
Pricing health services for cost-recovery has usually been done 
either by pricing to recover the cost of providing certain components of 
the service, or by guessing at a price level the conninity could support. 
As explained in Chapter 1, the information needed in order to apply any 
more sophisticated methods of establishing prices is rarely available. 
Mile a two-part tariff comprising a fixed annual charge and a marginal 
price per unit of service purchased (as required under most insurance 
schemes) is widely held to offer the potential for balancing equity and 
efficiency (Feldstein 1972), only fee-for-service pricing is reviewed here 
because of its predominance in PHC in sub-Saharan Africa at present. 
Vogel (1989) described pricing strategies in the context of their 
effect on social welfare through their relative efficiency. In contrast 
to the socially inefficient alternatives of adjusting supply to maximize 
profits, to lust break even, or to encourage consumption by overproduction, 
the socially Kd economically efficient supply level occurs when marginal 
cost of production equals average revenues, or price. This equates 
society's marginal valuation with marginal costs and a profit is generated 
which could be used to subsidize a pure public health good. 
The practical value of cost-based pricing was questioned by Musgrove 
(1986a), who observed that pricing generally does not determine supply in 
most public cost-recovery schemes, i. e., that fees are collected for the 
sake of generating revenue rather than to establish an optinelly efficient 
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equilibrium point. The price should take into account only the 
government's welfare function, which may include maximizing consultations 
as well as revenues. Maximizing this function subject to a budget 
constraint that includes the revenues generated requires that the price be 
set so the demand is inelastic. Concern only with revenue would require 
price elasticity to be set at -1, but equity concerns bring the optimal 
elasticity closer to zero and lowers the optimum price. Griffin (1987) 
argued that a detailed understanding of costs is not a prerequisite for 
setting user charges: For private sellers, price setting is an iterative 
process in which costs merely represent the lowest point to which prices 
can be allowed to fall. Since governments have no intention of covering 
costs initially, there is no reason to be preoccupied with costs when 
getting started. Prices need not be exactly correct from the outset, and 
where services were previously free, almost any fee recovered will make a 
large difference in revenues. 
An optimal price schedule for,, consumers would take account of 
income distribution, but in a further stage of development would also 
consider the possibility of obtaining more revenue through price 
discrimination from those having higher incorg s, with most costs being 
recovered from the majority of patients who are neither rich nor poor 
(Vogel 1989). Musgrove (1986a) recommended fee discrimination in favour 
of those consumers for whom non-price costs are already highest, on a 
collective rather than an individual basis to reduce administrative costs. 
Fees should be lower in rural areas of widely dispersed population and 
higher in areas with good transport and relatively easy access, but bypass 
fees should be charged to reinforce the referral system. Gertler and van 
de Geag (1988) suggested that the regressive effects of introducing user 
fees can be avoided by setting fees at clinics in poorer villages at 
different levels than in richer villages. 
The theoretical analysis has been extended to the actual situation 
in many countries, i. e., where there are initial government subsidies but 
there may not be excess demand at zero price due to low quality. If fees 
are charged and quality is improved, demand for the services will increase 
and there will be an increase in visits over that demanded at zero price, 
for a net social gain. The conditions under which this can happen are that 
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elasticity of demand with respect to quality is positive and exceeds the 
negative price elasticity, and that marginal costs after improving quality 
do not increase more than the total revenues generated by increasing user 
fees. This was shown by Birdsall (1987) and Jiminez (1987), and is one of 
the theoretical underpinnings of the World Bank's policy. The practicality 
of this principle wes questioned by Gilson (1988), who noted that some 
governments have not demonstrated commitment to the idea of retaining fees 
at the facility level. Crease (1990) found no large-scale experiences to 
date of fees having been used to improve the quality and accessibility of 
services in a way that would compensate for the regressive effects of 
charges, and Vogel (1989) doubted whether the 25t of revenue retained by 
facilities in Ghana is a strong enough incentive to improve quality. 
2.11.1 Variations on fee-for-service 
Maikinn and Block (1986) found the option of prepayment too 
administratively conplex for comounity-level PHC in guinea, especially if 
co-payments were employed to increase efficiency. They detailed a 
hierarchy of practical options for pricing in a typical fee-for-service PHC 
cost-recovery system: The primary choice is payment per visit versus 
payment per episode. Next, for either choice it is possible to have 
separate or combined charges for consultation and medicine, involving 
tradeoffs between risk-sharing, overuse of some services, and complexity. 
For any of the preceding combinations, there is a further choice of single 
or complex fee schedules, i. e., based on the actual cost of treatmwt or 
a flat rate, all of which entail further tradeoffs. 
2.11.2 12omptiocs; a rd sliding scaled 
one of the objections raised to user charges is the practical 
difficulty of identifying those who truly cannot pay. Experiences from 
cost-recovery programmes illustrate different approaches to this problem. 
There is a general tendency to place a low estimate on the number of 
indigents, on the aaaunption that the poor in many instances can find the 
required money in an emergency. In a revolving fund in Nepal only 5% of 
patients gnade use of the Sick Fu-4 for the poor (MSH 1988). In a comtunity 
financing scheme in rural Brazil a sliding scale was established and 
allowances were made for those unable to pay, and postponement of payments 
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was allowed if a client did not qualify for an exemption. Only 0.4% of 
visits involved reductions or exemptions, but debts were not repaid for 
6.5% of visits, suggesting that this was closer to the exemption level that 
should have been allowed (PRICOR 1987). In Mali exemptions for up to 15% 
of consultations were allowed for indigents, children, and 'social 
illnesses' (Medicins Sans Frontieres 1988). An opposite philosophy was 
expressed in Kasongo (Zaire), where equal payments by all were seen as 
necessary to promote solidarity (Gilson 1991). 
In the Gambia, -it was noted that the appropriate standard of poverty 
is difficult to assess because it is not the earning power of the 
individual that is the issue, but their access to money in the extended 
family environment (CIPPA 1986). In Chan no exemptions were made for the 
poor since the extended family is expected to help out when necessary 
(Waddington and Enyimeyew 1989). Allowances for exemptions may have to 
vary with price level and with season. In Kenya Huber et al (1989) found 
few cases of inability to pay outpatient charges, but recces nded 
nonetheless that allowance should be made for households who cannot always 
pay because their income fluctuates, or where there are many episodes of 
illness or very costly treatments are required for certain acute and 
chronic conditions. Abel-Smith (1989) warned that high hospital fees in 
Kenya would either further impoverish the poor or would be uncollectible, 
and recommended setting the level for medical indigence higher than the 
official poverty level. In Zimbabwe, where the income level at which 
charges begin is set rather high (Z$150 monthly), the Impact of user fees 
on the cormunity is said to be minor (MM 1988c). 
Where the solidarity of the extended family or the community for 
aiding the poor cannot be assumed, either formal or informal exemption 
mechanisms any be used. Huber (1989) proposed a formal system of 
exemptions in Kenya which required gathering information on patient age and 
sex, household composition, residence, nuttier of children in school 
(indicating ability to pay), education, occupation, appearance and dress, 
and recent health expenditures. But Abel-Smith (1989) noted that 
identification of the poor in Kenya is difficult because of household 
composition, lack of farm accounts, prevalence of subsistence agriculture 
and informal trading, and seasonal factors, and recomrended instead keeping 
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fees low overall to minimize time-consuming means-testing of patients 
claiming inability to pay. But a wide window for exemptions does not 
guarantee that they will be used. Takeup of formal exemptions in Nigeria 
weis low because many people were unaware of them or intimidated by the 
processes involved (Orubuloye at al 1991). In Thailand, although the 
official poverty criterion for exemptions included nearly 70% of rural 
households, the actual take-up of free care wes under 40%, which was nearer 
the level of officially defined absolute poverty (Mills 1991). Exemption 
on the basis of indigence is more often determined informally by village 
health committees that know the entire com=ity,, as in Mali, Senegal, 
Benin, Ghana, and Zaire (Mandl and Ofosu-Ansah 1988). 
There is a tendency for exemptions to grow out of control once estab- 
lished. In addition to those certified as indigent, exempt categories my 
include those with specific infectious diseases and those with presumed low 
A? such as widows, students, the blind, or soldiers. Rarely are efforts 
made to recover these exemptions from a sponsoring organization, such as 
the military or the education ministry (Griffin 1987). In some protects 
health personnel have also been exempted (Mandl and Ofosu-lash 1988). 
Hospitals in the Dominican Republic either reduced or waived fees for up 
to half their patients (Bitran 1988a). Exemption schemes can be 
manipulated by the wealthy, often at a cost to the poor; in Ouiarat, India 
wealthy merchants and landholders found ways of concealing their assets to 
qualify for subsidies in a rural bio-gas project (personal communication). 
Since measuring incomes is difficult, proxies such as geographical 
location could be used to implement a sliding scale policy. For Kenya, low 
fees were recommended in rural areas, moderate fees in urban areas, and the 
highest fees in the wealthiest city, Nairobi. Transportation coats would 
offset the incentive to travel to avoid high fees (Ellis 1987). CIPFA 
(1986) observed that while price differentiation between rural and urban 
areas is correct in principle, it can be inappropriate because urban 
poverty can be as acute as rural, and because of the lack of lower-level 
care alternatives in the urban areas of the Gambia. Abel-Smith (1989) 
suggested that fees in Kenya should be adjusted by average income level of 
the province or district, or if this is unacceptable, according to the 
average income of the poorest. He consented that this would require 
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knowledge of factors related to ability to pay specific amounts, including 
the degree of hardship caused to poor patients who were not excused from 
fees. Cross-subsidization among health centres has met with occasional 
resistance from communities, but has been shown to be feasible in Mali, 
where revenues were remitted to the district level (Mandl and Ofosu-Amaah 
1988). Brenzel (1987) found that price discrimination by geographical area 
wes accomplished de facto in Zaire, with fees set by local comdttees,, arid 
many of the more successful caenuiity financing schemes were characterized 
by cross-subsidization of services (preventive by curative) and of 
cosmunities (poorer by richer). Berman et al (1987) noted that it is 
difficult to measure income for rural agricultural households, and Good et 
al (1979) emphasized that in rural areas it is necessary to account for 
non-cash income, which may not show up in income calculations but may free 
up cash income to be spent for medical care. Socio-professional 
differentiation based on occupation, land ownership, or other factors, is 
a more realistic option than using income, although it is also difficult 
to differentiate between rich and poor farmers (U1IC P 1989b). 
Most of the work cited to this point has looked at the problem of 
user fees from the perspective of the supplier: it deals with such problem 
as the extent to which demand might decrease when fees are introduced or 
raised, and how to establish fees which will maximize the suppliers' 
utility function of generating revenues and inroving welfare. An 
uncomfortable vacuum has been left where knowledge about the effects of 
user charges on individual consumers is concerned. 
Perhaps because of the complexity of household economics, there have 
been few attempts to clarify what is meant by an affordable expenditure. 
A survey of living costs in urban areas of Kenya found a monthly food 
requirement for an average family of KSh 600, and a median income of KSh 
700, and concluded that 70% of families could not afford both adequate 
nutrition and the loan repayments for a proposed housing scheme, and that 
many urban families sacrificed diet in order to meet other unavoidable 
expenses (England and Alnwick 1982). Abel-Smith (1989) observed in Kenya 
that the actual access price of medical treatment was of little importance 
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as far as utilization was concerned because Kenyans will find whatever fee 
they are expected to pay in addition to transport costs, but the risk of 
generating real hardship was great. Wang'ombe (1984) calculated costs of 
a visit to a rural Kenyan health centre as KSh 20, inclusive of travel, 
time, and drugs. Neglecting rural/urban differences, this makes the cost 
of a PHC visit only 3% of monthly income, and perhaps 4% to 5% of monthly 
food expenses, but whether this should be considered a hardship cannot be 
judged without knowledge of many other factors. The question of ability 
to pay is further complicated by the fact that health expenditures differ 
from other household expenditures by their high variance across households 
and across time for a given household. over et al (1991) found in 
developing countries that most households spend only a small proportion of 
their incase on medical care, while a small number of households spend a 
great deal. Conflicting anecdotal evidence exists as to the hardship 
effect of medical expenditures, with the magnitude of the costs involved 
apparently a key variable. In Thailand, 60% of involuntary land sales were 
said to be due to high medical bills (Abel-Smith 1987). On the other hand, 
when costs are moderate they are apparently tolerated: in Bursa; households 
indicated no regret over having to resort to austerity measures for several 
months because of contributing about a quarter of their monthly income to 
a latrine construction scheme (Abel-Smith and Due 1988). 
There is no accepted definition in economics of an affordable price; 
advertisers and politicians speak comfortably of 'an affordable car', or 
'affordable housing', but this usually refers only to a product that is 
cheaper than most others on the market. A distinction between absolute and 
relative affordability was made by McPake at al (1992), with the former 
being judged in comparison to total income or expenditures, while the 
latter is based on comparisons with alternatives to government services 
such as private practitioners, pharmacies, or drug sellers. 
Some atteapts have been nude to take affordability into account when 
pricing health services. One approach has been to look at how much people 
are already paying for health care or drugs, or other measurable 
expenditures. Another is to determine a reasonable percentage of annual 
incone which could be spared to cover health costa. Same exannples of 
expenditure-based affordability criteria are: 
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1) In Bangladesh the lowest fees were charged to individuals 
who could not afford two meals a day throughout the year 
(Blakney et al 1989b). 
2) The annual premium for membership in health posts in 
Lalitpur, Nepal was set at the price of one cigarette per 
month, which managers believed households could easily forego 
in order to purchase health insurance (Roth 1987). 
3) In Guinea financial participation for health care should 
not exceed 2% of "family resources", corresponding to a 
calculated minimum income (UNICEF 1989b). 
4) In the U. K. a proposal for NHS prescription charges 
included an annual prepayment of 1% of mean income of the 
lowest 2% of wage-earners (Green 1985). 
5) In Brazil, fees were set at a level above costs but below 
competing private sector prices (PRICOR 1987). 
6) In Thailand, prepayment for 8 illness episodes was judged 
affordable by rural households because it cost one-sixth the 
mean annual expenditure on drugs and medical care (Myers et al 
1987). 
Incase-based definitions of affordability include de Ferranti's 
(1985) suggestion that the fee for out-patient services might be determined 
in relation to the daily agricultural wage, which Shepard and Benjamin 
(1988) showed adjusts for differences in ability to pay between countries. 
They believed it represented a "reasonable" level of fee, and demonstrated 
that each adult would have to work 2 to 4 days per year to pay for the 
typical family's health care if the charge per outpatient visit were a 
day's wages. But Blakney et al (1989b) noted that while agricultural wages 
are determined locally, drug costs are determined by international price 
levels, so their recovery mey therefore be difficult in the poorest 
countries. In addition, the US$0.50 to $0.75 cost estimated for average 
treatment cost for essential drug programmes assumes a level of efficiency 
in the drug supply system which often does not exist: a survey by 
Waddington (1989) of 9 drug revolving funds in sub-Saharan Africa found the 
treatment price for an adult malaria patient averaged $0.79, and $1.82 for 
a child with bronchitis. Average malaria treatment cost the equivalent of 
84% of a watchman's daily wages. An Maffordable level of expenditure on 
drugs is implied by behaviour such as not buying all prescribed items, or 
resorting to markets where the price of drugs is lower and negotiable 
(I0/DAP 1991b). 
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The effect of multiple illnesses on affordability is often not 
considered in a fee-per-episode scheme. The importance of this interaction 
was shown by Bitran (1988b), who calculated that a child who gets 3 illness 
episodes during the year may spend up to 30% of the annual household income 
available for that child. In rural Haiti, Coreil (1983) suggested that 
exemptions are most needed by households with more than 5 or 6 children and 
only one or two adults. Equity in favour of the more seriously ill is 
enhanced by not charging for repeat visits in Botswana, or by charging half 
price in Senegal's Sine Saloum project (Stinson 1982). 
Drugs accounted for 86% of all health expenditures in 19 African 
countries (Piachaud 1980), and there is a correlation between low per 
capita incomes, low health expenditures, and low per capita expenditures 
on drugs (tt110 1988b). Better selection of drugs and more effective forms 
of competitive purchasing, coupled with better internal management, have 
reduced the burden of cost to governments significantly but health 
ministries in many developing countries still have difficulty meeting the 
demand (WHO 1988c). Because sinnple essential drugs are used at the PHC 
level, the costs of adequate supplies are lower than at other levels of 
health services: average drug costs per treatment episode for 7 African and 
3 Asian countries was $0.14 at the village level, rising to $0.66 at 
hospitals (WHO 1988c). But although costs per capita are low, total costs 
are high because of the large number of cases seen at PHC level. In 
developing countries, the critical role that curative care plays in 
establishing the credibility of PHC (Gray 1982), and the link to reliable, 
adequately funded drug supply, has tended to focus the attention and 
efforts of planners and managers on the financing of drug supplies. 
User-charge schemes which attempt to recover the cost of providing 
essential drugs represent the most connanly attempted form of cost-recovery 
at community level health facilities (Stinson 1982). According to Carrin 
(1987), there is no a iori reason for channeling private expenditures 
towards the financing of drug supplies rather than other services, but the 
large share of drug expenditures in government health budgets means that 
patients' contributions can set free an hiportant part of the budget for 
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development of the health infrastructure and expanded services. It is also 
claimed that charges to cover the cost of drugs in public facilities might 
reduce overall household spending on drugs: if revenues were used to make 
drugs more available in public facilities, clients would be spared the 
higher costs of private pharmacists, and competition with private 
pharmacies would eventually drive down the high profits derived from their 
being near monopoly suppliers (World Hank 1987). 
While not yet regarded as a panacea and certainly not without their 
critics, drug revolving funds are being established in many countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa. The following statement is perhaps typical of the 
rationale and means proposed to solve the drug financing problem: 
"The deteriorating economic situation in Nigeria has hit the 
health system... extremely hard as funds are not available as 
they were some years ago. ... very few drugs and other materials needed to provide basic health care have been 
available in recent years from State Government funds. The 
lack of drugs at the dispensary level makes it inqxosible to 
use these facilities as cornerstones in an efficient health 
care system. An efficient drug delivery programme is 
therefore an essential part of a revitalization and 
strengthening of the existing health care system ... together with introduction of mechanisms to deal with serious 
constraints in the financing of such drugs. One of the 
adjustments which has been proposed... is the establishment of 
an essential drug programme and a drug revolving fund. (Moore 
et al 1986) 
The high willingness to pay for drugs has influenced policy in many 
countries. Koita and Brunet-Jailly (1988) recommended charging for drugs 
in Mali because such a scheme could maintain prices at the level currently 
charged by the Peoples' Pharmacies, which weis considered sustainable since 
'only' 5% of household income was currently spent on modern drugs. In 
Rwanda, selling drugs at government centres was preferred to raising 
consultation fees. A survey found that people were willing to accept 
higher user fees if these would assure availability of drugs. Tying fees 
to drugs would also facilitate retaining revenues locally and earmarking 
their use for drug supply (Shepard et al 1987). 
Pricing for 8uztainability, as opposed to limiting deterrence of 
potential users, has been emphasized in advice to governments. Cross et 
al (1986) described how the financial success of a revolving fund depends 
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on the interrelated price or markup schedule, cost-recovery objectives, and 
allowed exemptions. Price-setting and exemptions policy were identified 
as the problems most crucial to the survival of co munity drug-sales 
schemes by Foster and Drager (1988). If prices are set above people's 
ability to pay, the scheme will fail; if set too low, costs will not be 
fully recovered. MSH (1988) noted that a revolving drug fund must have a 
cost-recovery target, which may range from only part of the cost of drugs 
to full costs of PHC, but public health and equity objectives may make the 
goal of complete financial self-sufficiency unrealistic. The feasibility 
and sustainability of pharmaceutical cost recovery depends on conwunity 
acceptance of the need for cost recovery and user fees and assistance with 
oversight and accountability, adequacy and distribution of real household 
income, and protection of target populations without extending exemptions 
to the point where economic viability is threatened (Blakney et al 1989a). 
The objectives of affordability and sustainability are sometimes in 
conflict in cost-recovery schema. Gray (1986) reported that in an effort 
to keep prices low, two only schemes in Mali initially added 15% to the 
cost of drugs, but failed because this was insufficient to run the 
distribution system and provide incentives. Cross et al (1986) discussed 
alternative pricing strategies: 1) using the cost of the drugs and the 
overheads of the delivery system and 'pipeline', 2) using willingness to 
pay, based on 'expert opinion', and 3) test pricing to see what level is 
actually possible. Having calculated that a markup of 200% over supplier 
FOB prices may be necessary to make a revolving fund work, they noted that 
with bulk procurement of selected generic drugs the selling price may still 
be below private sector alternatives. A rough estimate was made by Foster 
and Drager (1988) that a 115% markup is required to sustain a revolving 
fund, while Wiaddington and Panza (1991) mention that a starting point of 
35-45% markup is often appropriate. In Benin the markup of three times the 
drug cost was determined from the total costs of operating the system, 
including subsidizing the cost of preventive services but excluding salary 
costs. This lack of agreement on the markup needed for sustainability 
implies that there is often room for improving efficiency so that lower 
prices can be maintained. 
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2.13.1 Efficiency and cowplexity in drug pricing 
There are several options for drug pricing in addition to the general 
pricing choices reviewed earlier. A system in which the fee per treatment 
reflects the actual cost of drugs would provide advantages in terms of 
cost-consciousness and inclination towards proper prescribing habits and 
the most cost-effective treatments (Moore et al 1986). Foster and Drager 
(1988) preferred a flat fee per drug to a flat fee per prescription to hold 
down costs, and a price-band system for drug prices as a compromise between 
ability to achieve full coat recovery and ease of administration. CIPFA 
(1986) recommended a pricing policy of one standard charge per prescription 
for the sake of simplicity, and so the patient will always know that 
payment will be expected. Guinea chose a system of fee per complete 
treatment, with the fee based on the actual cost of drugs used in the 
treatment (Knippenberg at al 1990). Advantages claimed for this approach 
include lower leakages compared with a fixed consultation price because of 
the linkage between revenue and the quantity of drugs used, the propor- 
tionality of revenues and utilization, and the effect of encouraging 
patients to finish their treatment. 
Economic efficiency requires the greatest markups on drugs that have 
low price elasticity, but from a social welfare point of view markups 
should be higher on drugs consumed by non-poor households. Coabining the 
two criteria, there would ideally be a sliding scale based on income as 
well as differential pricing based on elasticities (Carrin 1987). Because 
price discrimination for individuals can be difficult to implement, Litvack 
et al (1988) suggested the alternative of considering both drug necessity 
and cost in setting prices of individual drugs. A course of treatment 
which is both vital and expensive would be sold below cost, while less 
essential or palliative drugs which are cheap would be marked up. This 
approach can enhance equity by lowering the burden of necessary treatments 
to the poor while offering the choice of higher-priced treatments to those 
who can afford them, and has been applied in comainity drug sales schemes 
in Ghana and Benin (Mandl and Ofosu-Amaah 1988). However, Brudon- 
Jacobowicz (1989) argued that where markups on less essential drugs are 
used to subsidize more expensive treatments, there is a risk of promoting 
unnecessary demand for drugs, especially expensive ones, in order to 
recover costs. 
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scant and conflicting data on the risks inherent in cost recovery, 
particularly with regard to protection of the poor and the need for 
management skills, may have set the stage for the debate over the Bamako 
Initiative, a UNICEF/WHO progranme that has attracted much attention since 
its inception. Based on examples of better utilization and functioning of 
services achieved in several African countries by improving the 
availability of basic drugs and supplies to comrunities, with management 
at the district level, a plan for self-sustaining, decentralized PHC in 
sub-Saharan Africa was introduced at the September 1987 Meeting of African 
Health Ministers by MICE'. Named after the city in which the meeting wss 
held, the plan was initially described as "a joint WW/UNICEF response for 
establishing self-sustaining drug retail projects, the profits of which 
will help finance PHC" (WHO/AFRO 1988a). It called for a consortium of 
donors to provide funding to sub-Saharan Africa member states, for basic 
equipment for PHC services, provision of basic drugs as seed stock for 
revolving funds for the period of the programme, and support costs. Fees 
received for drugs were to cover operational costs, including salaries and 
the replenishment of drugs and supplies for MM and PHC programmes. 
Comnmity health committees would be strengthened or created where 
necessary to provide guidance for local health activities, and management 
of national progranmes would be decentralized to district level. 
The first guidelines for implementation (ii10/AFRO 1988b) enphaeized 
that measures for ensuring access for the poor were necessary, possibly 
through fee exemptions or subsidies for which criteria should be worked out 
with the contiunity. It warned that the markup on drugs might need to be 
increased a further 20% to 30% to cover community members who might be 
unable to pay the full anmount charged. 
Criticism of Bamako Initiative policies originated with European 
private organizations involved in health care in Africa, with their 
concerns being transmitted to donor agencies in their countries. Concern 
about rational drug use was an initial focus of criticism, specifically 
that drugs and financing not be overemphasized at the expense of the other 
elements of PHC strategy. Questions were also raised about equity and the 
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scarcity of management resources (HAI 1989). UNICEF came under attack for 
supplying an ingredient of "adjustment with a human face" which would 
"appease critics, not threaten the existing order, and protect the mipLM 
needs of the poorest" (Kanji 1990). The critics made four main claims: 
that charging for drugs would inevitably burden further the vulnerable 
because of the high markups needed to sustain PHC; that fee systems place 
unrealistic management and logistical demands on developing countries; that 
true self-sufficiency is unachievable because of the shortage of 
convertible currency in sub-Saharan African countries; and that charging 
for drugs would create perverse provider incentives which encourage 
irrational prescribing and an emphasis on curative activities. Chabot 
(1988) faulted the Initiative for not specifying how com=ities would 
control and use the revenues generated, and suggested that the effort might 
weaken efforts to become self-reliant because of increased dependence on 
external donors and the pharmaceutical industry. Garner (1989) asked that 
other sources of funding besides fee-for-service such as risk sharing, 
insurance schemes, or taxation be considered, noting that ability to pay 
is largely an unknown area, and identification of the poor presents 
problems. Corbett (1989) concluded that the poor are likely to become more 
impoverished if it takes longer to improve preventive measures to reduce 
their physical vulnerability than it takes to introduce charges for 
curative care. Equity of access wes a concern of the sponsoring agencies, 
but some countries "seem reluctant to tackle the question of indigents... 
they argue that enough protection exists through extended families, 
traditional mechanisms and community organizations, to cover costs for the 
neediest people. " The percentage of indigents was said to be only 1-2% of 
the population and "they always seem to be taken care of by traditional 
mutual help systems in the rural areas" (UNICEF 1989a). 
To deflect criticism, UNICEF began to euphasize the role the 
Initiative would play in the development of community-level efforts and 
self-reliance in PHC, and the potential for a longer term development 
strategy with a strong human and social element (Ofosu-Ansah 1989). In the 
absence of any empirical confirmation that the poor ' been adequately 
protected in existing cost-recovery schemes and that management and foreign 
currency requirements could be dealt with, the proponents called upon the 
idea of relative affordability, asking that the effect on the population 
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(especially the poor) would be in the "ence of any effort to mitigate the 
lack of essential drugs and poorly supported public services. Exanples 
from Liberia and Nigeria were put forward where, while charging for drugs 
caused an initial drop in utilization, the unavailability of drugs had had 
a far greater effect on patient attendance (Blakney et al 1989b). 
Knippenberg et al (1990) observed that before the isplementation of the 
Initiative in Benin' and Guinea the population resorted to private 
pharmacies, where expenditures on a single illness episode averaged over 
us$10, or to local markets where drugs of dubious quality were sold without 
control, and the amounts spent were not reinvested to improve the health 
system. Provision of curative services wes in fact to be emphasized, as 
a means of building colmunity support and to encourage mothers to have 
their children vaccinated during curative visits (Diallo 1991). 
For sane countries there was no problem of ill-focussed objectives 
or policy conflicts. Kenya saw the improved supply of basic drugs and the 
possibility of incentives obtained through the sale of drugs as the key to 
making their canaunity health worker scheme function better (Manen 1990). 
There, the issues of protection of the poor had already been examined in 
a lengthy policy debate over cost-sharing for social services. in Sierra 
Leone, an essential drugs program= relying on reimbursible procurement 
through UNICEF had been under development since 1986, and there weis 
political conmitwnt to achieve universal coverage of PHC (UNICEF 1989b), 
so the Bamako Initiative was embraced by a government that lacked the 
resources to do anything else. 
aulmarv 
This first section of this chapter reviewed the 
literature an effects of the global economic downturn of the 
1970's and 1980's on the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. 
These problems and the attau ted noxceconamic solutions 
resulted in reductions in spending on goverxa t health 
services. The poor were also especially affected by the 
elimination of subsidies which raised the price of their basic 
needs. Increased private financing of health care ties 
proposed as a solution by international donor agencies, with 
the call for user charges supported by studies that showed 
high demand for health care. These are seen by saw as 
beneficial, conferring net benefits and potential 
distributional iuprovementa. Otters believe user charges 
reduce equity and the utilization of services. 
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Repirical studies of the demand for health care, 
reviewed in the second section, tend to confirm the price and 
incaoe effects predicted by classical theory, but estimates of 
elasticities vary widely. on close scrutiny, axfi of this 
evidence is inconclusive, and estimates of the lower economic 
groups' ability to pay seems especially subject to different 
interpretations of the available data. It is likely that the 
interaction of the price level with quality and other factors 
affects the results to a degree that no general oa-clusions 
can be reached about the effects of prices on the utilization 
of PHC services in a given enviro. ent. Other efforts to 
assess the effect of user charges agree on a high overall 
degree of willingness and ability to pay in a given camaanity, 
but also that there is also a sizable minority that has little 
ability to pay. Longitudinal studies suggest that cam dties 
can adapt best to gradual, moderate price increases. Tha 
evolution of commonly applied rules for pricing wes reviewed, 
showing consensus an which services should be Priced mid on 
how complexity of pricing affects efficiency. The concept of 
equity is subjective but there is general agreement that 
amass to services by the poor can and should be protected by 
leans, of discriminatory pricing and ax I ions. Pricing rules 
have been formulated, but they are often applied in highly 
modified form, according to guesswork and pragmatic dame ds, 
reinforcing the neat for a more rational approach to setting 
price and exemption policy. Modifying these pricing rules to 
incorporate equity goals has proved less straightforward, with 
little agreement as to the best way to protect the poor and 
establish affordable prices. 
Revolving drug funds are the not commim wer charge 
sctsýne at PHC level, and offer unique possibilities for 
pricing to iscove equity of acceas, but ultimately the 
proble of m raging exemptions remains an obstacle to 
protection of the poor. The Bamako Initiative, a plan to use 
cost recovery for essential drugs as a source of revenue and 
a focus of aaosfu ity effort for development of PHC, has 
adopted a policy of decentralized decision-making, and iss 
identified the need for a framework for making decisions about 
pricing and exemptions. 
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Chapter 3: 
Review of Previous Work 
Part B: The Rural Subsistence Economy: 
Coping with Poverty and illness 
That ill people are generally willing to pay for treatment is clear. 
The poor are also often ajjjg to pay, as shorn by utilization of health 
facilities which require payment, but there is little information on what 
effect these payments have on overall household welfare, especially for the 
economically vulnerable classes. Each individual decision to seek treat- 
ment is the result of a comparison of the utility anticipated from the 
treatment, and the cost of the time, money, and other resources expended 
to obtain it; the 'rational consumer' chooses a treatment which results in 
a positive net benefit. To assess the impact of user charges and to 
clarify the concepts of affordability and protection of the vulnerable 
would require full knowledge of the benefits derived from the treatment 
bought and the welfare costs of payment, but measurement of benefits of 
primary health care (Mills and Thomas 1984) is a difficult task and is in 
any case beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Given the trend towards decentralisation of managing PHC, it is 
becoming less likely that price-setting will be done only at the national 
level. There are important economic differences between local areas in 
mast countries, as for example in the Sahel, where the population extends 
from relatively prosperous river basins through semi-arid pastoral lands. 
A system of district or lower-level price-setting is needed which can take 
into account the relative purchasing power of the local population and the 
deterrent effect of a range of prices. The preceding review of the effects 
of user charges on equity pointed to the need for additional research on 
affordability and protection of the poor. This chapter describes certain 
characteristics of rural subsistence economies as a context to interpret 
differences between households and between communities. 
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Identifying and counting the poor has long been a preoccupation of 
Western society. Its relevance to the field of development is largely due 
to the suspicion that economic growth by itself nay not solve or even 
alleviate the problem of widespread poverty in less developed countries 
(Chenery et al 1974). Measures of absolute poverty and of inequality, 
while related, differ in their significance. Relative inequality 
identifies the proportion of people who might have difficulty paying a 
price that the 'average' person could afford, but it tells little about the 
extent of absolute poverty, which can be measured by conparing absolute 
levels of income or consunption with "minimum levels" somehow defined. 
thenery et al cautioned that income measures nest include all forms of 
"permanent income" including in-kind income, and that rural income levels 
are typically understated. Extending the definition of income to include 
nonmarket sources tends to reduce apparent inequality (Kusnic and DeVanzo 
1982). 
3.1.1 Poverty and Nutrition 
In developing countries the most practical and frequently used 
measure of absolute poverty has been based on food, calculating the minimum 
expenditure necessary to attain a minimum nutritional intake, and 
multiplying by the average ratio of total expenditures to food expenditures 
for the population as a whole to estimate a minim= total income. 
Technical objections to definition of poverty lines and the limitations to 
measurement of incomes in industrial countries have been described by Barr 
(1987) among others. He cited difficulties with all attempts to construct 
an objective poverty line, including using the consumption of a specific 
bundle of goods, using total household expenditure, and using total money 
income as indicators. In particular, attempts to define a minimum level 
based on nutritional requirements is subject to the normal variances 
between individuals, and it is also unreasonable to expect people to fill 
those requirements at minimum cost. 
Seeking absolute poverty measures, rather than such relative criteria 
as 'earning less than 1/3 of average national t'IP per person', Lipton 
(1988) justified the view that 'adequate dietary energy' best sunnerizes 
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the essence of the basic needs approach, defining an 'ultra-poverty' line 
as the expenditure level where the spending pattern on foods and non-foods 
for the average household with a given size and age and sex corposition 
makes it just possible to meet the energy requirements for work and health 
and to maintain full mental and physical functioning, including un- 
diminished prospects of survival and wellness. Lipton found evidence that 
this requires at least the equivalent of 80% of the accepted specific 
nutritional requirement. A second and usually Huch higher "moderate 
poverty line" occurs at a level of expenditure where a household can Just 
avoid taking financial decisions that imply physical or human disin- 
vestment, i. e., sale or mortgage of physical or financial assets, or 
reduction of outlay or time devoted to acquiring educational capital. 
Although Bryceson (1989) noted that it is far from accepted that 80% of the 
accepted nutritional requirement is sufficient for maintenance of health, 
these definitions are potentially useful in the identification of the 
vulnerable. Lipton (1988) also found evidence of a discontinuity in 
behaviour at the ultra-poverty level, which can serve to identify the 
ultra-poor. They are in households that spend 70-80% of total outlay on 
food, but still meet less than 80% of the suggested dietary energy 
requirements. When more money is available, it is spent first on more 
starchy staples. This definition of the ultra-poor includes 10-15% of 
households in low-income countries, containing 15-20% of populations, and 
17-25% of pre-schoolers. 
3.1.2 8M11holders and Rural Poverty 
In most developing countries a characteristic of poverty groups is 
lack of ownership of productive assets (primarily agricultural land), a 
critical constraint on the income of small farmers (Chenery et al 1974). 
Rapid population growth supports the dilution of capital assets, and low 
rates of savings perpetuate patterns of capital concentration (needed to 
raise incomes) over time. Hill (1977) found in rural northern Nigeria 
(where land is bought, sold, inherited, and lost) that household wealth is 
associated with age due to the cumulative opportunities for acquiring 
wealth, and especially with the size of farm-holdings. Older household 
heads were also less dependent on obtaining loans and were more likely to 
receive gifts when needed to wake up cash deficits. Inter-household 
differences could also be attributed to the size and composition of the 
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household. Hill found that, barring disasters, a household could gradually 
accumulate wealth in the form of land brought under cultivation provided 
there were enough able workers. Extreme poverty does not affect whole 
canmanities, but individual conjugal or extended families, or (auch less 
frequently) isolated individuals. The poorest were characterized by a) 
owning small areas of farmland, obtaining lower yields per unit of effort; 
b) selling grain immediately after harvest when prices were lowest and 
having 'no time to farm' because their granaries were depleted so soon 
after harvest that they were obliged to do other, usually unremunerative, 
work; and c) having too little farmland to set their sons to werk, they 
were considered poor risks and so could seldom borrow money. Bryceson 
(1989) observed however that most of sub-Saharan Africa is land-abundant 
relative to Asia and Latin America. While about 80% of the population 
lives in rural areas, population densities are low. Land allocation is 
largely controlled through tribal mechanisms based on the criterion of need 
as defined by family size, and land sales are rare except in cash cropping 
areas. Landlessness is relatively rare, and wage levels cosparatively high 
because peasants are not dragged down by the degree of destitution seen in 
parts of Asia, for instance. Hired labour is relatively rare, with child 
and female labour far more important in peasant household economies. 
Where markets are not yet prevalent and where land availability is 
not a constraint on production, households which are better off cannot 
exercise greater dams for food, and as there is an equal chance for 
harvest failure in isolated communities, this works against the emergence 
of differences in nutritional status (McLean 1984). But while the land 
scarcity of northern Nigeria described by Hill may not be typical of tauch 
of Africa, extreme poverty within communities can still result from 
households having too little labour to meet their food needs through 
farming, lack of access to capital, or other factors specific to the 
household such as pest damage, accidents or illness (especially chronic 
illness and infirmity due to age), and miscalculations of an interpersonal 
or micro-political character (Richards 1986). In addition, markets for 
grain and cash crops have assumed importance in many areas. Zaidi (1988) 
connected the monetization of the rural economy with worse nutritional 
status in Pakistan; as more channels are opened to urban markets, surplus 
products which normally would be consumed at home are sold off in the 
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cities, leaving less food for agricultural workers. There farmers' food 
production is usually sufficient to cover their own needs, foodgrains are 
sold because after the harvest there is more food available than can be 
eaten and stored, and to exchange for processed foodstuffs and other 
necessities. While the purchase of consumes durables is relatively rare, 
even basically subsistence farmers require some cash. Bryceson (1989) 
noted that articles like soap, kerosene, cloth and cooking oil are fairly 
standard purchased items throughout the continent, and peasants would feel 
hard-pressed without them. She concluded that in areas with little cash 
econonw the trade in subsistence grains reinforces rural class differen- 
tiation. Stephens (1988) observed in Liberia that subsistence farmers 
rarely had surpluses which could be sold to build up cash reserves, and 
that the sale of food crops is not always due to production of surplus 
stocks. Post-harvest distress sales and rainy season purchases at inflated 
prices define a cycle of impoverishment in which poor households must 
operate. In contrast, middle and rich farmers sell their surplus late in 
the season when prices are higher and buy far less grain during the year. 
Loans of grain and irony to poor peasants are at high rates of interest. 
Where there are few cash crops or other opportunities to earn cash, it is 
not unusual for the food crop to be oversold to meet the household's 
purchasing needs (Bryceson 1989). 
Variation in nutritional risk between countries is not generally 
attributable to per capita income differences: the level of acute 
malnutrition in Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya is higher than in Cameroon, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, but it is also lower than in many non-African countries 
(Strauss 1988). This may be a consequence of food availability in 
subsistence areas: Sierra Leone had the highest per capita rice production 
in the West African rice zone (Richards 1986). Wile Hill concluded that 
extreme poverty does not often affect entire coy nunities, there are factors 
which can cause some coI% unities to be relatively poor; population pressure 
has reduced the availability of the most fertile land in Zaire, and the 
price offered to farmers by traders rapidly declines rapidly with distance 
from a market centre and the cost of transport (Cornell 1989). Young and 
Jasper (1992) were unable to show any significant intrahousehold differen- 
ces in the nutritional status of children under famine conditions in 
Darfur.. Sudan, and suggested that under these conditions all households are 
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below a critical threshold of access to food. They noted that no studies 
showing an association between household sxio-economic status (3ES) and 
malnutrition have been based on African data. 
The evidence presented thus far describes mich of sub-Saharan Africa 
as a place where food scarcity is not the rule, and where household-level 
subsistence is possible given enough available labour. With little 
government intervention in the subsistence sector, economic differentiation 
between households and comrkunities arises for reasons more related to 
fortune and market forces rather than to social structure, as is the case 
elsewhere. Poorer farming households have difficulties balancing their 
food needs with their cash requirements. 
Avoidance or management of hunger, ill-health, premature death, and 
loss of assets necessary to maintain existing living standards, is a 
universal priority. Corbett (1988) described three broad stages of 
responses used by farmers in sub-Saharan Africa to cope with food 
insecurity, 1) insurance mechanisms, e. g. changes in cropping patterns and 
planting practices, reduced consunption, and inter-household transfers, 2) 
disposal of productive assets, e. g., sale of land, agricultural tools, 
mortgaging of land or obtaining credit, and 3) destitution, e. g., distress 
migration and starvation. These mechanisms are of interest here since they 
could also result from economic stress due to having to pay for treatment 
when a household mmnber falls ill. 
In the Gambia farm households reduced consumption in the rainy season 
when food stocks were low and the harvest was yet to come. Other staples 
were substituted for the preferred rice and millet, and wild foods were 
gathered. In the case of serious food shortage and especially if the 
household was living on credit, meals were missed or the amount of food 
cooked reduced (Taal 1989). In Sierra Leone, early rice is planted as a 
hunger-breaker, and subsistence farmers use elaborate agronomic strategies 
to ensure against total crop failure. Cassava is substituted for the 
preferred rice, and wild foods are gathered in the rainy season (Richards 
1986). In both countries, the cultivation of a collective household grain 
66 
plot in addition to individual fields increases food production. 
Mechanisms such as these suggest that households usually have the potential 
to adapt to a temporary need for more cash. 
Similar behaviour was observed in Nepal by Nabarro et al (1989), 
where farmers coped with regular food deficits by reducing consumption of 
high energy foods during the months of shortage, selling agricultural and 
livestock products, making and selling crafts, seeking employment off their 
farms, borrowing food or cash from a moneylender, or leaving the household 
temporarily, thereby reducing the number of people who have to be fed. 
Their study suggested that there is a threshold of annual food shortage, 
in the vicinity of 3 to 6 months, over which a household is very vulnerable 
to external stresses and lives hand-to-meuth, moving from one crisis to the 
next with no prospect of accumulating wealth with which it can improve its 
situation. 
Cmvunity and kinship ties also enhance security. Nutritional risk 
in West Africa is mitigated by social and economic relationships within 
cosnunities, as for exannple amongst the Bambara in Mali, where land rights 
are held at the village level and larger households distribute grain to 
poor families (McLean 1984). In the Gambia members of a community are 
expected to help each other in normal times by forming a labour pool, and 
also in times of difficulty. Under Islamic law a certain percentage of a 
person's wealth must be given as alms to the poor, with from 8 to 10 
percent of food crops being used as such in the Ganmbian villages Taal 
(1989) studied. Richards (1986) identified the system of political patron- 
client relationships which exists generally in Sierra Leone, as being the 
most conwn and effective "safety net" available to both rich and poor 
villagers. Prominent villagers (known as 'big men') support and are in 
turn protected by a patron at the chiefdom or national level. In effect 
patrons gain access to labour, and clients to capital (both of which are 
in short supply), through such relationships. Patrons turn to clients to 
provide political support (e. g., in chieftaincy contests) and clients 
receive subsistence support (e. g., rice when the hungry season is severe), 
financial and help with disputes and court cases. Interhousehold transfers 
(gifts and loans) occur as a part of a strategy of risk aversion within an 
extended family, where transfers flow from better-off households to those 
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which are worse off. Such transfers accounted for 11% of all household 
incase in urban Honduras, effectively supporting one-third of poor 
households (Kaufman and Lindauer 1984). In India interhousehold gifts 
accounted for 4.7% of mean household income, and loans for 28.7%. A 
majority of the gifts and about one fourth of loans came from outside the 
village (Rosenzweig 1988). 
Intrahousehold factors also significantly affect risk, particularly 
health and nutritional risk in children. In most of sub-Saharan Africa 
women are maior agricultural producers, and in West Africa most women have 
their own budgets, control resources, and make decisions based on those 
resources (Orubuloye et al 1991). In Sierra Leone it is couvan for wives 
to tend their own rice plots and vegetable gardens in addition to the 
household plots, and they maintain control of their earnings from these 
(Richards 1986). Co-wives prefer not to pool resources in order to care 
for the needs of their own children, and wives in monogamous households in 
urban Nigeria were believed to prefer not to pool resources with husbands 
because of the husbands' spending on extrahousehold matters (Karania- 
DieJomaoh 1978). 
Decisions taken by the household to invest in timely treatment take 
the costs of illness as well as the cost of treatment into account. 
Haswell (1975) observed in the Gambia that borrowing for 'medicine' was a 
social necessity in communities living near the margin of subsistence, in 
which sickness of individual members of some households, particularly the 
smeller ones, was a major catastrophe at critical times in the agricultural 
season. There was great fear of personal accident or illness which might 
have disastrous effects on the economic position of the family. Corbett 
(1989) reviewed published data in the context of Chambers' (1983a) 
hypothesis that sickness can be a "ratchet" which leads to the further 
impoverishment of already resource-poor households. In general, 'buffers' 
such as reserves of cash allow households to cope with contingencies 
without adverse economic consequences, but households which lack these 
buffers have little choice but to reduce consumption of necessities, or to 
sell or mortgage vital assets which can prejudice the future economic 
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position of the household. She discerned two types of resource drain on 
the poor: the high costs of allopathic health care with its stringent 
payment terms, and the time lost from work because of incapacity due to the 
illness. 
Pryer (1989) found in urban Bangladesh that loss of income for 
households in the lowest earning quartile due to illness of household wage 
earners was as much as 74% of normal monthly household income, and the 
relative risk of a severely malnourished child coming from a household with 
an incapacitated earner was 2.5 times greater than from other households. 
The relationship between disease and productivity for subsistence farmers 
is less clear-cut, and is probably disease-specific. However, there is 
little clear evidence of a relationship between disease and decreased 
productivity and poverty in spite of the obvious suffering and economic 
disruption, because households cope with illness and death (Over et al 
1991). The coping effects of fatal illness can include displacement of 
other household members from their normal activities, or sacrifice of 
investment in schooling. Audibert (1986) found the elasticity of marketed 
yield of rice per acre with respect to household prevalence of schis- 
tosomiasis to be as high as -0.5 in Cameroon, but no significant effect was 
seen for malaria, perhaps due to the immunity to this disease acquired by 
most adults. When other household members substitute for agricultural 
labour lost to illness, their extra efforts can take their toll on the 
health, welfare, and long-term productivity of the household if the amount 
substituted is great. 
The effects of reduced food consumption due to increased household 
cash expenditures can be estimated, if only approximately. Cohen (1981) 
extrapolated the nutritional effect of an additional expenditure (on 
tobacco products) equal to the 4% of income already spent on health care, 
on a poor Bangladeshi family that spends all its income on food, housing, 
and clothing. Assuming a marginal rate of expenditure on food of 70%, the 
additional expenditure would result in a monthly deficit of 8000 calories - 
nearly a quarter of the monthly energy maintenance requirements of a 12 
kg child. Given the already precarious existence of children, even small 
differences in food intake may make the difference between death and 
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survival, with mortality for young children doubling for each 10% decline 
below 80% weight-for age. 
The foregoing results tend to validate the concept of the "poverty 
ratchet. " If a household is to recover from an adult death or serious 
illness, it must be able to weather a period of hardship with its human and 
productive capital intact. If forced to sell its productive assets or 
sacrifice the health of its other members by undernourishing and over- 
working them, it may pass below a threshold of poverty from which it cannot 
escape. 
Economic variables are seasonal in much of the developing world 
because of climate and the rhythm of agricultural production. In many 
regions farmers may have significant amounts of cash only after harvests 
are sold, and may also be short of food just before the harvest as 
subsistence stocks of staple foods become depleted. Non-farmers will be 
affected as well, by seasonal changes in food prices and availability. 
These normal seasonal effects have been described by Chambers (1981) as 
'screws' which drive people into poverty from which they get temporary 
reprieve in the dry season, while protracted stresses such as famine are 
'ratchets' which lead to an irrecoverable loss of resources. These effects 
may be more extreme in sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia because of less 
irrigation of cropland, poorer infrastructure for moving price-conpensating 
grain, more severe drought in bad years, and nodes of land ownership less 
conducive to obtaining credit by mortgaging (Lipton 1986). There are also 
inportant differences within the sub-Saharan African region: the severe 
drought of the early 1980's had little effect on the economies of the 
coastal states but were devastating for the Sahelian countries. Various 
mechanisms for coping with seasonal food shortages exist and are 
therefore widely used in sub-Saharan Africa, including intercropping and 
selection of crops with high resistance to naisture stress, raising 
livestock, and family and community solidarity. 
Chambers and Longhurst (1986) observed that emergencies such as 
illness occur at all times of the year but tend to concentrate in the lean, 
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difficult seasons. Many common diseases are seasonal because of weather 
patterns, availability of food, and the life cycle of disease vectors. 
Deaths and funerals are consequently more common, with these expenses also 
adding to the burden of food scarcity. The ability to pay even the 
relatively small costs of primary health care may be seriously reduced 
at times, and travel to health facilities is difficult because of the need 
to work on farms and the poor condition of roads. Mwabu (1989) observed 
in Kenya that the opportunity cost of time for travel and waiting for 
medical treatment in the wet season increases far above its level in the 
dry season, and thus patients are less likely to seek treatment for their 
illnesses, especially those not perceived as severe. Operational research 
studies in India and Honduras have identified seasonality as a variable 
affecting ability to pay for health care (PRIGOR 1987). Coreil (1983) 
found in Haiti that cyclical variations in available cash were greater than 
wealth differences within peasant communities. Seasonally reduced 
financial and physical access to health care may be especially serious in 
the West African rice-farming belt, where planting activity is intense 
during the wet season and diarrhoea, guinea worm, malaria,, and skin 
infections increase (Akin et al 1985). 
For poor households, the decisions made in response to serious or 
protracted illness are ways of coping with the additional economic stress. 
Corbett (1989) noted various strategies that households lacking buffers use 
to minimize risk of impoverishment due to illness, including preventive 
care, taking Immediate curative care, and not seeking treatment if it is 
likely to impoverish the household. Even if households do not invest much 
in preventive measures, once a household member falls sick they attempt to 
minimize the costs to the household by immediate remedial action. Opting 
for no treatment until it is evident that the illness has become serious 
is a strategy likely to be observed in households which do not have access 
to good information about treatment options, which have little access to 
good quality cheap treatment, and which lack buffers or access to credit. 
As with food emergencies, families resort to inter-household 
transfers to cope with illness. In Senegal, 45% of all patients with 
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insufficient funds to buy prescribed drugs immediately sought help from 
others, usually family members. A majority of households reported that 
they had been asked for help in paying for prescribed drugs (WHO/DAP 1991). 
3.5.1 Benefits and coats of self-treatment 
Self-treatment with traditional remedies or with modern phar- 
maceuticals is probably the most common response to illness in both the 
developing and the developed world. A subject of mich anthropological 
research, it has been the focus of recent attention for reasons related to 
the PHC concept of self-reliance and as a means of extending the coverage 
of formal health care systems, and out of concern for the potential dangers 
and economic consequences of the (medically) irrational use of potent 
drugs. Hardon (1987) reported that 80 percent of infant diarrhoeal and 
cough/cold spells are treated in rural Philippines without consulting a 
doctor. Over-the-counter drugs from pharmacies were the most common first 
line of treatment in urban Mexico, especially for diarrhoea, headache, 
cough, and stomach ache, and more often by members of lower socio-economic 
groups (Logan 1983). Relatively little is known about traditional and 
herbal remedies; by far most of that has been written concerns self- 
medication with modern drugs (Criel 1989), and many studies (e. g., Logan 
1983) have documented the supplementation and gradual replacement of 
traditional remedies by inexpensive modern drugs. As this research was 
intended to clarify the problem of affordability of government primary 
health care services, in view of the high rate of use of alternatives it 
was necessary to have an understanding of reasons other than cost why 
people might choose to use 'non-medical' forms of treatment. 
Health care conditions in Cameroon (i. e., great distance to 
hospitals, charges in mission hospitals, health centres nearby but lacking 
drugs and staff) made it likely that people restrict themselves to self- 
treatment even when they might prefer to seek the help of a competent 
outsider (Van der Geest 1988). Self treatment is made possible by drug 
vendors who bring products even to the most remote villages. Lasker (1981) 
also emphasized the accessibility of health services as the key factor in 
the decisions node in response to illness, but Criel (1989) pointed out the 
inconsistency of this view with the prevalence of self-medication in 
developed countries, where access to health services is unproblematic. 
72 
Some observers emphasize the important role of tradition or personal 
preference. Nchinda (1977) concluded from the relatively high utilization 
of traditional practitioners and other form of self-treatment found in 
rural Cameroon that the provision of Western medicine alone did not deter 
people from using traditional methods as frontline or supportive therapy. 
The importance of personal beliefs and preferences was also suggested by 
Mwabu's (1986) findings in rural Kenya that certain illnesses were 
associated with high rates of initial visits to specific types of 
providers, (e. g., pharmacies and shops for fever and headache, traditional 
healers for asthma and body pain, government clinics for wounds). 
The true reason for the popularity of self-treatment probably lies 
in some combination of costs, access, and preference, as sucmiarized by Van 
der Geest (1988): 
"Self-care is an individual's first and most commn reaction 
to the experience of feeling unwell; it is a non-decision. In 
developed countries it is a convenient alternative to medical 
consultation, but in poor countries people often have no other 
choice than to treat themselves. Were health facilities are 
difficult to reach, self-medication can be an explicit 
decision following deliberation about the costs and benefits 
of taking such a step. The decision to seek outside medical 
help may be postponed or rejected in favour of self-care 
because of obstacles which are anticipated (lack of transport, 
financial problems, the time factor, social distance). " 
Van der Geest attributed the popularity of using drugs from small 
shops or from peddlers in Cameroon to the ways the drug vendors respond 
better to the needs of the poor than such formal institutions as hospitals, 
health centres and pharmacies: a) they are more affordable; clients can 
buy as mch as suits their self -treatment need at that moment; b) they are 
more accessible: there will usually be a peddler within a radius of a few 
km., and they are available day or night, in contrast with the rigid 
schedule of formal health services; c) the social distance between client 
and provider is narrower. In Mexico, the reasons given most often referred 
to the efficacy of the remedies, the ease of communicating with the 
pharmacy employees, and the low cost (Logan 1983). 
Weighed against these advantages is the clients' awareness that the 
vendors have little medical knowledge, that the choice of medicines is 
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limited, and the quality of drugs may be inferior to those available fron 
the health services. If perception of quality of a given provider is 
affected by the results of previous visits, as suggested by Bitran (1988a), 
then in Kenya pharmacies are attractive for convenience reasons rather than 
for quality: Mwabu (1986) found that the rate of return for follow-up 
visits to providers was related to the results obtained initially, and 
return visits to pharmacies were low. From the perspective of medical 
professionals and economists, the disadvantages of self-treatment lie in 
the inappropriate use of dangerous products and in the high cost of many 
commercial products purchased through private pharmacies. Van der Geest 
(1982) cited examples of antibiotic resistance attributed to the sale of 
small doses by peddlers in Africa, the misuse of chloramphenicol against 
typhoid fever in Mexico, and the misuse of anti-diarrhoeals worldwide. 
References to high household expenditures on drugs were mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Bledsoe and Goubaud (1985) studied how the Mende of 
Sierra Leone have reinterpreted the function of the many western medicines 
that are available to them in the frame ork of traditional beliefs and 
treatments. The Mende uses of medicines are therefore consistent with 
Mende beliefs, but when viewed from the western perspective, they are inap- 
propriate and even harmful. 
3.5.2 Behavioural Models of Treatment choice 
Based on empirical data collected in Nigeria, Igun (1979) proposed 
a model of health-seeking behaviour that took into account the multiple 
well-defined systems of medicine and health care available, the uses and 
effects of the patient's social network, and the stages of treatment. 
Based on the assumption that patients always make rational (i. e, utility- 
maximizing) choices, Igun's patient moves from the first stage of health- 
seeking, in which the symptoms are experienced and are associated with 
being sick, to the self-treatment stage, if he believes he understands and 
can attach a label to the symptoms, and perceives the symptom as capable 
of being removed by self-medication. The third stage, of seeking treatment 
from an external source, is reached when he decides that self-treatment 
will not give the desired results. 
A model which takes into account price effects on treatment choice 
was used to describe and successfully quantify (comparing actual with 
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predicted choices) health-seeking behaviour by the anthropologist young 
(1981), who found that the potentially complex decisions of choosing a 
provider by individuals in a Mexican community could be reduced to a simple 
algorithm consisting of yes-no choices. Four criteria were found to be 
primarily involved in these decisions: 1) the seriousness of the illness; 
2) whether an appropriate home remedy weis known for the illness; 3) the 
person's estimate of the relative likelihood of cure using folk medicine 
as compared with medical treatment; and 4) the costs and transportation 
requirements associated with the medical treatment alternative and the 
availability of resources to meet these. Young described the decision 
process as an ordering of the available alternatives along one of two 
dimensions: the likelihood of cure for illnesses believed to be life- 
threatening, and the costs of less serious illnesses (or nearly all 
illnesses for poorer households). Since the only option which was 
considered to represent a significant price barrier was the use of a 
Western medical practitioner, the availability of sufficient money entered 
the decision only after it had been decided that the illness was grave and 
that western medicine was more likely to achieve a cure than folk medicine. 
Van der Geest (1988) contrasted Young's decision framework with a 
simpler explanation of reasons for using self-treatment: 
"The preference for a drug vendor has to be viewed within a 
range of therapeutic choices. People with a medical problem 
will first try treatment which costs them little. Only when 
this fails will other, more costly, more inconvenient, steps 
be taken. " 
Yet the following African woman seems to be saying that this is much 
more a consequence of poverty than of preference: 
"If they or their children fall sick, even in the less 
stressed villages, the men will not pay anything for them to 
go to a clinic. Instead, the women have to go to the bush to 
look for traditional leaves, or go to a traditional herbalist, 
whom they pay with a kola nut or two. If they see no iuprove- 
ment, they sell groundnuts to raise some money to go in search 
of western medicine... As women said: if you see us using 
traditional leaves happily, it is because we don't have the 
money to get western medicine" (Welbourn 1991). 
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This chapter has revierfad approaches to defining poverty 
and vulnerability to economic stress relevant to rural 
subsistence farming caaaunities. IhIle African farmers way be 
the poorest in the world, there is a variety of evidkmce that 
they are also capable of successfully coping with economic 
stress because of lard tenure patterns and co ainity traditi- 
or of Wutaal support. ()' aced with other developing 
regions, there is relatively little inequality in rural areas. 
Seasonal changes can affect both incase and health status, 
often negatively at the same time. 
Coping with illness often takes the form of law-cost 
self treatment with modern drugs or herbal remedies, but these 
may carry health risks. Inclination towards melf-trematment 
may be as strong a force propelling people toward the use of 
®rket drugs and traditional practices as price is in deter- 
ring people from medical treatment. In enviromments where the 
two exist together it may be difficult to separate the two 
effects on choice of treat mant. 
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Chapter 4: 
Sierra Leone: Background to the Research Setting 
This chapter provides a description of the physical, demographic, and 
economic environment of the country where the field research was carried 
out. The circumstances which led to structural adjustment measures, and 
the effects of structural adjustment on health and health services is also 
described, as is the background to the Bamako Initiative programme of cost 
recovery for drugs in primary health care. 
Sierra Leone is one of the smaller countries of Africa, located on 
the west coast about 630 miles north of the equator. The Atlantic Ocean 
coastline is 212 miles in length, and it borders Guinea to the north and 
east and Liberia to the east and south. Total land area is 29,925 square 
miles. 
Five main physical regions characterize Sierra Leone and its 
agricultural base: the small western peninsula upland region, which 
includes the capital Freetown with its large natural harbour and consists 
mainly of forested mountainous terrain; the western coastal swancs area 
covering the estuaries of the main rivers, where rice is cultivated in 
drained areas and fishing is economically important; the central plains 
region where rice and other food crops are grown on irrigated plots; the 
northern region of woodlands savannah, best suited for livestock and 
vegetable and fruit production; and the southeastern upland region, where 
rice is grown on inland swancs and upland fields and small tree crop 
plantations produce coffee, cacao, and oil palm. 
The climate is tropical, with constant high temperatures and high 
humidity. There are two well-defined seasons: a hot, dry season from 
November to April and a rainy season from May to October. Yearly average 
temperature is 26 degrees C (80 degrees F), and annual rainfall ranges from 
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3.5 meters (136 inches) in the west to under 2 meters (78 inches) in the 
northeast. Although Sierra Leone lies within the West African rain forest 
zone, there is little left of the primeval forest that once existed, having 
been replaced by secondary forest as a result of shifting cultivation 
practices. 
Administratively, the country is divided into the Northern, Eastern, 
and Southern provinces which are subdivided into twelve districts and 146 
chiefdoms, and the Western Area which includes Freetown. Approximately 1/4 
of the population lives in urban areas of 10,000 or more. Freetown itself 
has about a half million inhabitants, densely packed into a geographically 
restricted area. Population density of the country as a whole is about 130 
per square mile. 
The 1990 population was estimated to be 4.0 million, with a growth 
rate of 2.3% per annum. Crude birth rate has remained constant since 1965 
at 48 per 1000, while the crude death rate has dropped from 31 in 1965 to 
24 in 1986 (World Bank 1988b). Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 
46 for men and 50 for women. The high fertility and mortality levels have 
resulted in a youthful age structure, with 44% of the population under the 
age of 14. 
There are some 18 ethnic groups in Sierra Leone of which two, the 
Mende in the South and East and the Tenne in the North, are about equal in 
number and account for about 60% of the population. Lebanese and Indian 
immigrants dominate the commercial sector and account for the majority of 
the non-African population. Krio, the language of the freed slaves from 
the West Indies who colonized the Western area in the early 19th century, 
is the lingua franca of all tribes. English is the official language, and 
is the language of school instruction after class 3. 
Islam is the dominant religion, practiced by about 95% of the rural 
population. Christianity is relatively important in urban areas, and 
animism is an inportant element of both Muslim and Christian life. Secret 
societies are equally important among all tribes (except the Krios), 
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offering initiation rites to adolescents of both sexes involving 
circumcision and training in traditional practices. 
Educational levels are very low, especially among females in rural 
areas, where the literacy rate is 12% (ILO/JASPA 1990). Among males in 
rural areas it is perhaps twice that figure. 
Infant and child mortality in Sierra Leone are among the highest in 
the world at 165 and 273 per thousand, and probably exceed these levels in 
most rural areas. These grim health statistics reflect nutritional and 
environmental factors which put everyone at severe risk of a variety of 
infectious diseases. Poor access to, and low quality of, health services 
plays an equal part. Health infrastructure expanded after independence, 
from a main hospital in Freetown and a few small district hospitals to a 
network of government hospitals in each district, with a referral system 
to three provincial hospitals and the large Connaught Hospital in the 
capital. The 27 government hospitals have a total of 2,451 beds at 
present, 53% of which are in the Western Area. This is supplemented by 10 
mission hospitals and 40 mission clinics, most of which are in rural areas. 
Doctors have been trained abroad (a medical school was established in 
Freetown in 1989) and a nursing school exists in Freetown. In the 1970s 
a prograame was started to build health posts staffed by a variety of 
paramedical cadres in each chiefdom, often through local self-help 
initiatives. 
Primary health care was expanded in the early 1980s, with MCH aides 
and community health officers (trained at a new paramedical school) 
providing most rural health care. A comprehensive plan for PHC 
organization and activities extending down from the district hospitals, 
health centres, MCH posts, and village health workers was promulgated in 
1984 (Decosas 1990). The implementation of the plan has not gone smoothly, 
being interrupted by suspension of a major World Bank project and a sharp 
reduction in MOH budgets. A Village Health Worker scheme never got beyond 
the pilot project stage. At present there are about 370 peripheral health 
units (PHUs) of three main types, most of which are in rural areas. The 
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167 Coxmunity Health Centres (CRCs) have preventive, promotive, and 
curative functions, and are nominally staffed by a community health officer 
with two years training (or by a nurse/dispenser of an older cadre of 
health workers) and a female State Enrolled Conm. inity Health Nurse, who are 
assisted by an MCH Aide and a public health inspector and ancillary 
workers. The CHC may have as many as four or six beds for emergency and 
maternity cases. The 107 Co*mrunity Health Posts (CHPs) have similar 
functions to the CHCs but have no beds and are staffed at present by an 
older paramedical cadre who have had some recent retraining. There are 
also 75 MCH Posts which are staffed by MCH Aides, and who supervise and are 
assisted by several trained traditional birth attendants. This type of 
facility has one or two room available as a clinic or for deliveries, and 
a small complement of basic MCH drugs and obstetrical supplies. The system 
is managed by district-level PHC management teams. it was estimated in 
1989 that about 35% of the population in the rural areas (comprising some 
70% of the total population) was within a1 hour walk (3-mile radius) of 
a PHU. 
Other options for curative treatment in rural areas include self- 
treatment with a considerable range of traditional herbal remedies, many 
of which are prepared at home, self-treatment with drugs sold by itinerant 
peddlers and small shops, consultation with government staff in their own 
homes for private treatment, and traditional practitioners. There are 
virtually no private medical practitioners or licensed pharmacies outside 
of the district headquarter towns. 
The country is well endowed with natural resources, and more than 75% 
of the population earn their living from the land or sea. Agriculture 
contributes about 40% of gross domestic product (GDP). The majority of 
farmrs are subsistence farmers, the main crops being rice, yaws, millet 
and cassava. The country was a net rice exporter until the mid-1970s. 
Coffee, cacao, palm oil, ginger, and palm fibre are now exported in 
significant quantities. There are important mineral deposits of gold, 
diamonds, iron ore, rutile (titanium ore), and bauxite. Unfortunately, 
serious mistakes have been made in the nanagement of the econooW, and the 
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world economy has impinged negatively on Sierra Leone's, since the mid- 
1970s. The country's natural wealth has not been converted into improved 
welfare for the vast maiority, who now suffer one of the poorest living 
standards in the world'. 
Per capita incomes increased by a respectable 3.5% per annum during 
the inmediate post-independence era of the 1960s. The 1970s brought 
economic stagnation due mainly to the oil shock and the closure of the 
country's only iron mines. The 1980s witnessed a sharp decline in real per 
capita income, with the level at the end of the decade remaining about the 
same level as in the early 1960s, and 82% of what it had been in 1970. 
Between 1980 and 1987 per capita consumption decreased by 20%, per capita 
government consumption by 40%, per capita investment by 50%, and per capita 
imports by 70% (CSO 1990). Trends in average per capita income in terms 
of hard currency are obscured by fluctuations in the exchange rate, but GDP 
per capita per year averaged over the last five years was only $211, 
considerably less than the 1987 official figure of $310. 
In the wake of the first oil shock, the government pursued a series 
of short-term fiscal counter-cyclical programmes that spanned the rest of 
the 1970s. This option resulted in large budget and balance of payments 
deficits, but failed to arrest or reverse the economic crisis. The 
deficits were financed through international and domestic lending, leading 
to a rapid increase in the country's indebtedness and in debt service 
charges. In an attempt to increase the supply of foreign exchange, the 
leone was gradually devalued. 
The main causes of economic decay during the 198015 can be classified 
into external and internal categories. With regard to the external 
factors, the international economic environment has been extremely 
unfavourable to Sierra Leone, with the weighted index of terms of trade 
(1980 = 100) falling dramatically from 121 in 1979 to 54 in 1989 (CSO 
1990). Other factors were the worsened access to the international capital 
markets and the decline in international development assistance. The 
1A DDDP Iowa Developweot lodes based on life expectancy, adult literacy, and potchuin9 power 
placed Sierra Leone third Eton last anoog 130 countries in jigs. Co. pued to other Vest African 
coatries, the lodes was leas Una half that of ligeria, Liberia, Man, and Cite d'Ivoite. 
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combined effect of falling terms of trade, increasing debt service charges 
and declining capital inflows resulted in acute shortages of foreign 
exchange that pushed the country into default on its external debt 
obligations. At present the external debt of Sierra Leone, while not 
extremely high in -absolute terms at approxinately US$ 200 million, is 
approximately 25% of GNP and is considered essentially unserviceable 
(ILO/JASPA 1990). 
Internal factors contributed in no small way to the economic decay 
of the 1980s. These can be classified as structural ones and those which 
have been policy-induced (ILO/JASPA 1990). The structural factors refer 
to the major constraints on development, including the decline in diamond 
and gold exports, stagnating agricultural exports, and the rapidly 
deteriorating state of the infrastructure. Domestic policies and faulty 
decisions have aggravated the difficult structural environment. Some 
observers trace these back to a decision to close down the railway in the 
1970s, which was uneconomical to operate but provided the only macs 
transportation for agricultural produce from the rural hinterland. A 
similarly ill-informed decision was taken to close the iron mines at 
Marampa, resulting in large drops in exports and employment. A massive 
investment in infrastructure to host the 1980 QAU conference had a 
temporary effect in stimulating the economy, but resulted in no assets of 
long-term public benefit. A large number of agricultural development 
schemes have had little effect on the rural economy, which remains 
dominated by subsistence smallholdings and traditional practices. 
Fundamental policy reforms have seldom been formulated in a comprehensive 
manner, and their implementation has been fragmented and affected by 
corruption, with the resulting effects of stagnation seen in all sectors 
of the economy. The growing fiscal deficits and associated expansionist 
monetary policies accelerated inflation, spawned a thriving parallel market 
for foreign currency, increased the smuggling of export cons dities 
(especially diamonds) and the reluctance of exporters to surrender proceeds 
to the banking system, and reduced the ability of government to mobilise 
foreign exchange for essential imports and debt service obligations 
(Longhurst et al 1987). 
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4.4.1 Government Budgetary Operations 
The collapse of the economy resulted in the government's inability 
to collect sufficient revenue to finance essential public services. Total 
government revenue as a percentage of CDeP declined from 28% in 1978/79 to 
7% from 1984 to 1986, recovered temporarily to about 11% in 1987 and 1988, 
hit an all-time low of 5.1% in 1989/90, and most recently stood at 7.8% 
(CSO 1990). Grants represent only about 20% of govern ent revenue, and the 
taxation ratio of only 6 to 10% is extremely low compared to other similar 
countries. 
Public expenditures at the beginning of the 1980s were very high at 
30% of GDP, but have since dropped to 17%, mostly at the expense of 
development expenditure. Government employment is still considered too 
high by the World Bank (personal communication) but the percentage of the 
recurrent budget given toward wages and salaries has been reduced as real 
salaries in the public sector declined steeply during the 1980s. 
Despite efforts to increase revenues and curtail expenditures, the 
fact that 54% of public expenditure is earmarked for debt servicing has 
caused the budget deficit to remain at approximately 7 to 9% of GDP in the 
last four years. This deficit has been mostly financed through Central 
Bank lending (equal to 20% of the money supply in 1989/90), which added 
significantly to the inflationary pressure in the economy. The economy has 
been dealt a further severe blow since 1990 by the costs of military 
incursions into the southeastern part of the country by Liberian rebel 
forces. Expenditures on defence increased from 8.4% in 88/89 to 9.4% in 
89/90, and climbed more sharply in 1991. 
4.4.2 Inflation and aathange Rates 
Inflation remained below 4% per annum from independence until the oil 
shocks of the 1970s, wizen it surged to 15%. It began to accelerate much 
more rapidly in 1983, when the first significant devaluation of the leone 
took place, and averaged 65% per annum through the 1980s. There has been 
a close correlation between inflation and devaluation, with variations in 
the exchange rate explaining 96% of the variations in the inflation rate 
(ILO/JASPA 1990). Various methods of revaluing the leone were tried over 
the past decade, with a floating exchange system again in effect since May 
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1990. However, the 100-fold devaluation which occurred during the 1980s 
was ineffective in either increasing exports or bringing in capital, with 
a similar rate of inflation being its only obvious effect, probably because 
the deficit was essentially not trade-related (ILO/JJºSPA 1990). 
4.4.3 Stabilization, structural adjustment and economic reform 
In the 1970s the government attempted to address the grave economic 
situation through extensive consultations with international financial 
institutions. By and large, these programmes failed, mainly due to the 
inability of the banking system to exercise control over credit to the 
government and the government's persistent resort to short-term borrowing 
on onerous terms and to extra-budgetary expenditures (Longhurst et al 
1987). In 1981, a 3-year extended fund facility was started but canceled 
after the first tranche was disbursed, and a 1984 standby arrangement with 
the I1¬ underwent the same fate. Discussions with the World Bank in 1984 
for a structural adjustment programme were inconclusive but resulted in a 
loan for a health sector project. At the end of 1986, a 1-year standby 
arrangement was signed with the IMF, but was again cancelled after the 
first tranche was paid. In 1988 Sierra Leone was declared ineligible to 
use It4F resources, and the health sector project weis suspended. In all, 
only 60.5 million SDRs were utilized of the 259.4 million agreed during the 
1980x, illustrating the difficulty of the relationship between the 
government and the international lenders. 
Since 1986, negotiations have continued with the Its' and the World 
Bank on the basis of a "shadow programme" of conditionalities monitored by 
the institutions, but without any financial disbursement and support. Most 
of the conditionalities have been standard in nature, focusing on 
devaluation, credit restrictions, budget expenditure controls, inport 
liberalization, decontrol of prices, removal of consumer subsidies, and 
higher producer prices and interest rates. Some conditions were satisfied, 
most significantly devaluation of the leone, the removal of subsidies on 
rice and petrol, and the privatisation of rice imports, but the main 
problem for the lenders was the failure to control the budget deficit. 
4.4.4 The effects of structural adjustment and stabilisation ammures 
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Those measures which were carried out occurred rapidly, causing 
considerable shocks to the economy, and the effects have fallen most 
heavily on vulnerable groups (Longhurst at al 1987) which constitute a high 
proportion of the population due to highly skewed income income 
distribution. Sierra Leone is in the group of countries in which the 
poorest 40% of the population receive less than 12% of total GNP (Chenery 
at al 1974). The poor, who spend a high proportion of their incomes on 
food, were hard hit by the removal of the rice subsidy in June 1986 which 
led to a 300 percent rise in its price over the following year. 
Devaluation, higher fuel prices, and increased producer prices caused other 
food prices to rise rapidly in proportion to that of rice, most 
significantly the price of the next two most costly food items, fish and 
palm oil. And while there are at least some lower-priced substitutes for 
rice in the rural areas, notably home-grown cassava, in urban areas cassava 
is more expensive than rice. Between 1980 and 1986 the Freetown consumer 
price index (CFI) increased by a factor of 15, while nominal wages rose by 
a factor of 4, leaving waged workers 26 percent as well off as they had 
been in 1980. A pilot expenditures and income survey in 1988 showed that 
40 percent of the urban population was living below an income level that 
would buy minimum nutritional requirements, a large increase from 1978 when 
the comparable figure was 25 percent (ILO/JASPA 1990). However, this type 
of calculation appears to be very sensitive to the definition of basic 
requirements: an analysis of 1977 data found that 65 percent of urban and 
66% of rural households had incomes below that required to meet a "basic 
needs" package (World Bank 1981). Average real household expenditure on 
food dropped by 13 percent in urban areas over the period 1978 to 1989. 
The relative effects on rural areas are less clear. Self-sufficiency 
of farmers has decreased from 93 percent of household food requirements in 
1971 to 64 percent in 1985 (UNICEF/MONDEP 1989). Longhurst suggested that 
farmers might experience a net benefit due to increased producer prices, 
but those without cash crops or a rice surplus would be as hard hit as 
urban dwellers. To date there have been no studies to confirm this, but 
increased transportation costs and the fall in world prices for coffee and 
cacao since 1987 would certainly have eroded earlier gains in some farming 
areas. Average real household expenditure on food in rural areas dropped 
by 10 percent over the decade ending in 1988 (ILO/JASPA 1990). Longhurst 
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observed that the ability to insulate the co m inity from the immediate 
shocks of the stabilisation measures appears to be stronger the further the 
community is away from urban, town or roadside centres, where the adverse 
pull effects of the cash economy appear less apparent or imminent, and, 
"the speed with which urban price and economic changes are translated into 
the economic and cash activities in rural com=ities cannot be 
underestimated. " 
A comparison of child nutritional data from a 1978 survey with 
preliminary results of one carried out in October 1989 reveals little 
change in stunting (below 90% of standard weight-for-age) or underweight 
(below 80% of standard weight-for-age) categories, but there was a rise in 
acute malnutrition (below 80% of standard weight-for-height) from 3.0 
percent to 4.8 percent on a national level. However, the two surveys were 
not done at the sane time of year, and this last increase could be due to 
seasonal differences in food availability (ILO/JASPA 1990). The 1989 
survey found large urban-rural differences in the three nutritional 
criteria, of a nature that might reflect better food availability but 
higher infection rates in the rural areas. 
Most donor-financed inputs to health have gone to primary health 
care, which has grown rapidly, led by successful pilot projects in three 
rural districts and followed rather unevenly by expansion throughout the 
country. Since 1986, programmes in immunization, diarrhoeal disease 
control, and essential drugs have been strengthened by donors. While there 
had been a drop in rates of about 25 percent between the 1974 and 1985 
censuses, infant and child mortality data is not considered reliable enough 
to discern any clear trends over the period following structural 
adjustment, or to attribute any improvements to these progranu es (UNICEF 
1989). 
The delivery of rural government services was severely affected by 
the steep rise in the price of petrol and diesel, and has since been 
further constricted by budget cutbacks. In 1989/90 the health budget stood 
at 2.3 percent of total public expenditures, down from 4.4 percent in the 
two preceding years and a high of 9 percent in 1984 (CSO 1990), and was 
equal to USS 0.64 per capita. About 57 percent of this expenditure goes 
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to paying the salaries and wages of approximately 1900 permanent, 3500 
temporary, and 6000 daily-w®ged personnel. It is unreasonable to attribute 
the cutback in goverment services entirely to adjustment and stabilization 
measures: it could be argued that the reduction in non-salary recurrent 
expenditures was rather due to a recommended stabilization measure 
(reducing government employment) that was 1121 carried out. 
A high proportion of recurrent health care costs is financed by 
outside donors, either through contributions of inputs to government public 
health programmes, or by subsidizing non-governmental health facilities, 
mainly the network of missionary clinics and hospitals which provides as 
much as 30% of primary and 50% of secondary care in rural areas. 
Development expenditures on health constituted about 10 percent of the 
total development budget from 1986 to 1989, nearly all financed through 
foreign sources. 
The context and interpretation of health expenditures is dependent 
on the overall economics of the household. In Sierra Leone, 75 percent of 
the total population, and perhaps 90 percent of the rural population, 
depends on agriculture for subsistence and cash income. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, reductions in agricultural production and food consumption are 
possible outcomes of ill-health and significant expenditures on treatment, 
so information about the existing levels of income, production and 
consumption are needed to assess the effects of user charges. While most 
of the available data is about 15 years old, it is unlikely that conditions 
and practices have changed significantly in the rural areas. 
4.5.1 The fasminq sect 
Only 5% of the total land area is under cultivation, predominantly 
by small-scale farmers using manual techniques. The average farmer 
cultivates less than 2 hectares (t4ICEF'/MONDEP 1989), the main constraint 
to expansion being a shortage of labour during peak seasons (Richards 
1986). Since moat of the arable land is unexploited, pressure on land as 
such is not serious, but fallow periods have become progressively shorter 
as the population has increased. Most land is owned cosnEiflally, with 
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family land holdings being the most cannon variant. Most meimbers of a 
community obtain access to land by settlement, often with a small annual 
cash payment to the land holding group or chief (Spencer and Byerlee 1977). 
The basic economic unit in the rural areas is the household, an 
extended family unit which produces several crops to meet its food and/or 
cash requirements. Women have a special responsibility for seeing that 
their own children are properly fed. Wives of the household head usually 
have their own separate grain plots, and the vegetable gardens are tended 
almost exclusively by women. The produce of these separate plots belongs 
to herself for her own use (Smith at al 1981). Richards (1986) estimated 
that women claim 40 percent of total household cash income from crops. 
Rice is the staple food and most important crop in Sierra Leone. Yields 
vary with the type of soil and cultivation method. Average yields for 
upland rice in 1975 of from 631 lbs/acre in the North to 770 lbs/acre in 
the East were reported by Spencer at al (1979). Swamp farms yield more 
rice than the more traditional upland farms, but the work is more 
difficult. Richards (1986) calculated yields in the area he studied 
(Southern Province) of 17-20 bushels per bushel of seed planted for upland 
rice, and 40-50 bushels per bushel of seed for swamp rice. About 1/3 of 
farmers in the North and 1/2 in the East plant swamp rice in addition to 
upland rice. Rivers flow all year round, but there are few places where 
irrigation is used. Most crops are grown during the rainy season and 
harvested at the end of the rains or early in the dry season. 
Intercropping, rather than multiple cropping, is commn, with cassava, 
maize, beans, sorghum, millet, and vegetables being grown on most of the 
cultivated area. 
Latour is the most important and costly factor in the traditional 
farming system, with the use of capital inputs such as tools, fertilizer, 
and draught power extremely low. Peak labour requirements are during the 
wet season when planting and weeding are done, and around harvest time. 
The household and extended family members living outside the household unit 
are the major source of farm labour. Labour is also available by hire and 
by exchange, often through informal groups of farmers in a village who work 
on each other's farms in turn. Individuals and other groups of labourers 
are also available for hire. Spencer et al (1979) calculated the return 
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to household labour and management from upland rice farming at (equivalent 
of) US$ 0.08 per hour in the North and US$ 0.12 per hour in the East. 
Local labour wage rates were about 80% of these levels. Seeds are obtained 
from the previous year's crop or from friends. Since the failure of 
several agriculture development projects, improved seeds have become more 
costly. 
4.5.2 Household Food Consumption 
A 1974-75 survey (Smith et al 1981) found that the most important 
foods consumed in rural areas of Sierra Leone were rice (consumed by every 
household sanpled), palm oil, dried fish, groundnuts, and cassava. Rice 
constituted 24 percent of the total value of consumption of the average 
household. The standard meal consists of rice and a sauce of green leaves, 
onions, peppers, other vegetables, and pieces of fish or meat, cooked in 
palm oil. 74 percent of rice, 80 percent of cassava, and 52 percent of 
palm oil consumed were produced within the consuming household, but wide 
variations existed in the extent to which households concentrated their 
energies on production for home consumption or for the market. Annual rice 
consumption was 93 kgs per capita, or 126 kg per consumer equivalents, 
with rather large differences between regions and tribal groups. Rice is 
found to be an economically superior good, with specific consumption 
generally found to increase with income level. Smith et al (1981) examined 
the effects of market-oriented farming activities on food consumption. For 
cassava, palm oil, and groundnuts, consuaption increased as households 
produced larger shares of the quantity they consumed, but this was not true 
for rice. The study could not confirm the hypothesis that there is a net 
nutritional benefit from the higher incomes due to cash crop activities. 
The household budget of the average rural household in Sierra Leone 
suggests an existence above Lipton's ultra-poverty level, but not by very 
n=h. Calculation of a theoretical "basic needs budget" in 1977 showed 
that food would consume 72 percent of total expenditures (World Bank 1981), 
and preliminary results from a 1988 expenditure survey (CSO 1988) found 
actual food expenditures to be about 70 percent of rural budgets over a 
wide income range. King and Byerlee (1977) found that consumption of all 
luck Maki of the bouebold is asse"d to be egsivaleat to a specified frutios of in dolt 
Nle, based os age aid sei. 
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rural food products averaged 65 to 70 percent of total consumption for all 
income groups, with an average marginal propensity to consume food ranging 
from 0.54 in the highest decile to 0.84 in the lowest decile. Thus, it 
would appear that in 1977, even the poorest tenth of the rural population 
would not have been classified as ultra-poor, but there are no recent 
comparable studies which shed light on present conditions in the rural 
areas. 
4.5.3 Inter-household and intra-household allocations 
Richards (1986) described how Mende households short of rice in the 
pre-harvest season expect to be able to borrow from those with a surplus, 
and how farmers in a position to make such loans will do so more to 
strengthen their patronage relationships than to make an economic profit. 
Welbourn (1991) observed that most people do not keep cash reserves because 
most wealth is tied up in goods which people owe or are owed, in line with 
traditional patron/client relationships. Cash is seen as static and would 
only lose value. 
The main determinant of cash flows in subsistence farming areas is 
the rice harvest. Typically, small amounts of rice are sold by farmers 
throughout the year. Farmers who are not under pressure of debt burdens 
tend to release the bulk of rice in late December or early January, while 
the indebted repay loans or sell rice to cover other commitments at the 
peak of the harvest in October or November when prices are lowest. 
Richards (1986) and others have observed that the standard rice loan by the 
wealthy, of two bushels repaid for every one bushel given out, matched the 
price swing from a pre-harvest maxim= of Le 18.00-20.00 to immediate post- 
harvest low of Le 9.00-10.00. Rice sales and remittances were estimated 
to total only 20-22% of the total harvested, and Richards commented that 
it was unlikely that the problem of Impoverishment due to forced sale of 
produce at low prices that Hill (1982) noted in northern Nigeria, was 
general in southern Sierra Leone. 
The age of the household has an important effect on well-being in 
Sierra Leone. Young, newly established households have less child labour 
and established actual labour support, or patronage relationships to call 
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upon. On the other hand, old age and widowhood are usually not associated 
with poverty (Welbourn 1991). 
Within the Mende household, Welbourn noted that it is the man's 
traditional obligation to provide the food staple, clothing, and farm 
expenses. School fees, medical expenses, and other products of the cash 
economy, have no traditional gender delineation attached to them, and are 
a matter of negotiation between the man and wife. Welbourn noted that as 
economic stresses have increased, there Is a greater tendency for men to 
opt out of responsibilities and leave matters to the women. Men and women 
cope with emergency expenses such as for medical treatment in different 
ways. Men said that they sell produce or possessions to raise the needed 
cash. While women have their own grain stores, they use them to buy 
clothes and food for themselves and their children, then are expected to 
give some grain to their husbands. Men were said to not pay anything if 
a child falls sick, leaving the mother of the child to use traditional 
remedies. If the child does not improve, the woman will sell some of her 
own produce. 
In the absence of additional information, the implications of this 
economic environment on the user fee debate are still unclear. Part of the 
problem is that data on existing expenditure levels on health care are 
probably not reliable. The best recent data is from the national income 
and expenditure survey (CSO 1988) which found health expenditures of about 
3% of total expenditures in urban areas, and 3% to 5% in rural areas, well 
within the range found elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Food consumption 
and especially marginal consumption data suggest that for the poorest 
groups, additional expenditures (e. g., on treatment) would have the effect 
of reducing the amount of food consumed by 70 to 80 percent of the amount 
spent. 
The long history of fees for service in the health sector may place 
Sierra Leone in a category apart from many other sub-Saharan African 
countries. Government hospitals have had 'bed fees' for as long as anyone 
can remember, and although these have been only nominal for many years due 
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to inflation, they would have been significant when they were instituted. 
In addition, an unofficial fee for service system has existed for a 
surprisingly long time. Hardiman and Hidgely (1981) reported the results 
of a survey of rural households undertaken in 1977, which found average 
treatment costs as follower: 
Herbalist Le 2.56 (US$ 3.07) 
Ooverr nt disperssary/health cöitte Le 4.13 (US$ 4.95) 
aovmresent hospital Le 15.03 (UB$ 18.03) 
Mission hospital Le 7.28 (US$ 8.74) 
With the steady deterioration of government hospitals, the mission 
hospitals have seen both outpatients and admissions increase rapidly 
(pangun Hospital 1990), even as they were forced to raise prices 
continuously. These were already high due to their relatively low level 
of external subsidies (typically from 40 to 60 percent of recurrent costs 
excluding expatriate salaries). 
Edwards et al (1989) reported a study made in the early 1980s, in 
which the following payments were made for deliveries: 
Location TOtal Payment (cash + kind) f paying sam 
part in kind 
Hospital Le 18.59 (US$ 9.30) 4.3% 
PHU Le 8.74 (t $ 4.37) 6.2% 
Village Le 5.03 (US$ 2.51) 26.9% 
They noted that transport costs for deliveries in hospitals might 
easily exceed that paid the practitioner, and felt that this deterred many 
women, with a resulting high rate of fetal and maternal mortality. Decosas 
(1990) observed, 
"years of underfunding of the health sector have resulted in 
low staff morale as well as complete depletion of nedical 
supplies and pharmaceuticals. The staff has responded to this 
situation with the spirit of the entrepreneur, and today most 
employees (from cleaners to medical director) conduct some 
kind of private enterprise on the hospital premises: selling 
food, drugs, bed space, or treatment. Well-stocked private 
pharmacies have opened in the neighborhood of the facilities, 
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supplying patients with drugs, dressings, catheters, gloves 
(for the surgeon), and other medical paraphernalia. Those who 
can afford it are well served by this system, but once 
stabilized usually elect transfer to a private hospital in 
Freetown or Europe; however, for the majority of patients the 
care is hazardous and frequently completely unavailable. A 
woman in obstructed labor any well find herself being 
discharged without being delivered if the family cannot raise 
the money for the operating room supplies and the surgeon's 
fee. " 
Bledsoe and Goubaud (1985) associated the evolution of private 
practice in Sierra Leone with the decline in drug supplies to government 
facilities. Theft of drugs from government facilities was widespread, 
rendering many hospitals and health centres inoperative. Most of these 
drugs ended up for sale on the street or in private drug stores or in the 
clinics of private practitioners. They found that because of theft and the 
overall drop in drug funds, 
"a sick person is more likely to find medicines at mission 
hospitals, private pharmacies owned by government-employed 
doctors, in clinics of locally trained nurses or licensed and 
unlicensed dispensers, or from shopkeepers, market women and 
often illiterate and unlicensed drug salesmen who walk from 
village to village with drugs bought from large stores in 
town. " 
4.6.1 Cost recovery in Priaary Health Gare 
Ministry of Health drug supplies have declined since the early 1970s 
when the Crown Agents and most other foreign suppliers cut off credit due 
to arrears by the government. By 1980 the Ministry of Finance could not 
allocate sufficient foreign exchange to support cash purchases from 
suppliers, forcing the central medical stores to purchase the majority of 
m OH requirements from local importers. A 1983 study estimated that the 
government weis paying 150% over world prices for its drug supplies 
(Fabricant 1983). The amount spent provided only a 3-month supply of 
drugs. 
The general shortage of drugs in Ministry of Health facilities was 
felt most acutely at the PHUs as the scarce resources were directed towards 
the urban hospitals. In urban areas if drugs were not available for free 
in the hospitals, at least patients could take a prescription to a private 
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pharmacy and get the drug, albeit at a high price. But there are no 
pharmacies outside of the major towns in Sierra Leone, and low utilization 
of PHC facilities for curative and preventive services was attributed 
largely to the lack of drugs (World Bank 1983). With the aim of improving 
the quantity and reliability of drug supplies, a revolving fund for basic 
drugs was started in the early 1980's in two PHC pilot projects run by 
1100x. A flat fee for all dispensed drugs weis charged by village health 
workers (VHW13) and health centre dispensers, who turned over the cash to 
a PHC central office, where it was used to purchase new supplies of drugs 
every few months. In 1983 the programme was working well in three 
districts, with much credit given to the involvement of the local 
communities and the chiefdom health committees (Fabricant 1983). 
The VHW pilot programme suffered difficulties and was abandoned, but 
the PHC projects have retained the drug revolving fund feature up to the 
present. They served as the model for the national-level UNICEF-sponsored 
Essential Drugs Program e, which began in 1985. After a period of 
intensive inputs from UNICEF and Africare, the system was operating in all 
districts, with cost recovery rates ranging from 60% to 90% (PMISU 1989). 
The Essential Drugs Progranme in turn became the basis of the country's 
Bamako initiative programme for PHC development, which was enthusiastically 
promoted by the UNICEF field office. UNICEF provided an initial supply of 
PHC and MCH kits, funded the construction of district medical stores, the 
renovation of part of CMS, and purchase of lorries for the distribution of 
kits to the districts. A 30% markup over the cost of the drug kits was 
divided equally between the PHU for PHC activities in conjunction with the 
local comnanity including drugs for indigents and other exempt patients, 
the district stores to pay for operations, and the central medical stores. 
District PHC management comaittees oversaw the organization and training 
of chiefdom and village health development committees, which were in 
principle responsible for the local collection and management of funds. 
The cost of replacement kits was returned to UNICEF, which provided foreign 
exchange and managed the ordering of replacement kits from its supply 
division in Copenhagen. For a period of time UNICEF aide up the difference 
between the amounts turned in and the actual needs for replacement of an 
equal number of kits. At present it continues to provide hard currency in 
exchange for leones collected by the cost recovery programme, assisting in 
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solving the problem of inflation by making the exchange as soon as the 
leones are received and keeping the dollars in an interest-bearing account. 
A 14ICEF-commissioned assessment of the cost recovery programme 
(PMISU 1989) indicated that the population and comtmmity leaders were 
satisfied with the programme and believed it had inproved the availability 
and reduced the cost of drugs compared with drug peddlers. However, an 
attenpt by the Ministry of Health in early 1989 to increase the markup to 
130% to generate local funds for expanded PHC activities net with 
resistance, and there was concern that certain aspects of the new PHC 
development strategy were being perceived in an unfavourable light. The 
assessment found instances of poor people not using PHUs because the cost 
of drugs was too high or the units were too distant from their homes. 
There were reports of higher prices than those officially sanctioned being 
charged at government facilities, (a phenomenon also observed in Guinea and 
Benin under Bamako Initiative schemes (Knippenberg et al 1990) and 
attributed to the low and irregular pay received by health staff). Other 
factors influencing low utilisation of PHUs were also identified, including 
the presence of drug peddlers and traditional herbalists. 
A question remaining unanswered was whether the benefits of inproved 
supply of drugs at moderate cost (including increased utilisation) 
outweighed the likelihood that some poor patients were unable to afford 
them. The task of assessing the effect of the cost recovery progranme was 
made difficult by the lack of baseline data on conditions before the 
introduction of cost recovery and improved drug supply. The 1989 assessment 
probed only the opinions of PHU staff and connunity leaders on this 
subject. A protocol describing this research was reviewed in July 1989 by 
UNICEF and MOH officials, who decided that the research could provide 
ininediate and operationally useful information to the progranme, and 
offered to provide full field support for a limited period of time to carry 
it out in Sierra Leone. 
C 
This chapter has presented background InformtIon on, 
Sierra Leone, and described the economic conditions which led 
to the collapse of essential drug stWlies in government 
health facilities. Donors encouraged and assisted the 
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establishment of drug revolving funds for primary health care. 
Structural adJustment had resulted in serious hardships for 
most of the population, especially urban dwellers, but the 
question of whether user charges have worked extra hardships 
on the population is made more complicated by the long history 
of fee for service in the Sierra Leone health sector. 
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Chapter 5: 
Research Objectives and Methodology 
Justification for policies which support user charges for government- 
provided curative primary health care often include the claim that equity 
can be maintained or improved if consideration is given to establishing 
'affordable' fees and protecting the poor and other vulnerable groups. 
Various approaches to setting prices have been described, but no systematic 
and objective methods of identifying the poor and establishing operational 
rules to protect them can be said to exist. This task is couplicated by 
connpiex and seemingly inconsistent relationships between price, ability to 
pay, and utilization of services. The truly controlled experimental 
environment in which a longitudinal study of the effect of introducing user 
charges on utilization can be carried out is rare, making such a study 
impossible for most countries trying to implement 'Bamako Initiative' 
progrannes. At the samne time, economic and social factors vary widely from 
one country to another, and can also be expected to vary within a given 
country, so even if a large-scale study were carried out in one place, the 
results would not necessarily be applicable elsewhere. The trend toward 
decentralization implies the establishment of pricing and exemption 
policies on a local basis, but the complexity of the problem suggests that 
some type of operational research should be carried out wherever this is 
done. 
5.0.1 The research objectives 
This research attempted to add some light to the debate about the 
effects of user charges on the utilization of PHC and the welfare of 
individuals and households. A combination of simple quantitative and 
qualitative methods was used in the field during the early phase of 
implementing cost recovery for drugs at government PHC facilities. The 
research aims were: 
A) To assess with the greatest possible precision given the 
available methods and resources: 
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1) The economic factors which affect a household's 
ability to pay the costs of basic curative care. 
2) The relative importance of ability to pay, 
price, distance, seasonality, and personal 
preferences on the utilization of PHC facilities 
and household welfare, and the policy implications 
of these factors. 
3) Whether individuals needing exemption on the 
grounds of inability to pay are known to the 
community at large or to health personnel, and if 
not, whether the economic factors identified could 
be used to identify objectively cases needing 
exemption; and that community preferences are 
relating to subsidization of the poor. 
B) By paring down the initial comprehensive study to simple 
steps defining the collection of data on fewer variables and 
the reduction of data to the level needed to sake appropriate 
policy decisions, to develop a simpler operational research 
protocol for analyzing characteristics of a target cotmunity 
for the purpose of establishing equitable pricing and 
exemption policies. 
Following a review of the relevant background literature, the basic 
process was to 1) define a conceptual framework to guide the research; 2) 
develop methods and instruments for assessing coumnity economic factors 
and the impact of user fees; and 3) apply them in the selected field areas. 
The remainder of this chapter describes these steps. 
5.1.1 ©onotuai f=a oak for instnar nt development and data analysis 
From the perspective of the debate over user charges, there is an 
underlying assumption that any illness which bears a risk of becoming more 
serious should be treated by modern allopathic medicine; if an individual 
is deterred from seeking this it may eventually be more costly to him and 
to society. It is likely that the accessibility, price, and preference for 
alternative forms of treatment influence the decision whether or not to 
make the needed expenditure for allopathic (hereafter referred to as 
'medical') treatment. If the choice is made to seek care which has a cash 
price, the necessary amount will have to be found. One of the main 
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objections to user charges is that this payment has the potential to 
adversely affect the welfare of the household. 
Rural farming households react to unplanned expenditures in several 
ways, but Nabarro et al (1989) found that the coping reaction chosen is 
likely to be one which maximises household welfare over a term lasting 
until a point when they expect conditions to change. Reduction in food 
expenditures may merely result in short-term hunger, or if carried on for 
long, in long-term dietary energy deficiency and wasting, stunting, and 
reduced ability to work. Borrowing money may have little or no adverse 
effect if the amount is small and the terms of repayment are lenient, or 
it may result in an spiral of debt from which it is impossible to recover. 
Sale of assets nay have effects ranging from none to financial ruin and 
dependency if productive assets such as land or animals are sold. The 
effects of Wt seeking or delaying treatment can range from none whatever 
(for self-limiting conditions) to premature death. The principle behind 
the development of the research methodology was that equity of access to 
government PHC is adversely affected where the price of PHC treatment 
causes a form of treatment assumsd to be of lower quality or efficacy to 
be used dien there is a possibility that the illness would became mare 
serious if not treated medically, 2C if acquiring the price of PHC 
treatment is likely to cause long-term hardship for the household. 
5.1.2 A Decision Model of Treatsent Choice and Price-Deterrence 
To quantify the effect of pricing PHC services, the effect of price 
must be isolated from other influences on utilization such as physical 
accessibility and preferences. A model was needed which would put 
enpirical data from a household survey into a framework which could be 
analyzed in an orderly manner, focusing on the effects of preferences, 
household socio-economic status (SES), prices, physical access, and how 
money is obtained. The model developed for this research was derived from 
the classical theory of health care demand, which states that the 
consumption of a given type of treatment in a population is a function of 
characteristics of the entire population and of individuals, in particular 
the population size in the catchment area, the incidence and nature (e. g., 
type, severity, duration) of illnesses, the price of the treatment and 
alternative treatments, income distribution of the population, distance of 
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the population from the treatment source, and all other preferences, 
including the individual's perception of quality and value for money: 
(for an entire population) 
popalatioa size prices of I aad oller treatseats 
quantity consoled of itl treat'est illsess tscoot/assets distance otter preferences 
Qa =0 We I, P, y, d, PCefs) 
For a given individual with a particular illness, several variables 
can be dropped from this relationship, leaving as independent variables 
only factors related to the individual, including in this case the 
individual's income relative to the price of the treatment, distance from 
alternative treatment sources, and the individual's preferences: 
(Eu ,. iriv Uul with a Jim i1Um) 
luau/outs distuwe 
goutity coesooed of it1 treat et relative to prices / other preferuces 
Q. -0 ty:, d:, pcefa)) 
Various models of health decision-making were reviewed in Chapter 3. 
young's (1981) nadel, based on a series of discrete choices, seemed a 
flexible ay of representing the variables, and was adapted as shown in 
Figure 5.1. 
Although the actual order in which decisions are made does not affect the 
final outcome, the steps are shown here in a linear manner for clarity. 
According to this model, when illness strikes, the consumer's preferences 
(a complex of the nature and severity of the illness, education, age and 
sex of the patient, perceived equality, and other, perhaps unmeasurable, 
characteristics) largely determine what, if any, kind of treatment is 
sought: medical care, or some type of traditional or self-treatment. If 
there is good access to a medical facility (a function of distance or 
travel time and cost), the final choice then rests on ability to pay (ATP) 
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Figure 5.1: uecizwn romr-L oz az®aumenc . twice 
for the (usually) more expensive medical treatment1. 
The required price is either available at home, or the money is 
obtained in some way. If the money is in hand, medical treatment is 
purchased. Three situations are potentially detrimental to household 
welfare: 1) if the needed' medical treatment is not used because the price 
was a deterrent; 2) if the amount needed for medical treatment is obtained 
in a way which could adversely affect the household medical treatment, and 
3) if needed medical treatment Wals not used because of preferences or poor 
access. only the first two categories (the bolder lines in Figure 5.1) are 
of concern here since the latter is not governed by pricing policy. 
it Is "Sued that tke prices of the wrioes treibest options are keen Is advice to the 
col uer, or at 1e1st the relative prices. 
'Yletber or lot medical treehnt was actully regiired is of cause a clisical lecisios, 
reNered eyes more problematic by the retrospective uteri of most st dies. The degree of disability 
caused by the ilUess before treatment was soOWbt was esed as a first approilmtioe of severity: 
disability of less We a day was assumed to be self-lisitiej old sot seediey medical tratsest. 
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Young estimated his model using the outcomes of the final discrete 
choices (e. g., using a western practitioner) to calculate prior 
probabilities (e. g., of believing in western medicine, of having enough 
money). In reality, there are 'grey areas' which take the form of 
continuous variables, such as income, distance from facilities, and the 
strength of preferences. Data of this nature lends itself to analysis with 
advanced econometric techniques, but even researchers who use such methods 
have warned of their difficulties and pitfalls. Conditional logit methods 
calculate probabilistic demand functions for various treatment options 
assuming maximization of a household's utility function. Some of the 
problems of these methods have been described, with perhaps the major one 
being the difficulty of specifying this utility function. Mwabu and Mwangi 
(1986), who did in fact use this technique, commented that this "is a 
difficult and hazardous task because it requires speculation and 
experimentation on the true structure of a household's preferences", and 
Bitran (1988) noted that nested multinomial logit, as used by Dor at al 
(1987) is appropriate only if it is known in advance what factors influence 
provider-related choices, and that the results obtained from a given 
dataset can differ sharply depending on which model is used. With these 
caveats in mind and the intention of replicating the technique on an 
operations-research level, the dataset wes designed to use simpler and 
better-known analytical techniques. 
Mathematical estimation of many scientific models is sinplifLed when 
a linear, additive relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variables can be assimmd as a first approximation; estimating the 
parameters becomes a straightforward task of multiple regression analysis. 
Although the preceding linear presentation of the model suggests that the 
factors are nultiplicative (i. e., the outcome is the product of 
probabilities), it could equally be argued that all factors carbine at the 
point of decision-making in an additive manner. The fact that the 
dependent variable, choice of treatment, is not continuous can be dealt 
with by using nonlinear techniques such as logit, logistic regression, or 
discriminant analysis. The difficulties become more imposing when non- 
linearities enter the model in the form of correlations between variables. 
For exadnple, income might be related to location, and preference factors 
might vary with income. The effect of distance may be a combination of a 
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linear effect of the transport cost and opportunity (time) cost, and a 
threshold beyond which a sick person does not want to travel. The more 
nonlinearities, the m re difficult, complex and unstable the solutions 
become. Without knowing the nature of the variables and relationships $ 
priori, the best approach was to be prepared to analyze the quantitative 
data in a variety of ways, but relying on sultiple regression techniques 
to isolate the partial influences of correlated factors. 
Seasonality factors, which can be assumed to affect both access and 
ability to pay, were not explicitly included in this model. Due to the 
difficulty of linking the data needed to assess these factors from the two 
cross-sectional survey (dry and rainy seasons) datasets, interpretation of 
the results was more straightforward if the main determinant factors are 
estimated separately for each season. 
After reviewing the research protocol in New York and Freetown, 
UNICEF and MOH officials decided that the research could provide 
operationally useful information for Sierra Leone's Batneko Initiative 
progrm P, and offered to provide full field support for a limited period 
of time to carry it out. A combination of methods was chosen which would 
provide the needed data in the limited time available in the field. As in 
other studies of demand for health services, retrospective data were needed 
on choice and payment of providers, but specific data were also required 
on how the patient obtained the price of treatment and on the reasons for 
not seeking medical care. This was needed from non-users of medical care 
as well as recent users, so a facility-based 'exit-poll' type survey would 
not yield the necessary information. The objective of learning which, if 
any, proxy indicators of household socio-economic status (SES) could be 
used to predict ability to pay, required that this data be obtained for 
each illness case reported. Overall, the approach called for a household 
sample survey of the general population using a multi-purpose 
questionnaire. Fortunately, one of the main resources available was a team 
of interviewers who were experienced in conducting household surveys in the 
rural areas of Sierra Leone. 
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Since household surveys might not be possible for small-scale 
evaluations of local pricing policy, a small facility-based study component 
was also included in order to determine how health facility users differed 
from the population as a whole. Other data on seasonality, identification 
of the poor, and community attitudes about equity, would also be required 
from the household survey. Information relating to the effects of distance 
and seasonality on utilization was also available from health facility 
records. 
The quantitative information weis complemented by more qualitative 
data obtained through case studies of individual households and focus 
groups conducted at village level. It was originally intended to conduct 
focus group discussions as a part of questionnaire development, 
particularly to aid in the selection of socio-economic proxy indicators. 
The available time in the field did not permit this, but focus groups were 
used to clarify questions of village life and economics which the household 
interviews raised but did not explain. The case studies served a similar 
purpose. 
5.2.1 Household survey and questia Talre design 
The design of the household survey was guided by the experience of 
the planning, Management Information, and Statistics Unit (PMISU) of the 
MoH, which had carried out several health and nutrition surveys in Sierra 
Leone, and by literature providing a general view of the problems inherent 
to this node of research (Kroeger 1983; Ross and Vaughan 1984; WHO 1986; 
Hill and Graham 1988). 
Demographics, illness, and deaths: Module 1 of the household questionnaire 
(Appendix 6) covered household demographic variables. Module 2 covered 
illness episodes within a two-week recall period, the action taken in 
response to the illness, amounts of money paid in connection with these 
actions, sources of the money, and information on deaths in a 12-month 
recall period. A two-, week recall period was based on the current view that 
this provides a good compromise for a single-round survey between the 
number of episodes captured and accuracy of recall. No effort was made to 
go farther back in time in the case of chronic illnesses because of concern 
over losing accuracy, especially for amounts spent, and because the 
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research objectives would be satisfied by extrapolating from a two-week 
slice in tine-2- The lapse of time between the onset of illness and 
seeking treatment is a related factor which may be associated with ability 
to pay. This was not addressed explicitly because it was thought that an 
account of actions taken during the two-week period would represent 
adequately the economic constraints experienced by the individual and 
household. 
Bodo-wono®ic status: The research objectives required a way of assessing 
the socio-economic status (SES) of households, for three reasons. The 
first was to be able to determine the deterrent effect of prices on 
households of different economic levels and different geographic areas. 
The second was to find the determinants of ability to pay, which could 
potentially be used as 'objective' indicators for exemptions or a sliding 
scale. Third, estimates of household incon e and expenditures were needed 
to make informed judgements about the effect of existing and increased 
levels of user charges. 
Many discussions of survey methodology have emphasized the difficulty 
of this type of assessment in rural areas of developing countries. 
Household income is probably a superior variable by which households may 
be classified, in that it is an indicator of current consumption which 
affects and is affected by nutrition and health and is also a proxy for the 
wealth reserves which enable a household to withstand longer-term stresses, 
but it is difficult to measure in a household survey. Casley and Lury 
(1981) cautioned that merely asking for a statement of income coming into 
the household is likely to be fruitless, even if those with cash incomes 
are able and willing to reveal them, and that the economic level may have 
to be Judged from the productive activities of household members, 
agricultural holdings, and expenditures. Important individual components 
of income may be difficult to measure; Richards (1986) noted in his study 
of rice farming in southern Sierra Leone that, "there are no particular 
advantages, and several obvious disadvantages under conditions of 
lilis decisioi vas iutifled by a ssbsegveat survey (PNISO 11911 vbicb food that about half 
of reported illnesses lasted less this 1 Veit, 1St lasted less tbau I eoatb, and lost clrosic 
illnesses were treated oily with isezpeosive palliatives. [sideb Bad pol (1917) fond that 12% of 
first treatsests took place is the first leek of illsess. 
105 
caupetitive poverty, in revealing details of the harvest and crop sales to 
a stranger such as myself". Booker et al (1981) described in detail the 
problems encountered in a living standards survey in Senegal, leaving the 
ingression that it is nearly impossible to carry out such a study 
successfully. 
Alternatives to survey methods for the assessment of conditions in 
rural areas have been developed, such as the 'rapid rural appraisal' of 
Chambers (1983b). A similar Wade of research, "farming systems research" 
has spawned a technique for ranking households in a community by their 
wealth (Grandin 1988), but this requires spending considerable time in a 
single connmnity. (This approach was also rejected by the advisory 
committee, who emphasized that rural villagers feel strongly about not 
meddling in or even inquiring about the affairs of others. ) 
Development of the questionnaire was informed by the need to keep 
interviews down to one hour or less so the required sample numbers could 
be achieved with available survey resources, and to avoid fatiguing 
respondents. Given these constraints, it weis decided to rely on selected 
proxy questions to obtain information on household income and wealth. Any 
question included would also have to be easily answered by any adult 
respondent. In order for a question to be useful as an indicator for 
exemptions, its function should not be easily discerned by the respondent, 
and should convey a hint that the validity of the answer could be easily 
checked. 
The final module of the questionnaire asked the interviewee's 
opinions about equity and cross-subsidization, and about seasonal factors 
to learn if they could be assessed in a single-round survey. 
Drafts of the questionnaire were reviewed by an advisory committee 
comprised of MOH officials, the Ministry of Development and Economic 
Planning, and the Department of Community Medicine of the University of 
Sierra Leone. Some questions which were too time-consuming to ask or which 
did not provide information specific to an individual household were 
eliminated or relegated to the focus group discussions. For exanple, a 
question originally proposed asked for what other purposes the honey paid 
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for treatment had been intended. The advisory committee recommended 
dropping this because it presented the respondent with a hypothetical 
situation and the responses would be unreliable. 
Draft questionnaires were pretested several tines, with the resulting 
final version requiring from 20 to 50 minutes to administer, depending on 
the number of illness episodes in the household. Pretests suggested that 
the infornntion given by respondents was consistent and within the ranges 
expected. Once in the field, however, some original assumptions about the 
importance of certain factors (e. g., garden crops) proved to be wrong, and 
additional questions were added for the second district surveyed. 
5.2.2 Interviewer training 
Based on a requirement of speaking at least one of the local 
languages of the selected districts, 20 candidates were selected for a week 
of training. All had previous survey experience and had completed 
secondary education. Some who had assisted in questionnaire development 
were sufficiently familiar with the questionnaire to assist as instructors, 
and the group was also trained in running focus groups by UNiC F staff. 
The questionnaire wes printed in English, and ez hasis was placed on the 
correct oral translation of questions into the local language. Nine 
interviewers and 4 supervisors were selected for the first field round in 
Kenema district on the basis of having Mende as a first or second language. 
The Port Loko team included the beat interviewers from the Kenema round 
plus the remaining Tenme speakers. This second group received three days 
of retraining before going to Port Loko district. 
5.2.3 Sample size 
The minimum required sanple size for a population survey is 
determined by the approximate proportion of the group under study in the 
population and the precision required of the measurenent of the actual 
proportion in the population. For a multi-purpose survey which looks at 
several different sets of population groups, the sample size should be 
based on the proportion of the smallest group for which a measurement of 
highest precision is needed. This was the group of people reporting 
illness but not using medical treatment because of cost. A prior survey 
in Kambia district of Sierra Leone (PMISU 1988a) had found that 50% had 
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used medical treatment, with 30% choosing self-treatment with traditional 
herbs, 11% using self-treatment with western medicines, and 8% using no 
kind of treatment. There were no grounds for estimating a eriori the 
proportion that did not seek medical treatment for cost reasons among those 
who were ill, but 40% was considered to be a reasonable estimate. The 
objective was to measure the proportion of those who did not use medical 
treatment because of cost (estimated per the above at 50% x 40% - 20%) with 
an acceptable degree of precision. 
The Kambia study had found a point-prevalence of morbidity of only 
75/1000 during the dry season, with prevalence in a 3-month recall period 
of 120/1000. This difference suggested that minor illnesses were quickly 
forgotten. It was reasoned that if a 14-day recall period were used, and 
if a method of prompting respondents was used to remind respondents of 
minor illnesses as suggested by Gesler (1979) and Kroeger (1983), a self- 
reported morbidity rate of about 200/1000 would be found, so if the average 
household size was 8,1600 cases of illness would be reported per 1000 
surveyed households. 
Using a standard method of calculating sample size (WHO 1986), for 
a proportion of 20% in the population, a sale of 1600 individuals would 
result in a 95% confidence interval for the entire sample of 20% +/- 2.0%. 
However, this interval would be roughly doubled to allow for non- 
independence of choices within a given household (i. e., if all household 
members are constrained in their care-seeking options by common factors; 
it was not known ai whether this was true), and the use of cluster 
sapling (i. e., households selected from within selected villages rather 
than from the district as a whole), expanding the confidence interval to 
+/- 4.0%. If equal numbers of illness cases were surveyed in each of the 
two districts, the 95% confidence interval for each district would be that 
of the entire sample multiplied by /2, or +/- 5.6%. 
The degree of precision represented by this confidence interval would 
be adequate for most planning purposes if, for example, it were used to 
estimate the number of exemptions needed. A sample size of 1000 households 
vaa considered to be close to the maximum feasible given the length of the 
questionnaire and the resources available for field work. Since increasing 
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the sample size would have required a shorter questionnaire and reduced the 
confidence interval only in proportion to the square root of the increase 
factor, a sample size of 1000 households was adopted. In the event, higher 
morbidity rates and household size than assumed were found, and 1156 
households were surveyed, with 2543 illness cases reported in a total 
survey population of 10,190 household members. The 95% confidence interval 
for the subgroup of interest is nearer to 20% +/- 1.6% for the entire 
sample, or from 16.8% to 23.2% for the entire sample assuming non- 
independence, and from 15.5% to 24.5% for each district. ' 
5.2.4 Sample Stratification 
Since an objective of this research was to develop methods for 
assessing economic factors on a district rather than a national basis, it 
was not critical to select the districts randomly. Two districts scheduled 
for expansion of the PHC program m, Port Loko and Kenema, were selected for 
the study out of the country's 14 districts, and because the 1989 
assessment of the cost recovery progranme had been carried out in both 
places. To the extent that there are differences in economic, cultural, 
and geographical factors between districts in this small country, they 
could also be considered to be representative of the country as a whole, 
while the economic and ethnic differences between the two districts permit 
useful coamparisons. 
Port Loko district (1985 est. Population 335,000) is part of Sierra 
Leone's Northern Province, with a long coastline, and an interior suitable 
mainly for the cultivation of upland and swamp rice. The primary means of 
livelihood is subsistence farming (rice and cassava), with the average 
holding only 1.24 hectares in size (MAC Sierra Leone 1986). It is 
considered to be a uniformly poor district, but has known better times when 
a large iron mine was in operation. The population is mostly Tenne, one 
of the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone. There is one large 
mission hospital in the district, but PHC development had only Just begun 
and there were very few other health facilities for a such a large area. 
'Coofidence iatervals of siallar ugoitodes would be expected for proportions of other variables 
seasored to the study, With seller relative intervals as the proportion approaches Sl%, larger as it approaches zero. 
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Cost recovery for essential drugs for primary health care in government 
facilities was started in 1988. 
Kenna (1985 est. population 329,000) is in the Eastern Province, 
where diamond mining and cash crops produce a somewhat higher average 
standard of living than most other parts of the country. Mining activity 
is limited to the Sewe River basin in the northern part of the district, 
the chief economic activity of the rest of the district being cash crop and 
subsistence farming. The average holding is 3.75 hectares, with numerous 
tree crop plantations of over 6 hectares (MANRE Sierra Leone 1986). 
Nearly half the country's coffee and over half the cacao is grown in the 
district. The population is mostly Mende, the country's single largest 
ethnic group. Private (mining company and mission) hospitals are nerve 
numerous than in other districts. PHC has been relatively well developed 
since 1985, when a programme was launched by the World Bank. 
While Kenema has more private health facilities, both districts have 
a government district hospital, ' and every chiefdom in both districts has 
at least one government PHU. Maps showing the type and locations of health 
facilities are found in Appendix 5. Taken together the two districts have 
a population of approximately 92,000 households, so the sample of 1,156 
represents a 1.3% sample of the reference population of the two districts. 
The estimated number of households in all of Sierra Leone is 486,000. 
Stratification of the household sample was necessary because of the 
logistical problems associated with surveys in remote rural areas. Access 
to villages can be difficult because of very poor roads and barriers such 
as rivers and hills, and overnight accommodation is found only with 
difficulty. The household sample was stratified geographically so inter- 
viewers could obtain the necessary sample within a limited area over a 
period of several days, and then move on to another area. The first 
stratum was the chiefdom, since these political and administrative 
subdivisions of a district are convenient units for organizing a survey. 
Two chiefdoms per district were selected, in order to compare results of 
different physical, social, and economic environments. Consideration was 
4bere is a secoid sull gotetuxat hospital is tort Lote district seat the isteIaatio0al 
airport at Losgi, but this area is relatively Isaccessibie to cost of the district. 
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originally given to limiting eligible chiefdom to those with a minimum 
number of health facilities or those within a certain distance of a large 
mission hospital, to be assured of finding enough households that had paid 
a wide range for health care. Rather than risk biasing the sample it was 
decided to select chiefdoms at random but to include urban areas, in the 
sample. Within Kenenns district one chiefdom, Malegohun (referred to in the 
following text as MAL, with 1,908 households, total population 11,700) was 
selected at random from the northern diamond-mining part of the district 
and another, Langrama, was selected from an area in the southern part of 
the district which is economically reliant on farming. A was also 
identified as an area of very high infant mortality in a previous study 
(Kandeh and Dow 1987). Langrama chiefdom had a very small population (326 
households, total population 1,817), so the adjacent chiefdom, Niawa (976 
households, population 5,558), was added to it (the two combined chiefdoms 
are referred to as LAN in following text). Two chiefdoms were selected at 
random from the acre economically homogeneous Port Loko district, Bureh- 
Maconteh-Kasseh (EW: 2,618 households, total population 22,023) and Buya 
, tonende (WY: 2,746 households, total population 23,439). 
The differences in populations between chiefdaaa presented a sampling 
problem which was eventually resolved by opting to facilitate statistical 
comparisons of chiefdoms by aamQling equal numbers of households in each 
chiefdom rather than equal percentages. The proportion of households 
sampled therefore ranged from 10 percent in BUY to 20 percent in combined 
LAN . 
A second stratification was ss>de by village. To ensure that a random 
sample of villages would include a range of distances from health 
facilities, large-scale maps were obtained and lists were made of villages 
from 0-3,3-5, and 5-10 miles from an existing PHU. The number of villages 
surveyed was set at 8 to 10 per chiefdom based on the average number of 
households per village (from census data) and experience of that could be 
accomplished in a given period of time with the number of interviewers and 
the available transport. Villages with fewer than 20 households were 
eliminated from the lists for efficiency reasons. Two or three villages 
Mlrbai areas are Wind is Sierra Leon as toms with a popelatios of 11,101 er . o: e. 
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in each distance range were selected at random, and the number of 
households to be interviewed was calculated to be proportional to village 
populations and weighted up to a total of about 250 households per 
chiefdom. Between 30% and 40% of households in each village were surveyed. 
The principal urban areas in both districts were also sanpled, with a total 
of 99 urban households interviewed in 3 areas (Port Loko to, Lunsar, and 
Kenena town). Once the interviewers arrived at selected villages, houses 
were selected quasi-randomly by radiating out from the village centre in 
all directions, with each interviewer filling his quota by starting at the 
outskirts, selecting households at random to interview on the way back to 
the centre. 
5.2.5 Household data collection 
Field data collection took place in December 1989 and January 1990. 
The rather large number of field supervisors was essential, as the team 
divided in two on occasion and the supervisors were also responsible for 
checking questionnaires before leaving a village. Interesting questions 
often arose, which were elaborated into case studies with the translation 
assistance of a supervisor. At other times supervisors were used to inter- 
view patients at health facilities while the interviewers were occupied 
with households in the same village. Photographs of the interview teams 
and village life are reproduced in Appendix 5. 
Protocol required sending an advance party to visit the paramount 
chief seat before the teams entered a chiefdom. Another advance party 
moved out to the villages to advise them which day the team would be 
working there. Village chiefs usually arranged lodging for the team where 
necessary, and more importantly, asked all household heads to remain at 
home until the interviews were completed. There were no instances of 
household members refusing to cooperate. 
Quality control for the household survey consisted of an immediate 
review of all completed questionnaires by the field supervisors, which were 
rechecked by the researcher or senior PMISU staff while still in the 
village. one or more pieces of missing or inconsistent data was found in 
about every third questionnaire, which were given back to the interviewer 
for immediate correction, often requiring a return to the household. T 
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or three interviewers out of the 20 employed required significantly more 
supervision and correction, and in the case of one it was found later that 
he had consistently recorded the answer to one question incorrectly. (This 
was correctable since the interviewer's code number was part of each 
interview record. ) After all questionnaires had been corrected, about 15% 
of questionnaires were selected at random and kept aside while supervisors 
returned to the selected houses. Respondents were reinterviewed about 
illness episodes and expenditures and selected additional questions, and 
the answers recorded on separate forms. A paper based on the results of 
this assessment of non-sampling error is included as Appendix 3. 
An error. in instructions for interviewers in the questionnaire was 
found after the field data collection had been completed, affecting those 
cases using drugs already found in the home. The result was that for two 
subsequent questions these responses are missing, accounting for 4.6% of 
all cases, or 7.2% of all cases in the important category of using non- 
medical treatment. wile this reduces the total sample for those two 
questions and for crosstabulations using their results, there weis no reason 
to believe that the absence of those cases introduced any significant bias. 
5.2.6 Rainy Season Survey 
A followup household survey wes carried out in September 1990 during 
the rainy, pre-harvest season. This time fewer logistic resources were 
available, limiting the survey to a sample of 200 households in 6 villages. 
Several questions about sources of health and household expenditures were 
added in order to clarify some questions which had arisen in the first 
round of the survey. The main objective of this survey round was to 
examine the effect of seasonal factors on access, especially on the use of 
? pi primary health care facilities. 
5.3.1 Facility-based data 
To meet the objective of corVaring users of health facilities with 
the general population, the questionnaire for users of health facilities 
followed the pattern of the household questionnaire, but was pared down so 
it could be administered more rapidly. 167 patients were interviewed at 
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health facilities (PHC units, government hospitals, and mission hospitals) 
to learn if they represented the population as a whole and thus could be 
used as informants, rather than having to do a community survey for future 
district-level research. Health facility service statistics were also 
collected where available at PHUs and mission hospitals where they could 
supplement other information about utilization, effective catchment area, 
seasonal effects, and prices charged. Difficulty wes experienced in 
finding enough patients at PHC units and district hospitals, so the 
majority of the sample was from two mission hospitals. (Because of this 
bias, and the fact that the users appeared to represent a mph wealthier 
segment of the population, the data were not used in the analysis here, 
except for one piece of supporting information). Data were also recorded 
on service statistics and reasons for visits, seasonal changes, 
prescriptions, and distances traveled by patients. 
5.3.2 Focus groups and case studies 
One village in each chiefdom was selected randomly for focus group 
discussions after the household survey had been completed. An initial 
agenda was based on questions which had arisen during the first few days 
of household interviews. The village chief was asked to choose ten men and 
women he felt would represent the village, and when the group gathered in 
the evening six or seven of these were selected by the survey staff. Other 
villagers listened in and were occasionally asked to give their opinion on 
a topic. The discussions were characterized by much repetition and rela- 
tively little debate, but some open and lively discussions took place. One 
supervisor acted as the moderator and another took notes, and the 
proceedings were also tape recorded. Sinultaneous translation into English 
allowed the investigator to exercise a degree of control over the direction 
of the sessions. In Port Loko new questions were added to the original 
agenda to clarify some issues which had arisen. Each focus group lasted 
about one hour. 
As the investigator reviewed questionnaires while in the villages, 
certain households which exhibited typical or extreme examples of illness 
or particularly high or low ability to pay, were singled out. A further 
interview for a case study was made with the help of an interpreter, for 
eleven households in each district. 
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A data entry program using dBase III+ as written for questionnaire 
data entry on a microcomputer. The only coding done after the field data 
collection was for the description of the illness or synptoms, which were 
coded into standard disease classifications by a trained medical 
statistician. Three cou pleted database files contained questionnaire 
information on 1156 households, 2543 illness cases, and 426 deaths, with 
two other files for village and health facility user data. Data entry was 
verified by conparing printouts from the database files with the original 
questionnaires. All dBase files were converted to SPSS system files, which 
linked village-level information such as distance from health facilities 
with household-level data and data on individual illness cases. The final 
quantitative analysis was done using SPSS/PC+. 
The other survey instruu nts were analysed qualitatively. Cassette 
recordings of the four focus groups were translated from Mende and Tempe 
and transcribed, and case studies were prepared from written notes. Mile 
systematic analysis of this type of data is sometimes problenatic, the 
uniformity of the questions used provide clear opinions and answers to many 
key questions about rural household economics. Data from health facility 
users' questionnaires was entered in a form which permitted comparison with 
the general population sample. 
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Chapter 6: 
Exploring The Influences on Demand 
for Medical Treatment 
Part A: Morbidity, expenditures, and the preference and 
access factors 
The household survey dataset was designed to depict affordability and 
equity with respect to price, income, and distance factors. Analysis of 
the data was guided by the conceptual model described in the preceding 
chapter, with its primary outcome or dependent variable the choice between 
medical and non-medical treatment, in particular the choice between 
government PHC units and self-treatment. 
The choice of treatment wes assigned to be a function of three primary 
utilization factors (preferences, access, and ability to pay), in some 
linear or non-linear combination. The primary intrinsic, household-level 
factors were considered as independent variables: 
a) Sgeference: was assumed to be a combination of the 
particular illness and its severity, 'western' orientation, 
age and sex of the patient, perceived quality of services, and 
other, unmeasured factors. 
b) aocesz: was assumed to be related to the distance to fixed 
health facilities, or related factors such as transport cost 
and time. 
c) abilý to oav: a household ATP index w®s based on the 
amount of money spent on curative treatment over the recall 
period and how the money was obtained. It was assumed that 
this was related to incom, assets, and other, unmeasured 
factors. 
Price was implicitly incorporated in the model through the choice of 
the treatment used. As will be shown, price differences between various 
treatment options (especially medical vs. non-medical) were so large that 
there could be little doubt that the consumer was aware beforehand of at 
least the relative prices, so the choice would be based partly on price. 
Price was not an explicit independent variable however, so the model is 
most useful in conparing the characteristics of households rather than the 
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effects of price differences. price effects will be noted where 
appropriate. 
Variables from the household survey used in the conceptual model were 
first examined by cross-tabulation with the dependent variables. The 
objectives of the first stage of data analysis were to a) identify 
important variables for inclusion in the model, and b) to ensure that they 
met the requirements of the statistical methods used later on, transforming 
the data where necessary and removing outliers. in the second stage, the 
relative importance of the model's primary factors were estimated using 
multiple regression, and these results were used to clarify other 
observations. This chapter discusses the first stage analysis of 
preference and access variables. Income effects are covered in Chapter 7, 
and the regression models, including seasonal factors, are discussed in 
chapter 8. Seasonality was assumed in the model to affect both access and 
ability to pay, but to simplify the analysis and interpretation of the 
results, dry and rainy season models were estimated in Chapter 9 using 
separate regression models from the datasets of the two survey rounds. 
Standard statistical approaches have been used in reporting the 
quantitative results of the household surveys. For the cross-tabulations 
of categorical variables, chi-squared tests were used to determine the 
probability of true associations, and for continuous variables such as 
esounts paid, one-way analysis of variance (mm) was used to test the 
significance of differences in means and obtain confidence intervals. 
»IOVA takes into account the effects of non-sampling error (measured by 
doing reinterviews, as discussed in detail in Appendix 3). For categorical 
variables for which high rates of misclassification error were found, since 
there is no standard method for reporting the total error, the probable 
effect on the observed association has been noted in the text or the 
tables. 
6.1.1 Morbidity 
Morbidity, the etinulus for seeking treatment, weld reported for the 
two-week recall period. There were 2543 illness cases in the entire 
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household sample, for an average of 2.2 cases per household. This is 
higher than found in earlier surveys in Sierra Leone (PMISU 1988a, 1988b), 
probably because of the use of prompting by interviewers, but is comparable 
to that found in several other surveys in sub-Saharan Africa. The severity 
of the illness episode was rated on the basis of the reported duration of 
adult disability or child abnormal behaviour, with episodes lasting nage 
than one day counted as severe. As seen in Table 6.1, the rates for non- 
severe episodes (mostly self-limiting minor complaints) were similar in the 
five geographic areas studied (the 4 rural chiefdoms and combined three 
largest urban areas in the two districts),, but there were large differences 
in the rates of severe illness. LN4 chiefdom stands out with a mich higher 
rate than the others. The urban areas had lower incidence of both severe 
and non-severe illness. Overall, Keneea district (LAN and MAL) had 
significantly higher illness incidence than Port Loko district (p<0001), 
and differences between Chiefdom were also significant. Specific causes 
of nErbidity are discussed in a later section. 
Table 6.1: 
geographic area 
Per capita arocbidity rates by seMecity and 
Specific rbidity 
(rate/1O2! ion) 
ENc BUY LM MAL t 
Severe cases 131 144 205 135 113 
Non-severe cases 102 101 98 106 85 
Total morbidity 233 245 303 241 198 
6.1.2 Mortality 
A total of 426 deaths of household asters occurred in the preceding 
12 nnnths. The crude death rate in rural Kenna district was significantly 
(pß. 03) higher at 46.6/1000 than Port Loko (38.8/1000) or urban areas 
(24.9/1000). prong chiefdoms, LAN had the highest rate, but the difference 
was significant only at the p. 06 level. While children under 5 years of 
age accounted for 40.4% of all reported deaths, this age group was just 
15.5% of the sampled household population. The adult death rate was 
proportional to their representation in the ample, and children of age 5 
lie 
to 14 had the lowest death rate. Males had a slightly higher mortality 
rate than females. 
infant mortality for the two rural districts was calculated at 153 
for port Loko and 240 for Kenems, but age cohort information was not 
complete enough to calculate child mortality rates. These I1 R'a are within 
about 10% of those obtained in PMISU baseline surveys (PHISU 1988b, 1990), 
in which the more accurate method of using numbers of live births per 
mother weis used to calculate I)(I and CMte (Appendix Table A1.1) . 
causes of death (as recorded by the interviewer and later coded by 
a medical statistician) by chiefdom are shown in Appendix Table A1.2. 
Malaria/fever was the most co men cause of death, with respiratory 
infection the second leading cause, followed by infectious diseases 
including neonatal tetanus. Compared to a previous specific study of 
infant and child mortality (Kandeh and Dow 1987), it appears that deaths 
fron tetanus may have been under-reported. The chiefdom having the highest 
incidence of malaria morbidity also had the highest reported death rate 
from malaria. Most deaths were due to causes that could be prevented or 
treated before progressing to a fatal stage by effective PHC. 
Table 6.2 shows the choice of treatment used, for the entire dry 
Dawson sample by geographic area. There were significant differences 
between areas, but self-treatment with market drugs weis the most common 
treatment option used overall, followed by self-treatment with traditional 
herbs. Treatments included in the latter category were wetly self- 
prepared, but 18% involved payment of a herbalist. Use of other 
traditional practitioners was mostly reserved for chronic cases which had 
not responded to medical treatment, or severe cases in which witchcraft was 
believed to be involved. Among medical treatment choices, government PHC 
units (PHU) were used mist frequently, followed by consulting PHU staff 
Maters privately, using mission hospitals, and using government district 
hospitals. In the analysis of this utilization data, visits to government 
or mission hospitals, private allopathic practitioners, and PHU staff seen 
privately, are grouped under the rubric 'other medical'. PHU visits plus 
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'other medical' thus equal 'all medical'. For the entire sample, awe form 
of medical treatment was chosen as a first response in 35.3t of illness 
episodes. Same differences in utilization between geographic areas, such 
as the low utilization of PMUa and high use of mission hospitals in BUY.. 
were due at least in part to factors which were known before the survey, 
specifically the frequent closure of one PHU in ff1Y and good access to a 
mission hospital in that chiefdom. 
Table 6.2: percentage of vases using treatment options as a first action, 
by yeograQhic area. 
Firs! Action Taken 
'60VERNNENT GIST HOSPITAL 
OOVERIMENT PHC IMIT (PHU) 
. N18SI w HOSPITAL 
KUGS rim Koko 
TRADITIONAL HEALER 
NOVERIMENT STAFF PRIVATELY 
HERIAL TREATMENT 
, PRIVATE NOSPITAI/PRACTITIONEI 
HAD MISS AT NONE 
No TREATMENT 
6eogra Mic Area CARS 
Percent 
fa #other dial' treatst 
Percent Using Treatment Choice 
PORT LOKO LIST Kf1IEMA IIST 
thOMI 
Total 
Treatment 
m ROY LAN NAM. Percent (uses) 
.2 
72 
1.7 1.3 16.1 2.21 36 
21.0 6. S 24.2 21.2 5.6 20.11 510 
.t 12.0 .1 S. 1 1.0 5.41 137 
22.5 39.2 23.2 24.3 21.9 27.51 611 
4.2 3.2 1.3 2.6 .6 4.61 117 
1.7 3.6 7.1 12.3 10.7 6.51 165 
21.9 20.8 22.3 11.1 10.7 20.21 513 
.2 .5 1.3 9.6 1.11 21 
3.7 3.6 S. 7 4.2 8.4 4.61 l11 
1.0 9.1 S. 1 7.1 6.7 7.81 190 
100.01 100.0% 100.01 100.11 100.01 100.01 
L 
520 
20.5 
665 
26.2 
633 
24.9 
543 
21.4 
171 
7.0 
2531 
100.0 
6.2.1 &15e7ue<rt actions men in i11ne6s episcöas 
A second action was taken in 11.5% of illness episodes, and a third 
in 0.5% of cases. As seen in Appendix Table A1.3, self-treatment with 
herbs rather than drugs wsa the prost co en second action, and greater use 
was also made of hospitals. People appear to be highly flexible in their 
choice of treatment: a different type of treatment wss usually tried if the 
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first treatment failed to effect a cure. Table 6.3 shows that 94% of those 
who used traditional treatment (herbal self-treatment or a traditional 
healer) used a different category for a second treatment, with moat 
switching to medical treatment. 87% of those using market drugs first 
changed, with most trying traditional treatment next. 69% of those using 
medical treatment first changed, with most trying a traditional treatment 
next. 
Table 6.3: Seoad type of treatment uem by first type of treatment und 
First Treatment 
Count MEDICAL T 7 AD'L 
Cal pct DRUGS Row 
Second Treatment Total 
37 21 52 110 
MEDICAL 31.4 30.0 59.1 39.9 
22 9 31 62 
MARKET DRUGS 18.6 12.9 35.2 22.5 
59 40 5 104 
ITICHAL 50.0 57.1 5.7 37.7 
Column 118 70 Be 276 
Total 42.8 25.4 31.9 100.0 
6.2.2 Trestaeifis axed in ý resulting in death 
Appendix Table Al. 4 shows that a such higher proportion of cases 
(62.4% vs 35.3%) ending in death received medical trat than general 
illness cases, with PMJB the most frequently used source of treatment. 
Mission hospitals were used more often than for first actions, and auch 
higher use was even made of the government district hospitals, which did 
not have a reputation for good quality care. The most consun second action 
taken in cases ending in death wes use of traditional herbal treatment or 
a traditional healer. 
When some type of non-medical treatment or no treatment was used, the 
respondent wes asked the reason for choosing that treatment. Responses 
euere coded by the interviewer, with results shown in Table 6.4. Lack of 
money was given as the verein reason in 53.1% of cases. 
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Table 6.4: Remo or not ming medical tre& iit (first acticr ) 
Geographic Area 
Pct INK MY LAN MAL URI All 
THOUGHT NOT SERIOUS 11.0 12.5 6.1 15.4 31.3 11.9 
T (ETTER SGIM .7 4.5 1.1 1.2 3.0 2.1 
TOO FAR TO TRAVEL 5.7 8.0 24.4 10.3 1.5 12.1 
EIgij NOISY 54.6 51.6 55.2 33.0 41.1 53.1 
$0P'T LIKE PMU, STAFF 1.4 1.5 .3 1.2 1.0 
TN/ANT (RUBS MAILABLE 2.1 .5 1.3 2.6 1.5 
1 EFFECTIVE FOR PROILER 8.2 7.3 2.1 2.0 4.7 
KNEW A SELF-TREATMENT 13.1 7.3 4.2 0.3 14.1 1.2 
OTHER .7 2.1 3.7 2.8 7.5 2.8 
PHU As CLOSED .7 2.3 e e f .0 
MIT KNM 1.1 1.8 1.6 2.4 1.7 
Colson Total 100.01 100.02 100.01 100.02 100.02 100.01 
Area Cues Ares Percept 282 20.5 359 29.0 377 27.4 253 11.4 67 4.9 1378 100.0 
11 this mause vas coded osiy is Part Loko district 
34.3% of illness cases' were apparently deterred from medical 
treatment by lack of money. This high proportion would seem to indicate 
a serious problem of affordability, so the data were examined in closer 
detail. Most of the response patterns appeared reasonable: for example, 
the highest rate of 'too far to travel' in LAN was consistent with mean 
distances to both PTAs and hospitals being greatest there. But given the 
low use of PHUS in BUY, a higher response "es expected for 'P0.3 wes 
closed'. Examination of village-wise data suggested that the low 
utilization weis due to the fact that most of the Pl in this chiefdom were 
MCH units, which provide fewer services than Coanunity Health Centres and 
posts. Urban areas were apparently less affected by financial problems 
than rural areas. The quality control reinterviewe (Appendix 3) indicated 
that while most other individual response categories for reasons were 
'Cilcelete8 by u1tiplyiy the 14.7% that lid Net ISO medical trataeet by 1.511, the preportiu 
that said they lid met have eaeiO Meer. 
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reliable, there was confusion of 'too far to travel' with 'not enough 
money', suggesting that sane respondents had been confronted with the 
problem of insufficient nnoney for both transport and treatment, or that 
lack of transport or lack of time might have been the more accurate reason 
for others. The true confidence intervals for this category is probably 
nearer +/- 6% rather than the +/- 1.2% due to sanpling error alone. (This 
had the effect of reducing the statistical significance of the difference 
between the urban and rural areas to the 90%, or p<0.10, level. ) 
The reasons given for non-medical treatment for second actions 
(Appendix Table A1.5) differed from first actions mainly in the high 
proportion of those who had used medical treatment initially and thought 
the medical practitioner would not have been effective. 
The total cash amount= paid in connection with an illness episode 
was closely associated with the type of treatment used, as shown in Table 
6.5a. The lower part of the table also indicates considerable differences 
between geographical areas. Differences between mean amounts paid for 
different kinds of treatment (except for traditional practitioners) were 
statistically significant (p<O. 0001) for the sannpie as a whole and for each 
geographical area taken alone. This was also true when treatments were 
grouped into the general classifications which will be used in the analysis 
of treatment choice: other medical (government and mission hospitals, 
pHU staff seen privately', and other private allopathic practitioners), 
adhn the question was asked the second time, 11% of sashed respondents gare a different silver. 
the rate for the category 'sot enough mosey' increased fron S1. S% to 51.4%, and the category 'too far 
to travel' dropped almost the same amoest. The 'gross error' (see Appendix 3 for as explanation) for 
the category 'act enough moser' was -1t %, but there is to accepted ray to use this son-sampling error 
to modify the confidence, interval of the variable. 4a first approximation, the likely nos-sampling 
error was takes as I. S(#/- 111), or +/- S. S%, which An combined with the sampling error of 4/-1.2% 
resulted is a total error of 4/- 1%. 
9tavel tine ras treated is a separate detersieaat IN this imalysis. Valtiag time was negligible 
except for hospital outpatient visits, and even tleu the vile of this time ras small compared to cask 
arouwts paid. 
'Prices paid to Pig stiff sen ptintelr rare lover tlse the other option iecloded is the 'other 
medical' 'coop. this clessificatios was used throughout the nalysis tether than grouping those 
providers with PH visits, because they Delved as private practitioners, vere sees as an alternative 
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self-treatment with drugs (either purchasing drugs or using drugs already 
at home), self-tzeatment with herbs, and traditional healer, as shown in 
Table 6.5b. Similar patterns were seen in each geographic area, and also 
for the amounts paid for second actions (Appendix Table A1.6). 
Table 6.5a: Mean and median amounts spent on illness episodes by treatment 
used and geographic area 
Mwnt Paid For Action 1 
For all Chiefdoms 
Coe: eltatloe 
aid Drags 
Travel and 
Inctdeatals" 
leas 
Total 
Tali 
Mediae 
Total 
paid 
( 
Perceet 
payiq 
: eye 
60V'T DISTRICT HOSPITAL' (n=56) 342.1 138.0 480.1 200 1.91 
60V'T PHU (n=510) 121.0 4.3 133.3 70 10.41 
MISSION HOSPITAL' (n=137) 500.5 169.4 669.9 290 0.12 
DRUBS FROM MARKET' (n=697) 55.7 0.1 55.8 24 0.71 
TRADITIONAL HEALER (nail? ) 83.7 5.1 88.8 20 23.61 
60V'T STAFF PRIVATELY (n=165) 172.9 15.6 188.5 90 9.11 
HERBAL SELF-TREATMENT (n=513) 8.1 0.1 8.2 0 82.21 
PRIVATE DOCTOR/HOSP' (n=28) 482.9 153.5 636.4 160 7.11 
HAD DRU6S AT HOME' (n=118) 0 0 0.0 0 100.01 
NO TREATMENT (n=198) 0 0 0.0 0 100.01 
For all Treatments 
.................................. ..::.: ".:..:..:,:..,,...::...::. "... _.:.,,..,.:.::.:::::. ý. ". ":.: "::..:.... .:.:::.:.::.:::.:.::::. " 
BMK chiefdom 51.4 3.0 54.4 10 42.71 
BUY chiefdom 85.1 15.0 100.1 20 34.2% 
LAN chiefdom 73.8 19.0 92.8 20 34.11 
MAL chiefdom 161.0 31.6 192.6 40 28.01 
URBAN areas 139.7 0.2 139.9 40 31.21 
Notes to Table 6.5a: 
only cash prices were considered in this table 
b Grouped as 'other medical' 
Grouped as 'market drugs'. 
The differences between geographic areas seen in Table 6.5a are due 
mainly to much higher amounts paid for PHU treatment in MAL and the higher 
cost of transport to hospital in MAL. The last column of Table 6.5a 
indicates the rate at which patients are exempted or have charged deferred. 
The high exenption rate reported for traditional healers was due to the 
to the Pig, aid probably would mot be bond by official pCiclij policies. 
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practice of not demanding payment until the often lengthy treatment is 
finished. Interviewers' notes revealed that most exemptions in the PHL1s 
were because the patient was a relative of a staff member. The low average 
cost of treatment in BW was due in part'to the low rate of using mission 
hospitals there, but lower prices were also found to have been charged for 
PHU treatment in that chiefdom. 
The PHU price levels observed indicated that there had been a high 
level of overcharging by staff. The official prices of drugs included a 
30% markup, but as shown in Table 6.5c, the actual prices charged were 
perhaps 5 times the official prices in Port Loko district and 8 times in 
Kenems district. Some of this markup was used by staff to cover transport 
costs for replenishing drug supplies and the patients they treated free. 
Some staff said they used a higher markup on cheaper treatments such as for 
malaria in order to keep the price of more expensive treatments low, but 
while there were few accurate prescription records kept, the price data in 
general does not support that claim (except that the full price of 
injections appears to not have been charged in some cases). In fact, it 
was fairly well known to senior MOM officials that staff had been 
substituting the unofficial markup for salaries which had not been received 
for months. 
qhahle 6.5b: Mean amol*tl a Dail bi, tiraueeä trewlmw. rf f -Uri 
eaiaet ire 
r 
Range 
Paid 
! lean ]Iýotrt 
Spst peer 
episý (Le) 
S. D. 95% 
Oanfidence 
Interval 
PHU 0-1792 133.1 210.1 114.3-152.3 
Other medical 0-7000 425.9 831.0 338.5-513.5 
Drugs self-treat. 0-2000 47.3 105.9 39.8-54.8 
Herbs 0-500 8.2 38.9 4.8-11.6 
Traditional Pract. 0-2000 88.8 
L 
229.5 45.4-132.1 
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'table 6.5c: bison of Eil! ozices clamed (Le) by aeocrachic area 
All treatments Malaria an1y- 
Child (n) Mult (n) thud (n) Adelt (n) 
__K 73.0 (64) 151.8 (72) 51.3 (24) 136.4 (9) 
BUY 86.4 (14) 67.1 (21) 79.0 (5) 50.0 (2) 
LAN 83.1 (66) 130.9 (82) 83.8 (25) 229.9 (17) 
WAL 138.8 (80) 261.0 (64) 122.2 (43) 326.7 (12) 
. RB 
40.0 (5) 124.0 (5) 0 (1) 160.0 (2) 
" Includes cases with asuoia. Official prices of drugs were chioroquine tablets 150 01 bast: Le 0.90 to, 
aspirin tablets 300 p: Le 0.20 tag folic acid Le 0.20 ea, cbloroquine syrup 50.1 vial Le 15.00 ea. An 
course of treatment (including folic acid) should have cost Le 18.00 for adults, And Le 9.00 for children 
or Lo 18.00 if chloroqulue syrup was given. 
Mean amounts paid were considerably higher than the median a punts 
because of a smell number of cases in which amounts up to 25 times the mean 
were paid, and, for some treatments, because of some cases paying nothing 
at all. The two measures are highly correlated, and both are useful in 
these analyses: the means represent total spending of a group of cases but 
say little about the distribution, while the medians provide informetion 
about the distribution but do not reflect the effect of individual high 
expenditures. Table 6.5d shows the preponderance of low prices paid for 
individual first actions, resulting in a mean of Le 108.7, but a median of 
only Le 20.0. 
'table 6.56: DietribitIcn of tseatemt costs, full sa Qle (f isst actiam ) 
Price range (Le) Percent of Cäses 
0 34.5% 
1-20 18.9% 
21-50 14.0% 
51-100 14.3% 
101-200 8.6% 
201-500 5.4% 
501-1000 2.7% 
1001-2000 1.0% 
> 2000 0.6% 
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6.4.1 TOtal health espditures and expenditure by treatMMt option 
Total expenditure during the 2-week recall period for the 
entire sample was Le 302,796, or Le 261.9 per household. The large 
difference in the prices of different treatment options is thrown into 
sharp relief when the portion of total spending is compared to relative use 
(Table 6.6a). PK) use, which comprised 20.2% of first actions, accounted 
for 20.7% (c. i., 16.3 - 24.1) of total spending, but 'other medical' use 
(15.4% of first actions) accounted for 62.1% (c. i., 46.8 - 77.4) of total 
expenditures. In contrast, drugs (31.8% of first actions) accounted for 
only 12.1% (c. i., 9.6 - 14.6) of spending. These proportions varied widely 
between geographic areas because of the different utilization patterns and 
price levels. (These expenditures on treatment are compared with household 
income in chapter 7. ) 
The distribution of household aggregate spending in the recall period 
is less skewed than the distribution of prices of individual treatments 
shown in Table 6.5d. Most households had more than one illness case, and 
only rarely were low amounts paid for all actions in all cases. Table 
6.6b shows that most households still paid relatively little (the median 
aenumt wss Le 80) while a few paid high amounts. However, it is iraposeible 
to conclude from this data that a similar skewed distribution would be 
found for expenditures over the course of a year. 
Table 6.6a: Propoortion of total health e3gwdituae by treatment option and 
naearachic area 
Geographic Area 
Ttwtow t Choice HK aff LAN IGL URBAN 
Government PHU 20.7% 53.7% 3.7% 26.5% 22.3% 5.9ý 
Other medical 62.1% 14.1% 77.2% 45.5% 70.1% 76.3% 
Self-treat drugs 12.1% 16.9% 18.0% 16.6% 5.4% 13.8% 
Self-treat herbe 1.7% 8.4% 1.3% 0.8% 0.9% 0.3% 
Trad. healer 4.7% 10.5% 2.2% 10.5% 1.9% 3.9% 
101.3% 103.6% 102.4% 99.9% 100.6% 100.2% 
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Table 6.6b: Distribution of aggregate treatment ex dituaes, full smVie xxm=xo I of aggr treat#ý[lt e3geMltm 
H enditurea (Le) 
mmmmm 
Percent of Comm e 
mý 
0 18.2% 
1-20 13.5% 
21-50 10.7% 
51-100 13.7% 
101-200 13.0% 
201-500 16.2% 
501-1000 7.9% 
1001-2000 3.1% 
2001-4000 2.6% 
> 4000 1.1% 
6.4.2 )l=anes of prices 
Respondents who said they did not use medical treatment because of 
insufficient money were asked how such they thought medical treatment in 
general would have cost1. This could be considered a hypothetical 
question, but allowance as made for respondents not knowing (55% did not 
know), and they were not prompted for an answer. Figure 6.1 compares the 
mean amounts that respondents expected medical treatment would have cost 
with the mean actual prices paid locally for PHU and 'other medical' 
treatment. In all geographical areas except SW and the urban areas, the 
mean asuunts stated (by respondents who answered the question) were such 
closer to the actual local mean cost of treatment at hospitals and private 
practitioners, and were from 2 to 6 times higher than the mean cost of PHU 
treatment. A similar relationship was found when median amounts were 
cos ared. Differences between means of actual and supposed costs were 
statistically significant (p<. 001). 
The extent of mistaken expectations can be judged from the fact that 
only 25% of respondents (including those who said they did not know the 
cost) thought medical treatment would have cost leas than Le 300, a level 
1Istervievecs veto lutnctei to uk: flee aid weld you hot poll if you rest to a 'I@ctet' 
to get udiciee? ' Any ellopetlic provider 1sc1Nisg ! 11 disposers es1 ceruitr health officers were 
thought of as 'doctors'. 
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1.20 
1.00 
00C 
60( 
401 
20( 
Amount per episode, leones 
BMr BUT LAY MAL URB 
Geographic Arge 
® Actual PHU Cost 
Q Actual Hospital Cost 
" Thought Hedical Cost 
Figure 6.1: Mean amount respondent expected medical treatment would have 
cost versus actual PHU and hospital casts. (note: '9W' hopitat oasts are 
based on only 2 cases) 
higher than that paid in 90% of all PHU visits. Differences in expected 
price between different household income groups were not statistically 
significant. However, respondents located nearer to PHUs gave more 
accurate answers (mean responses were Le 321 for respondents within 0.5 
mile of a PHU, Le 569 from 1 to 5 miles, and Le 737 beyond 5 miles, with 
p<. 001). Because there was no such effect versus distance to a hospital, 
this must have been due to the nearer respondents having better 
information, rather than the more distant ones including the cost of 
transportation in their estimates. 
6.4.3 Correction to financial deterrence 
While only small amounts were spent in most cases in which 'not 
enough money' was given as a reason for not using medical treatment, in 
about 9% of these cases the amount actually spent on drugs or traditional 
healers exceeded the median amount paid locally for PHU treatment. This 
meant that either these cases were not correctly informed about the cost 
of PHU treatments or the reason given was incorrect since money was 
actually on hand. In either case, for the purpose of estimating the degree 
that enough money would not have been on hand, these cases should not be 
counted as being deterred for financial reasons. Making this correction 
reduced the actual rate of financial deterrence for the sample to 31.2%. 
Table 6.7 shows the correction factors applied to each geographical area. 
129 
A high proportion of such cases were found in villages distant from PHUs 
(10.3% versus 5.2% in villages with PHUs), suggesting that distance and 
lack of information rather than cost would have been more accurate reasons 
for using non-medical treatment in those cases. 
Table 6.7: (corrected effect of fthat ial detrrrerw! p by a naraehh arws 
6iolr. ic Ani 
111( 110 LAN N. Mi. 
USED NON-MEDICAL TREATMENT (A) 68.31 16.51 65.65 51.01 48.31 
REASOIIs NOT ENOUGH HOMEY (1) 54.61 51.6! 55.2! 53.81 41.81 
CORRECTION FACTOR' 6.01 11.71 8.71 5.91 24.01 
CORRECTED REASON: NOT ENOUGH MONEY (8') 51.31 45.61 30.41 50.61 31.11 
DETERRED FROM MEDICAL TREATMENT IECAU 
OF LACK CF MONEY (A x 1') 35.01 34.91 33.12 25.8! 15.41 
It 
'Percent of cases that gave 'not enough sonsyt as reason, where sore than the sedian PNU cost was 
Amounts paid in the case of deaths were considerably higher for most 
treatment types than the amounts paid for episodes when no death occurred, 
as shown in appendix Table Al. 7. The geographic pattern wes similar to 
that seen for other illnesses. 
6.4.4 Detwraice ad swAwlty 
In the definition of the conceptual model only those cases which were 
deterred and would have required medical treatment are considered at risk. 
This latter criterion is of course difficult to judge, but a safe first 
approximation is that most of the cases reported as not being severe had 
self-limiting symptoms which medical treatment might have alleviated sooner 
but which would not have become more serious without treatment. Of the 
cases deterred for financial reasons (corrected), 53.6% were severe, not 
significantly less than the overall average of 59.3% severe. Differences 
with respect to geographic area were statistically significant, with 63.7% 
of deterred cases in LMI being severe, as compared to only 39.7% in MAL. 
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All variables in the dataset representing household or case 
characteristics not obviously related to access or ability to pay were 
crosstabulated against treatment choice. Of these, severity, illness type, 
age, and an education proxy were retained as preference variables on the 
basis of possibly significant independent association with the use of 
medical treatment. 
6.5.1 Perception of quality 
Perceived quality has been used as a preference factor in some models 
of determinants of consumer demand for health (e. g, Bitran 1988a). The 
results obtained from treatment can be considered to be a proxy for 
quality; this was asked for each illness episode. The results shown in 
Figure 6.2 reflect the aggregate perceptions of efficacy (i. e., quality) 
by the entire sample or subsauple. More positive perceptions ('got 
better') and fewer negative perceptions ('remained the same') were obtained 
Serious Cases Not Serious Cases 
Figure 6.2: R U1t5 O tainea tr® treatm * of severe and non severe cases 
by different treatment options 
with medical treatment and self-treatment with drugs than with herbal self- 
treatnent, traditional practitioners, and no treatment. That the perceived 
results from 'other medical' treatment of severe episodes were not as good 
as from drugs is undoubtedly due to the self-limiting nature of cases using 
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the latter (mostly fever, body pains, etc. ). This data suggests the 
relative perceived quality of each treatment alternative for the entire 
sanple or subgroup, but is not statistically useful for comparison of 
individual illness cases or households, and was not used as a preference 
variable. 
6.5.2 Effect of severity of illness an treatment choice 
59.3% of all conditions were described as severe using the criteria 
already described. Table 6.8 shove that 'other medical' providers (mission 
hospitals and private practice) and traditional healers were used mach more 
often for severe cases, but the difference weis less pronounced for PHU use. 
These differences were statistically significant (p<. 001), but if the 
(Appswlix 3) 
misclassification error of 3%Ais taken into account, the only categories 
likely to be significantly different were 'other medical' and 'no 
treatment'. Severity was retained as a preference variable. 
Table 6.8! Treat=Mt t Me Used va - 
mart tonirr 1 hw of 1t1...:: 
PRU OTHER SEIF- SELF- TRA1'L NONE 
NNEDICAL TREAT TREAT HEALER 
DRUB HEIN 
% USED, SEVERE 21.0% 18.1% 30.3% 19.5% 5.8% 5.3% 
% USED, NOT Sßß 18.7% 11.1% 34.1% 21.2% 2.9% 11.5% 
6.5.3 sffect of specific illness on treatwnnt choice 
The distribution of reported illnesses (or symptom) shown in Table 
6.9 is typical of that seen in many sub-Saharan African countries. There 
was wide variation in the use of medical treatment by illness, but for the 
10 most common conditions (accounting for 85% of cases), medical treatment 
was used in from 26.2% to 42.3% of cases. When severe and non-severe cases 
were considered separately, use of medical treatment wes greater for most 
types of illness when they were considered severe. The greatest increases 
in medical use with severity were seen for stomach problems, body pains, 
and oedema. 
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Table 6.9: Ube of treatment options by illness 
(1) 
REPORTED SYWTRN 
(2) (3) 
PREVALENCE 
IN TOTAL 
SANDLE 
I (cases) 
(4) 
wINI ANY 
NEIICAL& 
TREATNENT 
I= 
(S) 
OSINI 
PIN 
TREATMENT 
1f 
(6) 
USIR 
OTHER NElICAL 
TREATMENT 
1 
FEVER, OTHER MALARIAL STNPTINIS 21.9 (555) 42.3 26.5 15.9 
HEADACHES (NO FEVER) 14.6 (371) 27.0 15.1 11.9 
RESPIRATORY SYMPTOMS 8.7 (222) 37.4 21.6 15.8 
GENERAL BODY PAINS 9.7 (222) 27.5 16.7 10.0 
DIARRNDEAL DISEASES 7.6 (190) 39.5 23.2 16.3 
STOMACH PROIIENS 6.3 (160) 31.9 14.4 17.5 
SKIN DISEASES 6.3 (160) 34.4 21.9 12.5 
EYE DISEASES 4.2 (107) 26.2 12.1 14.0 
SIDE PAIN 3.3 (85) 35.3 15.3 20.0 
ACCIDENTS, INJURIES, /HIRNS 3.3 (83) 34.9 20.5 14.3 
OEDEMA 2.9 (71) 36.6 12.7 23.9 
CHEST PAIN 2.4 (60) 31.7 10.3 13.3 
INTESTINAL NORMS 2.0 (50) 46.0 22.0 24.0 
NEASLESp OTHER INFECTIOUS t. 2 (30) 36.7 23.3 13.3 
SENITO-URINARY ANI S. T. D. 1.2 (30) 60.0 40.0 20.0 
TOOTHACHE 1.1 (28) 3.6 3.6 0.0 
CARDIOVASCULAR 0.8 (20) 45.0 25.0 20.0 
EAR DISEASES 0.7 (19) 36.8 13.0 21.1 
HERNIA 0.6 (15) 33.3 6.7 26.7 
ANAEMIA 0.4 (9) 44.4 33.3 11.1 
COMPLICATIONS OF PREGNANCY 0.3 (7) 11.4 57.1 14.3 
CONVULSIONS, EPILEPSY 0.2 (6) 33.3 33.3 0.0 
MALNUTRITION 0.2 (5) 80.0 20.0 60.0 
ALL OTHERS 1.3 (34) 47.1 20.6. 26.3 
100.0 (2539) (8 7) (510) 
Medical treatment s Goverment or eissioe hospital, M11, NON staff sees privately, or private practice. The percentage using nom-medical treatment is squat to (100-column 4HL 
Differences in medical and PHU usage by illness were statistically 
significant, so this variable 1 included as a preference proxy in the 
model. New variables were assigned values proportional to the use of each 
treatment option for each case of the particular illness, e. g, for all 
cases of fever ILPHU = 26.5 and I1, cyr *D = 15.9. 
6.5.4 zffect of age and am on treatment choice 
No statistically significant differences in treatment choice were 
observed when sex of the ill person wes the variable, but age effects were 
significant. Under-519 comprised 15.5% of the sailed household population 
but, as seen in Table 6.10, accounted for 20.1% of all reported illness and 
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32.7% of all PHU visits. Differences were statistically significant 
(p<. 0001), so age was retained as a variable. 
Table 6.10: Effect of Age an Treatsent Choice 
Cues 
t by all qcoer 
It by tceetwetl 
COY" PU 
Olin NIDICIL 
SILF-Till? 
SILr-ntlt lull 
nie hula 
roes 
its keel total 
tatet 
Me*"It 
! ilitl! '! £11 
mumm won s1 TO 1 11 10 1S ) is tOtlt 
161 19 33 261 511 
32.7 16.3 11.5 16.1 
(32.7) 11.0 16.51 (31.2) (111.1) 
91 37 11 241 317 
17.1 12.3 11.1 15.6 
123.3) 41.6) (4.11 (62.1) (111.1) 
141 122 63 411 111 
29.2 11.7 33.3 31.2 
(11.3) 115.0 (1.11 I53.1) (111.1) 
0 i1 19 323 S12 
13.1 22.3 25.1 21.4 
(13.1) 113.11 (1.6) (64.3) (111.1) 
16 1 7 16 117 
3.1 2.7 3.7 5.6 
(11.1) (6.1) (6.1) 113.5) (111.1) 
21 17 11 111 113 
3.1 5.7 1. S 1.1 
(11.1) (1.61 (3.11 (72.4) (111.1) 
111.1% 111.1% 111.6% 100.0% 
511 311 119 isle 
(21.1) 111.11 11.0 (60.7) 
6.5.5 Effect of educational status an treatamnt choice 
Many studies have found an association between the use of western 
medicine and the educational or literacy status of the household head or 
mothers. These particular variables were not measured in the household 
survey because literacy rates in rural areas of Sierra Leone were known to 
be extremely low. A proxy, the percentage of children of school age who 
actually attended school, may better represent the 'modern' outlook of the 
household. This school attendance index was associated positively with the 
use of PHUe, other medical treatment, and drugs, and negatively with the 
use of traditional forms of treatment, as shown in Table 6.11. These 
differences were statistically significant (p<. 0001). Although the cost 
of sending a child to school is significant (Le 1000 to Lo 2000 per year), 
the correlation of the index with any incomm factors was less than 0.100, 
thus making it a useful independent variable. There was a high level of 
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school attendance in urban areas, which also had high usage of medical 
treatment, but when urban areas were excluded from the comparison, the 
association was nearly as strong. 
Table 6.11: Effect of household school attendance on choice of treatment 
Cases 
t usiiy trateeat 
GOVT PHU 
OTHER IEOICAI 
SELF-TREAT DRUGS 
SELF-TREAT HERBS 
TRAP HEALER 
ROTE 
Total Cases 
z in school group 
Relativ School AtteMiaece " 
0 1 2 
166 130 156 452 
18.9 19.6 22.2 20.2 
99 111 136 346 
11.3 16.7 19.4 15.4 
248 214 251 713 
28.3 32.3 33.8 31.8 
235 121 97 433 
26.8 18.3 13.8 20.2 
50 34 14 98 
3.7 5.1 2.0 4.4 
79 33 48 180 
9.0 8.0 6.8 8.0 
100.05 100.02 100.02 
877 663 702 2242 
39.1 29.6 31.3 100.0 
+ School Attendance lndecs 
0s No eligible children in school 
1: 101 to 671 eligible in school 
2: sore than 67! eligible in school 
Distances to fixed health facilities and the type of the nearest PHU 
were retained as access variables on the basis of correlation with the use 
of medical treatment. 
6.6.1 Sffect of distaOe fram health facilities on choice of treatomt 
There was a strong negative relationship between the distance 
patients had to travel and the utilization rate of fixed health facilities. 
Figure 6.3, based on reported village-wise walking time to the nearest PHU 
(excluding BUY chiefdom because of low PHU usage), shows the rapid fall-off 
of utilization with travel time or distance. A logarithmic regression line 
fits the data points somewhat better (correlation coefficient " -0.91, R2 
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- 0.82) than a linear regression (correlation coefficient = -0.82, Rs = 
0.68). The data points also suggest discontinuities when grouped as in 
Table 6.12. Wien the data were plotted on a log-log scale, the slope of 
the regression line was -0.44, which can be taken as the elasticity of 
demand with respect to walking timet. Men BUY chiefdom was included 
there wars a similar relationship, but the maximum utilization for the 
entire sample was only 33% for villages where a PHU was located because of 
the low utilization rate of MCH units. 
sable 6.12: PHJ utilization- vermm dlat -,., A iry,... 41-1. .. .ý 
PHU utilization by distance PHU utilization by walking time 
Distance in 
miles 
% using PHU (N) Walking time, 
hours one way 
% using PHU (N) 
0 45.0 (634) 0 45.0 (634) 
0.5 to 5.0 23.6 (550) 0.5 to 2.0 22.2 (652) 
6.0 to 10 8.2 (512) 2.5 to 4.0 6.6 (410) 
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Figure 6.4: Distance and crass-distance effects on PHU and hospital 
utilization 
Figure 6.4 shows the much smaller effect of distance on hospital 
utilization (dark bars) than on PHUs (light bars), with a steady decrease 
not evident until beyond 20 miles. Increased distance to hospitals was 
apparently also associated with greater use of PHUs (solid line), and 
distance to PHUs was associated with greater use of hospitals (dotted 
line). Villagers living far from both a PHU and a hospital were apparently 
more willing to travel to a hospital, (especially a mission hospital where 
they could be sure of receiving treatment), than to a PHU, where drugs had 
usually been out of stock in the recent past. 
6.6.2 Type of nearest PHU 
The observed difference in the maximwm utilization rates of the two 
types of PHUs suggested that the difference in levels of service provided 
should be taken into account. ConITinity Health Centres and Posts were used 
by 42.7% of all cases in the village in which they were located, but MQ. i 
posts were used by local villagers in only 8.6% of cases. A duun variable 
indicating whether the nearest PHU was a Health Centre/Post or an MCH Post 
wes introduced to account for this quality difference between levels of 
PHU. This could also be considered a preference variable representing 
perceived quality but it is probably more meaningful as an access factor, 
as it interacts with the distance to a source of PHC services. 
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Medical treatment was need in only 35% of reported 
illness cases, with government primary health care units 
(PI) amounting for about half of this. There were large 
differences between prices paid, and also in the percentage of 
total health expzditures, for PHl treatment, hospital 
treatment, and non-medical alternatives. Of those cases using 
non-medical forms of treatment, over half claimed to have done 
so because of lack of money. Amounts paid and deterrence both 
varied significantly by geographic area. 
Significant associations with treatment choice were 
found for age of patient, orientation of the household toward 
education of children, and the type of illness concerned and 
the severity of the episode. These were the preference 
factors used in the conceptual model of treatment choice. 
Access factors (the distances to PHUb and hospitals, and the 
grade of service delivered by the nearest PIU) were also 
strongly associated with the use of medical treatment. 
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Chapter 7: 
Exploring the influences on Demand 
for Medical Treatment: 
Part B: Effects of Socio-Economic Status on Treatment 
Choice, Risk of Deterrence, and Risks in Obtaining Payment 
Socio-economic status (SES) or its proxies (household and per capita 
income, and assets or other indicators of wealth) are factors by which 
vertical equity effects are most often coupared. Households in the sample 
were classed into income groups and conpared by the choice of treatment and 
other characteristics. Other factors in the conceptual model were also 
compared: availability of money at home, the rate of deterrence for 
financial reasons, and the methods used to obtain the price of treatment 
if it was not readily available. The relative financial burden of 
treatment costs was also examined. 
Given the wide range of prices associated with the different 
treatment options, it was expected that household income and/or per capita 
income would play a role in the demand for medical treatment. Because of 
the difficulty of measuring incomes, proxy variables which represent income 
are often used instead in rural surveys. These are usually readily 
discerned factors kich are assumed to indicate the wealth of a household, 
and to be related to current income and ability to pay. Co mionly used 
proxies are ownership of livestock and consumer goods, the type of 
construction materials used in the house, and expenditures, especially on 
non-essential consumption. The wealth proxies measured in this household 
survey are described in the notes to Table 7.2, and descriptive statistics 
are given in Appendix Table A1.13. 
This study attempted to identify the influence of wealth factors 
separately from income, making It necessary to estimate income separately, 
from information obtained from respondents. Income from non-farming 
activities was extrapolated from the reported occupations of the household 
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head and all other economically active household members (including family 
members who live elsewhere and remit money) on the basis of typical 
earnings in the chiefdom or urban area. Income from farming was estimated 
from reported sales of major cash crops (coffee, cacao, and palm oil), and 
on the basis of the reported amount of seed planted and average yields and 
farmgate prices for rice, the major subsistence crop. This method was 
subject to error due to individual deviations from the average earnings, 
prices, and yields, but the wide range of the basic factors (economically 
active members, cash crops sold, rice planted, etc. ) found among households 
implied that the computed incomes would reflect at least a relative ranking 
of households. The income estimates are shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Calculated mean annual household income, per capita income, and 
relative ineauality, by geoqraphic area. 
Geographic Area mean rare 
Household 
Income (Le) 
(including 
subsistence)' 
mean Ion-Pare 
Household 
Income (Le) 
t 
Mean Total 
Household Income 
(Le) 
(iýegýýlitll'ý 
Mean Per Capita 
Total Income 
(Le) 
(i'egeality)"t 
f'ss3: 1 1e 
....... ....... : 
19165 272(7 46848 (3.6) 6720 ( 4.5) 
BT9C chiefdom 15502 29720 45564 (3.0) 6157 (4.1) 
BUY chiefdom 27781 21428 49545 (3.9) 5963 (4.7) 
47554 (3.5) 6060 44.4 
LAN chiefdom 20254 11695 31698 (3.3) 4606 (4.7) 
MAC, chiefdom 18927 33320 52768 (3.8) 9090 (5.0) 
Urban areas 4839 56972 62877 (2.7) 8913 (3.0) 
t 'totals' do not exactly equal the son of components because of differences in missing cases. 
to tatio of the lover bound of the highest quintile to the upper boned of the lowest quintile. 
7.1.1 Relative income groups 
In order to assess differentials within conmunities and sinplify the 
graphical presentation of the data, households were divided into relative 
income quintiles based on the income distribution in the each of the five 
geographic areas studied. As seen in Appendix Table Al. 10, this means a 
group III household in MAL chiefdom might have the same income as a group 
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IV household in poorer LAN. Actual income rather than groupings were used 
in the regression analyses described in Chapter 81. 
7.1.2 Wbalth variables 
The correlation between most wealth proxies and income on a case-by- 
case basis was rather low because of high variability, but when households 
were grouped into income quintiles the household income group correlated 
well with the means of the wealth variable. The strength of the 
relationship can be characterized by the correlation coefficient, R2, and 
the slope of the regression line. Figure 7.1 illustrates the relationship 
Household Income vs leaith Proxies 
ProbabilitT owning animals 
0. 3.900 
0. 
0000 
o. :. soo 
0, e taalth P=0x1e2 
. 000 Gn t P=ob. livestock 
1.500 ° Prob. fowl 
0. ° 
0. 
5.000 -ba 
'", Amount Others Ora 
0. se0 .7 
0 0 
r iz iii Ir r 
Income Ouintil" 
Figure 7.1: HDUBeMJL12 i+eeltn pccxy variables vs. twuseholä inraM group 
between household Income group and three wealth proxies which shoal 
different degrees of correlation and sensitivity (a wealth variable could 
have high correlation with income but would still not be a useful predictor 
if it changed only slightly with income, e. g, the probability of owning 
fowl, which was 0.54 for the lowest income group and 0.69 for the highest). 
The statistics for all 13 proxies are shown in Table 7.2a. 
iltetisticel laforuties is let lost All data sock as these are ! rotes late groeps. £ccordieq 
to a statistical coseltast, regresslos coefficleets ebtalsed free discrete data aN grouped data are 
seerlr equal All there are 5 or sore grog". 
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Table 7.2a: Wealth proxy variables in the household survey and correlations 
with household income 
mwmmý 
Statistical Relationship to 
EM-TH Pla0XY VMIMB Correletioe 
CoeEEicieýt 
13 leletioe" 
seusitivit 
tollse size aid contzgeties utortals . 11 . 11 
Possession . 92 JS 1.32 
Jumber wall eaten IZUI MIT . 11 1.14 
food Met than statch StIIII&I fear C"Itale . 11 1.18 
livestock' 
. 96 . 92 1.11 
Probability of onim e 39 . 11 1.16 
Vasty Is oacket. dry slazoalf Al . 11 0.27 
Now is octet caim season' . 11 . 11 5.55 
"e slo ope the regress oe: liee divided by the Valle of the wealth variable at the eidpoist of the iuote 
scale. Pof e: esple, the score for beat coistnctios lacreased at a rate of 4% of its quiitile III Valle 
per Iscoit 9eietile. 
'letereievers were asked to record their estimate of the household's relative wealth before sstisq all 
questiois. 
-Oily 21% of households reported cetemoales to the precediay year. 
-Besides illeess aid iccidests, the not come Ali erpe live eeer'escies were footfall aid local court 
cases, the cost of both bein' somewhat discretionary. 
gle advisory coeeittee se91ested that Mile not loesebolds Clasen the sane saint of rice per adelt 
the quality &W gesetity of s; redieets for 'sauce' for the rice increases with lacowe. Hires were Asta 
to detail their previous da s purchases. (this was loud got to be the IN a utioeal income aid 
eipeeditere save (CSO 11111 - those isgiediests rise with iscom at a rate only slightly grester this 
rice eosseeptioe. 
) 
of livestock sei fool were Not asked because this was thought to be too sessitiee a geestios, so 
te qeestiosuire ostod if JILVere and. 
'Roth geestlou were asked is both seams for the purpose of coiparisq the respoeses. this was sot 
origlselly Istesed as a wealth proxy variable. 
Table 7.2a shows that many of the wealth variables assessed in the 
household survey had high correlations with household income group. 
However, this alone is not sufficient to make a wealth proxy a useful 
predictor of Income since the sensitivity of some proxies wes quite low, 
and the actual correlation on a household-by-household basis is also low. 
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For example, while the average number of meals eaten the previous day and 
ownership of livestock clearly increase with income (Tables 7.2b and 7.2c), 
most households in every income group ate 2 meals and most did not own 
livestock. While the column percentages in Table 7.2c show that the 
probability that a group I household owned livestock was 19.7% versus 45.5% 
for a group V household, the row percentages show that the probability of 
a given livestock-owning household being in the highest income quintile is 
28.3%, versus 13.4% of being in the lowest quintile. This low degree of 
classification power makes the individual proxies inadequate for positively 
identifying the income group of households. 
Table 7.2b: 'Meals eaten' wealth proxy versus household incc group (cell 
entries are 'iuthers of households) 
Number meals eaten I II III IV V 
1 4 2 0 0 0 
2 108 92 88 76 55 
3 112 116 126 136 147 
4 0 0 1 1 1 
Mean nýmiber meals 1.48 1.59 1.63 1.69 1.78 
Table 7.2c: Ownership of livestock voraus household income group 
Count Inoue Group 
R ROV 
Col Pct I II III IN V Total 
sons not 1 169 14 10 11 769 
1v tock 80.3 
77.5 63; $ 6$. 9 U. 6 69.2 
e j 
Owns 46 49 76 75 97 343 
livestock 13.1 11.3 22.2 21.9 28.3 30.8 
19.7 22.5 34.2 33.3 45.5 
Tool 21.00 191 
0 . 00.0 
20. 20. 19 2 1 
Classification power is increased by combining several proxies. Four 
proxies having high correlation with household income for which there were 
no missing values (house construction, livestock ownership, meals eaten, 
and possessions) were combined in a wary which might be used in means- 
testing: partial scores of 0 and 1 were assigned if the proxy value wes 
below or above the mean. Households with a total score of zero were then 
compared with those having a (maxieim) score of 4.46.3% of high scorers 
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were in income group V and 68.3% were in either groups IV or V. 38.5% of 
low scorers were in Income group I and 66.7% were in either groups I or II. 
The probabilities of correctly identifying the poor or the rich through 
this combination of wealth proxies was therefore 1.5 to 2 times better than 
a random guess (i. e., 20% for one income group or 40% for two groups). 
7.1.3 Crew-checks of income estiaates 
The credibility of the income rankings is enhanced by the high 
correlation of the 13 different wealth proxies with household income group 
(the average correlation wes 0.885, R2 = 0.792). The association of per 
capita income with wealth proxies ms not nearly as strong, with a average 
correlation coefficient of 0.545, and Rz of 0.475. 
The income calculations were conservative in that some sources of 
cash or kind income may have been consistently excluded or underestimated. 
The calculated incomes shown in Table 7.1 result in average per capita 
income for the sample of only $103 (using the prevailing official exchange 
at the time of the survey of $US 1= 65 leones) compared with the official 
per capita GNP of $210 (which however includes the capital Freetown). The 
income estimates were compared with results of an extensive national 
household income and expenditure survey (NHIES) conducted over the period 
November 1989 to October 1990 by the Central Statistics Office of Sierra 
Leone. Referring to the expenditure data (usually assumed to be more 
reliable than income data) for the rural areas in Appendix Table A1.9, the 
two surveys agree that household incomes in the urban areas are highest, 
followed by rural Port Loko district, with rural Kenne district last. 
After correcting for different ways of calculating mean per capita income, 
the NHIES data showed per capita income in Port Loko higher than Kenema, 
while this survey found the reverse. The differences were small though, 
and the relative incomes for the rural and urban samples were nearly equal 
in both surveys, providing further confidence in the ranking ability of the 
present survey. 
The distributions of household and per capita incomes are skewed 
downward, with the skewness varying somewhat between geographical areas, 
as indicated by the measure of inequality in Table 7.1 which conpares the 
mean income of highest and lowest quintiles. Referring to Appendix Table 
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A1.10, this means that (for example) while mean household income in MAL is 
considerably higher than in BW, 20% of households in both chiefdoms have 
incomes below Le 20000. 
The most inportant difference between the results of the two surveys 
is in the absolute magnitude of incomes in leones, with the NHIES figures 
about 5 times those of the present survey. Since the NHIES collected data 
over the period of nearly a year during a time of nearly 100% annual 
inflation, presumably all income and expenditures were standardized to one 
point in time, but details of the methodology used were not available. The 
NHIES data fit the official per capita GNP figure of $210 if an exchange 
rate of $US1 = Le 130 is applied, a rate which would have been in use in 
mid-1990. By comparison, this survey's data fit the official GNP at an 
exchange rate of $US1 = Le 29.5, compared to the rate of 65 when the survey 
was conducted. This latter difference (a factor of 2.2) represents the 
degree to which this study probably underestimates incomes. As mentioned, 
there is reason to believe the estimates accurately represent relative 
income, and a correction of 2.2x will be applied where absolute income 
measures are needed, as in the calculation of health expenditure as a 
percentage of income. The form of income most likely to have been missed 
in the rural areas would have been occasional sales of garden produce. It 
is also possible that rice yields from swamp farms, and income from large 
ans petty trading were consistently underestimated. 
The differences found between geographic areas appear reasonable, 
reflecting the larger size of rice farms in BUY and the cash crops and 
diarrond mining in MAL. In the rural areas non-farm (cash) income comprised 
from 34% to 63% of total household income. LAN appears to be the poorest 
chiefdom, and there were also statistically significant income differences 
between villages. Some of the inter-chiefdom differences seen could have 
been due to village-level sampling bias (from the relationship between 
village size and non-farm income), but income differences between chiefdoms 
remained significant when village population was controlled for. 
7.1.4 Poverty and equality 
The overall rural incase distribution (Appendix Figure A1.1) shows 
that the relative incase share of the poorest two quintiles is about 15t. 
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There are no comparable data available for only rural areas in sub-Saharan 
Africa, but this figure represents a level of inequality less than that 
found in many developing countries (rural and urban combined), and is in 
the range of some industrialized countries. (If Freetown had been 
included, however, it is likely that the overall figure would be lower). 
This relative lack of inequality manifests itself in the appearance of the 
villages, houses, and people, and other indicators of wealth. 
7.1.5 Inas variation with rural location 
Villages with PHUS In them (usually the chiefdom's market towns) had 
somewhat higher mean household incomes than those in their immediate 5-mile 
radius, probably due to the greater level of economic activity. Sampled 
villages which were between 5 and 10 miles away had still lower incomes in 
BW and LAN, but in aJY and MAL they were higher. This was a confounding 
factor which had to be controlled for in the analyses. The mean household 
incomes for all chiefdoms were: PHU villages: Le 48205; 0.5 to 5 miles 
from a PHU: Le 40417; 5 to 10 miles from a PHU: Le 46505. 
7.1.6 Total household Inca e versus per capita incaoe 
The influence of both total household income and income per capita 
was examined in this analysis. It is generally accepted that per capita 
income is the better overall measure of welfare since it is directly 
related to individual consumption (most directly to per capita food 
consumption) and therefore to nutritional and health status. However, it 
might also be that high Aggzgate resources of the household enable it to 
withstand economic stresses, and this may be particularly true in the case 
of illness: if one household member falls ill the absence from work is less 
likely to have a serious effect on a large household than on a small one, 
and the resources of several earners can be pooled to pay for treatment. 
It was also shown that household wealth measures correlate better with 
total income than with per capita income. If high per capita income and 
high total income do not always coincide, it would seem an open question 
as to which is more advantageous when it comes to being able to pay for 
medical treatment. 
The distributions of total household income and per capita income 
between geographical areas differ mainly because of differences in average 
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household size (Appendix Table A1.11). In contrast to the findings of Hill 
(1977) in Nigeria, large households in Sierra Leone are apparently i 
usually better off than small ones in term of per capita income. As seen 
in Figure 7.2, farming income varied directly with household size but 
income from non-farming activities remained nearly constant. This may 
reflect a reality of rural life, that true self-subsistence is very hard 
to achieve (only 9.2% of rice-farming households never had to buy rice; 
half bought rice 5 or more months out of the year), so most households find 
other sources of income first and then farm as they are able to. As a 
household increases in size with the birth of children and the addition of 
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Figure 7.2: Total household 1m o ad per capita inca e vs. household size 
wives and children-in-law, moat of the additional labour is apparently 
applied to farming. But while larger households were often poorer, smaller 
households in rural Sierra Leone were found to be more vulnerable to pre- 
harvest hunger by Richards (1986) because lack of 'in-house' labour 
restricts scope for recovery from random shocks such as illness or weather 
conditions. 
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7 .2 'Medical 
Need': Morbidity and mortality risks by income group 
The risk of illness and death in the sane le population decreased 
steadily with household income (Figure 7.3), but the relationship with per 
capita income (Figure 7.4) was less clear. The increased mortality rate 
for the highest per capita income group was due to a high proportion of 
deaths in children under 5, while the higher rate of non-severe illness in 
this group was found disproportionately in adults. Since a high proportion 
of high per-capita income households were smaller than average, it may be 
that children are cared for less well in smaller households. Smaller 
households also had a higher proportion of older adults, who suffer many 
minor aches and pains. Table 7.3 presents the morbidity rates in terms of 
the number of ill per household, showing that low total income households, 
which have fewer household nmembers, have nearly as many illness cases as 
larger, higher income households in absolute terms, and thus have higher 
morbidity per household member. 
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Table 7.3: Household illness rates by household income grouo 
Household Incase Quintile 
I II III IV V 
mean Illnesses per household 2.12 2.24 2.17 2.18 2.41 
Mean household size 7.52 8.45 8.54 9.24 10.35 
Illnesses pes household member 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.27 
No consistent relationship was seen between treatment choice and 
either household or per capita income, as seen in Figures 7.5 and 7.6, 
100.0% 
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... , 
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YO TREATMENT 7.6X 11.0% 5.8% 9.2% 5.0% 
TRAD HEALER 6.0% 4.1% 5.8% 3.1X 3.4% 
HERBS 20.7% 22.5X 19.6% 19.5% 17.0X 
DRUGS E 28. i% 28. i% 33.3% 35.9X 38.2% 
OTHER MEDICAL Q 16.2% 14.1% 
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YO TREATMENT 7.6X 11.0% 5.8% 9.2% 5.0% 
TRAD HEALER 6.0% 4.1% 5.8% 3.1% 3.4% 
HERBS 20.7% 22.5X 19.6% 19.5% 17.0X 
DRUGS E 28.1% 28.1% 33.3% 35.9X 38.2% 
OTHER MEDICAL Q 16.2% 14. i% 15.5% 11.5% i8.6% 
PHU " MAX 20.3% 20.0% 20.9% 17.8% 
Figure 7.5: Treatment use vs per capita incase 
except for the use of market drugs. For the entire sample, there were no 
significant differences in PHU utilization by household income or by per 
capita income. By geographic areas, only the two Kenema chiefdoms showed 
well-defined increases in PHU utilization with household income (but not 
with per capita income), as seen in Figures 7.7 and 7.8. The statistics 
for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in the latter graph 
indicate no relationship between PHU use and household income in BMK, a 
negative one in BUY, and positive ones in LAN and KEN. While the 
relationship in LAN was somewhat stronger, the rate of increase was still 
149 
i00.0% -r< 
75.0% 
50. ox 
25.0% - - - - 
0. OX 
I quintile 11 quintile ]l1 quintil e IV quintile t quintile 
NO TREATMENT N 9. i% 9.6% 7.6% 5.3X 7.6% 
TRAD HEALER 4.3% 8.6% 3.7% 3.2% 3.5X 
HERBS " 21.5% 19.9% 20.7X 24.0X 14.6X 
DRUGS 33.3% 25.4X 33. iX 33.3% 35.0% 
OTHER HEDICAL Q 14.0% 16.6X 13. OX 14.9X 17.1X 
pHII 17.7% 19.9% 21.9% 19.2% 22.3% 
HO TREATHEXT N 9. i% 9.6% 7.6% 5.3% 7.6% 
TRAD HEALER 4.3% 8.6% 3.7% 3.2X 3.5X 
HERBS " 21.5% 19.9% 20.7X 24.0X 14.6X 
DRUGS 33.3% 25.4X 33.1% 33.3% 35.0% 
OTHER HEDICAL Q 14.0% 16.6% 13.0% 14.9X 17.1X 
pHII 17.7% 19.9% 21.9% 19.2% 22.3% 
Figure 7.6: Treatment use vs household income 
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Figure 7.7: PHU utilization by household iirr group, for different 
chiefdoms 
only 2.3% per income quintile. The negative relationship in BUY was 
probably due to the low quality of PHU services there and good access to 
a mission hospital. Part of the difference between districts is due to a 
stronger (negative) correlation in Kenema district (LAN and MAL chiefdoms) 
between income and distance from the PHUs, which are sited in larger, 
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wealthier villages. The observed correlation between income and 
utilization is thus partly due to residents of villages where PHUs are 
located using them more often than residents of the more distant villages. 
(In Chapter 8 multiple regression is used to control for the effects of 
these other variables. ) 
7.3.1 meanie elasticity 
Approximations (i. e., not controlled for the effects of other 
variables) of income elasticity of demand for various treatment options 
were made for the entire sample from C, S regressions of the preceding 
utilization and income data. Elasticitiesl with respect to per capita and 
total household income over the middle 3 income quintiles are given in 
Table 7.4. While PHIJ utilization increased slightly with household income 
(averaging the effects seen in the different geographic areas), the 
regressions also indicated that PHU utilization decreased with per capita 
income. This seeming contradiction is merely a consequence of the fact 
that high household income is associated with larger households, which tend 
to have lower per capita incomes. The opposite was observed for drugs, 
&JIFIsiuted by the relative cluye is *tilisatloi divided by the relative cbuuge 1s Incose. 
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however, with greater (positive) elasticity found for per capita income. 
Income effects are determined with more precision in Chapter 8. 
Table 7.4: Calculated incaaie elasticity of demand for different treatomts 
(armer quintiles 2-4). 
Elasticities with 
respect to: 
PHU OTHER 
MEDICAL 
MARKET 
DRUGS 
HERBS TRAWL 
HEALER 
NONE 
Per Capita Income -0.10 +0.01 
mmý 
+0.18 -0.08 -0.23 -0.14 
Household Income +0.12 +0.08 +0.05 -0.14 -0.36 -0.22 
7.3.2 Icperditure an treatments as a proportion of total I, 
Amounts spent on treatments used in the recall period were aggregated 
by household and multiplied by 26 to obtain the average annual household 
expenditures on treatment. These were expressed as a percentage of 
household income (multiplied by the correction factor 2.2, as discussed 
earlier). 
Compared with the 2.5% to 3.0% found for low and medium income 
countries (Shepard and Benjamin 1988), the resulting overall average of 
6.9% (c. i. = 5.5% - 8.3%) of total household income is somewhat high for 
the region. This percentage could be subject to errors in estimating 
income, and is also extremely dependent on the precise recall of 
expenditures in a two-week period. The extrapolation from the recall 
period also makes no allowance for seasonal variations in morbidity. It 
is likely that biases were random however, so, as with income estimates, 
this survey should have produced at least reliable relative expenditure 
data. The NHIES found that expenditures on health over the year of that 
survey averaged 4.5% of total household expenditure in rural Kenna and 
2.0% in rural Port Loko, lowers than the figures shown in Table 7.5 for 
the four rural chiefdoms, but in the same relative order. 
Table 7.5 shows variations between geographic areas and Table 7.6 
shows the same data broken down by household income groups. The breakdown 
by geographic area reflects differences in utilization patterns and local 
treatment costs. As shown in Table 6.6, expenditures on 'other medical' 
'It is of coeise also possible that health espeuditeces were stiuted is the 11111. 
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treatments dominated the average household's health budget at 62.1%,. but 
important differences were seen (Table 7.5, lines 5,7, and 9) as between 
the two Port Loko chiefdoms, where the proportion of income spent on 
treatment in BUY is nearly twice that of BMK due to high use of more 
expensive providers. The low proportion spent on treatment in BMC and 
urban areas is also noteworthy. 
In contrast to the large differences between geographical areas in 
the allocation of household health budgets, Table 7.6 shows greater 
similarity between income groups (lines 4,6, and 8). This is due in part 
to the higher specific morbidity rate of poorer households (seen in Table 
7.3). Since poorer households used medical treatment almost as frequently 
as wealthy ones', the nearly equal number of illness episodes per 
household results in high percentages of income spent on treatment (line 
3 of Table 7.6). 
Table 7.5: Expenditure an different treatments an percentage of incam and total 
t lth exmerditu=es. by aeoaraahic area 
aph is Atem 
PEA'S BMC 6BR LM MAL IUAN 
1 Neal areal household iscoax Le 113071 110241 109011 i373i 11103$ 131331 
2) Neal meat speit ON all treatments is recall 
erioa Le observed) 
275.3 133.0 211.1 250.1 474.1 151.1 
3) treatments as % of income 1.9% 3.5% 1.7% 9.3% 10.03% 2.1% 
! P10 expenditures as % of all treatments 21.7% 53.7% 3.7% 26.5% 22.3% 5.9% 
5) P10 e: peaditues as % of total income 1.4% 1.1% 0.3% 2.5% 2.4% 0.2% 
'Other medical' as % of all treat eats 42.1% 11.1% 77.2% 45.5% 71.1% 71.3% 
7) 'Other medical' as % of total income 4.3% I. S% 5.2% 4.2% 7.5% 2.2% 
1 Ores ex enditures as % of all treatments 12.1% 16.1% 11.1% li. 1% 5.4% 13.1% 
f) Dregs expenditures as % of total Income 1.1% 1. i% 1.2% 1.1% 0.1% 1.4% 
11 One PU visit as % of total income 1.13% 0.13% 0.01% 1.17% 1.11% 0.17% 
11 On 'other medical' visit as % of total ieco. e 0.11% 1.24% 1.41% 1.11% 1.52% 1.12% 
12) Ole dnp purchase as % of household IacoIIe 0.03% I. 15% 0.01% 1.11% 0.04% 1.14% 
Itley oily did so is 6Y, tie poorest cliefdom. The opposite sihatios existed is Mil., the 
richest cllefdoi, ritt the post spe. di. 9 oote this the tick. 
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Table 7.6: Rxpenäiture an different treatments as percentage of income and total 
health exaenäitures. by household income qram 
Im, sehoid Ircc o- 
PER 6 I II III IV V 
1) Mean annual household income (1e) 103070 25450 57100 90400 114700 246000 
2) Nean amount spent on all treatments in recall 
period (le observed) 
275.3 250.2 288.4 278.7 211.4 353.5 
3) Treatments as I of income 6.91 25.62 13.11 9.01 4.81 3.7% 
4) PHU expenditures as I of all treatments 20. n 18.9% 25.11 20.32 24.81 17.42 
5) PM expenditures as t of total income 1.41 4.81 3.32 1.81 1.21 0.61 
6) 'Other medical' as 2 of all treatments 62.11 63.1% 62.1% 61.73 50.11 63.4% 
7) 'Other medical' as t of total income 4.31 16.11 8.1% 5.6% 2.41 2.3% 
I) Drugs ez enditures as 2 of all treatments 12.1% 12.0% 7.61 11.91 17.62 13.41 
9) hags expenditures as 2 of total income 0.81 3.1% 1.01 1.12 0.82 0.51 
$0) one P1W visit as 2 of total income 0.131 0.542 0.292 0.151 0.101 0.052 
ýu one 'other medical' visit as % of total income 0.411 1.681 0.752 0.461 o. 2n 0.2n 
$2) One drug pwchase as I of total income 0.052 0.181 0.06% 0.051 0.042 0.031 
Table 7.7 shows percentages of income spent on treatment by 
geographic area and household income group. The exceptionally high 
percentage for quintile I in MAL is a result of the highest aggregate 
expenditure of any group (Le 739 in the recall period, or Le 19214 per 
year) and a corrected an incase of only Le 25100. The average cost 
reported for PLU visits was slightly higher than for other income groups, 
and this group also had several expensive hospital treatments. 
Table 7.7: Percentage of income spent an treat L by income group and 
amerwaohic area 
Geographic liouis& 1d I! MgaM stile 
Area I II III IV V 
12.5% 9.1% 7.7% 2.7% 1.3% 
23.9% 17.2% 15.9% 5.5% 4.6% 
1W 21.6% 16.6% 7.9% 10.4% 7.5% 
ML 76.5% 25.3% 15.3% 6.4% 5.5% 
tin 11.9% 3.3% 4.2% 3.0% 2.2% 
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7.4 Effect of local PHU treatment Drices 
Determining the relative importance of utilization factors from the 
dataset was complicated by the fact that the official drug markup schedule 
was not always followed and prescribing practices differed, so not only did 
individuals pay different amounts for the sane treatment in different PHUs, 
but average prices varied with the geographic area. Fixed official prices 
for drugs were not adhered to, with prices paid suggesting that PHU staff 
raised the unofficial markup to correspond approximately to local income 
levels. The data (Table 7.8, light areas) suggest some relationship 
between local mean prices and incomes in the 3 rural areas where PHC 
services were widely available and of approximately equal quality, but do 
not demonstrate that PHU utilization is necessarily higher when the price 
is cheap with respect to income. Other factors almost certainly affect the 
decision more than price, e. g., in the case of BUY chiefdom, where 
utilization was low because most PHUs offered few curative services and 
drugs. Since local price level did not appear to affect utilization it was 
not used as an independent variable. However, the PHU utilization data 
discussed in section 7.3 does suggest a possible relationship between the 
price-income ratio and the income elasticity for PHU utilization: there was 
no effect of income where the price of a visit was 0.13% of income (BMK), 
a negative effect (i. e., PHU treatment was an 'inferior' good) where the 
price was 0.08% of income (but services were very limited), but there were 
apparent positive effects in LAN and MAL, where the price of a visit cost 
0.17% and 0.18% of income. While this suggests that the price in Kenema 
district exceeded a threshold at which demand started to become income- 
elastic, this should be taken as only a rough indication since other 
variables have not been controlled for. 
-i-Ahle 7.8: Local PW price levels vs ir ni wý arir1 Pt al ut 11 17att 1 nn 
BM K BUY LAN M. un 
MeaannPPHHWUU visit cost (Le) 131 87 120 212 91 
E 
ehold income(Le)1 100240 1090.: 69736 116090 I$ 30 
/income 0.13% 0.08% 0.17% 0.18% ü. Q 
zation 29.0% 6.51% 24.4% 28.2 % 5. G1 
`TDeS! loCOee U'UL a osra UCVn 'UII . CU g1W4 Q Rol me esmiiates Dy a [&C109 01 1.1 
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In the preceding chapter it was seen that 'not enough money' was 
given most frequently as the reason for not using medical treatment. Not 
having enough money and not using medical treatment were both associated 
with low per capita and low household income. The bottom lines of Tables 
7.9a and 7.9b show that this results in a 'financial' deterrence rate for 
the lowest household income group that is about a third greater than that 
of the highest group, although the wide confidence intervals due to 
misclassification error reduce the significance of the difference. The 3 
lowest household income quintiles have higher deterrence rates than the 2 
highest quintiles, by 34.2% to 27.4%. This is a differential of nearly 25% 
greater deterrence for the lowest 3 quintiles, again reduced somewhat by 
allowance for measurement error. 
When morbidity differentials are taken into account, differences in 
financial deterrence between income groups are magnified, especially for 
the household income groups, as shown in Table 7.10b. The overall effect 
of higher financial deterrence and higher medical need is that, compared 
to the highest household income group the members of the lowest income 
households are 1.6 to 1.7 times as likely to use non-medical treatment 
because not enough money was available. Again, there was a sharp 
difference between the three lowest and the two highest income groups, with 
the lower three quintiles having specific deterrence rates about 40% 
higher. Again, the wider confidence intervals lower the statistically 
significant differences to perhaps half of these levels. 
? 1e 7.9a: Percentacre of c3mm äatowti] _ by rav r. i 4-a i *wr ~.., -rs 
Per Capita Inca Quintile 
I II III IV V 
USED NON-M¬DICMºL 62.5% 65.6% 64.5% 67.6% 63.6% 
TRFAmE a (A) 
REASON: NOT ENOUGH 53.2% 50.5% 45.1% 48.6% 42.5% 
MONEY" (B) 
OF CASES DEPFIiRED FROM 
MEDICAL TREATt4Wr BECAUSE 33.2% 33.1% 29.1% 32.8% 27.0% 
pFEmxOFMONEY (Ax 8) 
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Table 7.9b: Percent ma of rases d tE"_rri _ tw )w inn w%I ai rv. . ý..,.,.. 
Household Income Quintile 
I II III IV V 
USED NON-MEDICAL 68.3% 63.5% 65.1% 65.9% 60.6% 
TREATMENT (A) 
REASON: NOT ENOUGH 50.9% 49.2% 56.1% 46.5% 40.0% 
MONEY'S (B) 
MEDICA[. TREATM EN'P BECAUSE 34.8% 31.2% 36.5% 30.6% 24.2% 
06' LACK OF MONEY (A x B) 
"Corrected rate. Ilea eecorrected rates vote used the deterceoce rates were higher overall, bet the 
reletioeilip betviel groups was the aase. 
Table 7.10a: Percent of population deterred for financial reasons, by per 
r. mita inane atom 
Per Cavi Inca= Quintile 
I II III IV V 
CASES DETERRED (Table 7.8a A 33.2% 33.1% 29.1% 32.8% 27.0% 
ALL MORBIDITY 1000 Pov. (B) 248 242 244 260 288 
SEVERE MORBIDITY 1000 DoD. B' 153 141 152 142 120 
% OP POPULATION DETERRED FOR 
FINANC. REASONS: NA. ILLMNS 
Ax8 
8.2% 8.0% 7.1% 8.5% 7.8% 
% OF POPIJLJMON DETERRED FLOR 
FINANC. REASONS: SEVERE IIiAMB 
(A x B') 
5.1% 4.7% 4.4% 4.7% 3.2% 
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Table 7.10b: Urcent of population deterred fuar finarrial zeasam, by 
household income mouz) 
Hoimetwld Income intile 
I II III IV V 
CASES DETERRED (Table 7.8b) (A) 34.8% 31.2% 36.6% 
mmm 
30.6% 24.2% 
ALL MORBIDITY/1000 pop. (B) 282 265 255 237 233 
SEVERE MORBIDITY/1000 pop. 8' 165 156 151 144 140 
% OF POPULATION DETERRED FOR 
FINANC. REASONS: ALL ILLNESS 
(A x 
9.8% 8.3% 9.3% 7.3% 5.6% 
% OF POPULATION DETERRED FOR 
FINANC. REASONS: SEYEM 
ILUNESS (A x B') 
5.7% 4.9% 5.5% 4.4% 3.4% 
Respondents were asked if the money paid in connection with any 
treatment used was on hand in the household, and if not, how it was 
obtained. Table 7.11 shows that for the 1579 first actions taken where 
some amount was paid, 65.8% had the money on hand at home. The levels were 
lower for PHU treatments only, but for both classifications the variations 
among geographic areas closely reflect mean household income. 
Table 7.11: Availability of money at ha (fitat actions) by geoc¢atbic 
Aram 
Geographic Area 
% cases in which 
money was avaliable: 
BMC BUY LAN MAL URB ALL 
All Treatments 61.7% 70.0% 56.1% 69.1% 84.8% 65.8% 
PHU Treatment 49.7% 67.4% 49.6% 56.2% 90.0% 53.9% 
7.6.1 Aaºailability veraas a iount paid 
Availability of money at home was related to the aneunt paid, as 
shown in Figure 7.9. Over 80% of households had the lowest amounts paid 
available in the household, but for the highest amounts only about 40% had 
the honey available. The data points suggest a discontinuity near 100 
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leones, but there is also a fairly smooth inverse logarithmic relationship 
between availability of money at home and the amount paid, with each 100% 
increase in amount paid resulting in a 6% decrease in availability. 
Cases with money available 
90% 
80x 
pox 
box 
'" 
sox 
4ox 
" 
Sox Sox 
" Data 16og re ressio line 20 
i !0 100 1000 10000 
Amount Paid. leones 
Figure 7.9: Availability of money at hams vs wt paid. The repression line 
can be expressed +s: p at 0.95 - 0.113 1o93. P, where p is the probability of having the eeount P on hand. 
7.6.2 Availability as a de inapt of treatment choice 
Due to the way the question about availability of money was asked 
("was the amount actually paid for treatment available at home? ", rather 
than, "was enough money for treatment available at home? "), the results 
(Table 7.12) do not unambiguously reveal the extent to which non- 
availability actually deterred people from using medical treatment. Figure 
7.10 presents the data in a way that shows that when money was available, 
44.7% (495/1107) of cases used medical treatment. When money was p& 
available, 540 out of 1432, or 37.7%, managed to obtain some amount of 
money. 27.7% (397/1432) of those not having m ney available at hone used 
medical treatment (17% of these paid nothing, having received an exemption 
or credit). This implies a significant deterrent effect when compared to 
the 44.7% of cases in which money was available. The only condition under 
which this would not be true is if many of those who did not obtain money 
(group C in Figure 7.10) had decided to use non-medical treatment because 
of preference or access, but 60.5% in this group gave lack of money as the 
reason. 63.5% of group B also gave this reason, apparently not having been 
able to obtain the full amount they expected medical treatment would cost. 
" Data 16og re ressio line 
159 
Of those who had money available and used non-medical treatment (group A), 
47% said it was because of not having enoUqb money. 
Table 7.12: Availability of money versus treatment chosen. all e 
TRENI'M T TYPE % CHOOSING TREATMENT IF: 
MONEY 
AVAILABLE 
MONEY WAS NOT 
AVAILABLE 
PERL treatment 275 (24.8%) 235 (16.4%) 
Other medical treatment 285 (20.3%) 162 11.3% 
Self-treatment with drugs 490 (44.3%) 324 (22.6%) 
Self-treatment with herbs 63 (5.7%) 449 (31.4%) 
Traditional healer 54 4.9$ 63 4.4$ 
No treatment used - 199 (13.9%) 
Total 1107 (100.0) 1432 (100.0%) 
495 used medical 
money avaklabl" 
1107 547 used non-aedlcal A 
540 397 used 
ca39 ases obtained 
medical 
money 
143 used 
money not non-medical 
B 
available 14 
892 did not C 
obtain money, 
used non-medical 
Figure i. tu: ice or treatment related to availability of storey in 
the household 
Looking at the difference in the effect of availability on the 
different forms of medical treatment, the relative decrease when money was 
not available for 'other medical' (20.3% to 11.3%, a drop of 59%) was 
greater than for PHU treatment (24.8% to 16.4%, a drop of 34%). This 
suggests that PHU treatment was substituted for more expensive treatments 
in some cases where the expected price was not available in the household. 
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7.6.3 Availability versus income 
Availability of enough money at home to pay the full cost of 
treatment was also related to income. As seen in Table 7.13 and Figure 
7.11, there was a consistent pattern of increasing availability at any 
given price level with increasing income. For the prices paid for PHU 
treatment (most of which were between 50 and 200 leones) availability 
increased regularly with household income but the differences were not 
statistically significant. The differences between per capita income 
groups were statistically significant due to high availability in quintile 
III. 
Table 7.13: Availability of money at home for PHU treatment by income 
Income Group 
% cases in which I II III IV V All 
honey was avaliable: 
Household Income 48.3% 51.6% 53.8% 55.8% 58.3% 53.9% 
Group (p=. 676) 
Per Capita Income 47.0% 50.5% 65.3% 49.4% 61.2% 53.9% 
Group (p=. 032) 
vs. hou shold Incon» group 
pwmm comm wft wmýj awasable 
M 
to 
w per-caplh Innoms group 
lvaý°aý 
so 
79 
All" 3-11 >sý >w >ia >fa 
A-oW "-m 
P'1CJI]LE /. 11 : AVdlL W I. 1{. Y v= uxw1L'Y at Ili uy it cue gulp 
7.6.4 Availability versus age and sex 
There were no statistically significant differences in availability 
of money in the household related to the age or sex of the patient, as 
might have been the case if household resources were not shared equally and 
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PMwnt am"* wft wowey . vsI s 
wives (who might have fewer resources) were solely responsible for the care 
of themselves and their own children. From the rainy season survey data 
(when more demographic information was collected), wives in polygynous and 
extended households appeared to have the save degree of access to money for 
treatment as wives in smaller households and as men. 
Respondents who paid some amount but did not have the money at home 
were asked how the money was obtained. The coded responses included the 
possibility of having had only part of the money at home, or receiving 
treatment on trust (credit). As seen in Table 7.14, borrowing from a 
friend or relative aas prost frequently mentioned, followed by selling rice 
or other food supply, and then by receiving a gift. When property or 
produce was sold or pledged, the amounts involved tended to be lower than 
when money weis raised by borrowing or receiving gifts. 
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Table 7.14: First method aentioned of obtaining ney (first action 
taken) 
Percent $1519 IAztAod in Geographic Area Z Used Mean Nr. 
All Asount Cases 
wmý 
81W BUY LAN MAL URI Areas Raised 
mmw 
S8L0 RICE/FOOD CROP 10.1 
-------- 
21.5 
----"--- 
32.0 
--- -- 
15.8 
-- - - - - 
20.9 175.1 114 
SOLD/PLEDGE CASH CROP 4.6 
-------- 
5.8 
------- 
- -- 5.0 
- 
--- - 
2.5 
-- --- - 
4.4 158.4 24 
SOLD POSSESSIONS 3.7 
- ------- 3.3 -------- .8 
-------- 2.0 74.6 11 
PLEDGED OTHER PROPERTY 1.7 4.4 .8 2.0 102.7 11 
BORRON NONEYLENOER 
------ - 
3.3 
-- ---- 
.6 3.3 1.7 809.3 9 
BE8 SIFT/SUBSCRIPTION 
- 8.3 
-------- 
- - 9.1 
-------- 
-------- 
5.5 
-----"-- 
------- 
12.5 
--- 
-------- 
42.9 9.4 266.6 51 
BORROW FRIEND/RELATIVE 54.1 46.3 35.9 
----- 
49.2 
------- 
21.4 44.4 284.5 242 
PRODUCED FOR SALE 1.8 
--- - - -- 
3.3 .8 1.7 74.0 9 
SOLD ANIMAL 
-- - 
.9 
-------- 
-- --- 
.8 
-------- 
-------- 
.6 
---- -- 
-------- 
.8 
-------- 
.7 185.2 4 
DEDUCTED FRON SALARY 1.1 .4 30.0 2 
DEFERRED ON TRUST 2.8 
....... 
2.5 
........ 
4.4 
........ 
5.0 
.... 
7.1 3.9 214.5 21 
HAD PART OF RONEY 11.0 6.6 
- 
2.8 
.... 
2.5 
........ 
7.1 5.3 386.5+ 29 
USED BUSINESS CAPITAL .8 2.5 21.4 1.3 179.0 7 
PAID IN KIND .9 .8 .8 .6 267.3 3 
PLEDGED PLANTATION .8 .2 200.0 1 
EXTRA LABOUR .9 .2 10.0 1 
OTTER 1.1 .4 10.5 2 
DONT REMEMBER .9 2.5 .7 493.3 4 
Totals 100.02 100.02 100.01 100.02 100.02 100.02 leones 545 
TOTAL 
PAID 
7.7.1 Adverse Effects of Obtaining Money 
The range of possible effects on the household of different ways of 
obtaining money waa assessed by means of some of the case studies (N4,66, 
Appendix 2), focus groups, and discussions with interview team members. 
The various methods used could be classified as either rarely . 
conditionally, or never involving a risk of long or medium-term financial 
hardship. Receiving a gift ('subscription') was obviously a low-risk 
method (9.4%). Having payment deferred by the provider (3.9%), or having 
money deducted from salary (0.4%) generally involved lenient terns. Those 
who stated that they had part of the money on hand (5.3%) made up the rest 
(in all but one case) in one of the previously mentioned low-risk ways. 
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selling an animal (0.7%) was considered low-risk because the animals were 
usually chickens, more rarely goats, and never work or milk animals. 
Selling or pledging a cash crop (4.4%) is also a normal, risk-free way of 
raising small amounts of money, and doing extra labour (0.2%) or producing 
somthing for sale (1.7%) were likely to affect normal activities only for 
a short time. These methods accounted for 26.0% of cases where the money 
was not immediately on hand. Methods judged to usually have the potential 
of placing some additional hardship on the household included borrowing 
from a moneylender (1.7%), pledging a plantation (0.2%), pledging other 
property (2.0%), using business (petty trading) capital (1.3%), and selling 
possessions (2.0%), totaling 7.2%. In no cases were farm tools or land 
reported sold-1 
Methods which could have adverse effects under some circumstances 
were selling rice (20.9%) and borrowing from a friend or relative (44.4%). 
Since the household interviewe did not ask in detail about the results of 
obtaining money in these ways, some assun+Qtions were used in the analysis. 
For selling rice', the now amount was less than that raised through gifts 
or borrowing, but still represented about 15 cups of rice, not an 
insignificant quantity (adults consume about one cup per day). A lack of 
rice was considered by most people to represent no hardship if it persisted 
for no more than a day or two, but could have more serious effects if it 
persisted longer even though substitutes such as cassava might be 
available. The more self-sufficient rice-farming households (ones 
reporting that they had to buy rice only for short periods throughout the 
year), or households which had high inane from cash crops or non-farming 
sources probably would have had enough on hand to eat even if they did not 
have cash and had to sell some rice. Applying these criteria (>l day of 
household rice consumption sold, lower 3 quintiles of per capita income, 
4bese i. d9eaests abut the risk of adverse effects do sot take late accent the problem of 
delayed effects from cutest esplaoud expeiditues, sock as sot bald able to pay school fees for 
the most term. Some overall household eipedituce data is presented is Chapter 11, bet without 
tsorly socglul cossesßtios taten for all bed'et item it is difficult to how which item meld be 
most reduced. The responses is the faces gcoop to this lire of 4ustieds9 were set very useful. 
'liclaids (llli) described hod a ho selold's store of rice is a preferred lore of savings which 
Not oily retails Valle ieciuq leflatios, bet becaae its price fluctuates with the senses, is otter 
traded by both producers jai siddlesea for profit. 
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and having to buy rice for more than 2 months if rice was a subsistence 
crop) placed 13% of cases in which rice was sold into the 'risk' category. 
Borrowing from a friend or relative most often took the form of a 
small amount of rice which was then sold for cash. Repayment was almost 
always on flexible terms and small loans were sometimes written off. 
Interest was required in some cases when large amounts were borrowed, but 
this was not asked in the household interviews, so similar criteria to 
those used to determine if selling rice was 'risky' were applied to loans: 
if the loan exceeded 5 days rice consumption and the farmer was not self- 
sufficient (buying rice more than 2 months per year), the loan wale 
considered potentially risky (without regard to income). This resulted in 
15.7% of all loans being classed as involving risk, mostly the ones for 
higher amounts, with a significant number in the upper range of PM 
payments (80-180 leones). 
Using these criteria, only 3.7% of all illness cases (including those 
who paid nothing and those where money available at home) obtained 
money in ways presumed to entail some risk. Limiting the cases to those 
for which an amount greater than zero wes paid raises this figure to 5.7%. 
In terms of geographical differences, LAN had the highest risk level as a 
result of the prevalence of high-risk methods, but MAL (the wealthiest 
rural area) weis the next highest. This was probably due to lower self- 
sufficiency in rice in both LAN and MAL (coffee and cacao growing areas). 
The high prices paid for most treatments in MAL elevated a higher 
percentage of those who had to sell rice to raise money into the risk 
category. In LAN, the poorest area, a relatively high percentage sold rice 
or used other high risk methods, probably because there were fewer other 
households that were able to give or loan money. 
Severity affected the ways in which money wes obtained. There wes 
a higher rate of seeking gifts for severe cases using medical treatments, 
but for all treatments combined, selling rice was the method most closely 
associated with severe illness. This explains most of the difference in 
risk levels also: although the differences were not statistically 
significant because of the small number of cases, 68.9% of cases using 
'high risk' methods of obtaining money were severe, versus 59.0% of cases 
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using 'low risk' methods. It is possible that advance knowledge of the 
price of treatment affected the way money weis obtained, but severe and non- 
severe cases r using medical treatment had nearly identical expectations 
of what the price of medical treatment would have cost. 
7.7.2 Effect of irnýawe on the risk of adverse effects 
The distribution of risk cases by the amount paid and by income group 
(Tables 7.15 and 7.16) shows that the risk of adverse effects increased 
with the amount paid and decreased with income. Examination of the ways 
that different income households raised the money sheds some light on this 
(Table 7.17). If they did not have the money on hand for treatment, the 
wealthiest households frequently were able to, and probably could afford 
to, sell rice or other food. They needed or wished to borrow money or 
receive gifts less often, and they had more recourse to other low-risk 
methods. The degree that richer households sold rice more often than the 
poorer ones may also be the degree to which they were free to lend rice to 
poorer households. This is suggested by the first two lines of Table 7.17. 
Quintile III appears to be caught in between - it could not sell as much 
rice as the two wealthier groups, but nor did it borrow or receive gifts 
any more than they did, so it resorted to more high risk methods, 
especially selling or pledging possessions. 
Table 7.15: Risk obtaining money vermin mount oaid1 
]fount Paid (Le) 1-20 21-40 41-80 81-180 >180 ALL 
(N) (448) (262) (263) (273) (301) AMOUNTS 
% of cases obtained 3.1% 0.8% 5.7% 6.2% 20.9% 7.0% 
with risk 
'rv[ rw usc, V. lb v[ %; 409u uui -alls [[3g'ß dW zur 'ouut[ mitc41', 11.11 M! [t. 
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Table 7.16: Risk obtaining money versus income group 
Income (soup I II III IV V ALL 
GROUPS 
S of cases obtained with 4.5% 5.1% 6.4% 4.8% 1.7% 7.0% 
risk (household income) 
% of cases obtained with 4.8% 5.4% 6.2% 3.3% 2.9% 7.0% 
risk (per capita income) 
Table 7.17: Methods of obtaining money used by household income groups 
% Method Used by Income Quintile 
Method Used I II III IV V 
SELL RICK 13.11 19.71 17.1% 25.0% 31.9% 
BORROW PROM PRIRID/RBLA? tvR 51.3% 41.0% 41.1% 46.2% 34.6% 
CB? GIFT 11.1% 15.4% S. 6% 5.1% 6.11 
OTNBR L00 RISC 14.2% 9.4% 13.9% 15.3% 21.3% 
IICI RISK 7.31 0.11 11.21 1.91 3.41 
ALL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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The combined effects of price and income are shown in Figure 7.12, 
where the dark segments of the vertical bars represent cases for which the 
method used to raise the amount paid could have had adverse economic 
results. Similar patterns are seen in the 4 lower household income groups, 
with significant risk associated with the highest level of payments and 
rather less in the range of PHU costs. For all income groups taken 
together, PHU treatment involved risk in 6.7% of cases, versus 12.4% of 
'other medical' treatments. 
Income had an apparent effect on the use of the more expensive forms 
of medical treatment, but if 'vertical' equity is defined in terms of equal 
utilization or access to treatment by different income groups, then equity 
of PHU use appeared to be high. Access and preference factors appeared to 
determine the utilization of medical treatment much more than did the 
socio-economic status of the household. The poorest households 
consequently paid a much higher percentage of their income for treatment, 
so if vertical equity could be said to be low if it were to be defined by 
this criterion. Mile the effects of payment for individual treatments 
appeared to be benign, the effects of cumulative payments were not explored 
in enough detail to know if they affected the status of the household. 
The relative inportance of the determinants of utilization is 
explored using statistical techniques described in the next chapter that 
revealed the partial correlations of each variable independently of the 
others, but some of the income-related results shown in the preceding 
chapters warrant further discussion: 
7.8.1 103a11ty of use of medical treatment 
While about 30% of households were deterred from using medical 
treatment for financial reasons, the differentials between poor and rich 
households (Table 7.9b and Table 7.10b) were not as large as would have 
been expected in view of the income differences, which were in a ratio of 
nearly 10 to 1. The difference in actual PHU utilization was also very 
low, corresponding to an income elasticity of +0.12 (Table 7.4). This adds 
up to a scenario of high priority being placed on allocating household 
168 
income to treating illness, but somewhat inconsistent with this is the high 
rate of financial deterrence observed in the highest household income 
groups. Only the highest household income quintile was significantly 
different from the rest in these aspects of treatment choice behaviour. 
7.8.2 Equality of poverty 
While the overall equality of income distribution in rural Sierra 
Leone may be better than neny developing countries, it is still the case 
that 63% of the population falls below the average income level, meaning 
they have incases of less than $US 87 per capita (based on the average for 
rural areas from the NHIES), not all of which is initially in cash. Most 
wealth indicators such as possessions were quite modest in scale and 
variation: a well-off household might own 1 or 2 wristwatches, or perhaps 
a sewing machine or radio/cassette; electrical appliances, motor vehicles, 
and even bicycles were virtually non-existent in the rural areas. Even 
though the upper 20% of households were many times better off than the 
lower, the highest per capita income quintile enjoyed a mean income of only 
uus 572 per capita per year, with the highest household income group having 
a total household income of $US 36701. This income level supports few 
luxuries, and apart from lending money to other households (mean amount 
loaned by the highest income households was $US 114 per year), ceremonies 
and feasting ($US 643 per year or 21% of income) were the most apparent 
form of 'conspicuous consumption' by well-off households. 
7.8.3 Availability of money 
The immediate availability of money appeared to affect utilization, 
but the data (Tables 7.12a and 7.12b) do not suggest an unambiguous 
relationship. It is difficult, and perhaps not valid, to reconstruct the 
decision process from the observed outcomes, but it appears that not having 
enough money immediately on hand resulted in about 1/3 lower utilization 
of medical treatment. The small differentials between rich and poor in the 
Hued as this eocrey date, collected by niy the e: cleeye gate of 29. S to cozcespood with 
the IIIW. 
'! N tickest leoselolis also loi a 'possessius' Scott of abut 4 this that of the poorest, 
but as eestioeel, this rarely 611seoted to sore this a Eer vristwtcles eil ar dho/cassette. Nora 
veaitl is probably stored is the form of good cletliy, bot this vu set cooated is the possession 
WON. 
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use of medical treatment arise in part from the relatively equal 
availability of cash at home in the amounts needed. 54% of cases using PHU 
treatment had the money available at home, with no significant difference 
between household income groups. The exact meaning of this percentage is 
important to the understanding of the deterrence data but difficult to 
ascertain from a cross-sectional survey: it could mean that the 46% of 
cases that did not have the money available came from households where that 
amount of money is never available, but it is more likely that availability 
is more a random event, and the percentage represents the probability that 
a household will have the money available at any given time. 
The high rate of financial deterrence claimed by high income 
households weis surprising, but is partly explained by the relationship 
between household and per capita income. 43.6% of household income group 
IV and 14.6% of household income group V households fell into the three 
lowest per capita income quintiles (median per capita incomes $US 43, $US 
96 and $US 150), so it is plausible that the equivalent of one or two 
dollars would not be available, especially if the household head was away 
from hams. Quite apart from the major seasonal variations, income may be 
irregular: a large farmer may have just paid hired labour, the coffee 
broker may be late in visiting the area, the civil servant's salary is 
delayed. In terms of assets, nest households except perhaps the very 
wealthiest 20% or so are evidently in the same situation. The only real 
credit-worthy assets in rural areas are rice farms and cash crop 
plantations, which are limited in productivity by a scarcity of labour and 
are subject to the risk of a poor harvest. 
7.6.4 apparent price effects 
Wile price elasticity 2U _U 
for treatments could not be estimated 
from the household survey data, there was an apparent association between 
the local price-to-income ratio for PHU treatment and the elasticity of 
demand for PHU treatment with respect to income. However, even in the 
geographic area in which the highest income elasticity was observed the 
income effects were rather small, but the relationship does suggest that 
when the price of a single visit exceeds a certain percentage of income, 
the poor begin to be deterred more than the wealthier households. 
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7.8.5 Irxorrect expectations of cast 
Some deterrence from using PHU treatment was certainly promoted by 
incorrect expectation of the cost. All income groups had nearly the same 
idea of how noch medical treatment would have cost, but this was much 
nearer to the cost of hospital visits or private practitioners than to the 
cost of PHU visits. Thus futile the true price miaht wß"11 hA%m h. wn 
available or would not have deterred someone from obtaining it in some way, 
the amount thought to have been needed (several times the actual cost) 
acted as a deterrent. Since the PHUs, government hospitals, and most 
mission hospitals charge outpatients on the basis of the drugs dispensed, 
and the charges in PHUs had been established a relatively short time before 
the survey, this lack of clear information is not surprising. 
7.8.6 Effect of severity of illness 
For severe illnesses, the income differential seen for the more 
expensive forms of medical treatment nearly vanished. The small relative 
increase of the solid lines in Figure 7.13 indicate that demand for both 
PHU and 'other medical' treatments was nearly inelastic with respect to 
income for severe illness. When illness is severe, the consequences of not 
getting better may be more dire for poor households, which have fewer adult 
hands available to substitute for sick household members. 
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The price of an individual PHU visit represented about 0.5% of total 
household income for the poorest group, and a single 'other medical' visit 
cost about 1.7% (Table 7.6). These levels way not represent a severe 
deterrent, especially for severe illness, but the relative equality in the 
use of medical treatment meant that poorer households paid upwards of 10% 
of total household income on treatment over the course of a year. There 
were large differences between geographic areas as well, with the poor 
appearing to suffer the greatest burden of expenses in the wealthier rural 
areas. Most of the total expenditure was for hospitals and private 
practitioners rather than PHUs, but even PHU visits alone aggregated over 
the year cost 5% of the poorest households' income. It is not difficult 
to comprehend the degree of hardship this could represent for the poor, but 
the deterrence of households in the upper income groups, for whom a single 
visit represented only 0.05% to 0.10% of income, remains a paradox which 
can be best explained by the hypothesis that cash availability is highly 
random over tine. 
when the money was not available, the amounts associated with PHU 
treatment could nearly always be obtained in ways that involved little risk 
of longer-term adverse effects. The willingness to spend the amounts of 
cash on hand (undoubtedly small in the case of low income households) or 
go to some effort to obtain the money, may be due in part to a perception 
of high quality of PHU treatment based on collective results and the 
availability of drugs. 
Perhaps the most important factor promoting equality of utilization 
of PHUs is the possibility of borrowing. This was by far the most common 
way of raising money for treatment when it was not on hand, and is 
therefore an inportant strategy for coping with illness. A more formal 
type of mutual aid society waa said to exist in only 9 of the 36 villages 
surveyed. 
There appears to be a small surplus of cash in the village which can 
make its wary around to those in need. 19% of household heads interviewed 
said they owed ngney to someone (median amount = Le 1000) and 15% owed rice 
'lost of this rote collectlee farm tke produce of v kick wa cud for coenelty purposes; oily 
oee was ee osose of 'toetiee' flat existed for Nttel lass to members. 
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(median amount = Le 2100). Similar numbers said they were owed money and 
rice, in amounts approximately the same as owed by others. In all, 26.4% 
of household heads were in debt, and 23.4% had made loans of cash or rice. 
All income groups were likely to be both lenders and debtors, but the 
wealthiest quintiles owed and were owed by far the most and the poorest 
owed the leaste. When asked how one manages to support a family in these 
disastrous economic times, a common good-humoured answer in Krio is "dig 
hole an' cober", meaning one borrows (dig a hole) and then borrows again 
from someone else to pay back the first loan (cover it up). 
The high equality of availability of money for PHU and drug treatment 
might also have been also due to the potential for easy borrowing. Most 
low income households probably did not -. actually have much money in 
pocket in readiness for an emergency, but they might have been freer to 
spend the day's housekeeping money knowing that they could easily borrow 
some rice or money from a relative or friend. When household heads were 
asked how they would obtain Le 500 for an emergency, even the wealthiest 
said more often that would borrow than that they would have this 
amunt on hand (Table 7.18). 
Table 7.18: Methods used (hypothetically) to obtain Le 500, by household 
nnný armmms 
Incase ckot I II III IV V ALL 
GROUPS 
would have Le 500 on hand 10.2% 2% 19.8% 26.3% 31.1% . 1% 
Would borrow 60.6% 59.4% 50.5% 48.4% 43.2% 52.5% 
453191111 193110 Vccs LUM 97 psi c4jlL4 Ilcous 1991P 
According to focus group discussions (Appendix 4), the system works 
because borrowing is treated seriously: loans are nearly always eventually 
paid back because there is no recourse in emergencies once a good 
reputation is lost; In that case a family may have to leave the area and 
'ticbords 11110 Noted that rice loges to cord off pre-buvest huger are sot sees as radeln 
exploitive by those who take then the creditor-debtor role may easily be reversed sooedey dee to a 
cbimge IN fottuwe, old fillets ue 9ese1ally optialstlc that by a cbauye of plautly strategy they 
ca achieve better reselts most seasoe IN rill be able to repay the loam. 
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start anew. The fear of not being able to repay a loan, even under the 
most lenient of conditions, may account for sane of the greater financial 
deterrence of poorer households. They may also be unable or unwilling to 
sell rice, the next most common way of raising money. 
7.8.7 Different behaviour for use of drugs 
While demand for PHU treatment, for the more expensive 'other medical' 
treatment options, and for self-treatment with drugs were all nearly 
ras? ect io 
inelastic with^household income, the consumption of drugs for self- 
treatment appeared to be more associated with higher per capita income. 
This apparent anomaly might be explained if a different process of 
allocating resources in the household were used in the case of drugs. 
While wives are financially responsible for certain aspects of their 
own lives and their children's, it is the household head who generally pays 
for medical treatment. In the rainy season survey round it was asked who 
had provided the money where payment was involved. In 67% of cases it was 
the household head, with a wife, the patient, or another person paying in 
only 33% of cases. Since male household heads were the patients in fewer 
than 25% of all cases, it can be taken that they usually pay for other 
household members. However, there was a significant (p <. 001) difference 
in this pattern for different treatments. The household head paid for 79% 
of cases using PHUs, but for only 53% of cases in which drugs were used. 
This could mean that drugs were used when the household head did not have 
the higher amount of money available for medical treatment or was 
temporarily absent, or that the decision to use drugs is made more 
independently of the household head than are decisions about medical 
treatment. This could also explain the stronger relationship between use 
of drugs and per capita income, since the number of earners in a household 
increased more rapidly with per capita income than with household income 
(Table 7.19), with the most frequent second earner being a wife who is a 
petty trader. 
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Table 7.19: Number of earners (including remitters) besides household head 
vs. income 
Number of other earners Der household 
Income 
group by Total Household 
Income group 
by Per Capita 
income ou 
I . 11 . 09 
II . 12 . 11 
III . 17 . 14 
IV . 18 . 19 
V . 26 . 31 
Based on observed patterns of obtaining money, it appears that self- 
treatment with drugs is often used when money is unavailable at home but 
it is considered inportant to use some treatment. For medical treatments 
and traditional healers there was no significant difference between severe 
and non-severe cases in whether money was available at home, but for drugs 
34% obtained money outside the home in non-severe cases, versus only 22% 
for severe cases. 
'lb summarize the results described so far, eedical 
treatment, including treatment at government primary health 
units (PIIb) cost significantly more than any form of self- 
treateent or traditional treatment. Analysis of the household 
survey data using cross-tabulations Indicated that the 
important factors which seen to direct people to use medical 
treatment when they fall ill include the severity of the 
episode, the particular type of illness, the age of the 
patient, the 'modern' orientation of the household (as 
measured by school attendance of children) among 'preference' 
factors; and distance from health facilities ('reds' 
factors). While higher (total) income households used the 
more expensive foray of medical treabant (hospitals and 
private practitioners) more often, the decision to use the P*J 
showed relatively little relationship to either household or 
per capita income. The use of drugs appeared to be related 
closely to per capita j coax. 
Wien medical treatment was not used, in over half of all 
cases lack of en0u4 coney was given as the in reason. This 
rate decreased with increasing ineom, but the percentage of 
cases deterred from wadical treatment for 'financial' reasons 
still exceeded 25% for the highest income group, perhaps 
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reflecting the relative equality of circumstances in met 
rural areas. 
Correct information about the cost of PHU treatment 
appeared to be lacking, with most people associating it with 
the higher cost of hospitals and private practitioners. In 
only 25% of cases in which non-medical treatment was used 
because of lack of money was the respondent's expectation of 
the cost in the range of PHU treatments. 
7h e proportion of cases deterred from using medical 
treatment for reasons of cost was auch greater than those 
using medical treatment but risking adverse effects on the 
household. There was apparently greater willingness to do 
without medical treatment (30% of all cases were deterred for 
financial reasons) than to raise the money in potentially 
difficult ways (only 7% of cases). The availability of the 
price of treatment at ham depended on the amount paid and on 
income, and not having the money immediately at hand appeared 
to affect the choice of treatment: all income groups were able 
to obtain money, but only the wealthiest quintile was able to 
do it with significantly lower risk than the lower ones. This 
risk was more important for the more expensive forms of 
medical treatment than for PHU use. 
In addition to differences seen between income groups in 
their choice of treatment and amounts paid, significant 
differences were found between geographical areas in terms of 
morbidity rates, incase, utilization of medical facilities, 
amounts paid, deterrence for financial reasons, deterrence of 
severe cases, and the degree of risk entailed in paying for 
treatment. Rstia®tion of the relative importance of these 
factors was done with the aid of multiple regression 
techniques, as described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: 
Exploring the influences on Demand 
for Medical Treatment: 
Part C: Regression Models of Ability To Pay 
and Choice of Treatment 
After screening the household and personal variables from the 
household survey for possible relationships to treatment choice using 
crosstabulations, regression techniques were used to determine the unique 
effects (i. e., the partial correlations) of each factor. This was done in 
2 stages: the first identified the household-level factors most closely 
related to ability to pay; in the second stage these ATP factors were used 
together with access and preference factors in models of treatment choice. 
The aim of constructing ATP indices was to quantify the main factors 
that affect ability to pay for treatment, assumed in the conceptual model 
to be income, wealth, and other unmeasured factors. This was done using 
a nultiple regression model with selected independent variables, of a 
typical linear form: 
predicted AMP - Ba + Be (ii c)+ Bs ( a1th) + ... + at (variabler) 
As already shown in Tables 6.5a and 6.5b, the level of payment was 
closely associated with the type of treatment used. The conceptual model 
assumes that if preference for non-medical treatment and poor access to 
medical facilities were not constraints, the choice of treatment should be 
directed toward medical treatment, unless limited by ability to pay. Even 
within the bounds of choosing medical treatment, a range of prices could 
be paid, depending on such choices as hospital outpatient versus PHU 
treatment, paying transport costs or welk, or requesting an Injection when 
not strictly necessary, or on the provider's assessment of how much the 
patient should be charged. If a household-level variable is defined which 
is related to anaunts paid and controlled for extrinsic factors, the 
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intrinsic wealth and income factors affecting ATP could be identified by 
comparing households that pay different amounts. 
8.1.1 (for eptua1 problems associated with MP variables 
As far as possible, the ATP index should reflect differences in ATP 
only, and not access or preference factors. Households which might have 
had high ATP but paid only a small amount because they preferred to use 
self-treatment or none were thus eliminated from the dataset, based on the 
reason given for using non-medical treatment. The 4.6% of cases using 
traditional healers were also eliminated because of the unusual types of 
illness and payment often associated with these cases. By this stage 1697 
illness cases out of the original 2543 remained in the sample. 
Multiple cases: Two further conceptual problems arose in the development 
of the ATP index. First, in addition to the fact that 11% of illness cases 
involved a second action, most households reported more than one illness 
episode in the recall period. The distribution of the number of illness 
episodes is shown in Figure 8.1. 
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It was generally true of a household having multiple cases that some 
cases received medical treatment but others did not, for financial or other 
reasons. For example, of the 185 households which had 3 cases, in 96 (52%) 
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financially deterred; in 34 (18%) 2 of the 3 cases were financially 
deterred and in 20 households (11%), all 3 cases were financially deterred. 
it appeared that some households with multiple illnesses reactfa limit in 
their ability to pay during the period, or rationed their funds and credit, 
with this limit probably being related to the household's ATP. (This 
effect is illustrated in Appendix Figure Al. 2, which shows that households 
in LAN chiefdom exhausted their available money after 4 to 6 illness 
episodes in the recall period, whereas this was not observed in other 
areas. ) The simplest way of taking this fact into account would be to use 
as the ATP index the total of all amunts spent on treatment of ill 
household members in the recall period, but this would give an unwarranted 
low score to a household that happened to be healthy during the recall 
period. On the other hand, using the av rase amount spent on treatments 
per episode would compensate for varying amounts of illness between 
households, but would not credit households that managed to pay higher 
amounts for several cases with a higher score. No way was found to 
reconcile these two approaches, so both 'total' and 'average' indices were 
calculated and statistically evaluated to determine which was more closely 
associated with a given set of independent variables. 
Different prices paid for different illnesses: Next, in addition to a 
household's ATP, it was possible that observed differences in the an unts 
paid were due to differences in types of illness, age group, distance from 
facilities, or geographic area. For exaVie, if on average significantly 
more was spent to treat illness A than illness B, households with illness 
A would be credited with a higher ATP index than those with illness B even 
though the same type of treatment had been chosen. There was no reason to 
suspect that eliminating any particular illnesses would bias the remaining 
sample, so this problem was resolved by eliminating all cases with 
illnesses for which the mean amount paid was significantly different from 
the overall mean. Expensive (but relatively rare) conditions such as 
hernia and complications of pregnancy were dropped, along with such 
inexpensive ones as toothache and 'chest pain'. All other factors (age, 
distance from PHU, geographic area) either had no statistically significant 
effect on the mean amount paid, or the differences could be explained by 
overall differences in PHU and 'other medical' utilization, and would 
therefore not be an artefact. An exception was for respiratory diseases, 
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which showed significant differences after controlling for treatment choice 
in the amount paid in different geographic areas. These were dropped from 
the dataset, leaving 1427 illness cases which either used medical treatment 
or were deterred from it for financial reasons, did not use traditional 
practioners, and were controlled for the amount paid with respect to 
illness type, distance from a PHU, patient's age, and geographic area. 
The resulting dataset contained expenditure data (the ATP indices) 
and wealth and income variables for 647 households out of the 1026 which 
had reported any illnesses. Table 8.1 gives mean values for the two ATP 
indices calculated. Mean household income for this subset of cases was 
within 2% of the entire sample, and differences by geographic area were 
less than 7%, so it was reasonably representative of the overall household 
sample. Logarithmic transforms were calculated for the aggregated average 
and total amounts spent in order to more closely approximate a normal 
distribution, and also for independent variables that had large ranges. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables tried in the ATP regressions are 
shown in Table A1.13. 
Table 8.1: A1? index values by geographic area (full saW1e) 
Aggreqated Household 
Expenditure on Selected 
Treatments 
Number of 
Households 
AVERAGE per 
episode (Le) 
TOTAL all 
episodes Le 
64.0 115. 135 
131.3 281.9 126 
LAN 147.1 256.3 166 
MAL 6.4 401.9 165 
URB 144.8 236.3 55 
ALL AREAS 149.3 271.6 647 
8.1.2 Weighting factors for different ways of obtaining money 
The final problem concerned the possibaity that, as well as the 
actual amount spent, the 'y in which money was obtained also reflected 
ATp. It could be argued that households having a given amount on hand at 
home had higher ATP than those which did not, and those obtaining a sum in 
a low risk way had higher ATP than those which had to use a high-risk 
method. If this were so, it would be necessary to either include a 
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weighting factor which would take account of this (e. g., amounts spent 
which were available at home might be worth 1.5 times those obtained by a 
low risk method, 2.5 times those obtained by a high risk method. ), g to 
control for this effect by analyzing these groups separately. The approach 
used to find the correct weights was to measure the correlation between the 
ATP indices and the independent variables using different weight factors, 
starting with factors of 1.0 for all three groups. The highest 
correlations occurred when weights from 0 to 0.1 were applied to cases in 
which money was not available at home, which meant in effect that the best 
correlations (and therefore the most valid models of ATP) could be obtained 
when cases having money available at home were treated separately from 
those in which money had to be obtained by some method. 
8.1.3 Correlation of Wealth and income variables with ATP indices 
All of the wealth and income proxy variables from the household 
questionnaire dataset listed in Appendix Table A1.13 were examined for 
their suitability as independent variables in the ATP regression model. 
some were rejected because of many missing or zero-value cases, and others 
because they were components of total income which had smaller correlations 
than the full income variables (Appendix Table A1.14). Since the 
interpretation of multiple regression results is difficult when there are 
strong linear relationships between independent variables, the aim was to 
reduce the set of independent variables to a single one representing each 
main factor group assumed to affect ATP: current income, accumulated 
wealth, status, credit, demographics of extended family, etc. Variables 
with a high degree of covariance and low correlation with the ATP indices 
were discarded. Given the small degree of association between treatment 
choice and income shown in Chapter 7, it was not unexpected that low 
correlations were found between all wealth and income variables and the ATP 
indices: no income variable exceeded . 16, and no wealth variable exceeded 
. 38. 
A series of regressions showed that total household income (rather 
than per capita income or any income component) had the highest correlation 
with the ATP indices, and that the log-transformed indices were better 
correlated with most income and wealth factors than the non-transformed 
indices. The beta coefficients were quite low however, ranging from . 12 
181 
to . 15 against LNAVG (the logarithm of the average amount spent per 
episode), with R2 of only . 015 to . 025. 
wealth variables were then selected on the basis of high correlation 
with ATP and low correlation with total income. The amounts of money 
reported to be held by the household head in the dry and rainy seasons 
(pOCX MAX and POCK MIN), were the variables that best net these criteria. 
When they were entered into the model they improved the sample R3 over that 
obtained with income alone, whereas when most other wealth variables were 
entered, they lowered this statistic and the beta coefficients changed in 
ways that indicated high correlation with income. Adding other wealth 
variables did not improve the regression. The regression model's 
statistics in Table 8.2 reflect the observed low correlations with the 
average the household spent on treatments, and indicate that wealth and 
income (as measured) account for only 5% to 10% of observed variation in 
the amount spent. According to the beta coefficients, income was more 
important than wealth when money was available at hone, while the reverse 
was true when money had to be raised outside the household by low-risk or 
high-risk methods. Since the significance of all coefficients was between 
(p=0.05) and (p=0.10), these relationships are not definitive. 
Table 8.2: Regression statistics for POCKJM and household income agairmt 
ATP Index IVG 
Money available 
at hose 
Money obtained 
all methods 
Money obtained 
high risk methods 
All cases 
combined 
ý 1.17 x 10-' 6.64 x 10-4 1.02 x 10-' 6.34 x 10-9 
____ 
5.09 x 10-' 3.75 x 10-' 5.55 x 10-' 3.39 x 10-' 
Constant 1.81 2.89 1.87 1.94 
R2 . 105 . 056 . 109 . 051 
Betarar-zwa . 231 . 151 . 210 . 145 
8eta. oacýuºx . 207 . 176 . 236 . 160 
ppCKj4AX was therefore a useful variable in representing wealth 
without being correlated with total income. Unfortunately, these qualities 
were not foreseen and it was acquired from only a 30% subsimple in the 
household questionnaire, thereby limiting its usefulness in this analysis 
because of the many missing values. The wealth proxy variable with the 
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next best characteristics was the total of consumer possessions or its 
logarithm (LNO ). As seen in Table 8.3, this variable produced 
different results than POCK _M, with 
the smaller beta coefficients for 
income reflecting the higher correlation of LNOWNED with income. The beta 
coefficients suggest that possession of assets (or the factors that give 
a household the ability to accumulate them) is more important than Income 
in determining ability to pay higher amounts for treatment. This is 
potentially a useful finding for the assessment of household and comn*unity 
ATP since household wealth proxies are generally more accessible than 
income. 
Table 8.3: Regressian statistics for I and hansehold irx c against 
mm index UTAW 
Money available 
at home 
money obtained all 
methods 
Money obtained 
high risk methods 
all cases 
combined 
2.91 x 10'4 3.02 x 10'6 2.57 x 10-0 2.93 x 10-0 
gc, r, 0.8559 0.4673 0.7311 0.4786 
Constant 1.62 2.96 1.77 1.97 
R= . 096 . 040 . 074 . 041 
Bet wo . 058 . 064 . 052 . 063 
getaupoamo . 286 . 169 . 250 . 172 
Having selected the income and wealth variables that best represented 
ATP at the household level, the variables representing access and 
preferences were included in overall models of treatment choice. The unit 
of analysis weis the illness case, with all illness cases used this time. 
Logistic regression was employed because this statistical technique allows 
the independent variable to be dichotomous, (e. g., PHU or not PHU) rather 
than continuous as in the case of the ATP Indices. The procedure estimates 
the probability of an event"' occurring as a non-linear function of the 
slechsigea eilst Mich sinltaneoesly estimate the probabilities of all possible choices, the 
best klon beii9 rartatioas of alttsoN a1 logit. There were 2 male reasois for mot rslaq amy of 
these: because of the difficult technical regeiremests, e. g., that the coasour has prior taovledge 
of prices aid that his utility fesctiom is know; aN becaose the research objectives could be at 
with inforiatios about 1Nivideal choices obtained with simpler regressiom techaigaes. IN addition, 
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independent variables. For more than one independent variable the model 
can be written as: 
Prob ( event) -1 
1+ e-Z 
where Z is the linear combination 
Z- a0 +B1X1 +B2X2 + ... +BpXP 
and the logistic coefficients B, are analogous to the B coefficients in 
linear regression, in that e (the base of natural logarithms) raised to the 
power BL is the factor by which the oddsl of the independent variable 
occurring change when the ith independent variable increases by one unit. 
Dummy variables representing the probability of choosing a given form 
of treatment were used as dependent variables in the logistic regressions. 
Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables tested in the 
regression models are shown in Table 8.4. 
computer progranes for the sore advanced methods are not widely available, which would restrict their 
use as operational tools in the field. 
'odds being defined as the ratio of the probability of the event occurring to the probability 
of it not occurring. 
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Table 8.4: Descriptive statistics for all variables used in regression models 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimus Maximus N Label 
USPHU . 20 . 40 . 00 1.00 2543 dummy for used PHU 
USOTHNED . 15 . 36 . 00 1.00 2543 dummy for used 'other medical' 
USALLNED . 35 . 48 . 00 1.00 2543 dummy for used any medical 
USDRUSS . 32 . 47 . 00 1.00 2543 dusty for used drugs for self-treatment 
USHEROS . 20 . 40 . 00 1.00 2543 dusty for used herbs for self-treatment 
USTRAD . 05 . 21 . 00 1.00 2543 dusty for used traditional healer 
USNONE . 08 . 27 . 00 1.00 2543 dusty for used no treatment 
TOT INC 47058.73 43649.25 . 00 575000.0 2477 total household income 
PC ! NC 5575.37 6753.12 . 00 145000.0 2477 per capita income 
WALK P1 1.08 1.12 .0 3.0 2365 walking time to nearest PHU, hours 
01ST H1 19.77 9.15 4.0 38.0 2365 distance to nearest hospital, miles 
NEAR PHU . 79 . 41 . 00 1.00 2543 type of nearest PHU (OzICH, 1=CLIP) 
ILPHU 20.10 5.99 3.60 57.10 2543 propensity to use PHU for specific illness 
ILOTI*ED 15.26 4.38 . 00 60.00 2543 propensity to use 'other medical' for illness 
ILLALNED 33.36 7.99 3.60 80.00 2543 propensity to use any medical for illness 
ILDRUSS 32.05 10.96 . 00 46.60 2543 propensity to use drugs for specific illness 
1IHERVS 20.16 8.38 . 00 50.00 2543 propensity to use herbs for illness 
ILTRAD 4.62 2.82 . 00 28.60 2543 propensity to use traditional healer for illness 
ILNONE 7.84 4.09 . 00 18.30 2543 propensity to use no treatment for illness 
LNSCHL -1.05 1.11 -2.30 1.41 2199 In (school attendance index 4.1) 
SEVERE . 59 . 49 . 00 1.00 2543 severity of illness (0=self-limiting, 1=other) 
LNOWNED . 70 . 72 . 00 3.69 2543 In (possessions index +1) 
AGEGPI 2.41 . 80 1.00 3.00 2543 age of ill person 
8.2.1 Analysis methods 
All of these variables (and their logarithmic transforms in some 
cases) were tested against the independent variables in order to select the 
ones with the most significant regression coefficients. Household and per 
capita income were tested separately because of their high covariance. 
Five preference variables, two access variables, and two variables 
reflecting ARS were selected for each treatment model. Eight different 
models, each using all 9 variables, were estimated. Separate models were 
also estimated controlling for geographic area and income. The procedure 
used was to identify outlier cases in each run by means of the leverage 
statistics, and then repeat the runs without cases having high leverage. 
The output of a typical run is shown as Appendix Table Al. 15. Each model 
answered the question: For the cases selected, how much influence do each 
of the independent factors have on the probability that this treatment will 
be used rather than another option? 
'This statistic is a fauctios of the residual aaalogons to the leverage statistic in least- 
squalls regresslo', aid can be used to detect cases that have a large iipact oe the predicted valves. 
Fever Use 5% of outlier cases were rejected is asr gives na. 
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In linear regression the standardized B, or beta, coefficients 
indicate the relative importance of individual factors, and the R2 
statistic indicates how much of the total variation in the outcome is 
accounted for by the variables used in the model. An analogue of the beta 
coefficient in logistic regression is the R statistic, which represents the 
partial correlation (i. e., the relationship seen when all other factors are 
held constant) between the dependent variable and each independent 
variable. A positive value of R indicates that as the variable Increases 
in value, so does the likelihood of the event occurring. These R 
coefficients are presented in Table 8.4 for the entire sample, and in 
subsequent tables for each geographic area and income group. 
Table 8.5: R coefficients for logistic regression models for entire sample 
rnaah. s represent coefficients not sianificantly different from zero) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Preference Variables Access Variables MP 
Variables 
' 
Severity Illtte 5 Modern 
(school) 
Aget Type of 
nearest 
Phi 
Distance 
to 
hospital 
Walking 
time to 
PHU 
Incas= Assets 
pHU . 094 . 104 (1) . 214 -. 278 
OTHER MEDICAL . 112 . 103 . 069 . 082 (3) -. 198 . 257 
ALL MEDICAL, . 071 . 023 . 101 (l) . 124 -. 076 -. 056 - . 
043 
DOW . 042 . 044 (2) -. 129 - . 
018 
- - 
p. 196 . 038 . 043 (2) -. 131 . 024 . 047 
HERBS 197 -. 082 . 064 (2) . 076 -. 031 
TqM HEALER . 044 
21 
- - . 
128 . 112 -. 080 
No TREATMENT -. 149 . 154 - - - - - - -. 
095 
'The age group having the highest likelihood is coded in brackets: (1) under 5 years; 
(2) 6-15 years; (3) over 15 years. 
'Coefficients were the same for household income and per capita income in all models except 
the one using DRUGS as a dependent variable. 
"Using total household income as the income variable. 
'Using per capita income as the income variable. 
Logistic regression provides no statistic analogous to the R' of 
linear regression of how well the sample data fit the model, but the 
predictive power of the model is approximated by the ratio of 
classification of predicted to observed outcomes. As seen in Table 8.5, 
the overall results are only mediocre (remembering that a coin toss would 
provide a success rate of 50%), although the best rate, 80.9% for PHU use, 
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is respectable. These results merely reflect the fact that most of the 
independent variables correlated rather weakly with utilization of any 
treatment option. While it is possible that variables were measured 
inaccurately, it is more likely that treatment-seeking behaviour has a 
large component of behaviour which cannot be predicted from the variables 
that were measured, or indeed perhaps any 'objectively' measured household 
and individual factors. 
Table 8.6: Classification powaz of the logistic regression models 
Iepesdeot variable is model 
Observed 
probability 
of outcome 
Ielative results 
predicted 
correctly 
Positive reselts 
predicted 
correctly 
Percestage 
correct overall 
Used PIU 1.21 12.2% 75.9% 11.9% 
Used 'other medical' 1.15 733t 55.0% 11.11 
Used all medical 1.35 11.2% 12.7% 16.3% 
Used drags self-treatuest 1.32 61.1% 70.0% 12.1% 
Used herbs self-treah"et 0.20 61.6% 63.4% 11.9% 
In Table 8.5, the column containing the coefficients for the type of 
illness was shaded to draw attention to the fact that this variable was 
always significant because of the way the dummies were defined. The 
influence of this factor on the outcome is nevertheless real, and since 
other coefficients were virtually unchanged when the regressions were run 
without these variables, they can be considered to contribute to the 
choice, although the relative degree to which they do in any given model 
is probably biased. Comparing the models in Table 8.5, the coefficients 
do suggest that there is more specificity associated with the kind of 
illnesses most often treated with drugs, herbs, and traditional healers, 
than for those for which medical treatment is more often used. 
Most of the other coefficients are consistent with the results 
already seen in crosstabulations, although some relationships found to be 
statistically significant in the tables were not significant in the 
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regressions. This is because the partial correlations tend to reduce the 
significance of apparent associations when there is covariance of factors. 
8.3.1 the of PILS 
Access was the most influential factor determining PHU use, with 
walking time to the PHU having the largest (negative) coefficient. The 
type of PHU was nearly as important, although this was only a variable 
factor in aw and BUY. The effect of distance to a hospital on PHU use was 
not significant in the entire sample, as had been suggested by the 
relationship seen in Figure 6.4. Although the difference in distance 
scales for hospitals (maximum 38 miles) and PHUs (maximum 15 miles) makes 
this difficult to interpret, it suggests that hospital outpatient clinics 
are not used as substitutes for a PHU provided the PHU is more conveniently 
located. Among the preference variables, age was significant, with a high 
relative likelihood of under-5s using PHUs. The coefficient for severity 
was zero, indicating that the small difference seen in Table 6.8 was in 
fact not significant when other factors were controlled. The small 
variation in PHU use with school attendance seen in Table 6.11 was also not 
significant. The lack of coefficients significantly different from zero 
for either ATP variable is inconsistent with the positive value for 
elasticity with respect to household income seen earlier in Table 7.4. 
However, the initial logistic regression run resulted in a small 
coefficient for assets which became insignificant after outliers were 
removed, suggesting that outlier cases had been responsible for the 
calculated positive elasticity. 
8.3.2 the of other radical treatment 
For 'other nmedical' use, the time required to walk to a PHU had an 
even more imgortant positive influence than the negative effect of distance 
to a hospital. This reinforced the conclusion that PHUS used out of 
choice when they are as accessible as a hospital, probably because of the 
lower cost. The distance effects were about twice as important as any 
other factors. Age was significant, with adults being the most likely to 
use this option, and modernity (school attendance) was also a significant 
positive factor. While the low income elasticity shown in Table 7.4 was 
confirmed by the absence of a significant coefficient for income, there was 
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a small positive coefficient for assets. The high coefficient for severity 
agrees with the high differential for severity seen in Table 6.8. 
8.3.3 the of 'all medical' treatamts 
Since there were nearly equal numbers of cases in the two categories 
of PHU and 'other medical', the coefficients for most variables in this 
del are approximately the means of those estimated for 
t 
= del alone. This 
makes the results for this model rather meaningless, e. g., for the 
coefficient for walking time to a PHU: it would be incorrect to say that 
this factor has such a small (-. 056) effect on the use of j, medical 
treatment. It is more appropriate to think of PHU and 'other medical' use 
as separate options insofar as most of the treatment choice determinants 
are concerned. The fact that one of the ATP variables has a significant 
(but small) coefficient while neither PHU use or 'other medical' had is 
almost certainly due to the larger combined sample size. 
8.3.4 Ube of drugs 
Access to PHUs had a small negative effect on use of drugs and access 
to hospitals had none, indicating that drugs were not used merely as a 
substitute for medical treatment when access is poor. However, the type 
of PHu had a strong influence when access was controlled for, probably 
because of the much smaller range of drugs available in the MCH units. Age 
was less of an influence than for medical treatment, but children 5-15 
years were relatively most likely to receive these drugs. A 'modern' 
outlook was weakly associated with the use of drugs. Severity was not a 
factor, but the specific illness was important. Alone among all of the 
treatment options, and consistent with the calculated income elasticities 
in Table 7.4, the coefficient for per capita income weis significant. 
8.3.5 the of herbal treatsent 
Self-treatment with herbs was (negatively) related to access to 
hospitals, but not to access to PHUs. Since there was a significant 
negative coefficient for wealth, and there was a similar positive 
coefficient for 'other medical' use (but none for PHU use), this suggests 
that herbal self-treatment was primarily a substitute for hospital 
treatment (but not for PHU treatment) for poorer and more distant 
households. Modernity was also a significant (negative) determinant, and 
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the specificity of illness type was high. As with drug self-treatment, 
children 5-15 were relatively more likely than other ages to receive herbal 
treatment. 
8.3.6 Use of traditional healers: 
Poor access to both PHLIs and hospitals were the most important 
determinants of the use of traditional healers. Wealth was negatively 
correlated, but contrary to the calculated high negative elasticity seen 
in Table 7.4, the coefficient for income was not significant. The 
coefficient for severity small but significant, and the coefficient for 
illness type was highest of all the treatment options. The fact that 
'modernity' did not enter the model for this treatment choice but did for 
herbs suggests that while people with a 'modern' outlook recognise that 
Western treatments are more effective than herbs, they still respect the 
traditional healer's skills, especially for certain illnesses. 
8.3.7 Ilse of no treatment: 
Use of no treatment was associated most strongly with non-severity 
and the type of illness, suggesting that people are are that certain 
illnesses are self-limiting. AN (assets) were also a strong negative 
factor, but access to medical facilities was not significant. 
As seen in Tables 8. la to 8.7e, some coefficients which tended to 
cancel out to zero for the entire saeple were significant when individual 
geographic areas were examined. Soave coefficients for individual areas 
were statistically insignificant because of the small sample sizes, notably 
for the use of traditional healers and for 'other medical' in BW,, so 
comparisons of those models may not be valid. 
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Table 8.7a: R coefficients for logistic regression models_ 4c thil ftinm 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Preference Variables Access Variables ATP 
Variables 
LISE: Severity 
its Modern 
(school) 
Age' Type of 
newest 
PHi 
Distance 
to 
hospital 
Walking 
tine to 
PHU 
Incomes Assets 
PHU "0 . 030 . 040 (1) -. 185 . 028 
OTHER MEDICAL' -. 140 
ALL MEDICAL' 
_ . 
029 . 072 (l) -. 191 
DRUGS 
_ 
'4 ' - - - - - - 
HERBS , 0111 -. 190 . 135 (2) -. 039 
TRAD HEALER . 111 . 2R_: . 158 
NO TREATMENT -. 074 . 153 - - - -, 
141 
- - - 
'The age group having the highest likelihood is coded in brackets: (1) under 5 years; (2) 5-15 
years; (3) over )S years. 
'Coefficients were the same for household income and per capita income in all models. 
'Only 13 'other medical' cases. 
.. ßt-7.. 0 7º.. t... -... -- 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Preference Variables Access Variables ATP 
Variables 
USE: S verity iliae& Modern (school) 
Age' Type of 
newest 
PI#I 
Oistarce 
to 
hospital 
Milking 
tim to 
PHU 
Income Assets 
PHU 
- "045 . 
161 (1) . 103 . 043 -. 151 -. 016 
OTHER MEDICAL . 109 . 1N _ -. 
211 . 168 
ALL MEDICAL . 084 . 053 . 031 (1) -. 183 . 096 
DRUGS . 211 . 115 . 094 
HERBS +2tß -. 101 . 112 - 
TRAD HEALER . 124 
NO TREATMENT -. 128 . lta . 055 -. 165 
'The age group having the highest likelihood is coded in brackets: (1) under 5 years; (2) 5-15 
ears (3) over 15 veers. 
Coefficients were the same for household income and per capita income in ill models. 
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. nýt, la A 7rß" T. rvnisfir rn ffiriantc fm ýo.. ýýea,... .... a.. ie 7 aM ,. a. s.. ca- 
Dereend 
et 
Preference Variables Access Variables AZp 
Variables 
USE: Severity l1taec Modern (school) 
Age' Type of 
newest 
P)#1 
Distance 
to 
hospital 
Milking 
ties to 
PHU 
Incas' Asiets 
PHU 
_ 
144 
_ . 
078 (1) -. 385 . 048 
OTHER MEDICAL . 049 . 101 -. 237 . 268 . 126 -. 061 
ALL MEDICAL . 035 . l3 . 081 (1) -. 115 -. 194 . 064 
DRUGS" l 
_ . 
079 . 020 
DRUGS' "l1 . 082 . 074 
HERBS . 22+4 . 131 -. 087 
TRAD HEALER : '`"228 . 065 . 163 . 100 
NO-TREATMENT . 057 
'The age group having the highest likelihood is coded in brackets: (l) under 5 years; (2) S-IS 
years; (3) over l5 years. 
'Coefficients were the same for household income and per capita income in all models except the 
one using DRUGS as a dependent variable. 
"Using total household income as the income variable. 'Using per capita income as the income variable. 
Table 8.7d: Logistic coefficients for regression models, MMJchiefdom 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Preference Variables Access Variables 1il14 
Variables 
LISE: Serenity Ittflesss Modern (x l) 
ADe, Type of 
serest 
PHU 
Distance 
to 
hospital 
Talking 
tim to 
PHU 
Incas Assets 
PHU . 164 (1) -. 191 -. 219 
OTHER MEDICAL . 155 . t3<i . 062 (3) . 321 
ALL MEDICAL . 090 "t0b'< . 085 (1) -. 156 
DRUGS "221 . 160 (2) . 095 _ 
HERBS "2 
TRAD HEALER . 107 
NO TREATMENT 1% 
'The age group having the highest likelihood is coded in brackets: (1) under S years; (2) S-lS 
years; (3) over 15 years. 
sCoefficients were the same for household income and per capita income in all models. 
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Table 8.7e: I istic coefficients for regression models, urban areasl 
Dependent 
Preference Variables Al4 Variables 
Variable: 
WE: 
amity Illness Modern 
(school) 
Ages Income Assets 
PHU" 
OTHER MEDICAL . 041 
ALL MEDICAL . 079 _ . 
059 
_ 
DRUGS 
HERBS 
TRAD HEALER' 
NO TREATMENT 
'No access variables are shown because there was a hospital and PHU in each urban area. 
2The age group having the highest likelihood is coded in brackets: (1) under 5 years; (2) S-I5 
years; (3) over lS years. 
aCoefficients were the same for household income and per capita income in all models. 
"There were only 10 cases using PHUs. 
'Only l case. 
8.4.1 Comparison of A7P variables 
ATP variables were the most significant in some treatment models in 
BUy and LAN chiefdoms. In BUY the negative sign of the coefficient for 
assets on PHU use indicates that PHU treatment was an 'inferior' good, 
which is consistent with most operational PHUs in the chiefdom being MCH 
units. BUY was also the only area where the coefficient for an ATP 
variable in the model for 'no treatment' was significant, perhaps a 
consequence of the high amounts paid for treatment (seen in Table 6.5a), 
and the low level of non-farm (i. e., cash) income (Table 7.1). LAN was the 
only geographical area to have a significant coefficient for an income 
variable for 'other medical' treatment and for a wealth variable for PHU 
use. This is probably a combined effect of the considerably lower incomes 
and lower mean asset score' in this chiefdom and an average cost of PHU 
treatment as high as that in BUY. The use of medical treatment was also 
associated positively with Al? variables in urban areas. 
8.4.2 Coaipar ison of access variables 
Access variables were significant in all geographic areas. The high 
negative coefficient for walking time to PHUs on PHU use in LAN is 
'LAM had the lowest . eaa score of any area: 1.01 vs. the Bean of 1.69. 
193 
consistent with the fact that villages farther from Pius tend to be 
poorerl, so distant villagers were deterred in 2 ways. Distance effects 
on 'other medical' use were significant in BUY and LAN, but not in MAL (nor 
in B[« due to small sample size). This was probably because the higher 
incomes in MAL moderated the deterrent effects of high transport costs, and 
also because many of the 'other medical' visits in this chiefdom were to 
a local private practitioner. The cross-effect of distance from a hospital 
on PHU use was not significant. (The large positive coefficient in MAL is 
an artefact caused by the coincidence that most of the sampled villages 
which were far from a hospital were also far from a PHU). The other cross- 
distance effect, of distance to a PHU on 'other medical' usage, was 
significant everywhere except BM K. It is worth noting that even where the 
perceived quality of PHUS was low (in BUY), they were used more than 
hospitals when they were accessible. Herbal and drug self-treatment 
increased with distance to PHUs and hospitals, with the higher coefficients 
in BUY and LEAN consistent with the higher observed income sensitivity. The 
high negative coefficient for 'no treatment' seen in BW is probably an 
artefact due to the fact that all sampled Bi« villages were nearly the same 
distance from a hospital, but the village nearest a hospital was one of the 
poorest. 
8.4.3 () ariaan of pcefereece variables 
Preference variables had significant coefficients in all areas. 
Under-5s were most likely to receive PHU treatment in all 4 chiefdoms, and 
in MAL the differences were large enough to identify a pattern of 
preference: PHUs for under-5s, 'other medical' for adults, and drugs for 
children 5-15. In B MK,, herbal treatment took the place of drugs for 
children 5-15. Modernity was a significant factor in the use of PHUs in 
Bw, of 'other medical' in LAN, and of drugs in BUY (where it was also 
negatively associated with the use of herbs). It is interesting that the 
pattern of positive sign with a 'Western' treatment (clinical or drugs) and 
a negative sign for traditional treatment (herbes) was found only in the 2 
chiefdom in Port Loko district. This nay be associated with cultural 
differences between the different majority tribes in these districts. 
'Nein looselold iuoaes: PR villages, Le 35375; 1.5-5 lila, Le 29351; greeter thee 5 @llei, 
Le 31116. 
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Severity was positively associated with medical treatment in all areas 
except BW, possibly because treatment costs were lowest there. 
Although the coefficients for income and wealth were especially 
sensitive indicators in this stage of the analysis because of the narrow 
range of income in any one group, it is difficult and perhaps deceptive to 
identify income-related trends when coefficients are small (below about 
. 100). Only the analyses for medical treatment are presented. 
8.5.1 PHU use by inoo. e group 
The coefficients for PHU use (Table 8.8a) indicate that distance to 
a hospital was less of a factor for higher income households than it was 
for poorer ones; wealthier households had the option of paying for 
transport to hospitals that the poor did not enjoy. In addition, the 
specific illness was Huch more important a consideration for poorer 
households. The trends for the ATP variables are too weak to conclude 
anything about the direct effects of incoi. 
Table 8.8a: Pill treatwnt model regression coefficients for household 
inc !! arOl B 
Household Income Quintile 
Variable I II III IV V 
týlalking time PHU -. 183 -. 321 -. 272 -. 291 -. 229 
Distance hospital -. 147 . 083 
Type nearest PHU . 191 . 104 . 172 . 202 . 173 
Age . 011 . 103 . 114 . 124 
Type of illness . 144 . 104 
severity 
_ . 
101 -. 092 
Assets . 051 -. 053 . 065 
Household income -. 057 
8.5.2 'OUME radical' use by incawe 
The higher coefficients with increasing income for walking time to 
the PHU (Table 8.8b) again reflect the fact that the wealthy are less 
likely to walk to a distant PHU than the poor because they would be Hare 
likely to use a hospital instead. Hospital and other medical use by the 
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poor was more likely to be determined by the nature of the illness, but not 
the severity, than by the rich. AL? variables were not significant in any 
income group. 
Table 8.8b: 'Other medical' treatment model regression coefficients for 
hansehold income qrOi B 
Household Incase Quintile 
Variable I II III IV V 
Walking time PEN . 140 . 248 . 115 . 278 . 292 
Distance hospital -. 182 -. 258 -. 172 -. 160 
Type nearest PHJ -. 100 . 070 
Age . 045 . 073 
Type of illness . 157 . 130 . 088 . 070 
Severity . 212 . 127 
Assets 
Household income 
As discussed in Chapter 2, calculation of price elasticity from 
cross-sectional data is subject to technical problems which have put some 
published results in question. In principle, in a regression model in 
which the dependent variable is the quantity of treatment consumed and the 
independent variables include price, the coefficient of the price variable 
is proportional to the price elasticity at the mid-point of the price 
range. Cross-elasticities are similarly related to coefficients of the 
prices of other treatments used as independent variables. But for these 
assumptions to be valid several conditions not be fulfilled, perhaps most 
important of which in the case of the present research is that the consumer 
has knowledge of the price of the treatment used and alternative treatments 
before waking the choice. Data from the household survey showed this wes 
not true (although most would have known relative prices, e. g., drugs 
versus hospitals), and the survey of health facility users found only 6.3% 
knew haw auch the treatment would cost before leaving hone. 
A more co. m n-sense approach to estimating price effects without 
relying on multiple regression techniques W= explored. If a range of 
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differently priced treatments are easily available to a group of patients, 
theory predicts that more of the lower-priced treatments will be used, 
provided they are all perceived as being equally effective. This was 
tested for the single most frequent illness, malaria, controlling for 
access by limiting the sample to villages within one mile of a P0.1. 
(Foster (1991) described a hypothetical household decision-waking process 
for malarial illness in which a mother elects to try self-medication when 
her child has an attack in the hope that the episode will resolve itself. 
only when she sees that home treatment is not working will she consider 
taking the child for professional care, typically with a several-day delay 
from onset of fever. This entirely plausible scenario adds to the 
understanding of the price-demand relationship, showing that it is not 
based only on a static, one-time utility-maximizing decision. ) 
Because of the high markups at the PHUs, chloroquine and aspirin 
could be bought from peddlers for less than from PiLle, although a full 
course of treatment was usually not purchased. It is not surprising that 
many preferred to do this since the results obtained (Figure 6.2) were 
similar for both types of treatments. Table 8.9a shows that market drugs 
were cheaper than PHU treatment in all 4 chiefdoms, but drugs were used 
more frequently (shaded area) only in BUY, where the PHUs were of of lower 
perceived quality or were often closed. This suggests that the two 
treatments were not in fact perceived as equal in quality, perhaps because 
many cases of malaria were in infants and children and regarded as 
potentially dangerous, so high value was placed on the consultation and 
diagnosis. men the analysis was repeated for headaches and general body 
pains (usually described as non-severe and usually afflicting adults), a 
different picture was seen (Table 8.9b), with drugs being used more often 
(shaded areas) in 3 out of 4 chiefdoms. Given these dissimilarities, it 
wa concluded that equal perception of drugs and PHUS could not be assumed 
generally, and that any approach to estimating price effects by simply 
comparing consumption was likely to yield unreliable results for the sample 
as a whole. 
I Herbal teiedies coe11 baue bees iacieiel in the analysis as a virtually cost-flee treatuest, 
but the results obtained Vote lot co prable to those Eros dtels or P11 treabest. 
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'h1P 8.9a: Price and utilization of PHU and drug treatment. for malaria 
Mean cost per episode (Le) Relative utilization 
Chiefdom 
PM1 (n) Drugs (n) PHU Drugs 
g{K 71.1 (27) 10.7 (22) 41.8% 37.3% 
BUY 43.0 (8) 24.5 (24) 
LAN 69.0 (24) 17.9 (10) 64.1% 25.6% 
MAL 109.4 (33) 66.8 (15) 56.5% 24.2% 
Table 8.9b: Price and utilization of PM1 and drug treatment, for headache 
="A nF+nPral body naiv 
Mean cost per episode Relative utilization 
Cýiefdam 
PHU (n) Druck (n) PHU Drugs 
F 
237.5 (9) 14.4 (13) Z3.1ý _3,3 
__ 
3Jy 80.0 (3) 45.2 (44) 4.3`% 
54.8 (27) 14.1 (7) 65.9% 17.1% 
MAL 95.4 (11) 63.4 (14) 28.2` : 9% 
The first regression model discussed in this chapter demonstrated 
that household wealth and income variables accounted for only 5 to 10% of 
variations in the amounts paid for treatment. This was true concerning 
both the average amount paid for treatment in a household or the total 
amount paid during the recall period. For the amounts actually paid, 
'ability to pay', as defined as a combination of wealth and income factors, 
appears to play only a minor role in determining how much is actually paid. 
There was a somewhat better correlation with the average amount paid than 
with the total, suggesting that when expenses mount up in a short time, 
some households have to make more use of borrowing and other methods of 
obtaining money in order to use medical treatment. The models also showed 
that the relative importance of wealth and income changed depending on 
whether the amount spent was obtained outside the house or was available, 
but since the individual regression coefficients were small and were very 
sensitive to the wealth indicator used, this could not be considered 
conclusive. 
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The logistic regression models of treatment choice used the ATP 
variables found most significant in the first model, and added the most 
significant variables in the 2 other factor groups of preferences and 
access. The results of the logistic regression models provided insights 
into the individual decision choices involved, with data in a much more 
contact form than crosstabulations and reducing the chance of erroneous 
conclusions due to covariance of factors. Separate regression models were 
estimated for each treatment choice, and estimating the models for subsets 
of data for different geographic areas and income groups allowed 
comparisons of partial correlation coefficients to be made. The model for 
PHU use confirmed the insignificant role played by wealth and income in PHU 
utilization, but also clearly identified LAN chiefdom as the exception to 
this, especially for the more expensive forms of medical treatment. 
The coefficients for distance variables in the PHU and 'other 
medical' models helped identify the complex relationships between proximity 
to a PHU, proximity to a hospital, and income. Rather than proximity to 
a hospital detracting from PHU use, it appears that nearby PHUs are used 
in preference to traveling to a hospital. This rule is modified by 
wealthier households, however, for whom the cost of travel is less of a 
deterrent. To try to compare the relative importance of arouoa of factors 
(i. e., ATP vs. preference vs. access) is to tread on statistically slippery 
ground, but looking at the orders of magnitudes of the coefficients, most 
ATP coefficients were less than . 1, most preference coefficients between 
.1 and . 2, and most access coefficients were between .2 and . 3. 
Access to medical facilities was unimportant in the decision to use 
drugs for self-treatment, and the regression models confirmed the positive 
association with per capita income but not household income. This unique 
characteristic among treatment options makes drugs a 'superior' good in 
economic parlance rather than merely a more affordable substitute for 
medical treatment for the poor. An image of the decision to use drug self- 
treatment instead of PHU or other medical treatment emerges: drugs are seen 
to be effective (Figure 6.2), especially for some common illnesses. They 
are 'modern'; they are conveniently available if a peddler is in the 
village, taking less time to purchase than a visit to even a local PHU. 
In addition, low income elasticity does not preclude a price effect: other 
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factors being equal, rich and poor alike will choose the least expensive 
treatment they think will be effective; indeed, households in which money 
is less relatively subject to the control of the household head (i. e., with 
more female earners) tend to buy drugs more often. 
In linear regression models of X14 variables, household 
Income and wealth variables were found to account for only lOt 
of the variation in observed amounts actually paid for 
treatment. Wealth and income varied in their relative 
Import , nc. 'depending an whether the amounts paid were 
available in the household or had to be obtained elsewhere. 
These differences in the coefficients of the Al? variables 
were not statistically significant after access and preference 
variables were included in overall models of treatment choice. 
Separate logistic regression models were estimated for 
each treatment choice, and estimating the models for s 
of data for different geographic areas and income groups 
allowed comparisons of partial correlation 
coefficients to be made. 
Mile the models could not positively identify factors 
which direct the choice of one versus another form of 
treatment, it is clear that income and wealth play only a 
small part in these decisions, and that for decisions about 
medical treatment, access is the moat important factor. wile 
it would be useful to know how mach the price difference 
between medical treatment and merket drugs affected the 
choice, price elasticity could not be determined from the 
available data, and it appeared that other factors affected 
utilization more than price for some caemon illnesses. 
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Chapter 9: 
Seasonality Effects 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the rainy season in mach of the tropics 
is characterized by increased morbidity, difficult transport conditions, 
and reduced food supplies and cash availability. Since resources for the 
rainy season followup household survey were limited, it was decided to 
focus on the effects of seasonality on PHU utilization, with emphasis on 
the effect of income fluctuations, and secondarily on the effects of 
changes in physical access. One chiefdom in each district was chosen (0« 
in Port Loko and MAL in Kenema7-), from each of which 3 villages were 
selected for the rainy season survey on the basis of higher than average 
PHU utilization in the dry season. Two villages in each chiefdom had 
cameunity health centres; the third village in each chiefdom was several 
miles distant from a PHU. A total of 200 households were interviewed by 
the same team of interviewers used in the dry season survey, using a 
similar questionnaire. 67% of the households were located in villages with 
P}Js, with the rest in the more distant villages. An effort was made to 
revisit the same households that had been interviewed in the dry season 
round, but 17 new households were added to meet interview targets. This 
round of the survey was carried out in early September 1990. All seasonal 
corm arisons in this chapter were made with a subset of the dry season 
household survey that includes only the 6 villages surveyed in the rainy 
season. 
PHU service statistics from 1988 and 1989 show attendance peaks in 
June and October with a trough in between, so, while utilization patterns 
do not reflect only morbidity, it is incorrect to generalize that morbidity 
in Sierra Leone is consistently higher in the rainy season, which runs from 
March to October. The changes between morbidity patterns observed in the 
like fu11.1euf data uilysie doe Is only HIS lid lot meal the Ostia of diffelow" 
teteeee t1I nd the ether chiefIee.. lad this bete taw, UI mid Im bete selected In the riley 
ceasn senel. 
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two survey rounds were subtle: as seen in Appendix Table A1.16, there was 
little change in overall morbidity in El« (223 cases/1000 in the recall 
period versus 237/1000 in the dry season), but a sizable decrease was 
observed in MAL (187/1000 vs. 243/1000 in the dry season). Compared to 
these overall decreases of 6% and 23%, episodes described as 'severe' 
dropped by only half as much. Digestive system infections decreased by 
nearly half in both areas, and respiratory infections decreased to a lesser 
extent. Malaria was the most prevalent illness in the rainy season, but 
seasonal effects were significantly different (p<. 02) in the two chiefdoms: 
malarial symptoms increased in the rainy season from 57.3 to 82.4/1000 
population during the recall period in BMK, but decreased from 74.7 to 
60.8/1000 in MAL (Appendix Table A1.17). These differentials enphasize the 
existence of distinct regional patterns within a country. The drop in 
intestinal infections was probably due to the availability of better 
quality drinking waters. Decreased respiratory problems in the rainy 
season suggest that they are due in part to the dusty conditions of the 
rice harvest in Port Loko and to the rigours of mining in Kenema, and may 
also be associated with the lower prevailing temperatures during the 
harmattan (dry north winds prevailing from December through February). 
These observed seasonal variations are perhaps counter to conventional 
assumptions. 
High inflation, largely due to devaluation of the leone, has been a 
fact of life in Sierra Leone since the early 1980's, a fact which 
complicates a longitudinal study of household economic decisions. Between 
the two rounds of the survey the official exchange rate increased from 65 
to 176 leones per $US, and the black market rate rose from about 100 to 210 
per $US, an Increase of 110%. The official consumer price index (CPI) 
increased from 14,705 in December 1989 to 26,890 in September 1990, an 
increase of 83%. As mentioned in Chapter 4, inflation in Sierra Leone has 
been largely driven by devaluation. For the purpose of calculating changes 
in real prices between the survey rounds, a value between the price 
the peat incidence of diarrhoea Is at the beglulog of the riles whoa cowtamiuaets are flnslei 
late water sources. 
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inflation and the devaluation rates of 90% has been used as a deflator 
here. 
While price inflation undoubtedly works hardships on households, it 
does not necessarily result in reductions in consumption of essential 
goods. In rural health zones in Zaire user charges were adjusted upwards 
in a such a way that their inflation-adjusted prices remained approximately 
constant over time, but such price increases were not found to have had a 
negative effect on PHC utilization (Bitren 1988d). As seen in Table 9.1, 
the prices paid for most treatment options in rural Sierra Leone increased 
between the two survey rounds at a rate comparable to overall inflation. 
In June 1990 (between the two survey rounds) the official prices for 
essential drugs dispensed at PHUs were increased by 100% over previously 
established prices, reflected in prices shown paid for PHU treatment'. 
overall price increases for medicines, services and transport are reflected 
in the costs of other providers. The price of drugs from peddlers 
increased at about same rate as the price of drugs at the government PHUs, 
so remained lower by the same ratio. 
Table 9.1: Prices paid per case for different treatment option (including 
travel costs) 
Dry Season Rainy Season 
Price 
Median 
paid 
(Le) 
N Median 
paid 
(Le) 
N 
Chan" 
( current 
leones) 
Government hospitals 580 5 1120 5 +93% 
PHUs, BW chiefdom 65 120 185 71 +184% 
pHUs MAL chiefdom 100 114 200 58 +100% 
Mission hospitals 6003, 16 1950 22 +225% 
Traditional practitioner 40 9 80 20 +100% 
Government staff seen 
privately 
110 20 400 11 +263% 
Drugs from peddlers 
O-AkdlFd WSPA I-& ION iffi Ph. A 
20 
-- 
117 48 114 +140% 
____ -- ___ -- --- --I .... w  UI 09 "VV 60 LCV LGLq. 
Albe varieties to dry-seeses prices cod diEferest iscrases suggest that esforcesest of esifor  
official prices for dregs becue sore effective after the price iecce&se. 
203 
9.1.1 Household descx3raphics and annualized incoaaea 
Household demographics from the 2 survey rounds were similar in terms 
of household composition, except that households in both chiefdoms had 
increased by an average of nearly one adult, probably in response to the 
greater need for farm labour during the rainy period. Calculating 
household incomes for the previous 12-month period the same way as done for 
dry season data yielded incomes that were higher in real terms (i. e., both 
using dry season leones) in the rainy season survey by an average of 34%. 
This was due mostly to the increased adult population per household, which 
raised the number of economically active household members from 2.12 to 
2.63 per household. In addition, rice farmers in BW reported a 
significant increase in seed planted over the previous season and tree crop 
farmers in MAL reported larger harvests than in the dry season survey. 
Farming income increased proportionally more than non-farming income in 
HMC, while the opposite weis true in MAL, there there was an increase in the 
numbers of petty traders and miners per household. 
9.1.2 actual availability of money on hard 
The recalculated annualized Incomes do not reflect the inmediate cash 
availability in the households at the actual time of the survey, however. 
In both survey rounds the question of seasonal differences in availability 
of money was explored by asking a sub-sample of household heads to identify 
the months they had most and least money on hand, and how much they had in 
their pockets at those tines. There was general agreement about which 
periods constitute the dry and which the 'hungry' seasons, and about two- 
thirds were able to give an answer to the question about money on hand. 
mean and median amounts for geographic areas and income groups are shown 
in Table 9.2, which indicate large differences in seasonal availability of 
money for all groups. Although there could have been misrepresentation for 
various reasons, the amount reported on hand correlated well with household 
income groupings. Cash is 'built up' after the harvest, and is spent down 
as the rains approach, with a decrease in availability of the order of a 
factor of 10. 
The question asked weis not how much was available at the time 
treatment was needed, so the responses reflected the household heads' 
estimate of how much they usually had on hand in either season. Still, 
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choice of treatment was strongly associated with the amounts which 
household heads claimed to be in their pockets during the dry season (Table 
9.3), with those using 'other medical' treatments having the highest 
amounts in pocket, although in the rainy season PHU users had lower amounts 
than those using drug treatment (p<. 01). 
Table 9.2: Money available as reported by household heads of different 
geographic areas and income groups, by season. (Data for both seasons is 
from the full household sample in the dry season household survey) 
IN POQCET DRY SEASON 
(leones) 
IN POCK RAINY SEASON 
(Ieqnes) 
Groups Mean Median Mean Median 
Bt4E( chiefdom 1257 550 153 20 
BUY chiefdom 2293 1000 102 8t? 
LAN chiefdom 2984 1500 369 80 
MAL chiefdom 2681 400 177 10 
URBAN 4615 1000 149 35 
Household Income I 1157 600 61 16 
Household Income II 2096 800 91 35 
Household Income III 2629 500 170 5i) 
Household Income IV 2452 1000 180 40 
Household Income V 4489 2000 486 90 
Per Capita Income I 1343 900 85 20 
Per Capita Income II 1498 550 13'1 20 
Per Capita Income III 3605 2000 305 80 
Per Capita Income IV 2851 1000 274 45 
Per Capita Income V 3079 1000 166 40 
-Differences in group means were significant at the p<. 05 level only for 
housenota income 
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IN POCKET DRY SEASON 
(leones) 
IN POCKET W NY SEMON 
leaves) 
Treatment Used Mean Median Mean Median 
PHU 2352 1000 2'76 40 
OTHER MEDICAL 3426 1500 261 80 
SELF-TREAT WITH DRUGS 3001 1000 295 80 
SELF-TREAT WITH HERBS 1302 400 20 
TRADITIONAL HEALER 1238 900 
. 
NO TREATME21T 1046 400 20 
A graph of the cumulative amounts the household heads claimed to have 
on hand in the two seasons (Figure 9.1) indicates that in the dry season 
approximately 20% had less than the median cost of PHU treatment (70 
leones) on hand and 25% had less than the mean amount (133 leones)'. In 
the rainy season 60% had less than the median, and 75% had less than the 
mean cost of PHU treatment. 
comparing the data from the dry and rainy season survey rounds, in 
December 1989/January 1990 the median responses were Le 100 on hand before 
the harvest and Le 2000 after the harvest. In September 1990 the 
respective answers were Le 200 and Le 2500 (Table 9.4 compares the two 
survey rounds). The exact meaning of these figures is difficult to 
interpret because respondents were asked to recall amounts for a period 
when the CPI was lower', but it seems certain that most households had far 
less cash available during the rains. Given that fact, it is significant 
that average spending on treatment during the rainy season stayed high in 
real terms. The median amount spent per illness episode for all treatments 
used increased from Le 40 to Le 80, and the mean aggregated amount spent 
'the gcapled data is based os the dry season survey, ritt all aiovats reported In dry season 
leoses. 
=aespooses to 015 and 016 In faces group 11 (Appeodii 4) suggest that it takes a long time for 
people to adjust their concepts to current price levels in terms of what is cheap or expensive, even 
though nearly everyone is aware of the current price of a cup of rice. One man said if he took Le 
1.00 from the money he had at home he would have a hard time replacing it-rather difficult to accept 
when a cap of rice cost Le 12.00, unless he had no source of income whatsoever. 
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Figure 9.1: Money reported to be in pocket by household heads by sefficn 
(from dry season survey). 
per household in the recall period increased from Le 425 to Le 825. These 
increases closely mirrored the inflation rate. Table 9.4 conpares the 
reported amounts in pocket from the villages surveyed in the 2 survey 
rounds, and conpares the mean and median amounts reported, by chiefdom. 
In both surveys, amounts reported available in the rainy season were 
roughly 10% of that available in the dry season. Respondents in the rainy 
season survey were somewhat more optimistic about the amounts they usually 
had in pocket in the rains, with the medians rising from 35 to 200 in BW 
and from 0 to 200 in MAL. 
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Table 9.4: Comparison of amounts reported in pocket in the two survey 
rounds. by chiefdom 
IN chiefdom MUL chiefdom 
In pocket 
DRY SRASON 
(Le) 
[a pocket 
RAINY SRASON 
(Le) 
In pocket 
DRY SEASON 
(Le) 
I. pocket 
RAINY SRASÖR 
(Le) 
110 AMOU1? 106 99 3500 254 
MLDIAI AMOUNTS 500 35 400 0 
................. ... . 
NVA ANQUITS His 321 10M SO 
MRDIAI AMOUNTS 2000 200 4500 200 
93 Seasonal Qhanaes in Utilization of Treatment Options 
In both chiefdoms the naior seasonal changes were decreased use of 
PHUs and a nearly equal increase in the use of market drugs for treatment 
of illness, as shown in Table 9.5. 
Table 9.5: Choice of treatment options by season and chiefdoms 
EM CHIEFDOM 
______ 
MAL. CHIEFDOM 
F 
Dry Rainy Dry Rain 
PW 39.0% 29.5% 41.9% 34.3% 
Other Medical 2.6% 5.4% 15.1% 15.4% 
Drug Self-Treat 26.3% 33.2% 25.4% 35.5% 
Herbs Self-Treat 23.4% 18.7% 9.2% 7.1% 
Traditional healer 1.6% 6.6% 1.5% 3.0% 
None 7.1% 6.6% 7.0% 4.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
The relative change in the utilization rate for PHU treatment (in 
visits per illness episode) was -25.2% in BZ« and -28.2% in MAL. The 
conpensation by increased use of self-treatment with drugs suggests that 
'A1though the patterns in the two chiefdoms were similar, the changes in relative utilizatioi 
were statistically slgnificaet 11 AMI (p=. 0121) but not is MAL (p=. 1101). 
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economic factors, i. e., price increases, decreased availability of nnoney, 
or the increased cost of time during the rainy season, were partly 
responsible for the decrease in medical treatment, with changes in access 
accounting for the rest, since presumably preference factors did not 
change. Without data from the following dry and rainy seasons it is 
difficult to tell if the change in PHU utilization was primarily a result 
of a seasonal drop in the availability of money or of failure to adapt 
perfectly to long-term inflation. However, given the evidence that people 
compensate for long-term inflation, it was assumed that seasonal income 
fluctuation, or more precisely, sharp decreases in money in hand, was the 
more important. 
As shown in Table 9.1 the real price increase in 3« was nearly twice 
that in MAL, but relative utilization actually dropped more in MAL. This 
suggests that the decrease was noch more a consequence of decreased cash 
availability (since there were approximately equal decreases in both areas) 
than increased price. It is difficult to infer much more than this due to 
the nature of the data. 
Table 9.6 shows a greater effect of distance on PHU use in the rainy 
season than in the dry season. The relative decrease in distant villages 
was 30%, coaapared to 21% in the villages for which access to a PHU was not 
a problem. About 1/3 of the decrease in distant villages would therefore 
seem to be due to reduced accessibility (because of heavy rain, poor 
roads), with the rest due to other factors. However, the distant villages 
had significantly lower mean household incomes (Le 35830 vs Le 52031), so 
part of the utilization difference (30% vs. 21%) apparently due to distance 
could have been a result of this incon e difference. The greater drop in 
drug utilization may reflect the income difference, but could have also 
been due to fewer visits by drug peddlers to the village during the rains. 
Use of 'other medical' treatments increased, and was not affected by 
distance to a PHU. 
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Table 9.6: Seasonal changes in PHU and drug utilization, by distance from 
R ATIVE LIrILIZMTIat RAZE 
DRY 
SEASON 
RAINY 
SEASON 
% 
CHANCZ 
PHI! - VILLAGES NEAR PHU 42.7% 33.8% -21% 
PHU - DISTANT VILLAGES 30.7% 21.5% -30% 
DRUGS - VILLAGES NEAR PHU 25.8% 29.0% +12% 
DRUGS - DISTANT VILLAGES 26.3% 25.3% -4% 
OTHER MEDICAL - NEAR PHU 7.5% 8.5% +12% 
OTHER MEDICAL - DISTANT FROM PHU 12.3% 13.9% +13% 
9.3.1 Effect of ineý on utilization 
To isolate the effect of distance from the PHU from income effects, 
the relative utilization only in villages near a PHU was examined (Figure 
9.2). Household income appeared to be a somewhat more important 
determinant of utilization of PHUS and other medical treatment in the rainy 
season (dotted lines) than in the dry season, but the trend in the dry 
season was unclear. The correlation between income group and PHU 
utilization rate during the dry season (solid lines) was not significant, 
but it as in the rainy season (correlation coefficient = 0.61, R2 - 0.37). 
This income effect was small though: the slope of the regression line for 
this relationship indicated an increase in utilization of only 2% per 
income quintile. 
Referring to the problem of determining the true distance effect 
because of the confounding effect of an income differential between near 
and distant villages, the income difference (52031 vs. 35830 leones) was 
equivalent to slightly more than one income quintile, so since utilization 
decreased by 2% per quintile, 2% to 3% of the observed drop in utilization 
apparently due to distance was probably due to this income differential. 
The actual seasonal distance effect thus produced a decrease of 7% in PHU 
utilization (a quarter of the total drop), with the rest being due to 
reduced availability of money and other factors. 
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Figure 9.2: Relative utilization of Pik and 'other medical' by income 
group by season, for viliag close to a PHU (SIC and I chiefdom). 
Despite the lower reported amount of money in pocket during the rainy 
season, for any amount actually paid for treatment money was available at 
home in a higher percentage of cases than in the dry season (Figure 9.3; 
the x-axis groups are seasonal quartiles for amounts paid). There vats an 
x having sonar available 
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-*-Dry Beason 
-V 
figure rn'"13 "KENRY ava1L ie dy a oxit paid (quartiles) and 
season 
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especially dramatic improvement in the availability of higher amounts. In 
addition, a higher percentage of households in every household income group 
s money available 
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had money available for PHU treatment in the rainy season (Figure 9.4). 
The proportion of those with money available for drugs remained nearly 
unchanged. This unexpected finding could mean that the 1990 hungry season 
was less severe than usual and that people were willing to use at cash 
reserves they had to pay for treatment. Evidence that hungry season 
conditions are not always severe comes from Stephens (1988), who did not 
observe widespread acute malnutrition during a rainy season survey in 
neighbouring Liberia, even though rice was reported to be scarce by many 
households. Other possible explanations are that the dry season survey had 
found people especially short of cash because of traditional heavy 
expenditures (by Moslems and Christians alike) at the Christmais period, or 
that by early September the worst of the hungry season was already over 
(about 30% of respondents said their cash-poor season was over in August, 
26% Septenter, and 22% October). 
The data suggested that when money was not available, more cases used 
methods to obtain it that risked potential adverse effects, but there were 
too few to be statistically significant, and in any event no 'high risk' 
methods were used to pay for PHU treatment. 
...... ..... 
t ................ 
............. a............... 
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The proportion of users of non-medical treatment who said they did 
so for financial reasons decreased from 54.3% in the dry season to 37.8% 
in the rainy season, resulting in a 'financial deterrence' rate of 22.2% 
of cases (compared to 34.3% in the dry season). The proportion giving 
distance or lack of transport as the mein reason increased, but the 
greatest change was for cases in which the illness was not thought to be 
serious or who recovered soon, which increased from 11.9% to 26.7%. This 
again suggests that economic and health conditions were not very severe 
during the 1990 rainy season, although the percentage of 'severe' cases 
reported was virtually unchanged from the dry season. 
9.4.2 Logistic regression aodela of rainy aessan treat choices 
Identical logistic regression models were run on the dry and rainy 
dataaets (Table 9.7). No significant income coefficient wes found for PHU 
use in either season. income was significant for 'other medical' use in 
the rainy season, however. The absence of a severity factor in the rainy 
season may reflect the fact that the distinctions were blurred by the high 
proportion of 'other medical' cases which were severe in the rainy season 
(82% vs. 71%). The increase in the coefficient for walking time for P1ß1 
use is consistent with the observation of greater sensitivity to distance 
in the rainy season. The larger drop In the coefficient for distance to 
hospital on hospital use and large increase in the income coefficient is 
probably an artefact resulting from very high income in the village 
farthest from a hospital. 
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Table 9.7: Seasonal differences in R coefficients of logistic regression 
models (H4( and MAL combined) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Preference Variables Access 
Variables 
ATP 
Variables 
LISE: 
Severity t}lae Modern 
(school) 
Aye' Distance 
to 
hospital 
Milking 
tine to 
PHI 
lncod Assets 
PHU DRY . 015 (1) -. 060 -. 050 
PHU RAINY . 105 (I) -. 043 -. 059 
OTHER MED DRY . 120 : >. tTh _ . 
062 (3) -. 296 
OTHER MED RAINY -. 186 - . 
126 
_ 
DRUGS DRY 
_ . 
153 . 063 _ - _ 
DRUGS RAINY 
ine age group naving one nignest IIKeiinooa is coaea in oracKecs: (i) under a years; (u 
6-15 years; (3) over 15 years. 
'Coefficients were the same for household income and per capita income in all models. 
9=5 Discussion 
The results of the rainy season survey showed that morbidity was not 
higher than in the dry season as expected, but that utilization of PHUs did 
decrease disproportionately. Although there were increases in treatment 
price due to inflation and a real price increase in one chiefdom, since 
money was reported to be much less plentiful by household heads, most of the 
drop in utilization was presumed to be due to the seasonal effect of lower 
availability of cash. Drugs, a cheaper form of treatment, were used more 
often: all signs point to greater financial stress. Access is assumed to 
be worse in the rains, and an increased negative effect on PHU utilization 
was in fact observed. Since the discussion of availability versus 
utilization in section 7.6.2 suggested a strong relationship between 
availability of money and use of medical treatment, there is an apparent 
contradiction in finding greater availability of money at home for those 
who used the PHU and other medical treatments, the lower reported rate of 
being deterred for lack of money, and the increase in the use of more 
expensive medical treatments in the rainy season. This can be explained 
if people were more reluctant to borrow or obtain money in other ways in 
the rainy season, leaving those who d14 have the money to use medical 
treatment. Borrowing rice (from those who have remaining stores) is in fact 
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said to be much more prevalent in the rainy season (Richards 1986; focus 
groups), but cash may sinply be harder to obtain. 
PHU utilization dropped by nearly the same percentage in both BMC and 
MAL, but the price increase in SW was much greater. As seen in Table 7.8, 
MAL had the highest prices with respect to income of all the surveyed 
areas. Despite having the highest income of the rural chiefdoms and high 
utilization of PHUs, the greater response to the smaller price change in 
MAL may indicate that prices were close to being too high in the dry 
season, and the reduced cash availability in the rainy season sifted out 
many households that had less than the price of treatment available and 
could not obtain the rest because entire communities were cash-poor. This 
is consistent with a higher proportion of users of medical treatment 
reporting that money had been available. The lower reported rate of 
financial deterrence by non-users could be due to a change of perspective 
in the rainy season: when it is raining hard and there is rice to be 
planted, an illness that would seem serious enough to go to a PHU for in 
the dry season might appear less serious, and the question of whether there 
is enough money on hand might never arise. 
There was a decrease of about 30% in the specific 
utilization of PI and overall medic-. al treatment observed in 
the rainy season follo V survey. About 1/3 of this decrease 
was determined to be due to poorer physical access, while the 
remainder was most likely due to reduced availability of 
money. The fact that am people using medical treatment had 
the money available at hare, and that fewer were deterred from 
medical treatment for financial reasons stands in contrast as 
a paradox unless it can be explained by greater reluctance or 
inability to borrow or obtain money in other ways. Perhaps as 
a result of this, the differential in utilization between poor 
and wealthy households wes observed to increase in the rainy 
season, especially for the more expeisive medical treats ts. 
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Chapter 10: 
Discussion of Equity and Affordability Findings 
and Policy implications for Sierra Leone 
This chapter reviews the major findings of the household survey data 
analysis, introduces supplementary data to illuminate further the findings, 
and identifies the most important conclusions in terms of relevance to 
policy decisions about pricing PHC services for equity, affordability, and 
efficiency. 
Medical treatment was chosen in about 35% of all illness cases, with 
the rest using self-treatment with drugs or herbs, traditional 
practitioners, or no treatment. Wide variation in the mix of choices was 
seen in the different areas studied, with PHUs used more than more 
expensive private practitioners and hospitals when they were nearby and 
offered a good range of curative services. Drugs purchased from market 
vendors or peddlers were usually cheaper than PHU treatment and used more 
often. Herbal remedies costing little were also frequently used. If the 
results obtained from treatment are an indication of their perceived 
quality, market drugs and PHU treatment were nearly as well regarded. if 
the first action taken did not produce a cure, a different type of 
treatment was usually tried the next time. There was no apparent bias 
against or mistrust of medical treatment, and there seemed to be some 
recognition that certain problems were 'hospital sickness'. In severe 
cases hospitals and private practitioners were used more often, and medical 
treatment was heavily used In severe cases when life was evidently in 
danger. Market drugs were used when not enough money was available or 
obtainable, but also more for certain problems for which they were known 
to be effective, such as general body pain or fever. Herbal remedies were 
also effective for certain problems, but were used more by poorer 
households. Traditional healers were used for specific (often chronic) 
ailments, and no treatmnt was used infrequently, though more often in 
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cases perceived to be self-limiting, and when no money could be found for 
treatment. 
The relative importance of independent household variables were 
compared by using multiple regression models. The model for A14 factors 
showed that variations in the actual amount paid depended relatively little 
on household income and wealth variables. Each treatment choice was 
modelled individually, with the factor coefficients showing that access to 
facilities was relatively more important than various preference variables, 
which were in turn more important than socio-economic variables. 
10.2.1 Vertical equity of PM ciharges 
Low income weis associated with lower use of private practitioners and 
hospitals in most geographic areas. For PHU treatment, there wes an 
apparent positive association between household income and utilization in 
Kenema district, where PHU prices were high conpared to income (a single 
visit cost 0.18% of annual income), but not in Port Loko district where 
prices were lower (0.07% to 0.13% of income). However, after controlling 
for other variables, this relationship was statistically significant only 
in LAN, the poorer of the 2 Kenexea chiefdoms. This were the only clear 
evidence of lower PHU utilization by the poorest groups, but the rainy 
season survey found a greater drop in utilization in MAL (the wealthier 
KeneM chiefdom) than in BW, despite a greater real price increase in the 
latter chiefdan, suggesting that the dry season prices in MAL were near a 
threshold where utilization would be affected by further increases. This 
is tentative evidence that such a deterrence threshold exists, somewhere 
between 0.12% and 0.18% of annual income for a single PHU visit. 
In the entire aanVIe, there was only a small difference (32% vs 39%) 
in the y. * of medical treatment between the richest and poorest household 
income groups, but a higher percentage of the poorest groups wes dgtgXjd 
from using medical treatment for financial reasons, making the differential 
in terms of the proportion of cases that used non-medical treatment because 
they did not have enough money 35% for the poorest versus 24% for the 
richest. However, by this criterion there wes no statistically significant 
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difference between the 4 lowest household income quintiles - only the 
richest quintile was significantly less affected. When the effect of 
different morbidity rates was included, there was a 1.7: 1 ratio between the 
lowest and highest income groups in the likelihood a given individual would 
have to use non-medical treatment due to lack of money, but the average 
rate of deterrence was only 4.6%. 
The inniediate availability of money in the household seemed to be a 
more critical determinant of choice than actual income, although the two 
were related (Figure 7.11). Availability of money appeared to be a random 
event, with the probability at any given time of having enough on hand only 
slightly higher in richer households than in poorer ones. In the nearly 
half of all cases that had to obtain money for treatment outside the 
household, again it was the poorest 80% of households that ran a similar 
higher risk of adverse economic effects due to the methods they used to 
obtain it, especially for the higher amounts paid for hospitals and private 
providers (Figure 7.12). 
These deterrence and risk differentials were statistically 
significant but rather small, so whether they represent equity differences 
which should be redressed by pricing policy is an open question. 
Furthermore, there were important differences between deterrence from PHU 
use and the more expensive forms of treatment. Relative PHU use was 
virtually identical for all income groups, in part because there was no 
significant difference in availability of honey for treatment between 
income groups in the PHU price range (Table 7.13). The regression model 
for PHU use demonstrated fairly convincingly that SES was not an important 
determinant of use, except in the poorest chiefdom. 
10.2.2 Mistaken expectatiaca of cost 
Part of the reported 'financial' deterrence was probably due to 
erroneous expectations of the cost of PHU treatment. Health conmittees 
were functioning in very few communities, and PHU staff did not go to great 
lengths to make the official prices known. (Q41 in focus group $1 provoked 
a discussion of the need to know the correct prices. ) Because of the 
system of variable charges (i. e., based on the actual cost of prescribed 
drugs) used in nearly all government and private health facilities, it was 
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not surprising to find that only 6.3% of users interviewed at health 
facilitiesl actually knew how arch the charge was going to be. Official 
PHU charges had been introduced only recently, and 3/4 of those who were 
financially deterred and used non-medical treatment thought the cost of PHU 
care would have been more than the actual median price of PHU treatment, 
with no significant differences between income groups or geographic areas. 
The expected cost levels that they reported and that deterred them were 
Huch closer to the levels paid for treatment at hospitals (Figure 6.1). 
When people spoke of not being able to afford treatment (focus groups 11 
and #Z), they invariably referred to expensive operations or the high cost 
of transportation or its unavailability in emergencies. 
This high level of misinformation warrants further comment: even in 
the nearly total absence of public media, it would be expected that someone 
who wanted to know the cost of visiting a PHU would ask around the village 
in case a neighbor had had recent experience. Perhaps the reason why this 
apparently does not happen Is the reputed value placed on secrecy, or at 
least privacy, in rural Sierra Leonean culture. Secret societies are in 
fact the central cultural tradition (Islam is by comparison a casual 
adjunct), and on the personal level it is often said that a person's 
financial affairs are his own concern. This probably is true even in the 
extended family, as implied in focus group N1 (Q35). Given this high 
degree of misinformation, it is plausible that as many as a third of cases 
apparently deterred from medical treatment might have had enough on hand 
or could have obtained enough for PHU treatment. in the discussion of 
corrections to financial deterrence (Chapter 6) it was seen that 9% of 
these cases had in fact spent more than the median price of a PHU visit. 
Figure 9.1 showed that in the dry season while perhaps 40% had less"sA 
the Le 600 mean price of hospital visits, only 25% had less than the mean 
cost of a PHU visit. Lower expected amounts would also encourage more 
people to try to obtain money when they do not have it: if rice had to be 
sold to raise money, the difference between the expected and actual amounts 
could equal several days of rice consumption for an entire household. 
1tro$ the facility user server (this ras ose piece of lsforsatios which vas not affected by the 
selection bias). 
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10.2.3 Affordability 
If the income estimates were correct, the mean price of a single PHU 
visit (Le 133) was well over twice the often-used benchmark of a day's 
agricultural wage, although this varied from one chiefdom to another. 
However, households are fairly large, usually have more than one earner and 
resources are pooled to an extent, so at 0.13% of total annual household 
income (half of the entire household's daily income), a single PHU 
treatment might well be seen to be 'affordable' by the average household, 
at least in comparison with the price of 'other medical' visits of 0.41%. 
However, the cost of a single PHU visit represented 0.54% of total annual 
household income for the lowest household income group, a level which might 
understandably shift consumption to palliative market drugs, the average 
purchase of which cost the poorest only 0.18% of total household income. 
The focus groups reinforced the impression that treating illness was & very 
high priority: if money is on hand or can be obtained easily it will be 
spent on whatever treatment is considered necessary. The relationship of 
price to the amount on hand or which can be raised quickly may influence 
the choice of treatment as much as that of price to annual income (if 
indeed income is known at all). 
10.2.4 Medical need 
whether the observed degree of deterrence is significant from a 
policy point of view also depends on the objectives of the PHC programme, 
which include general coverage targets and reductions in overall and child 
mortality. The mortality data from the household survey are suggestive of 
differentials between income groups, but the sample size was too small for 
differences in any of the mortality rates shown in Table 10.1 to be 
statistically significant at the p=. 05 level. Thus, while there could be 
an association between SES and specific mortality rates, it cannot be 
proved conclusively from the available data, nor can it be demonstrated 
that higher mortality was due to lower use of medical treatment. 
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Table 10.1: Mortality rates by income arom crier 1000 eer vicarl 
Household Income Group 
I II III IV V 
Infant deaths 202 157 186 191 223 
Under-5's 113 83 156 97 94 
All ages 50.0 41.3 42.7 42.8 35.4 
10.2.5 Aggcegate household expenditures an treatment 
A more serious problem of vertical equity is represented by the 
cumulative financial cost of illnesses over time in the household. Over 
the course of a year, households spent on average 6.9% of total income on 
treatment (Tables 7.5 and 7.6). Whether this level is 'affordable' is a 
question that perhaps cannot be answered. Certainly it is not budgeted for 
and put aside, although this is done for some types of expenses, such as 
initiations. Illnesses are not the only kind of emergency expenditure to 
confront a household: 45% of all households had large unexpected expenses 
in the previous year which averaged nearly Le 3000 (2.9% of income), with 
funerals and court cases as frequent as major illnesses and accidents. But 
while these events might not be rare, most households said they would cope 
with them by borrowing. Of even greater concern is the fact that the 
aggregated expenditure on treatment represented 25.6% of income for the 
poorest 20% of households, which are reputed to spend from 70% to 80% of 
income on food (Lipton 1988). While Income is redistributed through gifts 
to a certain degree, most transfers for health expenditures involved debt 
in one form or another. Unlucky farmers who pledge crops or farm have 
been known to lose these assets, and high health care costs could cause 
this to happen if debt piles up at a rate of 25% of income per year. 
However, while the preliminary survey of the NHIES (CSO 1988) found an 
average of 72% of income spent on food in the predominantly urban Western 
Area, the final NHIES data for the rural areas surveyed (Table 10.2) 
suggest that it is closer to 50%, varying little with the number of earners 
per household (because of assumptions made in the income calculations in 
chapter 7, this proxy would correlate well with total household income). 
while it is unlikely that there is such slack (clothing and shoes were 
perhaps the largest category which could be reduced in an emergency) in all 
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but the highest household budgets, there would be less danger of adverse 
nutritional effects than if the proportion spent on food were higher. 
Table 10.2: Selected ho old budget caqponenta from the NHIS4, Post Loko 
Kenna rural areas 
Keneu district (rural) Port Loko district (rural) 
1-2 3-4 >5 1-2 3-4 >5 
earners earners earners earners earners earners 
ttce, cereals 28.2% 30.5% 37.2% 38.7% 47.5% 43.8% 
as t of food 
expenditures 
food, dual as 51.1% 59.4% 47.6% 52.0% 52.4% 51.3% 
t of total 
Medical as t of 3.8% 6.3% 6.8% 2.4% 3.6% 2.4% 
total 
hoes, clotkiy 7.29 9.4% 13.2% 13.5% 15.4% 14.5% 
as t of total 
e: eeditirea 
10.2.6 Impact of 'other medical' treatment costs 
The differential between lowest and highest income groups in terms 
of percentage of household income spent on treatment is nearly 6: 1 (Table 
7.6), compared to the deterrence differential of 1.7: 1. However, only 1/5 
of this total spending on treatment resulted from PHU treatments, with most 
of the rest due to fewer but more costly 'other medical' treatments. 
Hospital and private practice coats thus cause most of the financial burden 
on households1. Most mission hospitals in Sierra Leone had exemption 
system, which administrators claimed helped reduce deterrence in the face 
of rapidly rising prices. About 5% of outpatients receive sanctioned 
exemptions, and perhaps as many inpatients abscond after a hospital stay. 
Most hospitals in principle required the patient to be interviewed by 
members of a welfare cowdttee which assessed the patients' ability to pay 
and made arrangements for the costs to be covered. In addition, some 
hospitals used the principle of a sliding scale, either by higher formal 
charges for patients from wealthier districts, or by imploring obviously 
wealthy patients to pay more than the official charge. Focus group #1 
(016) and Case Study 03 gave the impression that most people believe that 
'This is of coarse III of the argomats is favoer of uer Charles for 9ovenMat PIC, NMI, that 
the charges vould be less this 11 the private sector, although the coipacisoa is Noce otte. betreu@ 
sources of dregs. Is this contest, dill peddlers are perceived as cheaper, "illy because they are 
sot particular about sellieq lscosplete courses of treatlest. 
222 
the poor now pay as Huch as the rich in the mission hospitals, so the 
hospitals are perhaps in a position to do more to relieve the burden on the 
poorest households. Government hospitals are also a financial hazard to 
the poor since informal fees are very high and are negotiated directly with 
staff1. 
10.3 Horizontal eaaIty 
As shown in chapters 6 through 9, there were large differences both 
between and within geographical areas in terms of specific utilization and 
burden on household budgets, representing equity differentials more 
significant than the differences between households of different SES 
(vertical equity). In addition to the differences between the 2 districts 
studied, there were significant differences between MM and LAN chiefdoms 
even though they are both part of Kenen district, which is generally 
considered to be relatively wealthy. While there was a statistically 
significant effect of wealth on PHU utilization in LAN alone among 
geographical areas, there was also in MAL a very high cumulative burden of 
treatment expenses on the poor (Table 7.7). Urban areas were significantly 
better off than rural areas in terse of income and access to health 
facilities. These patterns imply that chiefdom-level pricing policies 
would be more effective in maintaining equity than a district-level 
policies, which in turn would be better than a single national price 
schedule. 
In all rural chiefdoms, households located farther from a PHu were 
auch less likely to use it than those located nearby. Again, the 
differences in morbidity rates (Table 10.3) were not statistically 
significant, but suggest an association between proximity to a PHU and 
lower mortality. Since malaria and respiratory illnesses were the moot 
frequent causes of death, this also suggests that PM treatments for these 
conditions were more effective than the alternatives used in more distant 
villages. 
'tieiiy: of a 1191 lfcicu oenelopMet leek study of jemand loepitels in siezte Lette. 
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Table 10.3: Mortality rates by distance from a PEU (per 1000 per year) 
Distance Foram PHU 
0 miles 0.5 to 5 
miles 
>5 miles 
Infant deaths 158 199 245 
Under-5's 89 110 109 
All ages 35.4 45.0 46.8 
While MOH policy makers were aware that distant villages are 
disadvantaged by poor access to PHUs and attempted to construct new PHUs 
through comrunity self-help progranti s, fewer new projects were undertaken 
as the economic situation worsened. More MCH centres than the more 
comprehensive types of PHUs have been opened recently, but these offer 
fewer services and, as seen in BUY chiefdom, were not well utilized. Not 
only was distance itself a deterrent, but the distant villages were 
somewhat poorer. To conpound the problem, patients from other villages 
than the one the PHU was in were sometimes charged much more (Case Study 
*1). Finally, the degree of misinformation about the cost of PHU treatment 
was greater in the more distant villages. 
This research has identified problems of affordability and equity of 
pHC costs and their relative magnitudes, for which a range of possible 
solutions exist, the feasibility and acceptability of which will be 
discussed here. An overall objective of improving the welfare of the 
population is assumed here, as well as a constraint of a limited health 
budget with which to do it. 
If policy makers believe that the existing situation is not 
acceptable, policy alternatives and possible courses of action are: 
1) To reduce the burden of treatment costs for 011, households by: 
a) encouraging the use of Pinie in place of more expensive forms of 
medical treatment. The results of this study suggest that this 
could be done by improving awareness of PHU prices, offering 
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exemptions, and improving the range of services offered at MCH 
units. 
b) limiting the maximum annual outlay for PHU treatment by means of 
a prepayment mechanism. 
2) To price PHU services selectively to favour the groups which are most 
deterred from using them and which bear the heaviest financial burden. 
a) to compensate for differences in vertical equity. 
b) to compensate for differences in horizontal equity. 
c) to compensate for lower utilization during the rainy season. 
d) to compensate for higher risk of mortality. 
10.4.1 Viers an eýompýtions and cross-subsidization 
As discussed in Chapter 5, equity is a relative concept, and pricing 
policy should be guided by local views of what is desirable and acceptable. 
The concept of cross-subsidization was found to be generally acceptable in 
Sierra Leone: when asked whether the poor should be asked to pay nothing, 
a small amount, or the full cost of medicines, 61% answered a small amount, 
36% preferred nothing, and 3% said the full amount. Although a higher 
percentage (45%) in (wealthier) MAL suggested the poor should pay nothing, 
as did the lowest household and per capita income groups, there were no 
statistically significant differences between income groups or geographic 
areas. It was then explained to respondents that the drugs must be 
purchased by the MOH and paid for from the fees paid, so if the poor pay 
less, the rich would have to pay more. They were then asked if they still 
thought it was fair that the poor should have to pay less if the rich have 
to pay more. Of those who preferred a smell paynnent or free drugs for the 
poor, only 50% thought it was still fair. The wealthiest respondents were 
most favourably disposed toward subsidizing the poor if a small amount was 
paid rather than nothing at all. Another view, that conuLinity solidarity 
would be damaged if people paid different amounts, w e expressed in focus 
group 11 (Q31). 
10.4.2 Identifying the pool 
Finding objective, practical ways of identifying the poor, if this 
is regarded as being necessary to implement pricing policies, was one of 
the major objectives of this research. One approach (an element of the 
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Bamako Initiative strategy) is to rely on the local knowledge of a chiefdom 
or village health committee to identify those who are always too poor to 
pay the full charge, or to decide in individual cases of inability to pay. 
Chiefdom committees were organized, but at the time of the survey they did 
not appear to be very active, and could not be expected to be available 
each time a decision as needed for an exemption. Village health 
committees, which would be expected to have better knowledge about who 
needed exemptions from their locality than a chiefdom committee, did not 
exist in any villages that did not have a PHU. It is possible to 
contemplate a system similar to that used in some countries, in which a 
village chief certifies that the patient cannot pay. The chiefs are 
trusted (Focus Group *1) by their own villagers, but whether they would not 
vanifest a local bias is open to question. 
An alternative is a more formal kind of means-testing. Two or three 
major canponents of total income (e. g., number of bushels of rice planted, 
rn tuber of petty traders, bags of coffee sold) could serve to identify the 
rich and the poor, but this approach would need to be verified. Some of 
the wealth proxies tested that were most closely correlated with income 
were not applicable to all households in any given year (amounts others 
owe, amunts spent on ceremonies and emergencies). Others which were less 
sensitive but more generally applicable could be conbined to make a 
household wealth score, but it was shown in section 7.1.2 that this would 
misclaasify many households. Ownership of assets correlated relatively 
weil with household income (Table A1.14), and was a fairly sensitive 
indicator of PHU and 'other medical' utilization, as shown in Table 10.4. 
Assets appear to be a more sensitive indicator of ability to pay than 
income, since they represent the household's ability to spend income on 
items other than necessities, which may also be exchangeable for coney or 
food in emergencies. Households with an asset score of 1 or more were such 
more likely to use PINa, and those with a score of sore than 2 were also 
more likely to use more expensive treatments. A finer-scaled index could 
probably be devised, using more con n possessions such as cooking pots, 
shoes, etc., in addition to the assets used in the survey (Appendix 6). 
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Table 10.4: PIU and 'other u dical' utilization vs. asset awership u ana 'otner wdicai' utiliza tion vs. asset omm 
Asset Index PHU utilization 'other medical' 
utilization 
0 16.7% 13.3% 
1 or 2 22.3% 13.6% 
22 23.0% 21.3% 
However, it is questionable whether the other major criterion for 
proxies would be met, namely that they should not be easily manipulated by 
the patient. It is not possible to know to at lengths people would go 
to distort the truth if this approach to means-testing were taken (for 
either fee-for-service or a prepayment scheme), so some experimentation and 
evaluation would be required before adopting it. The proxies which would 
be less easily manipulated because of their less obvious connection with 
wealth (e. g., the amount spent on 'sauce' ingredients or house construction 
details) were found to be weakly correlated with ATP and income. The best 
of the proxy ATP indicators was the amount of money usually on hand, but 
the intent of this question would be seen quickly. 
If a price-discrimination or exemption decision were needed at the 
time of every treatment, a more efficient approach than formal means- 
testing would be to leave the decision in the hands of the PHU staff 
members who are responsible for managing the drug fund, not to exceed a 
certain percentage of exemptions, which would be related to the markup. 
Since it was apparent early in the survey that exemptions were being 
granted informally at PHUs, a question was introduced into the focus groups 
about how the poor could be identified, and whether an exemption system not 
incorporating rigid means-testing was likely to be abused. Denials of 
knowing others' personal affairs notwithstanding, it was agreed in general 
that the poor and the rich were readily identifiable. There was also 
consensus that most people had too much self-respect to pretend they could 
not afford to pay, although there might be a few such cases. Apart from 
the high rate of exemptions given to staff members' relatives, this system 
may work well enough, although an appeal mechanism involving the local 
health committee would be a desirable adjunct. Further research into 
informal means-testing could be fruitful. The approach to wealthier 
patients, (e. g., a fixed surcharge for those recognized by PHU staff as 
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being rich, or asking for a voluntary contribution), would be simpler than 
identifying the poor since there is no stigma attached to being rich, and 
the rich are probably very well known to the rest of the cons unity. In 
general, considering the relatively predictive Yp power and possibility 
of manipulating 'objective' proxies, it may well be more efficient to rely 
on traditional mechanisms for counteracting the small deterrent effects of 
user charges at the PHC level. 
10.4.3 Feasibility and acceptability of prepayment 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, prepayment or insurance schemes have 
received relatively little attention in sub-Saharan Africa despite their 
inherent advantages of risk-sharing and loss limitation. All such schemes 
involve the collection of a premium or subscription, issuing proof of 
entitlement (a 'health card' has sometimes been used), purchasing of drugs 
and/or other goods and services, and good management, and two of the most 
frequently mentioned drawbacks are the lack of ability to pay a fairly high 
annual premium and the need for an administrative mechanism which is 
trusted by the community. Focus group discussions indicated that the 
principle was thought to be a good one, and that money would be most 
available in December and January. This is the time of most ceremonial 
feasting, so the purchase of the health card or equivalent would likely 
come at the expense of feasting, which would have minimum adverse effect 
from the point of view of welfare. The drawbacks, as revealed in focus 
group 81 (Q38,039,040) were that not everyone would be able to make a 
one-time payment of the amount suggested (Le 400 for a year's coverage), 
and uncertainty about who could be trusted with the drugs and money. In 
fact, the total premium required to cover the actual (as opposed to the 
official) markup would be far in excess of this if there were no subsidies. 
(I f the premium were established based on of f is drug pr ices and markups, 
it is possible that there would be resistance from PHU staff who would no 
longer be able to hide their unofficial markup in a total fee for service. ) 
These problems would require time and experience to resolve. 
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10.5.1 QQtion la: Increasing PHU utilization without price discrimination 
Reducing PHU prices relative to other treatments would directly 
relieve only a small fraction of the burden of the cost of illness, but if 
PHU visits were substituted for 'other medical' visits, even if present 
prices were maintained, total expenditure on treatment would decrease. For 
example, if 50% of all cases now using more expensive providers were 
treated initially at PROS, the cost of the new mix of treatments would drop 
from 6.9% to 5.6% of household income. This would also raise the 
percentage PHU treatment expenditures from about 20% to nearly 40% of total 
health expenditures, so any pricing policy changes (i. e., to favour the 
poor) and efforts to enforce official prices would then have twice the 
effect on total health expenditures. For a substitution rate of 75%, the 
percentage of income would drop to 5.0%, and PHU expenditures would be 49% 
of all treatment costs. A higher volume of PHU visits would in turn 
achieve the recovery of fixed and semi-fixed costs (e. g., transport of drug 
kits, stationery) at a lower unit cost, and thus allow future increases in 
the official markup to be kept to a minimum. 
Inproving awareness of prices: Making the official prices more widely 
known would achieve higher utilization in several ways. As discussed 
earlier, this would probably cause fewer people who thought they did not 
have enough money to be deterred. It would also make it easier to control 
abuses of the system by PHU staff. Simplification of the pricing schedule 
would undoubtedly also assist in this regard. The system of individual 
drug prices results in an official price list (Appendix 7) that is 
formidably long and hard to understand by the public. The major 
theoretical objection to price bands or single pricing is that more 
expensive drugs will be demanded. Analysis of the price list and the most 
often treated complaints suggest that tablets and capsules could be 
conveniently put into 2 or 3 price bands, ointments and tinctures into 
another, and injections into 2 or 3 categories. Alternatively or in 
addition, prices of standard adult and child treatments for the most conmtn 
illnesses could be calculated and publicized. The first 10 most common 
reasons for presentation at PHUS account for 85% of cases, so including 
different child and adult prescriptions for some illnesses, most cases 
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would be covered by a dozen or so prices. Cross-subsidization of more 
expensive treatments for life-threatening illnesses (e. g., antibiotic 
injections for respiratory infections) by less expensive and essential 
treatu nts would also be easily incorporated into a simplified price 
schedule. 
per-episode pricing: Mile only 11% of illness episodes involved a second 
action taken in the recall period, the second action weis often more costly. 
Pricing treatment by the episode rather than by the visit would result in 
lower expenditures by households which had more serious illness, and would 
also encourage follow-up treatment at PHUs, which could in turn lower total 
costs by reducing unnecessary self-referrals to more expensive providers. 
This would of course raise the average cost of treatment for cases not 
requiring subsequent treatments, but not by more than 10-15%. The concept 
should be acceptable, since it is the same as used by most traditional 
practitioners. 
offering alternatives to full cash payment (without ý-tasting): Since 
all income groups exhibited relatively high rates of financial deterrence 
(only the highest income quintile was significantly lower than the rest), 
and since apparently much of this deterrence was due to the temporary 
unavailability of money in the household, an exemption scheme which 
compensated for this could increase utilization if its existence were 
widely known. Pull exemptions for the 35% of all cases that were 
financially deterred would mean that fewer than half of PHU users would 
pay, requiring another doubling of the markup on drugs, but other 
approaches can be imagined. An extension of the present informal credit 
system, in which the user promises to repay the fees within a certain time, 
and obviously wealthy users are asked to pay extra, would be workable. 
Accepting payment in rice could also encourage people who have trouble 
selling rice before leaving home, and would also work well in a formal 
credit system. These approaches would require creative accounting systems 
and the active participation of local health co nnittees. 
Miniass rage of PHC curative services: The desirability of substituting 
pHC for higher levels of treatment raises a question of the range and 
quality of services which should be provided by PHtb. While this problem 
230 
weis beyond the aim of this research, the field data indicated that nearly 
all conm n problems were treated at PHU8 (Table 6.9) but also that the 
range of services offered by POl units did not attract as many users as the 
more comprehensive Cam unity Health Posts and Centres. 
10.5.2 Q2tlon lbs PrepaYaent to liadt the burden an household budgets 
while the cumulative cost burden on the poor could be reduced by 
mean of a sliding scale that lowered the cost of visits for the poor, 
probably a more effective way of accanplishing the objective would be to 
limit the maxim m amount paid in PHUs, ideally to a percentage of income 
(however measured). This could be done efficiently through a prepayment 
scheme. if it is found necessary to Introduce means-testing, it is more 
efficient to do so at the subscription time than to have to verify facts 
or identity at each PHU visit, although some type of identification could 
be used to certify exemption status. A copaynient would probably be 
necessary to minimize excessive use, especially by nearby residents, and 
to enable the revolving fund to adiust prices on an ad hoc basis to keep 
up with drug cost increases. The copayment amount could also be geared to 
income (by having different colour cards, for example), since a lower 
marginal payment would differentially encourage the use of the PHU by the 
poor, and would be paid without much complaint by the rich if it were lower 
than the full cost of drugs from the market. A major potential drawback 
to this scheme is the difficulty people would have paying what is basically 
a yearä, average cost of treatment at one time, perhaps even with cross- 
subsidization. Government subsidies would be necessary, but are unlikely. 
10.5.3 aoti i 2a: Prim discrimination by M croup 
Although the principle of cross-subsidization was generally 
acceptable and objective raethods of identifying the poor (and rich) could 
probably be developed, it is difficult to envision the advantage of any 
such sc e when most of the poorer 60%, if not 80%, of households are in 
a similar financial situation. Probably the best way to do this would be 
if the exemption-cumdeferral system described above were operated in a way 
that allowed full exemptions only for those who absolutely could not pay 
(requiring the active participation of a PHU coanunity management 
cpmiittee), with subsidies provided by the wealthy in the form of higher 
payments. 
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10.5.4 Qgtion 2b: Price discrimination by location of residence 
The differences between districts and chiefdom are too large to 
ignore, and there would be few obstacles to establishing official price 
structures that are proportional to local (i. e., chiefdom) income levels. 
This would tend to equalize utilization, but would also mean that areas 
with higher prices and incoms would also have more funds available from 
the official markups for PHC development. Cross-subsidization between 
cocmunities could be considered as going against the principle of local 
control of revenues, and could be politically difficult to accomplish. The 
same could be accomplished through direct subsidies from the government, 
but the distinction between public and private subsidies is quite small 
when maximum cost recovery is a necessary objective. 
Encouraging more PHU visits by people living distant from the 
facility would probably accomplish more in the wary of improving equity of 
utilization than any attempts to improve vertical equity, and could also 
be mich easier to achieve. It would be worthwhile and a relatively single 
matter to offer a lower price schedule to the more distant villages, and 
to see if this increased utilization. objections to cross-subsidization 
might be raised, but the fairness principle is obvious and objections could 
be discussed. While it is possible, it seeins unlikely that people would 
be able to falsify their village; this would have to be tested. As a 
starting point, a reduction in PHU fees proportional to distance walked 
could be tried. 
10.5.5 ion 2c: Prue disc ruination in favor of those in greatest risk 
Although identification of other high-risk categories was not a main 
objective of this research, some of the results suggest that a policy of 
lenient exemption for certain categories of cases could be effective in 
achieving PHC mortality reduction objectives. Wile the numbers found in 
the household survey were small,, it is likely that there is excess infant 
and child mortality from malaria and respiratory illnesses among the poor 
and in villages distant from a PHU. If it were known that treatment for 
children wes free or very cheap, this might encourage earlier presentation 
for treatment. 
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10.5.6 Option 2d: Seasonal price adjustments 
Despite the contradictory observations on the availability of money 
by users of PHUs and the lower rate of financial deterrence reported, the 
drop in utilization observed in the rainy season was probably due to less 
money being available. It is also probable that the 'hungry' season 
observed was a particularly easy one. There may not be a need to reduce 
prices in the rainy season, but there is potentially a need to allow for 
more exemptions in bad seasons. The timing of price increases is best left 
for the period when most people reported maxim= availability of money, 
i. e., after the rice harvest in Novenber/December, and all price rises 
should be very gradual. 
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Chapter 11: 
Conclusions and the Broader Relevance of the Research 
u. 0 Intro&wtim 
Perhaps the most general conclusion of this research is that the 
economic behaviour of households when confronted by illness is complex and 
difficult to generalize. This fact alone explains the inconclusive nature 
of the previous work reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. The methods and results 
which have been described here do not in themselves represent a 'magic 
bullet', i. e., a simple set of observations and formulae which when 
processed would reveal an affordable price and exaction schedule, for 
those charged with making efficient and equitable cost-recovery policies. 
yet, mich of what was learned appears to have potential application in 
settings other than Sierra Leone, and lines of future research can be 
identified which could answer questions which were not definitively 
resolved. 
tt i Hci aaýeralizable are the fines? 
The surprising finding (in view of the assumed poverty of rural 
subsistence farmers) of high vertical equity of use of priced services not 
be seen in the context of Sierra Leone's history of payment for medical 
care in all sectors. Since this history may be unique, there is no 
justification for claiming that equity should be as high in other countries 
with similar rural econanies when PHC services are priced similarly, but 
hopefully it will encourage caT arative research, particularly in West 
Africa. As far as the somewhat tentative affordability findings are 
concerned, namely that 0.12% of annual income (or two daily agricultural 
wages) appears to be the threshold of significant deterrence for the poor, 
this should be adopted generally only with great caution. Here too, a 
repeat of this research would be needed to confirm this result. 
11 .2 Ayvlicabilitr of 
he research met +" tmý 
The health interview survey methodology provided useful and generally 
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reliable data, and has became a widely-used research tool in many 
countries. How it would need to be adapted to other contexts depends 
largely on the objectives of the new study: in this research, the sample 
size and the approach of matching household economic characteristics with 
the outcome of treatment decisions was adequate to detect relatively small 
differentials in vertical equity. The horizontal equity differences could 
have been found with a somewhat smaller sample, and if the major aim of a 
study is only to determine how household budgets are allocated, a much 
smaller sample size would have sufficed also. on the other hand, a noch 
larger sample would be needed if the main objective was to measure 
differential mortality rates. 
The household survey was highly experimental in the sense that little 
was known beforehand about measuring differences in SES in the specific 
envirarinent, so if the findings for Sierra Leone are thought not to apply 
in another country, analysis and data collection would be much simplified 
if some preliminary fieldwork were done. Some of the 'rapid appraisal' 
methods such as 'wealth ranking' (Grandin 1988) could be used, together 
with in-depth household interviews to establish SES factors before the main 
survey. 
The qualitative survey instruments were valuable for clarifying how 
cash enters what was apparently a mainly subsistence economy, and also in 
. covering community attitudes about paying for treatment which could not 
be fully expressed through a questionnaire survey. The number of focus 
groups conducted was probably excessive, as little new was learned after 
the first 2 despite differences between the communities. Case studies were 
useful, and would probably be an efficient way to learn more about 
decision-making in the face of illness. 
As is probably true of most quantitative research, the effort 
required to analyze the data was vastly more than initially expected. This 
is a general argument for researchers not to succumb to the tenptation of 
expanding their research instruments the maximxn that the field resources 
will permit. Given a complex dataset, however, techniques such as multiple 
regression proved to be an efficient way to examine them. If one has 
confidence in the survey data and knows exactly what one is looking for or 
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has a clear model, it should be possible to bypass the examination of 
individual variables (presented in Chapters 6 and 7) and proceed directly 
to modelling. This could be done (cautiously) for a quick assessment of 
horizontal and vertical equity in different regions, for exarple. 
U. 3 A different pproach: oyeratiaUI peseggy 
The research described here had broad initial goals, but a broad and 
fruitful research agenda could also be developed by working backwards fron 
specific operational questions. Several likely avenues of continuation of 
this research are: 
1) To identify canmunities or sections of communities which 
experience high mortality and morbidity, and to examine in depth the 
relationship between health status and low incase, poor access to 
facilities, malnutrition, sanitation, or other risk factors. This 
type of direct observation, focussing on groups for which 
interventions could have a large impact an prograrmme objectives, is 
likely to be more informative than general population surveys. 
2) As expected, the data provided by the cross-sectional survey did 
not reliably reveal much about the price elasticity of demand for 
treatment. While not strictly essential for setting prices, it 
would be ideal to have an idea of the effect of price changes. A 
carefully planned and controlled longitudinal experiment appears to 
be the only way to gain this information. 
3) It would be useful to verify some of the speculative conclusions 
of this research by an observational study at household level of the 
treatment choice decision-making process. Because of the risks 
involved in treating nalaria and respiratory illnesses with market 
drugs, it would be valuable to observe the decision process in 
detail at the household level, especially the extent to which the 
choice rests on availability of money and the outcome of the 
episode. Since drug vendors are the major source of modern 
medicines in villages distant fron a P'HU (and where government 
health services are unlikely to be introduced for many years), this 
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could be linked with research into changing the vendors' behaviour 
to improve the effectiveness of their treatments and minimize the 
potential for inducing drug resistance. 
4) The effect of dissemination about the actual costs of PHU 
treatment on the utilization could be studied in a simple comparison 
of a few chiefdoms. 
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Appendix 1: 
Additional Tables and Figures Referred to in the Text 
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Table Al. 1: 11sti®ted infarct and child mortality rates by district 
Calculated Rate per Port Loko Rural Kenema Rural 
1000 live births 
Infant Mortality 153 (PMISU 173) 240 (PMISU 216) 
Under-5 Mortality (PMISU 310) (PMISU 318) 
Table Al .2: Ca of death by chiefdcm 
Count 
Col Pct 
Port Loko Dist 
BIM( . BUY 
Keneu Dist 
LAN 1MAL URBAN 
Roy 
Total 
MALARIA AND 15 15 19 1 24 78 
FEVERS 15.5 14.6 16.0 28.6 21.7 18.3 
_ -------+------- _ --------+------- ------- DIARRNOEAL 5I5 7: 6 23 
DISEASES 5.2 4.9 5.9 1 7.1 5.4 
INFECTIOUS 68 13 I5 2 34 
INCL. TETANUS 6.2 1 7.8 10.9 S 6.0 8. 8 4 
_ --"---+------- -------+-------- -"---- RESPIRATORY 17 1 9 1 8 5 4 50 
INFECTIONS 17.5 t 15 . 6. 7 I 6.0 17. 4 11 77 
_ _ ........ 
CARDIOVASCULAR 13 21 1 8 
1.0 2.9 1.7 1.2 4.3 1.9 
--"----+--- --- ------"-+------ ------ ANAEMIAS 0 9 61 3 1. 1. I 1. 
9 
_ - _ 
MALNUTRITION I 
- ---- 1 
2 1. l. 7 t 
------------- - ------- - " _ --- 
IFIED) 
1 64 9 3 1 
(C . . . 4. 4 ------f---- _ +--- _ ------ UBTI/STD 
_ --- 1 9 
OF CHILDBIRTN 1. . 2. S 43 2. l - "_ 
D WE 
SENILIT 
I1 t 
11_7. 
6S6 
0i .1 
1 
4. 
32 
"_ . - _ : _" __ 
UPOISON 
IkT 1.1. .8 4 1 6 -------- ------+--"---- ------ 
. 
CONVULSIONS 3. I2 , EPILEPSY 3.1 2.6. 4.3 2 .A 
OEDE sI 15 7; 5.2 1 14.6 5.9 6.0 4.3 737 
NEAOAD(S 
4 
11 
10 9 . . . , 4.8 8.7 S. _ _ _ 
PAINS (ALL !0 10 62 1 30 
SITES) 10.3 9.7 3.0 : 2.4 8. I 7 0 
-- ----- MIELLAIEDUS :::::: 
::::: ::::: 
13 9 
i 
1 
: i:::::: 
43 3.1 
SPECIFIED, NOT 6 6 
25 
1019 1 
0 
UNKNOWN . . 10.1 8. 
Coluen 9 103 119 84 23 426 
Total 22.8 24.2 27.9 19.7 
1 
5.4 100.0 
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Table A1.3: Percentage of cases using treatment options as a sword action, 
by geographic area 
Second IktioTTakes 
GOv gotw l 91 A05PITAL 
60VERNNENT PHC UNIT 
NISSION HOSPITAL 
DRUGS FRON PEDDLER 
TRADITIONAL HEALER 
60VERNKENT STAFF PRIVATELY 
HERBAL SEIF-TREATMENT 
PRIVATE HOSPITAUPRACTITIONER 
HAD DRUGS AT HONE 
Geographic Area Cases 
Percent 
P(T LO KO BIST KENEM A BIST 
URBAN Row 
8* BUY LAN PA Percent 
1.4 1.6 3.1 8.0 3.8 
22.9 1.6 16.9 19.5 10.0 15.7 
1.4 14.8 3.1 11.5 10.0 7.8 
21.4 24.6 10.8 23.0 
------- 
10.0 
--- - -- 
19.8 
10.0 4.9 18.5 6.9 20.0 10.2 
2.9 11.5 24.6 11.5 11.9 
34.3 36.1 21.5 16.1 40.0 26.6 
-------- 
1.6 
-------- -------- 
1.1 10.0 
------- 
1.0 
5.7 3.3 1.5 -------- 2.3 - 3.1 
70 61 65 81 10 293 
23.9 20.8 22.2 29.7 3.4 100.0% 
Table lit . 4: Firnt action taken for cases in which a death occtaced, by 
aeocra tihic area 
Col Pct INK DUY LAN MAL UNI 
Row 
Total (costs) 
GOVT DISTRICT NOSP 11.3 
-------- 
7.6 
-------- 
9.2 
---"---- 
10.7 
--"---- 
30.4 
. .. 
10.8 46 
GOVT PMC UNIT 42.3 7.0 31.1 42.9 
. --. 9.7 29.1 124 
MISSION HOSPITAL 3.1 
-------- 
37.9 
-- -- 
.8 ------- 
11.9 
-------- 
17.4 
-------- 
13.4 57 
DRU6S FROM PEDDLER 2.1 
_ _ _3.4 
8.3 
" . 
4.7 20 
TRADITIONAL HEALER 6.2 S. 9 9.2 7.1 4.3 7.0 30 
60VT STAFF PRIVATE 4.1 6.9 10. i 7.1 4.3 7.0 30 
HERBAL SELF-TREAT 3.1 5.0 10.1 1.2 0.7 5.6 24 
PRIVATE PRACTICE 5.2 .A 2.4 4.3 2.1 9 
NO TREATMENT 14.4 15.5 10.9 2.4 13.0 11.3 48 
DIED SUDDENLY 9.2 
--"--- 
S. A 
"------- 
11.8 
-------- 
6.0 
---"---- 
8.1 
-------- 
0.2 3S 
DON'T REMEMIER 2.5 .73 
1; 01M 97 103 119 94 - 23 426 Totil 22.9 24.2 27.9 19.7 5.4 100.0 
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Table A1.5: Reason for not using medical treatment in illness cases, for 
the second action taken 
F Pct Total I 
THOUGHT NOT SERIOUS 1.3 
GOT BETTER SOON 0.7 
TOO FAR TO TRAVEL 8.5 
NOT ENOUGH MONEY FOR TREAT 50.3 
THOUGHT DRUGS UNAVAILABLE 3.9 
NOT EFFECTIVE FOR PROBLEM 21.6 
KNEW SELF-TREATMENT 7.2 
OTHER 4.6 
DON'T KNOW 2.0 
Coluim 153 11 1 
Total 100.0 
Table A1.6: Amounts spent on secord actions by action and by chiefdoiu 
.., ... I 
Aggpu t. Pad for 
For all Chiefdoms 
MEAN ? O? AL 
PAID 
Percent 
mwý 
V' 
GQV'T 
MISSION HOSPITAL 1067.9 0% 
DRUGS FROM MARKET 56.6 21 
TRADITTONAL HEALER 170.9- 
- 
-- 
7% 
GOV'T STAFF PRIVATELY 185.5_ 3 
_ 
UMBAL SELF-TREATMENT 12.8 7Q& 
PRivATE DOCTOR/HOSP 206.7 
_ 
0% 
HAD DRUGS AT HOME 0 0 
_ 
NO TREATMENT 0 100% 
For all Treatments 
B14C chiefdom 94.2 36% 
iefdom BUY ch 230.4 35 
_ 
LAN chiefdom 111.8 22% 
MAL r-hiefdom 328-8 20 
URBAN areas 78.0 30% 
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Table Al. 8b: Illness cases by age group and by chief= 
Count 
Col Pct 
(per 1000) 
Port Loko Dist 
Bilk BUY 
Kontos 
LAN 
Dist 
MAL URI 
Nov 
Total 
109 79 140 141 44 512 
UNDER FIVE 20.7 11.9 22.1 25.9 24. ) 20.1 
(304) 
------ - 
(195) 
-------- 
(425) 
-------- 
(402) 
- -- 
(267) 
- 5' 3 7 8 6 1 - ---- 68 ---"---- 300 
5-9 YEARS 11. 10. 10. 12 5 18. 11.0 
(167) (166) (214) (205) (1 ) 
0 
ý 
10-15 YEARS ( 1 8 1 9 1 
6 
(2 6 
) ( 6 ) ( 4 ) ( 7 ) ) 1 
303 4 § 399 305 77 1542 
OVER IS ýý 68 .1 5 3 1 60.6 ) ) ) 1 ( 20) 
66) 
( 
Colwa 522 S 633 545 111 2543 
Total 20.5 26.2 24. 21.4 7.0 100.0 
(233) (245) (313) (220) (166) 
Table A1.9: Selected results of the National Household Irnoee ad 
Expenditure Survey (NABS) (Figures in leones, with last column in $U8 at 
Le 130= $US 1) 
Household 
Income 
Household 
Expenditure 
Per 
Capita 
I ncane 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Le $US 
Port Loko Rural 180375 180375 23425 23425 $180 
Kenenna Rural 130500 114500 24952 21892 $168 
Urban PL+KFý1/2 219565 170300 41929 33349 $257 
Freetown 256780 197300 49285 37870 $291 
Table A1.10: Nousehold inecue aryd per capita incýowe quintiles by geographic 
area 
Area 20% below: 40% below: 60% below: 80% below: 
HH PC HH PC RH PC HH PC 
All 17500 2070 30000 3651 43460 5750 62500 9388 
BW chiefdom 20000 2143 30000 3667 43750 5357 60000 8750 
BUY chiefdom 17216 1875 30348 3138 43400 4746 67500 8750 
LAN chiefdom 13750 1500 20760 2642 30000 4708 45000 7000 
MAL chiefdom 20000 2500 35000 4515 49500 7308 75000 12500 
Urban areas 30000 3938 42660 6135 56200 8571 82000 11667 
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Table A1.11: Survey sample household coi osition 
BUY LAN MAL URBAN 
TOTAL MEAN 
MN 
TOTAL MEAN/ 
! NI 
TOTAL MEAN 
/181 
TOTAL. MEAN 
/HH 
TOTAL MEAN 
IHN 
Under one year 80 0.32 102 0.38 77 0.29 87 0.32 39 0.66 
l to 4 years 275 1.10 303 1.14 252 0.98 264 0.97 97 0.88 
3 to 9 years 353 1.41 433 1.63 310 1.23 331 1.21 192 1.76 
10 to 14 years 255 1.02 334 1.26 173 0.68 176 0.64 111 1.02 
15+ (adult) 1280 5.12 1537 5.78 1268 4.91 1311 5.08 464 4.26 
Household total 2243 8.97 2709 10.18 2090 8.10 2245 8.22 903 8.28 
Attending school 285 1.14 326 1.23 172 0.67 215 0.79 262 2.40 
15-15 in school 46.81 42.51 34.81 42.48 96.41 
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Table A1.12: Mews amotzits paid for ftrat actions, by imam grOW 
a) Includin cases laying : ero: P C it I l er ap s of a oco"e 1r leve 
Variable Value Libel Neon Std Oev Cases 
For Entire Population 107.6509 363.4352 2352 
" 00 C2 -I 
tpý. 0904 316.7669 391 
. N ' 113.2157 366.3346 510 1NC 3.00 RPC 92.0216 221.4704 482 
RPCINC 4.00 92.9601 276.3570 403 RPCINC 3.00 149.8444 527.5156 360 
By levels of Total Household Income 
Variable Value Label Mein Std Div Cues For Entire Population 
00 RIOT INC 1 
101ý 6509 
7308 14 
363.4ý 
361 
5 235q 
. RTOT"1NC 2.00 
R OT'TINC 3.00 
00 RTOTINC 4 
. 1ý9t 
296 
14 3877 
. 16 465 . JS Z66 
P 
46I 
9 
. , 207.2 9 47 RTOTýtNC 5.00 142.3203 443.6516 481 
fg T iºe Population 
a 1. RP 
RPCC1NC 2.00 
RPCINC 3.00 
RPC1NC 4.00 
RPC: TMC 5.00 
Iy levels of Total Household Income VaºiaAle Value Label 
E Lire Population R 
TÖT 
RTOT1NC 2.00 
NC T R 0 
-IIN C TÖ 00 4. 
RTOTINC 5.00 
Nun Std Div C. sts 163.6684 
ý 
437 
. 6100 
154363 
17e. 7616 447.64ý9 ý 
133.9521 264.3. w 334 137.0533 344.8262 244 
245.1103 609.2093 263 
Nun Std 0w Cain 
163.6684 437.8213 1547 
139.4741 444.7 
142.766s6 
32566 1.86,7 
1 
205.667 
$21.1799 17 
bºia if Value ü -11Fý-- dc sPHU K 131 201 R 164 RTÖTINNC 2.000 1 
RTT 4: 
0ý0 23' ' '0t 11 1 RTOTTJNC 
5.00 
118.3491 
177: 
4 10i OTHER MEDICAL 4241118 032.21 340 RTOT INC 1.00 1 . 3710 879.124 62 RTOTjNCC 3.0000 3.162.7819 77 
RTOT7 5.000 
0 : 4810 
94.7 7 
TREAT 
S4 
DRUGS 47.9107 107.1425 730 
RTRpTIMMCC 3.0000 
SELF-TREAT 
:) 
RTOTýNC 4.0 0 RTO1_ NC 5.00 Zs 1A3 
6A4 ý0 11 
SELF-TREAT NERD A. 935 39.41 
R 
1.000 
01 1 . 
470 
: 
RTOT1NC . 00 RT0T1NL 4.00 
RIOT INC 5.00 ý: AR 33 12.1674 75 
RTS I 00 
TRM HEALER 71.8911 138'10 ! 100 
RTOT7 
3.0000 60.8824 105: 
012 
1 RTOTJMMC 
5.000 7765401 
T24: 
0322 
261 
d) For PHU treatment, inclulino oayinu iero: 
"joyets of rer t: a tta income 
Variable Value abet 
For Entire Population 
RPC INC 1.00 
RPC1 2.00 
RPC 1 3.00 
RPCINC 4.00 
ban 
131.6056 
123.4032 
197.4639 
112.7347 
100.1951 
RPC INC 5.00 106.1746 
Std Div CAN% 207.5452 464 
431 l 
304. 
97 
168.1414 
171.6383 82 
137.9915 63 
Table A1.13: Independent variables uaed in regressions with 1l4 irden 
Variable Nam std Oen Nisiew Naliew N Label 
HN TOTAL 9.35 4.12 1.0 31.0 647 N household SIIbers CON51AIE3 6. 3.10 . 95 22.93 647 $ 'consuaptios equivalents' in household 011 SOIL 1.11 1.39 .0 9.0 641 N children in school IN11I5 1.49 1.36 .0 9.0 647 N under 5s CINtONIC .. 13 . 
37 .0 2.0 646 N chrosicaýIv ill in heus. heid 13.43 4.29 4 27 
1.97 . 64 1.0 4.0 2.32 1.43 1.0 9.00 
1.46 1 
82 
07 : Al .07.0 .0 
.0 099 . 33 :03: 
ö 
. to . 29 .02.0 
! 673¢. 
49 
37212: ¢2 ý1 250000 
! 010 0 
77.22 
2+x. 72 
4.. 
0 
264100 
169777.24 43372169 
4.66 1ý00 
6232.59 6911.16 . 06 65000 8.29 1.08 2.30 11.08 
845.44 2015.9933 ý0 1200600 
634.11 2357.77 0 14000 
2.90 1.85 2.30 9.5 
3.95 3.06 .0 12.0 
76.13 S1. 
ä9 
60 
2400 
13.32 8.73 2.37 105 26 
77.91 57.34 2 500 
13.64 11.37 . 24 86.96 
4481.35 7099: 
SS 3.20 
400000 
2225.26 3183.15 7 30000 
6.84 1.49 1.95 10.31 
872.54 1969.45 0 14000 
1715 464 -02 0 4000 0 
1470.9ý1 
1416.04 
2587.63 5516.1100 . 00 40000 0000 0 
1. 
180+. 
63 
1 2' 
X2.7$ 
2.30 
3200.2 57.85 0 
. 214 0 
5000 
93 . 1.60 246ý -4: 
61 2: 
79 
. 64 . 40 . 001 1.010 
. 32 9139.30 : 000 4286.65 0 106600,0 
5.20 3.23 2.30 11.58 
647 
641 
647 
647 
647 
647 
647 
647 
647 
647 
647 
627 
X27 
626 
626 
58 
543 
641 
297 
616 
616 
1 
II 167 
1 
1Q 
167 
167 
1 
164 
135 
131 
647 641 
323 
323 
index based ön house size and constr4ction 
enuoerstor s ranking of household SES N economically active household members N household ushers farmers N household members einers N household ambers petty traders N household sebeºs large traders N household members junior govt employees N household members senior gov't employees N who remit money to household Estimated household no' farming income loý non-farming income 
Estimated household fining income 
oý farming income 
stinted total household income Li total income 
Estimated per capita income log per capita income Bushels of rice planted Monty received from garden crops Value of polo oil pºý cod log value of pals oil produced N months rice bought by fare households 
oder of consumer possessions tsp ent on rice yesterday Ast all rice per 'conception equivalent' Amount ent an sauce ingredients Ast sp ent sauce per 'consuption equivalent' }s 
petto s 
yes 
coremohies last r Lýoý 
Amount 
aount 
speenntonn 
cceereooniýs 
r 
Amount spent on emergencies last year Log amount spent on emergencies Amount cash owed to others Amount kind owed to others Amount cash others owe household head Amount kind others out household head Total cash and kind owed to others dotal csph and kind others owe t total owed to others tot tot t others ore A"t in pocket dry season Amount in pocket rainy season School attendance inlet 
Log school attendance index oil tnpss cases in household Outer or ownin fowl Dusty for ornin large livestock income from coffee and cocoa 
log income from coffee and cocoa 
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Table A1.14: (bwrelations between wealth., ineam and M4 
variables, for all cate ies of obtaining money together 
< MALIN >< 11ýOE ) (--#1º1NICEB -) 
C. rrelatiais: =me OIN S WIN SP AK M_rM UFAM UDCCS 101 lt 1011E U86 UM L 
COIBT'JC 1.0000 . 3796e. . 3423.. . 361t" . 1260 -. 0944E . 1660*. . 2456'. . 3102% . 1244K . 1773M# 80 ja . 3795" 1.0000 . 311610 . 2868.4 . 1781 -. 10%. . 2134" . 2408.. . 0990E . 16110 . 1326m mM TOT . 34230 . 3116*. 1.0000 . 47271* . 4165" -. 1476*. . 29%'+ . 4007" . 1640.. . 2426*. . 221" OP am . 3161" . 296 . 472111 1.0000 . 566411 -. 1716*. . 2270.. . 3075'. . 1931 1GMH . 169 POCk_MX . 1260 . 1181 . 4165 . 5664'+ 1.0000 -. 228 . 1402 . 0893 . 0510 . 2306* . 2108. LNFW -. 0914. -. 1036E -. 1476*. -. 111911 -. 22851 1.0000 -. 3810,1 . 0739 . 2162,1 -. 1313++ -. 090 
LNMCS . 1660*1 . 2134" . 2906*1 . 2270" . 1402 -. 381000 1.0000 5504O# -. 0919. . 1625H . 1338.. TOT p( . 2456*' . 24000 . 4007'+ . 3075*1 . 08919 . 0739 . 394*1 1.0000 . 1150 . 1401++ . 1306" IN TOTAL . 31020 . 0990E . 16401 . 1931" . 0319 . 21621* -. 04191 . 1130* 1.0000 . 0791 . 1311+ L& . 1744*. . 1651*' . 2426" . 16531+ . 2506+ -. 131 . 162 . 140111 . 071 1.0000 . 9903fß . 070TH . 1113" . 1526*. . 2281*0 . 166H . 21091 -. 09331 . 1330H . 13011" . 131110 . 9006*t 1.0000 
$inisa p+irriw N of caet: 125 1-tailed Sigaif: I- . 01 ti - . 001 
Table A1.15: Sa Qle output of Sp8S logistic regression pcocedute 
logistic regression USALIMED with TOT [NC VALK)t OISTJII NEIRJ*J 
ILLALMED LNSCIL SEVERE LNOIAIED MESP1 
/catpaicalzagegpl/(step/contrast (ayeypt)zder/criteria pi*(. l)/classplot/priat"suMary Cory. 
Total nueber of cases: 2543 (Ummighted) 
Nuebor of selected cases: 2543 
Nueber of unelected cases: 0 
Nueber of selected cases: 2343 
iffier rejected because of sissing data: 564 
Nueber of cases included in the analysis: 1179 
Dependent Variable.. USALUE® am any medical 
Beginning hock Nunür 0. Initial Loo Likelihood Function 
-2 Log Likelihood 2541.3617 
1 Constant is included in the nodeI. 
Beginning hock "or 1. Nithod: Forward Stepviu (NAL1) 
Isprov. Modes Correct 
Stop Chi-Sq. di sip Chi-S4. di sit Class I Vsºial" 
I 36.089 1 . 000 56.08! 1 . 000 66.14 IN: IU. ALIIEI 
2 33.692 2 . 000 89.780 3 . 000 66.09 INs IN8P1 
3 21.203 1 . 000 110.984 4 . 000 66.04 IN: LN0WI 
4 17.549 1 . 000 128.533 5 . 000 67.21 [NJ NALKJI 
5 26.370 1 . 000 134.903 6 . 000 68.47 IN: NEM p*J 
6 13.942 1 . 000 168.845 7 . 000 68.57 IN: 018T H1 
7 15.425 1 . 000 184.270 8 . 000 68.42 IN, SEVERE 
8 3.383 1 . 066 187.653 9 . 000 68.37 IN: LNSCIL 
End Block "or I PIN = . 1000 L imits reached. 
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Table A1.15 (continued) 
Final Equation for Block I 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than . 01 percent. 
Chi-Square df Significance 
-2 Log Likelihood 2353.709 l%9 . 0000 
Model Chi-Square 187.633 9 . 0000 
Improvement 3.383 1 . 0659 
Goodness of Fit 1960.124 1%9 . 0000 
Classification Teile for USALUE® 
Predicted 
. 00 1.00 Percent Correct 
011 
Observed 
. 00 0 1179 124 90.01 
1.00 11 502 1 174 1 25.741 
Overall 68.3n 
Variables in the Er}itian 
Variable B S. E. Wald df Sig R ES(B) 
I, tiýK P1 -. 15B4 . 0498 10.1202 1 . 0013 -. 0äG3 . DISTJ41 -. 0279 . 0089 16.33Bb 1 . 00 00 -. 075'7 . gl2~i Iý -M-FM . 9102 . 1413 41.3710 1 . 00 00 . 1245 2.4949 i, ý a fn . 0317 . 0067 31.1321x7 1 . 00 00 . 10$w 1. ý0 ýL,. . 0872 . 0474 3.3829 1 . 06 39 . QQ33 1.0911 SE%V E . 3997 . 1002 13.0000 1 . 0001 . 0713 1.4913 L? WED . 2067 . 0741 7.6560 1 . 00l ß. 0473 1.?. 203 AE 1 29.74213 2 . 00 00 . 100s X1(1) . 4243 . 0047 25.0745 1 . 00 00 . 03 1. Sm PIý1 c2) -. 435ß . 013m 24.66'33 1 . 00 00 -. 09 4 . 6467 Cansta nt 2.2947 . 2904 60.7389 1 . 00 00 
Cornlatüm Ibtrixt 
Co dat VNk Pl DISJI I(* PNi ILL J0 U811( Si: « UWE) p6 1(1) ME I(2) 
C mstýnt 1.00000 . 020,! -. 2 -. 12234 -. A3S92 . 17390 -. 19110 -. 20140 . 190! 0 . 03202 {M X pl . 01099 1.00000 -. 3341 -. 00311 -. 03181 . 09110 -. 01021 . 07921 -. 04 . 04633 GIST Hl -. 216! 9 -. 35 1 1.0000D -. 44663 . 01692 -. 01336 -. 09914 . 01910 -. 018% -. 00001 «%-. 12131 -. 00377 -. 41iä 1.00000 -. 4 l3 . 06101 . 07451 -. 12009 -. 01 . *a 1u. JE -. 93592 -. 03191 . 01690 -. e3313 1.00000 -. 006f3 -. 00000 . 013033 -. 1712! . 00092 LN9I3L . 17390 . 0140 -. 013äi . 06101 -. 00643 1.00000 -. 009! 1 -. 2f011 -. 03061 -. o 
SOIENE -. 19110 -. 0142! -. 04914 . 07451 -. 00010 -. 00691 1.00000 -. 01691 -. 01060 . 04Siý ý -. 20140 . 07121 . 01110 -. 12021 . 01343 -. 22471 -. 01631 1.00000 . 00116 -. 06161 AAl(1) . 196! 0 -. 01632 -. 018% -. 04313 -. 17429 -. 00064 -. 01060 . 0©116 1.00000 -. 613! A6E 1(2) . 03202 . 04633 -. 00009 . 00ý . 00012 -. 04% . 00880 -. 06168 -. 67m 1.00000 
---- Vviýbie not in tlw Ewätim ------- --------- 
Rýsidurl Chi $ pia . 100 with 1 dt Sits . 7511 
Vxi+ble Scare dt Sig R 
ý p( . 100© 1 . 7511 . 0000 
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Observed Groups and Predicted Probabilities 
160 J. 
f 
R 120 
E 
0 11 
u I1 Ill 
E 90 111110111 1 
N 11100010111 11 
C 11000000000111111 11 
v 11000000000000100111111 
40 00000000000000000011111 11 
100000000000000000000001111111 
00000000000000000000000000110111 1 
00000000 00000100101 
Predicted 
Prob: 0 J5 1 
Group: 000000000000000000000000000000111111111111111111111111111111 
Predicted Probability is of Mesbership for 1.00 
Symbols: 0- . 00 1-1.00 
Each Symbol Represents 10 Cases. 
Table A1.16: Overall aotbidity by season and district 
Dry Barion Rainy Beason 
Cases/household - Port Loko 
Cases/household - Kenema 
2.00 
2.22 
2.19 
1.88 
Cases per capita - Port Loko 237 226 
Cases per capita - Kenema 243 187 
Table A1.17: Seasonal arotbidity pattezrs (cams/1000 population) 
PORT LOKO DISTRICT KEMM DISTRICT 
Reported Symptom 
Dry Season Rainy Beam Dry Season Rainy Serino 
Malaria/(ever 37.3 82.4 74.7 60.8 
Headache 21.4 29.0 25.8 23.2 
Total malarial symptoms 78.7 111.4 100.5 $4.0 
DiV, dysentery 15.3 8.4 24.9 9.9 
Stench pains, worms 22.2 9.4 24.0 19.9 
Total digestive syytoas 37.5 17.1 4.9 no 
Respiratory symptoms 32.0 25.3 24.0 16.6 
8eeeral body psis 21.4 21.5 16.9 21.0 
Eye, ear aid skis 26.7 11.7 31.1 15.3 
Total symptoms 197.1 194.7 221.4 166.9 
Percentage of all reported 
Norbidity accounted for by above: 83.21 86.31 91.2% 89. E 
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Appendix 2: 
Case studies 
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Cass Studies from village intsrvisws 
Kenn District 
1. Niala: Rouse #9 
Njala is a very small village accessible only by footpath after 
crossing a river. Livelihoods are small coffee and cacao plantations, with free-lance diamond mining nearby. 
The house has 2 rooms with mud-and-wattle walls and a thatch roof. 3 adults and 2 children comprise the household. The woman's husband is a diamond miner, and there are no other contributors. (But this is an example 
of how a household member may grow a salable crop even though s/he is not 
referred to as an an economic contributor. The village heads call her to 
cut rice, for which she is given rice in exchange. ) 
she did not buy rice but cooked 3 cups of the rice she earned, for herself and the child. She spent Le 40 on palm oil (a pint will last 3 days), and Le 30 on other ingredients for sauce. 
illness cases: Adult r with serious headache and fever, and a 2-year 
old r with fever and scabies. The wasian and child were both ill at the time of the visit. There was no money in the house, but 2 days after the 
onset of illness her husband returned from Lawoma with Le 200. She said she doesn't know how he got the money (probably from mining). 
she walked to Weiima (about 3 hrs away) but the dispenser asked her for Le 500 so gave her only part treatment -1 injection for the child and 2 injections plus 6 tablets for herself. She had no more money but returned 
to the PHU because she was still feeling sick, and was "driven away". She 
then decided to send someone to buy chloroquine because she was "cold" and 
knew that chloroquine was good for this. She didn't have the Le 20 needed, but got it by selling potato leaf and pepper. She took 4 chloroquine 
tablets and now feels better. She also gave the child chloroquine, and the 
child also is feeling better. 
Q: why not just buy chloroquine in the first place? 
At when a person is sick they should go to the hospital. 
This woman also had chronic dysentery and worms since her last 
pregnancy. (while pregnant she had an acute attack of vomiting. She was 
admitted to hospital and treated, but only partially because of the 
pregnancy. ) Within the past 2 weeks she has another attack, but did not go to the PHV because she had no money, and so used wild leaves. The 
attack stopped for 2 or 3 days, then returned. Now she says she hasn't 
enough money to be treated for worms. 
Asked about how she would cope with an emergency expense of Le 500, 
she said she would go to a person who trusts her, or to her parents. "It's 
common, if someone doesn't have enough, you go to someone who does. " on 
equity questions, "If someone has nothing, they should get medicine from 
God. if others have to pay more, it's okay. " 
**** contrast the statements of the dLspenaer from the PHI at w1janat 
Since the inception of cost-recovery, everyone in the chiefdoms nearby knows they must pay. He will accept half payment with the balance on 
completion of treatment. There were some problems in charging because he 
had no UNICEF drug kits frost August to December and had to buy drugs on the 
market. 
8e claims that patients fron outside the town of Wilima pay 1/4 the 
price of residents, which is completely at odds with other tales which 
state the opposite. He admits there was a "crisis" in the village when 
other villages in the chiefdom refused to pay for PHU construction. Wilima 
residents then did not want other villages to use the PHU. Allegedly the dispenser is under great pressure to charge outsiders more and to give Weiima people free treatment. He claims that everyone pays the same amount 
269 
for items from the drug kits. For non-kit items he charges only the cost 
price of the item, and not including his transport costs. 
other complaints about the dispenser: He charges Le 120 for BCß for 
newborns. Xpeteiaa patients have paid Le 600-1000 for treatment. 
Dispenser: "This is a mining area - people tell lies. " (In fact he 
probably takes advantage of the relative wealth. ) 
2. Giehun Koio. house 3. This is a better-off looking household, with 
concrete oors, concrete pillars supporting a zinc roof, and walls of 
plastered mud. The head of the household is a farmer, and the brother is 
a trader. Sacks of cacao can be seen in a storeroom. The trader says that 
the farmer makes more money than he does - he doesn't know how many bags 
he buys and sells, but he makes a profit of Le 600 - 800 per bag. The 
trader brother sees his household as being better off than most other 
households in the village. 
3. Giehunxoio, house 26. This is an average-looking house, opposite from 
a church near the village centre. However the interviewer could not tell 
the status. The interview was conducted in Xrio using an interpreter for 
Mende. The man interviewed is a farmer, and sold 5 bags of cacao for Le 
5000 and exchanged one bushel of coffee for rice. Between this and his own 
crop, he has to buy rice for 3 months out of the year. He has to buy rice 
Nobody else in the household contributes. He also has a food garden. He 
wears a good suit, and is holding about Le 100 in one hand. 
They have no listed possessions, although the senior wife was wearing 
good clothes. They cooked 8 cups of rice yesterday at Le 20 each, and 
spent Is 80 on soup. They spent money together with other households on 
ceremonies - they spent Le 300 on his father's funeral, and also sent 
several basins of cooked rice which he borrowed from relatives who had 
already sold their crops. A village dispute cost his sister Le 120, which 
they raised by selling bananas. In an emergency costing Le 500 he would 
pledge crops. 
He had trouble understanding the question on equity, but finally said 
the poor should pay like everyone else. "The whites (at segbweaa) are no 
longer allowing exemptions'. (Possibly this was said for the benefit of 
the white man present, according to the interviewer] 
During the past 2 weeks one child had a fever, and couldn't play for 
several days. She was taken by foot to Segbwema (mission hospital) for 
treatment. The child has recovered. They were charged Is 200 but had only 
Le 80 with them. 
a second child also had fever and they walked to Segbwema again. The 
charge was Le 200 but this time they had the full amount. 
Sam orovesnor, field au rrisor: Farmers place high traditional value on 
feasting after " harvest. They do not consider it important to save for 
emergencies. These are met by borrowing and repaying after the next 
harvest, including a small coffee harvest in August during the rains. 
Farm production is limited by inputs, mainly labour. This has been 
made even more serious by increased migration from farm areas. Farmers 
only cultivate an area that their families can manage. Land is freely 
available, and seed is saved from previous harvests. 
School fees are about Le 1000/year for primary. Le 2000-3000 for 
secondary. 
Given the risk of losing their crops to moneylenders if an emergency 
should strike when they have no cash, why do the villagers spend so 
apparently recklessly on feasting during harvest season? Answer - traditional values are stronger than "rational" financial planning. 
4. seadumi. house_11_. A visiting son gives his sick mother money to go 
to the PHU. She as anaemia and swollen feet. His son has kwashiorkor, 
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looks weak. He had gone to Kenema hospital where he paid Le 600 for 
medicines and Le 200 for consultation. 
Another brother is sick, spent Le 500 for a traditional healer. He 
had the money from his trading occupation (buys coffee/cacao here, sells in Kenema). Be has a big extended family, and could get Le 500 from them 
if he needed to. This man believes the government should charge the poor 
only a nominal amount, and it is right for the better-off to pay more than 
the cost of the medicines. Seasonality: He can have as much as Le 10000 
after the harvest, and saves it to last to the rainy season, when he will 
have about 5000 left. By the and of the rains it is used up. 
There was a death of a newborn due to complications of delivery. He 
paid Le 1500 for admission to private hospital in Kenema. The baby died 
2 hours after birth. 
The Community Health officer is new at post, and has tried hard to 
revive confidence in the PHU. He describes Sendumei as a poor town, mostly 
rice farming and little coffee/cacao. Farms are small and there is little 
cash cropping, according to a teacher who had to resign as head to become 
a class teacher in order to have more time for farming. His stipend is Le 
1500 per month, but he received it last 5 months ago. He says it is 
impossible to charge people here Le 200 to treat common conditions. He 
charges people who say they are poor nothing or a reduced amount, and there 
are a few instances where a higher amount (Le 200) las been charged for 
malaria or headache. People in Gbandawo said they have preferred to travel 
to the PHU at Blass, than to Sendumei, even though it is more than twice the 
distance, because it is a larger town. 
5. Sendueei H8 35: 16 household members, 11 of whom are children. 
Patient #1: 6 yr old male had pneumonia, went to PHU. Charged Le 120 
for treatment, got slightly better. He had only about Le 60, so was 
treated half on trust by the CHO. 
P #2: 9 year old male, had a acre. Medicine was bought in Kenema 
from a pharmacy, where they had gone for other purpose. (Mother?? ) had to 
sell a tin of palm oil which she had produced to pay. Now feeling better. 
p #3 : 14 year old male with malaria. Went to the PHU, paid Le 120, 
but got worse. He was advised by elders to seek advice from a herbalist, 
who treated him for Le 600. He is now recovering. Patient had to pay Le 200 in advance, a fowl, 14 cups rice, and a bottle of palm oil just to get the herbalist off to the bush to gather the herbs. Then he had to pay Le 200 more, borrowing the money and the fowl from friends. Different people loaned different things. 
(Note on sendumei: Farms are small, with small cash crop sales. Most cash borrowed is returned in kind. 2 cases of kwashiorkor seen. 
6. Gorahun Vaasa es 24 Head of household (around 50, born here), is town 
chief. 
p #1: had fever, wanted to buy tablets but no vendors were around 
(reason entered on Q was 'too far to travel'). Used lemon grass tea, got 
slightly better. Next day vendor came so he spent his last money (Le 20) 
on 4 tablets, and got better. 
P# 2: headache, went to herbalist because no transport was available. 
Paid Le 10. 
P #3: Fever and scabies, used leaves he picked himself. 
P #4: Female child with fever. Household heads bought tablets for 
Le 42, now child looks better. Money given to him by brother-in-law, must be repaid tonight. Will repay by selling bananas from his plantation, 
which he normally uses for family's own consumption. One tree is enough 
to pay debt, and he owns 20 trees. 
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P #5: had a chronic stomach ache and had been using herbs but didn't 
get better so went to a private dispenser 10 miles away at Poturu, getting 
a (free) lift on a motorbike. He asked for Le 400, but she gave his 280, 
which was all she had when she left home. Now feels slightly better. She 
had the money, which her husband had left with her. 
P #6: Septic more on leg. Bought 10 tetracycline capsules in a span 
of 2 weeks, at Le 4 each. She was lent the money by a friend without interest. Be can repay it any time he gets the money (He is a rice farmer, 
but hasn't harvested his rice yet. Be can get (only) Le 6/cup at this 
time. 
The household head's wife gave birth to a baby who died last March 
at age 3 months from tetanus. The TBA gave a injection, for which she was 
paid Le 40. They had the money at the time. 
Another dependent lost a1 month old baby to tetanus. Treated it 
with native medicine, but the baby died. The mother was not will enough 
to travel, so they sent for the dispenser and the TSA but they did not 
come. 
A field survey supervisor rated this family 'average' SES. The 
household head is a rice farmer and has cash crop plantations. Be used to 
be a tailor but now depends on farming. Five household members help with 
farming. A brother who is a policeman in mono sometimes sends money. 
Every adult had his own farm, ranging from 1/2 to 1 bushel planted, and 
they make separate cash sales. One bushel planted yields 3 to 10 bushels. 
They sell a bushel which contains 60 butter cups at Le 6 per cup, or Le 360 
per bushel. 3 bushels of rice are planted in total, every year. They have 
5 acres of coffee trees, with about 4-500 trees per acre. In a good year 
these yield 1-1/2 to 3 bags of clean coffee, but the trees did not bear 
much last year so their yield was only 1 tin, or Le 600. They own 
chickens, but no livestock. They consume all their own harvest, and then 
have to buy rice for 6 months. They do not plant more rice because they 
would not have enough labour to work the coffee and banana plantations. 
The family owns 4 wristwatches and a sewing machine. 
Everyone ate rice yesterday, from their own harvest. Plasmas was from their garden, but they bought a pint of palm oil (Le 30), Maggi (Le 
6), dried fish (Le 10) and salt (Le 8). This total of Le 54 was supplied 
by the household head, and Le 4 for chili peppers was from the wife's own 
pocket. The wife cooked in the morning and in the evening, so the family 
ate 2 times. 
Emergencies: Mother-in-law died last week, requiring Le 3000 in 
expenses. They raised the money by cleaning their first harvest (3 months 
worth of consumption) and selling it. He is depending on a good coffee harvest this year to buy the extra rice. if there were another emergency 
costing Le 500 he would borrow it from a friend. 
The head would like to see free treatment for the poor, but if it 
requires others to pay more, only those who can afford to should have to 
pay more. 
7. Mutual (Langrate ahlefdoa): Wosºen's comeittee has a 
cassava and r ce farm, and the men have a mutual rice farm. They sell the 
produce and keep the money for emergencies. Planted 6 bushels of rice this 
year. Last year they harvested 85 bushels from 1-1/2 bushels planted. 
This year they expect 150 bushels yield from the 6 bushels. (7) 
Price of coffee Le 20/lb last year. Higher this year, but buying 
hadn't started yet. Bag weighs 175 lbs. Cacao sold for Le 20/lb this 
year. 
8. Yibeies IM "8: The household head was educated and spoke English, 
described himself as an agriculturist. His 2 wives both had severe headaches which lasted about 3 weeks. He sent the first wife to the PHU 
at Yabaima (35 minute walk), where the dispenser gave her tablets and an injection for Le 90, which she had on hand. 
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The next wife, Bindu, was also sick. She sold 8 cups of rice to buy 
Panadol from a passing vendor for Le 48. She did not go to the PHU because 
she couldn't sell enough rice, but had enough for tablets. The same was 
true when his 3-year old son Sheku had a headache. Then they sold 3 cups 
of rice and bought Panadol. 
This man plants 5 bushels of rice and harvests 40-50, which feeds the family of 9 for 10 months. Be has to buy rice for 2 months, "especially if they get guests in the 2 months before the harvest. He gets cash by 
selling coffee (Le 3000 this year) and his wives are small traders. 
9. TibeimaHE The household head is a poor-looking elderly farmer. One 
of his 6-year old sons had a fever, for which native leaves were applied but the boy did not improve. He had no money for medicine so went to a 
nephew who loaned his some cacao which he had just harvested, to sell so he could buy medicines. Be used the money (Le 40) to but "Chinese oil", 
which made the boy better. To repay the nephew's loan he will sell rice, 
of which he planted 1 bushel in the swamp. The 1 bushel planted feeds 6 
people for 2 months. Be must buy rice for the remaining 10 months. Be 
also has small holdings of coffee and cacao. (Last year he sold only Le 400 worth of cacao, and his coffee trees did not bear at all). He owns 1 
sheep and 4 fowl, and claims no possessions. 
The household bought no rice yesterday, but had to sell Le 40 worth 
of rice to buy plassas for sauce. The household had no ceremonies in the 
past year, but lost a village case that cost Le 40,000 (although the 
agriculturist doubted the size of this case). He has "many ways" of 
getting money, including business transactions involving palm oil (possibly 
buying and holding until prices rise). He also has two brothers, one a 
chief, one a carpenter, who send money occasionally. if he needed Le 500 
for an emergency, he would borrow it. 
10. Gorahunwa Hs 81 Head, a farmer, spent Le 6000 on an initiation, but 
he had been saving for "1 to 3 years in advance". He raised the money by borrowing, producing palm oil, and selling coffee. He would raise Le 500 in a current emergency by pledging his coffee crop. If sick during the 
rainy season, he would have no source of money, and would "leave everything 
to God. " 
11. Gorahunwa IM #3 The chief plants 6 bushels to feed 9 people in the 
household, but he has to buy rice for 7 months because he entertains guests frequently, and sells rice because of bad storage conditions and then buys it back later. 
Port Loko Districts Flat, getting very dusty in January. Palm trees and 
oranges. Friendly kids and grownups, but hospitality isn't as overwhelming 
as in Kenema. Team members are getting sick and all are tired today. we 
are almost out of paracetamol, and have already distributed about 10 doses 
of chloroquine. Nobody is going hungry here but they are certainly just 
getting by. All the houses are crumbling. Many goats and chickens 
scraping around, and smoke from cooking fires make the landscape look like 
northern India. Each house has a rice storage chest on the verandah. 
is Kota Ferrv IM #0 A death was reported, and not enough money to. pay for treatment. Victim was an adult male, ago unknown but he has children. The household head is the elder brother of the deceased and the town 
chief. as said the man had pain but refused to go to the hospital. He was 
sick for 4 or 5 days. It was originally reported that the reason was not 
enough money, but the brother denied that. Be was not very healthy, 
couldn't control urination. Was his death due to witchcraft? "Couldn't 
tell. " 
Use oA high number of injections, mostly 
crystalline pea c n, was r. cor d in the rgistor. The dispenser says he is now using the Essential Drugs manual, and has cut down an injections for malaria. 
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13. Gbaran HB #1 Illness of infant was paid for, but recorded as not 
having enough money on hand. Source was reported as "begged/got gift", but 
the woman had gotten the money from her husband. "Gifts" may be therefore 
from other household members, and probably should be counted as having 
sufficient money since it represents a certain amount of "goodwill" 
possessed by the household which would also be reciprocal if the donor were 
to approach the recipient when the recipient had enough money. 
14. )ta bando HB #5 (Multiple providers) Patient is a woman of about 35 
with a viral (herpes) skin condition and a nervous problem for the past 2 
months. She first tried native herbs but didn't get better. Ton days 
after the start of the problems she got an injection from a peddler whom 
she did not know, and got slightly better, but she is now still ill. She 
also bought tablets from a vendor for Le 16. To pay for the injection she borrowed Le 180 from her brother, but couldn't repay it, so the brother 
wrote off the debt. 
15. (Death) The adult brother of the head had a stomach ache, went to 
Freetown first and then the Mabessene, but died after returning hems. The family did not remember how much was spent, but the man had enough money. 
The household head and 4 other members assist in farming. They plant 2 bushels of rice and have oranges, plantains and bananas as cash crops. They have to buy rice for 3 months, for a household of 10 people. They do 
not sell any rice after harvest. 
16. )4a bando 88 #9 The wife of the household head just delivered and is having abdominal pains. She used native herbs, but has no money for the 
PHU. 
Her husband borrowed Le 80 from his brother, and will have to repay it with rice worth Le 8001 He says he doesn't mind, and will manage with less rice because he has a banana plantation, a cassava plantation, and 
will make some palm oil. Asked if they will have enough to eat this year, he answers no, but they will manage somehow. " The household of 9 people 
plants 4 bushels, and buys rice for 3 months. 
7 Namasundu (Pledging and repayment) The household head would get Le 500 by p1 edging a cash crop, but if he couldn't redeem it in a 
reasonable time he would seil rice to repay the loan. His reason is that the person who lends money can harvest the cash crop indefinitely until the 
pledge is redeemed. 
18. xasonkie 811/10 (Town Chief, 21 people in household) A case of meitiple 
sources o money. 
Head of household is a farmer, plants 3 bushels of rice. No other 
crops except bananas which he sells occasionally. Be can only sell them if he carries them to Perudugu. He never sells his own rice harvest, but 
must buy rice 8 months of the year, for which he gets money from "people 
who give him small amounts. " 
P #1: The chief (age about 40), has had sores and insensitive skin 
on his foot for 2 years. Occasionally he cannot work because it 'itches. 
He bought drugs from a vendor for Le 50, and had money available. Be got 
slightly better. Be didn't go to Mabessens, mission hospital because he 
thought it would have cost Le 100 including transport. He was able to 
spend Le 50 because it was spread over a 2-week period. Be has been to the 
mission hospital 7 times in the past 2 years for the same problem. Se also 
used herbs as a second action. 
P #2: His wife, around 40, fell while pregnant. She now has neck 
pain and trouble breathing and cannot work. She paid a peddler Le 100 for 
an injection, which her husband gave her, but condition remained the same. 
she did not go to hospital because there was not enough money, but she did 
not know how much it would have cost. 
P #3: An adult male, around 40. suffers slow urination, probably 
UTI, and cannot work. He used herbs because he was told by others that it 
274 
"is not a hospital problem. " Be did not know how much it would have cost 
to go to the hospital because he had never been to one. 
P #4: Adult female, pregnant, with a cough she first described as 
not serious, later changed to serious, although she looks healthy now. she 
used tablets bought by her husband from a peddler, but didn't know if he 
had the money available. she said that she would actually have gone to the 
hospital if she had the money. 
P #5: 5-yr old female with chest pain, not serious. Used herbs 
first, then drugs were purchased from a peddler. Money was available. 
P #6: Adult male (Bai) with stomach ache. He used herbs and also 
capsules which he had bought more than two weeks ago. He would have gone 
to hospital if he had the Le 600 he thought it would have cost. 
19. masonkie HH99 
This household planted 9 bushels of rice and harvested 30 bushels. 
The household of 21 consumed all their rice by the end of the next harvest. 
They also consumed all their cassava. They get gifts from relatives, 
especially the families of married daughters. The household head had a 
poor yield 3 years ago and had to borrow small amounts from various people 
over a 2-year period. Now heavily indebted, when asked how he will repay 
the 50 bushels of rice he owes, he replies that he will do it bit by bit 
as he gets money or rice throughout the year rather than all at once. Be 
will also ask daughters' inlaws for some. "Are they rich? " "Not really 
rich, but they must help out if i an in trouble. " He had a bundu 
(initiation) ceremony this year on which he spent Le 20,000. Good friends 
of his contributed. other males who want to have initiated females as 
wives also contributed (he has 9 daughters. ) Notei Ability to borrow 
depends on credibility but everyone seems to have someone who trusts him. 
People will maintain credibility by "digging and covering" until they have 
to flee the region. 
20. ? tasaaboi 8H#168 Use of Market Medicine* 
p #1: Household head, had a painful boil but still could work. He bought "Chinese medicine" from a trader for Le 24. He would have gone to 
the hospital but thought it would have cost Le 100. He was feeling 
slightly better at the time of the interview. 
p #2: 6-year old boy with fever, described as not serious. Mother 
bought Top-Tabs for Le 20, and the boy got better. Also rubbed Chinese 
medicine. He didn't go to hospital because it was too far (asked if he 
would have gone if it had been only 2 miles - yes). 
P #3: 4 year old male with constipation, which resulted in a stomach 
ache. They would have taken the child to hospital if he had become 
helpless, but used native leaves instead. The cost to them was zero. 
Asked why they used native leaves rather than medicine from a peddler, they 
replied that the peddler wasn't available - he comes only every 2 weeks. 
He also knew the leaves are effective. 
21. Korre 8aaa 9 
This is a fairly well-off looking household in a well-off village (on 
main road), but the wife had no money when her child was ill, so spent Le 
8 on tablets.. she thought it would have cost Le 300 to go to Mabesseneh. 
There is little doubt that this could have been raised if the husband had 
been home and it had been a serious case. (See also HH#30 Port Loko, boy 
Foday had no money because the father was not home, even though it was a 
well-off house. 
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Assessing Response Reliability in Realtb 
Interview iuzveys by R. int. rviexs 
Stephen Fabricant' and Trudy Harpham' 
Department of Public Health and Policy 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
24 August 1992 
Data from interview surveys at households or health faailitias are used to assume such 
oo-amity parameters as baalth states ad fasters related to ability ad willingwe to Vol 
for health s. rviaas. While the offeat of sample airs on owdL&Osw latorvals is generally 
well uad. rstood by surer designers and the policy maters wts use the aura results, the 
typical survey is also subject to dos-saspliag ersora of magnitudes whiab may eclipse the 
saspliag errors. Thasa are aalt rarely aaaaased and reported with the survey results eras 
tbsu they my have a major offset os their iatsrpwtaties. Thin study measured sss- 
aaapliag orsoes is a Mr8ehoi4 sae.. y aaawetai is sierra Less. by eampariag the results of 
reist"rviws with the responses given originally, aa& found that oaetaia types of <watioss 
are subject to greater . scor than othars. ! 6a Radhags should is of use to bsigeers of 
sisslae sums, sad to the.. iss rely on waY surveys for sNkiN polioy aasisiass. 
S alth interview surveys 
Household surveys have become a valuable tool of health planners and 
policy makers in the search for better ways of managing and financing the 
activities of the health sector. Especially in less developed countries, 
where official health statistics may be facility-based and data from censuses 
or general population surveys are likely to be incomplete or out of date, the 
information required to make sound policy decisions may be best obtained 
through specialized surveys. If a comparison of users and non-users of health 
facilities is needed, it is usually necessary to sample the general population 
by means of household interviews. 
soyroes of error and need for quality control 
Sample surveys are subject to two basic types of errors: sampling 
errors, which are attributable to the problem of obtaining information about 
an entire population from a selected sample, and non-sampling errors, which 
are due to variations between a given response and the true answer. Sampling 
errors can be estimated a priori and can be made as small as necessary by 
increasing the size of the sample and by designing the survey to ensure that 
the sample represents the population with a minimum of bias. Non-sampling 
errors can be defined as all errors other than sampling errors, and result 
from biases introduced at any stage of the survey process - survey design, 
questionnaire development, field data collection, data processing analysis, 
or reporting - which affect the validity or reliability of the results. The 
causes of some non-sampling errors, such as mistakes in recording responses 
or in data processing, can be minimized by exercising care and using 
IpW wedidat.. Y. alti Poliey Ooii. Loadoe School Si bIiw cud lso$ .. l $ 4t. ia. 
'NOior Leatursr. Maltb policy that. Lcsdaa scbool of VY91MN red lr i"I NedlaiSM 
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appropriate quality control procedures, while others, such as the respondent's 
inaccurate recall or wish to conceal the truth, may be extremely difficult to 
avoid. 
The magnitude of both kinds of error is of great importance when 
reporting the results of the survey. The level of significance of an observed 
difference between groups, for example, is related to the errors associated 
with both sets of measurements. It is normal practice to use computers for 
analysing data sets from surveys, and to report results which the software 
package finds statistically significant. The total error of a sample variable 
is the geometric sum of the sampling error and the non-sampling errors, but 
it is unlikely that the non-sampling errors would have been taken into account 
by the statistical software. Researchers and readers alike may be misled by 
widely used guidelines for survey design which appear to promise, for *X- 10, 
a 95% confidence interval of plus or minus 10% if & certain calculated sample 
size is used. such "rules" ignore the effect of non-sampling errors. Using 
the field of health economics as an example, some of the seminal reports on 
the subject of user fees and the price elasticity of demand for treatment were 
based on household survey data of unspecified validity. The reporting of 
results based on sophisticated econometric methods may have masked 
deficiencies in data quality. 
The importance of non-sampling error is highlighted in classic texts on 
survey methods, such as (1). The authors bemoaned the lack of attention paid 
to non-sampling errors by researchers using household surveys and suggested 
that '... there is here a fertile field of research for students of survey 
methodology. it is of the greatest importance for all engaged in surveys. ' 
A standard text on surveys in developing countries (2) suggests that, 
"... as a minimum, a rough grading of quality be provided the reader, for 
exaaiPlo t 
A) Basic data am reliable (aaoorats objsativa esthoda wsd)s error is oainLy dw to 
smWILaq. 
B) Darts of thno oatiaatos rely, on aasnry swell ot the rosp: - - is o o-ss püap error s. y 
be as iEportant as sa. pliaq orror. 
C) Respondents were solaatant to ansvor the question on ich this it.. dspsodss 
non-saopliaq . rsor is snbstautiaUy greater than the sa piing orres. f 
The authors cited an example of a published agricultural survey in which some 
of the non-sampling errors were estimated to be six times greater than the 
sampling errors. The practical implication is that costly efforts to reduce 
sampling errors by increasing the sample size may reduce the total error only 
slightly when non-sampling errors are large, and indeed can increase it if 
having a larger sample requires a relaxation of other standards of quality. 
Although non-sampling errors are routinely reported for large, national 
censuses, smaller scale surveys often ignore such errors. A review of health 
interview studios in developing countries (3) cited only a few where any type 
of validity check was made, yet important variations in reporting were 
278 
measured in both of the morbidity surveys whore reinterviews were used. 
Recall bias in case-control studies has been reported in only one study of 
reproductive hazards (4), and for that one most citations quoted it 
incorrectly. So, as Moser and Balton suggested in 1971, this is still a 
fertile area of research, particularly in the health field. 
In contrast to the cut-and-dried calculation of sampling errors, the 
estimation of non-sampling errors is possible only empirically. Several 
methods have been used to check the validity and repeatibility of health 
interview surveys. These include internal consistency checks, comparison with 
"expected" patterns, reinterviews, medical examinations, cross-checks against 
medical records, repetition of the study using a different sample, and 
observational studies. Moser and Kalton suggested that post-enumeration 
surveys (PES) consisting of reinterviews should become standard practice. The 
PES of the UK 1981 national census demonstrated that true non-sampling error 
rates are hard to predict and are frequently under-estimated in the absence 
of a PES (5)(6). one problem with large-scale PESs is the inevitable delay 
between the original survey and the repeat survey. This leads to a 
confounding of true error with recall error arising from informants' inability 
to remember the situation at the time of the original survey. On the other 
hand, reinterviews have been criticized as a validation technique (7) on the 
grounds that the result of the second interview will be unpredictably 
influenced by the first, with the degree of influence likely to increase with 
shorter intervals between the interviews. 
Despite these limitations, reinterviews are a practical and useful 
method of assessing non-sampling error in household surveys. In a recent 
example from the health research literature (8) 'consistency checks' were 
performed on a questionnaire used in a clinic setting and repeated in 
households about a week later. Zn this case-control study of the health 
impact of improved water supply and hygienic practices, the authors examined 
responses to level of maternal education and use of water source. There was 
disagreement between data collected at the clinics and that collected at hose 
for both these variables. For maternal education a difference of 0.4 years 
in the mean duration of maternal schooling between the clinic interview and 
home interview was observed, which led to a statistically significant 
difference when comparing cases with controls. A high rate of 
misclassification (231) was also found for the variable 'type of water source 
used by the household' but the authors suggest that the differences obtained 
were most likely due to a real change in water sources between the two 
interviews. This highlights the importance of minimizing the time period 
between interview and re-interview. 
In considering variables used to examine the association between other 
sexually transmitted diseases and 01V infection (9) the effect of 
misclassification of the variable 'number of sexual partners in the last year, 
was estimated. If for example 50% of the subjects having five or more 
partners in the last year claimed that they had fewer than five, and 5% of 
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those having less than five partners claimed they had five or more, they 
showed that because sexual activity was measured imprecisely there was an 
apparent association between syphilis and HIV infection where, in fact there 
was none. 
Designers of surveys which attempt to obtain new types of information, 
especially from unfamiliar cultural zones, would benefit from knowing in 
advance the reliability of certain types of questions and the magnitude of the 
non-sampling errors which should be expected. This report examines these 
needs in the context of a health utilization and expenditure survey which was 
undertaken recently in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Materials and m. thoäs 
The Ministry of Health of Sierra Leone has been introducing user fees 
for primary health care since 1982 under several pilot projects, and in 1989 
undertook operational research to obtain information on the effects of payment 
on equity and utilisation of services. This study included a survey of 1156 
households in two rural districts, with a questionnaire composed of modules 
on household demographics, illnesses within a two-week recall period and 
actions taken in response to them, household socio-economic indicators, and 
questions on equity and the seasonality of household finances. 
Refinements in questionnaire design and survey technique were made in 
order to minimize potential sources of error. No hypothetical questions were 
asked, such as where a person would go for care if they were sick, or how much 
they would be willing to spend. A list of lay terms for common symptoms was 
read to assist respondents in recall of illness events in the two-week recall 
period (10). Questions were pretested and modified to minimize confusion, and 
experienced interviewers were used who had received specific training on the 
questionnaires and spoke the local languages. Sven so, it was considered 
possible that answers given by respondents (mainly illiterate subsistence 
farmers having relatively little contact with health services or Nmodern" 
concepts of health and illness) might not be completely reliable. Responses 
such as illness of household members, treatments used, and amounts spent 
depended on the recall of past events. Others, such as household membership, 
might be subjective, while still others, such as the quantity of crops sown 
or harvested, and the possession of livestock, might elicit deliberate false 
answers. 
Quality control was addressed by checking questionnaires for 
completeness and internal consistency while interviewers were still in the 
village, and rectifying discrepancies by sending the original interviewer back 
to the household. After corrections were made reinterviews were conducted 
with 15% of originally surveyed households. Original questionnaires were 
selected at randoM and kept aside while different interviewers returned to the 
selected houses. The time lapse between original interview and reinterview 
varied from less than one hour to overnight. Respondents were not told if 
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their answer differed from the one given in the original interview and no 
explanation was sought by the interviewer. 
For attributes relevant to the study, the characteristics of 
reinterviewed households were similar to those of the originally interviewed 
population. In about one-quarter of the revisited households the original 
respondent (usually the head of the household) was unavailable so a different 
household nwmber was rointerviewed. Analysis of differences between the 
original and reinterviews in these cases also provides information about the 
reliability of using respondents other than household heads and mothers. 
Reporting non-sampling errors 
The problem of how response reliability can be estimated from 
reinterview results has received relatively little attention. For the sake 
of discussion, a reliable response will be taken as one which is repeated when 
the respondent is asked the question on the reinterview. A reliable response 
may not necessarily be a valid one, since validity implies that the question 
was interpreted by the respondent to mean what the interviewer intended and 
was answered truthfully, but if a response is repeatible, a major type of non- 
sampling error can be assumed absent. in some studies which have included 
large-scale PES's, non-sampling error has been reported in a way which 
provides detailed information on errors associated with each response category 
for a question, defined as follows: 
gross error rate is the proportion of responses in a given category for 
which a different response than the original one was given in the reinterview. 
It is therefore a measure of the reliability of individual responses to a 
given question, and also of the level of randomly occurring error which would 
be undetected by a gross comparison of original and reinterview data. Errors 
which occur randomly tend to weaken or mask the true relationships by 
introducing anomalies into observed results. 
not bias is the difference between the proportion of answers to a given 
question falling into a given category in the original interview and in the 
reinterview. This estimate of error is generally smaller than that indicated 
by the gross error rate, because erroneous responses will cancel out to saue 
extent by randomly falling into different categories. Net bias reveals 
systematic errors which tend to distort true relationships. This rate can 
therefore be considered to be a measure of reliability of the question for the 
entire sample, i. e., the degree to which a response could be expected to vary 
between interviews. The sum of the net biases for all response categories for 
a given question equals zero. 
Relative net bias is derived from net bias= it is the net bias for a 
given category expressed as a percentage of the proportion of responses found 
in the reinterview falling into that category. The usefulness of relative net 
bias is doubtful, as it is always biased upwards for categories with fewer 
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responses. Table 1 shows eaaýnples of these three measures from the 1981 PES 
undertaken for the UK census. 
Where appropriate, this schema has been used here to compare the 
reliability of interview questions and response categories from the Sierra 
neone survey. While the error parameters just described can measure the 
"liability of discrete response categories within questions, they are 
inappropriate for continuous variables such as ago and expenditures. 
Additional parameters have been used in the analysis of errors in continuous 
variables for this survey: the percentage of individual responses which do not 
match exactly, the mean difference between pairs of values and the absolute 
of the mean, the mean of the ratio of error to original value, and the mean 
of the absolute value of this ratio. These provide information about the 
magnitude of the error in addition to the frequency of error. 
R. lisbility of survey variables: 
As an example, the reliability of the variable age of ill household 
member' was analyzed by a comparison with the reinterview data. Results of 
the analysis both by age category and as a continous variable are shown in 
Tables 2 and 3, which reveal some of the weaknesses of the conventional 
reporting method when continuous variables are involved. Gross error and not 
bias as calculated by age ranges (Table 2) are less stringent than the 
criteria of exact match and mean absolute error as percentage of age by single 
year interval (Table 3). 
A summary of similar analyses on other variables used in the survey 
is given in Table 4. In general, the means, medians, and distribution of 
reinterview responses closely matched the original responses. While it is 
comforting to know that the results are consistent for the population sample 
as a whole, the fact remains that individual case error is high for some 
important questions, such as the reason for self-treatment. If this indeed 
reflects non-sampling error, it should be taken into account in reporting 
results. 
Table 4 also compares the repeatibility of responses on reintorviews 
with the original respondents with the reinterview results obtained from 
respondents who were not the original respondents. While reinterviewing a 
different respondent may not be methodologically sound, the fact that 
different respondents were able to supply the same answers as the original 
respondents to certain questions shows that certain, but not all, types of 
information are well known to many household members. 
These results suggest that a typical small-scale household health 
interview survey can be subject to varying degrees of non-sampling error. The 
meaning of repeatability as an appropriate measure of validity is open to 
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question, however. It a respondent gives the same answer to a question asked 
by a different interviewer so®e time after the first interview, it is likely 
that the respondent was sure of the answer in the first place and had it well 
fizsd in mind. Given the opportunity to change the answer, the respondent 
chose not to. While this is a reliable answer, it implies little about 
validity. Consistency of response does not rule out the possibility that the 
original response was biased or a deliberate fabrication. When the interval 
is short, as in the present survey, a deliberate lie in the first interview 
would tend to be repeated in the second. 
Using similar reasoning, a different answer to the same question could 
mean the respondent originally had no firm answer in mind but made a best 
guess. The response in the raint rview might be nearer to the absolute truth 
if the respondent deliberately reconsidered the question, or it might be 
another vague guess or attempt to satisfy what may seem to be the 
interviewer's desire for an answer of any sort. since respondents were always 
given the chance to say they did not know an answer, in principle the only 
reason for a deliberate lie would have been when it would benefit the 
respondent; such topics in the questionnaire usually can be identified. 
For questions for which there is no evident motive for a lie, a reg)eated 
initial response might indicate a valid response, while a different response 
in the reinterview can mean that a degree of uncertainty existed in the mind 
of the respondent and the response was probably not valid. Leaving aside the 
possibility of interviewer recording errors, in this case the original answer 
(normally the only one available for analysis) was probably wrong and it 
cannot be certain that the second answer is any more accurate. This is 
suggested by the lower overall rate of consistent responses when a different 
respondent is reinterviewed about an event within the household. Two types 
of error may exist in this case: the two respondents may have different 
opinions or interpretations of the question, or one may simply be worse 
informed about the situation. 
These problems may be insoluble if there is no collateral information 
about the validity of both the consistent and the inconsistent responses. 
When analysing the quality of the US Current Population Survey by the use of 
re-interviews (11) the surprising result was found that proxy data produces 
lower response variance than self-reported data. This was partly explained by 
the fact that response variability is an inadequate measure of data quality, 
and that reliability is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
accurate data. The proxy reports may have been consistent without being 
valid. 
Relevance to health interview surveys 
From Table 4, some generalizations can be made about the relative 
reliability of different types of questions often asked on health information 
surveys: 
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1. Questions for which high response reliability (case error less than 
10%) was observed included the sex of household members, actions taken in 
response to illness, whether an injection was received during treatment, 
identification of household members who were ill in the recall period, and 
source of money used to pay for treatment. When zero or medium to high 
amounts were reported paid for treatment, the error associated with the price 
paid was also in this lowest range. 
2. somewhat higher case error (10-20%) was found for the variables 
incidence of illness, whether enough money was on hand to pay for treatment, 
age of ill household members, the amount the respondent thought medical 
treatment would have cost in cases where self-treatment was used, and for 
medium amounts paid for treatment. 
3. Highest case error (20-30%) exists for questions related to the 
result of action taken, the seriousness of illness, the reason for choosing 
non-medical treatment, and for high levels of expenditures on treatment. 
4. it is evident that questions of a subjective nature, such as the 
seriousness of an illness or the outcome of treatment, are subject to 
considerable uncertainty for sick people themselves as well as proxy 
respondents. others, such as the incidence of illness and the sex of 
household members, are clearly recalled and are known to other household 
members, as are actions taken in response to illness or important curative 
events such as injections. 
S. Response errors on expenditures for treatment span a wide range. For 
expenditures greater than zero but less than 50 leones, " discrepancies were 
frequent, reflecting the small expenditures which occurred up to two weeks 
earlier and which were probably of no great importance to the respondent and 
therefore subject to recall error. Infrequent, large errors (recording errors 
or deliberate falsifications) also were found in this range, resulting in a 
high average error. Repeatibility improved markedly with higher costs, in the 
range of 50-300 leones (which included nearly all Pac charges), perhaps 
reflecting the increased importance to the household of these greater amounts. 
The high level error for amounts still greater than this may have been due to 
deliberate misrepresentation on the original interviews, and is also amplified 
by the small number of cases in the highest categories. 
How these errors should be interpreted depends on the use to be made of 
the data. The nature of the variances is critical: for expenditures for 
treatment, many small deviations from zero result in a low degree of 
correlation between the data sets, but whether a certain group spent an 
average of zero or 4 loons* for treatment is probably not important when 
expenditures range up to the thousands. For the range of expenditures as a 
-Me official azchaoya rata W" $%Us " Lw 65 at the tim of tin survey. 8y aeapasison, agsionltnral 
wrkars could . asa ft 10 30 to Lm 60 per day, apsoding on the region. 
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whole, it takes only a few cases of a respondent giving a wildly higher number 
on a reinterview, or a similar magnitude of interviewer recording error, to 
degrade the overall repeatibility. A consistent system of dealing with 
outliers would seen essential. 
Co alusions 
while sampling errors continue to receive a substantial amount of 
attention in the design and implementation of health interview surveys, 
non-sampling errors are relatively ignored. This paper has argued the 
importance of measuring one aspect of non-sampling error, that of response 
reliability. A method of analysing the results of reinterviews has been 
presented and the example of the reinterviews from a morbidity and health 
expenditure survey in sierra Leone has highlighted types of questions which 
are prone to this kind of error. Reinterviews are rarely conducted and the 
results of them are even less often reported, therefore there is little 
research with which to compare these results. However, given the burgeoning 
number of health interview surveys in developing countries being used to 
provide information on which to base policy, it is crucial that the quality 
of such surveys be more routinely measured and reported. The neglected but 
important topic of non-sampling errors needs to be more widely understood, 
measured and taken into account. 
gates The author. gratefully acknowledge the adviw of Dr. Thiarry IMrtsna and Mr. $iaon Coil ns, Dsparta pt 
of Zpidriology aad Population Sciaao. s, London school of By916011 end Tropical Medicine during the pr paritLou 
of this paper- Field srwarah ws . npport. d by LVXM. 
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Table 1 
1981 post-oauesratioa survey, UK 
Selected results of data errors and biases 
shared use of bathor shower 
Marital status - divorced 
Crawls to work by 'car pool' 
Trawls to work by bus 
Soasotr adapted fr Thoma. (19*7)' 
M« snaos ý UM MUMM iv Isis 
%"% 
7 -0.5 -29.1 
3 -0.1 -1.3 
6" 2.4 142.7 
9 0.9 5.9 
Table 2 
Response errors calculated from age ranges 
A" IUPC Oris iaýý FASV DB ' aslls*el? wPC ! 
aeoss Nas 02LAr=vs oýoss ssr UL&Tsvs ý$ re: MULAMM s is a lxii NUT liit8 UUi0R sibs NUT sins WDR WAS Ni! DUE 
"" " " 1 1 81 " 
0 grass 16.0 0.5 + 8.6 15.8 0.8 15.7 16.7 -1.1 -12.7 
1-5 years 9.8 -1.7 -11.7 6.2 -1.3 -10.9 15.8 -4.9 -17.0 
6-15 years 18.3 1.3 9.5 15.4 1.2 7.8 28.4 1.8 11.2 
Adult 6.1 -0.1 - 0.2 3.4 0.8 - 1.1 20.0 4.3 9.2 
o y.. e. 
1-s yea" 
6-is y.. U 
Adult 
all a0 
Table 3 
Response errors calculated fror 1-year intervals 
an UM? UU Mo gor io Baas IMr Isar An M mss PrA UM USC? S wos osea a.. ea $am= " noon wo. eý. oa USC. % e. oa Ua ... sa 
IA. "Au Ia. in "an "a TA. IA "a/ 
19.0 0.05 -- -- ls. " 0.04 -- -- 16.7 0 
11.4 -0.02 0.2% 6.1% 11.5 -0.07 2.7% 4.3% 30.0 +0.0" 5.4% 1.3% 
54.1 -0.31 4.05 15.60 $1.1 -0.05 4.45 13.20 41.4 -1.10 -19.40 33.60 4.1 
13.0 
3.4 
U. o 
Tsblo 4 
smart of non-sampling error 
3,., 
17.4 
MULTABLE _+"" "O+.. s. wwr 5JI LN ONOr 'DIFFSOMM' Nsspasmmpts 
Illness incidsaa Binary 11t 2t" 15t fewer oases reported 
Ago of ill household =sabers Continuous 130 2% somewhat higher error 
i. of ill household members Binary 0.50 0.5% saw error 
seriousness of illness Binary 260 30 Nearly double error 
Action taken multiple 19% it slightly greater error 
Result of action taken multiple 26% 1.30 Doable error rates 
Amount paid for treatment Continuous lt to 6104 0% to -221 600 greater error 
Reason for non-esdioal action multiple 270 20 Not analysed 
Newivinq an injaation Binary lot 3% similar error 
Availability of money Binary 161 it much greater error 
source of aonsy multiple lot 2.51A similar error 
Amount thought medical ears Continuous 171 15% Not analysed 
would have Cost 
Vor binary or Mitiplo Choiw variable@ the ca. " omen' given is tin = *an o[ gross errors gor all eatoqoria= error for individual aatogorih may be wob higher or lower. Tor continuous variubiN "ca. e error. is the ran of absolute orror$ for the entire range. 
Tor binary or multiple choice variabUa 'saap71 Grror" is the man not bias for all aatpori4a. /or 
continuous variables 'aaapla error, is the aaaa percent error for the satire raayo. 
°Psraat diiisswios in an incidoow sates. 
'Depends on price camp - a. text. 
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Appendix 4: 
Focus Group Transcripts 
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Sierra Leone Heal h Economics Survey: Focus Group Discussions 
The body of the text consists of translations of the tape-recorded discussions. Time are 
supplemented by notes made during the sessions by the field assistant supervisor J. S. Fornah. These notes 
appear in closed brackets: I I. 
The questions for the finit discussion were in an English written format based on the objective of 
determining whether answers to some of the research questions could be obtained from community groups 
- rather than by household questionnaires. Some questions were. added spontaneously during the firm 
discussion. and for subsequent group discussions the list of questions was revised as topics were elucidated 
and new ones arose. 
If the tape translations are reasonably accurate. It seems as If many of the questions were not 
interpreted as Intended by the moderators or by- the discussants. Many of the responses also are not as 
to the point as expected, probably reflecting the gulf between the researcher's mode of thinking and the 
vUlagers. It will be necessary to re-read these transcripts several times to arrive at conclusions on some of 
the topics broached. 
#1: KPETEMA 13 December 1989, Kenema District, Maipohun Chiefdom 
Discussants: Mamie Jam, female farmer, married 
Amadu Bah, Rice, cassava farmer 
Patrick J. Bockarie, teacher and hunter 
6ockarfe AbdulaF, coffee, cacao farmer, miner, works with cooperative. 
Arms Samal, coffee, cacao fanner 
S. S. Moloe, retired farmer. supported by children 
Mamie Jeneba, farmer 
Translated from Mende by Josephine A. Kamera 
Field Supervisor Lansana Salankole is moderating. The prhcipal Investigator ats next to a field 
interviewer who translates for him, and feeds new questions back to the moderator. The group setting is 
in a courtyard of a house of an elder. There Is a full moon, with some hazy douds. Swwn people have 
been selected from 10 picked by the chief. One man, a Twine speaker. has been asked to sit back down 
and is replaced by a woman who had been interviewed today. There an now five males and two fs ales 
on the panel. About 30 «her villagers are Waning but rarely saying anything. A tmeN amount of palm wine 
has been consumed already. The session, as all the nest, Is begun with a prayer. 
Introductions: (Moderator) Please don't think we are trying to pry Into your bam, but give us honest 
answers so we can help. This white man came all the way from England to find out why people die so 
sassy, and how people manage to cure themselves, and how much you pay. 
Teacher (Introduces Mmsdf): There are 305 children In the School, going up to dass 0. They often drop 
out cf school for 4-5 months at a time. 
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01: How do you We In this town? 
A: There's no other way but farming - coffee, cacao, kola, rice - that's how people survive. 
A: There's another way to get money - bananas, coffee, kola. Many other people do this. 
02: Do people save money at home in case of an emergency? - 
A. No, we spend it as soon as we get any and then find some more. 
A: Our money is in the bush. We pick coffee and sell it when It Is ready. 
03: What if there is an emergency? 
A: We have a big society (osusu or Kompe) - we agreed to help each other out If anything 
happens. If someone has no relatives, others will sell crops and just contribute for medical care, 
etc. 
04: What it someone is not a member of the osusu? 
A: If he has a relative In the osusu, the relative can recommend to the osusu chief that they loan 
money to the person. 
05: What N there is no relative In the osusu? 
A: We can still help out. 
06: Is there anyone here who can lend money to people? 
A. There Isn't anyone here who does that. The money we manage to get just goes through our 
fingers and then we have to struggle to get more. 
A: Sometimes we have cooperative employment, like for the mosque we built Every day a di ferent 
person pays the workers. 
A: , Some people lend money, usually people who have just sold crops. The loan is often repaid In 
kind with rice or other crops. 
A: People can't afford to pay school fees - that's why kids drop out of school. (The teacher asked 
the children to bring Le 100 each since he had not received his salary. The parents refused, 
some saying 'I am a farmer, so you can be one too', and stopped them from going to school. 
He had formerly asked them to bring Le 2 every day, but when he asked for the lump sum the 
parents balked. ) 
A: A loan from the os au carries the same interest as from other tenders -3 for 2 (. 50% per 
month). Furthermore, sometimes osusu members can't afford the Le 2 caºtrIxdion they must 
make every Friday. 
A: There are a lot of different osusus " some have 8,10,15 ne mbers. They take Le 2 every week, 
but many cant make that much. People who don't pay for a kxq time get kicked out. If they 
are sympethetlc, they (the csusus) just charge more lotetest for the arrears. 
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A: Sometimes we can get credit from the cooperative for six months or a year. It can be repaid 
In produce. But If people have earned enough from farming they wouldn't borrow money since 
they have trouble repaying IL 
07: Is there any other way of borrowing from friends or relatives without pledging something? 
A: It's not possible. To borrow Le 200 you have to promise a lot of produce or a part of your 
plantation. You feel bad since you know it's worth more than the amount borrowed. 
08: Can you also pledge other property - radios, clothes? 
A: Yes., but k's easy to lose them [radio. tape, pans, clothes) If the time Is exceeded, tx9aft the 
lender Is sympathetic. Some people won't even charge profit [Interest) but others will ask for 
a large profit to redeem R. 
A: We can also borrow money against palm oil. A 10-gallon tin which costs Le 1800 Is often given 
for a loan of Le 600. 
A: Farmers who are enlarging farms may lend money In exchange for future labour. Le 60 per day 
Is the rate for 'heavy sweat, but when you're In difficulty you have no choice and may have to 
take as little as Le 30 per day. 
09: How can you tell who has the most money? 
A: If we knew, would we be worrying about how to got money? 
A: You can tell by their plantations and houses. 
010: How do you know? 
A. If a man has a large plantation and the crops are good that year. 
A: When someone Is spreading coffee or cacao to dry over and over. 
011: How could a doctor tell If someone has money? 
A: If someone can pay or not pay - If they can pay the amount charged. 
012: How many bags of coffee or cacao will make someone well off? 
A: Five bags means God felt sorry for you. 
A: Rich people can make a case against you If you mess around. But they will also help you If you 
go to them in need. Usually rich men have big families and their wires don't do heavy work on 
farms. 
013: If someone Is sick with malaria, how much do you O)qnd to pay for treetm8f*? 
A: It depends how sick the person Is. The doctor wit make different dhupp. 
A: If k's very serious the hospital wUl charge you La 2000. You can't afford that money. 
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014: How much Is it possible for a poor man to pay?. 
A: Ten cents or Le 2 Just a small amount would be best for me. I'm very poor and would bep 
the doctor. 
015: If you took Le 0.50 from the house, would It disturb your budget? 
A: No, but WI took Le 1.00 from the money I have at home I would have a hand time replacing It 
If I had Le 20 1 would take It all to the doctor, but If I gave It all to the doctor how would my 
family eat? 
016: Would you pay the same amount for a small chid as an adult (yourself)? 
A: I would want to pay less because a child doesn't need the same treatment as grownups. 
A. At Segbwema (mission hospital) there used to be free treatment for adults and children. Now 
it doesn't matter if you are poor or rich, adult or chid, you pay the same. Transportation Is also 
a problem - people can die before they reach the hospital. 
017: If someone is really sick, will the chief or anyone else help them so they don't die? 
A: Yes, It happens. People will get together and try to help. Often there Is no transportation so 
they use native roots and leaves. 
018: Won't the osusu help? 
A: Yes they will. but transportation Is the problem. It costs Le 300 to go to Segbwema or Kenema, 
and then the doctors will take Le 200. So even the osusu or rich people wop't lend that much 
money to a poor fanner who will not be able to repay It. 
019: Is the cost of transport the problem or is It the treatment costs? 
A: We could take the sick to hospital by hammock, but then It will std cost a Iot. so we stay at 
home and use native remedies. 
A: Both are dUfk uk. Before independence the whites used to help us with health care. For 
deliveries theyd give us baby clothes, food. Now is AN too expensive for us. We used to go 
to hospital even for a headache. Now we think that roots are better than white man's medicine 
for malaria because of the cost and efficacy. 
A: If a sickness Is not cured right away at hospital it costs money so they we take them back to 
the village. 
A: A brother needed a hernia operation which coat Le 8000. If you only have one beg of coffee 
tow can you afford it? We just keep them at home and give them roots. eta. 
A: It's not easy to go to the big town - you have to walk all morning just to get to the main road, 
so how is a pregnant woman to get to hospiW? 
A: This land Is fertle but we never see tfie money when we make plantations because of debts and 
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020: Has anyone had to sell land or plantations? How much would R cost you to have to s0 land? 
A: House problems, family affairs, etc., may all necessitate selling land or other property. Poverty 
causes us to pledge our plantations, and since the Interest builds up they often can't be 
redeemed. 
021: What if a parent dies and leaves some pledged property to a son or daughter? 
A. Often people will not return the property and It will be lost. 
022: Some people spend on societies and ceremonies. Why do people like to do this rather than 
spend on sickness? 
A: We used to do it, but not now. Times are rough so we do it just a little. It's still Important to put 
our kids in a society. 
A:. For me It would be more Important to spend on a sickness than for a society. Everyone plans 
for happy occasions but nobody plans for sickness or other unhappy events. 
023: Will people sell harvests for sickness, or only for ceremonies? 
A: For a very serious illness people may pledge their fauns for a period of several years to 
someone else. It's not the same as selling the farm since after the time Is up the right to the 
crops Is yours again. But if you want to pay back the money sooner it can't be done. 
A: it's really the only way to yet a lot of money In an emergency. 
A: You can also go to a strong relative to borrow, M you can convince them that your farm will have 
a good crop. 
024: Can you get money from someone without pledging anything? 
A: Yes, someone who knows you well can help you to the extent that he Is able. 
A: For large amounts they will bring In another strong man to guarantee the loan. He- would 
Inspect the farm to see if it Is worth the amount the owner wants to borrow. 
A: The best way to borrow is to not be In a panic. Go to a rich person and explain your problem, 
and they will give you the money and tell you how much to repay each month. 
025: Will people sell their food to pay for care? 
A: Yes. people do sea their rice. I had to do it this pant rainy season. 
026: What would miners do In that case? 
A: The people they work for would take care of the miner, and then would Cut their salary for a few 
months. 
A: Some diamond dealers don't make much money. At least they don't keep much money around 
the house so you can't always count on them for kmns. 
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A: Diamond buyers will give loans to miners they know if they sign a note to sell them the nect 
diamond they find. 
027: Will they help you even M you don't promise them a diamond? 
A: No, only if they know you often got diamonds. And they don't always have cash on hand either. 
028: Do you think the rich and poor should pay the same for treatment? 
A: There's no choice. If I'm sick I want the doctor to cure me. 
029: Should the poor pay the same Le 200 as everyone also for some medicine? (?? ) 
A: "1f someone really had the money they would bring it. so If it's possible they should treat 
(poor) 
people for free. 
A: That person has a family. The doctor has to pay for medicine. he doesn't get it free, so the poor 
should pay a small amount. 
A: We don't think the poor should pay the same as the rich, but they should give the doctor 
something to cover the cost of the medicine. 
A: The doctor will sympathize more if you pay some small amount than If you pay nothing. 
030: Is it fair to the rich If they cover the amounts the poor don't pay towards the price of the drugs? 
A: It wouldn't hurt them, and it would be a big help to families. 
A: It's true- man lives by man. 
A: It's a big help, like I someone comes over at the clinic and offers to pay for someone who hasn't 
got enough. A poor man always lives by a rich man. 
031: Would someone who received free treatment go home and announce it to everyone? 
A: In Africa people have a lot of self-respect. They don't like to be Identified as poor so not 
everyone would cheat. It you want to eat well you buy good food. and M you want to get better 
you pay for good treatment. 
A: [People will pose as poor] A respectable man wouldn't do that. 
A: if -a chid gets free treatment I wouldn't ask for the same. because I am a big person. 
A: There are some people who-God made without self-respect. They have money but won't spend 
it on themselves. 
A: If everyone pays different prices it spoils it for everyone - no unity or organization will be Ief. 
A: If a rich man pays more It will discourage the poor man. 
A: The Poor would poor to pay a small ama ll, for their own self-respect and bra they 
understand that medicine is not free. 
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032: Can you tell who Is rich and who is poor? 
A: Yes by the Condition of their skin, Bothes, and how they walk. If people never go to work on 
their fam and just sir and buy other's produce they are rich. 
A: If someone uses a lot of palm oll and good fish in the soup. It their skin Is shiny and smooth 
they get good nourishment. 
A: Also by howv they dress In the village. 
033: (Points) But AN has nice clothes on now. Does it mean she has money? 
A: These are ordinary clog" 
034: Is there anyone in this village you can go to to ask a favor quickly? 
A: The first person is the town chief. The women have their own chief. 
A: The only person we would trust and believe Is the chief. 
035: Does a man's wife know If her husband has had a good year and has money? (No responses) 
036: Which months are the best months for you? 
A: Now - when the harvests have begun. 
037: And for the diamond diggers? 
A: The dry season Is (when we can work because the streams are almost dry] and we haw enough 
to enjoy ourselves. 
A. (Teacher) For MO. I should yet money every month. I work for the govemment and I'm happy 
If the money comes every month. 
A: in dry season from December to May we [get enough palm oll and the women go fishing] really 
enjoy ourselves. We can buy new clothes, shoes. (During this period. we find what we eat for 
the remaining months. ) 
A: When the money comes we don't keep it around. It just goes on family, expenses, school fees. 
038: Can people accumulate Le 10,000 as a safeguard? 
A: (Miner) My way Is to get a diamond and sell It and get a full belly, then kook for another one. 
039: Would It be possible for people to contribute Le 400 during the dry season for a yews supply 
of medicines? 
A: Yes. we could. 
A: No, some of us have big famUies and can't afford to pay Le 400 for eves. It's easy for you 
from the big cities but not here In a village. 
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A: ICs not possible to pay IA 400 in one month. 
A: Where do you think we can get enough to feed our families and also pay for medicines? 
A: DUforent Messes attack us each year. How can we be sure that we'll have the right medicine? 
(Ws won't know the right one to take). [if we get only certain drugs and a different Illness befalls 
us that is not treated with those drugs we would die] The only thing we know for sure is that 
you should help us. 
040: Who would store the drugs for you? 
A: If we're sick and need the drugs we might have to bribe the person who is storing them for us. 
Who would that person be? He would have to be capable of keeping the tablets safe and know 
how to treat us. The rich people would bribe them to get more medicines even I we all paid Le 
400. It would be better to have someone who could sell us the medicines at a low price. 
041: You said there were people you could trust here. Don't you still trust them? 
A: We trust the chief, but as a spokesman. not as a dispenser of drugs. 
A: You haven't made It dear to us what we should do. We don't know the right prices - they 
charge us Le 100 for an injection, Le 800 for a delivery. We need to know the correct prices, 
like Le 10 for malaria, etc. So If the dispenser overcharges us he should be reported. Even 
when we go to Markdate (immunization) they make us pay Le 5 or they wouldn't vaccinate us. 
We cant help ourselves - you must tell us the right prices or we will always be at the mercy of 
the dispenser. 
A; (Elder) When the drugs come. 1 I'm not your friend you won't give me any. We are not even 
honest to each other. Dishonesty and greed create all our difficulties. There's no mutual trust. 
#Z; GANDORHUN 17 December 1989, Kenema DisMct, Niswa Chiefdom: 
Discussants: Massa Kamera, had of women's society 
Baindu Contek assidant to - 
Yatta Massaquok assistant to local TBA 
? Tindia, blacksmith. farmer 
Momsdu Kpska. mason 
Abduhd Sannih% talor 
Alhe$ Mustapha Contsh, farrmw, Islamic teacher 
Sheku Kpaka, farmer 
. rice and cash crops 
(Note: Selection d PW*i aMs seems biased towards elkes such as the TBA and tradesmen. ) 
Translated from Mende by Joseph ns A. Kamera 
jOjEQdUOM : vxplatned we didn't cone with bad news, just want more Information about their health. 
Where are the nearest medIcal fadMes, etc. we wo do the survey tomorrow and repeat some of these 
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01: How do people earn cash money here? 
& By bffnkV. ceder ft trough $Ming coffee, kola cacao. 
p Is this true for varyone in town? 
A: (Women) Yes. R's true. Women also glean coffee after harvest - they can get as much as a 
WOW which they will sell for use on their children. 
03: Do you have money for emergencies? 
A. No. we sell the crops and spend the money right away. By the time enough money can be 
wed k's probably too late to save a sick padent Kenema Is the only place that is dose 
04: How can you got money In an 
A: We pledge Importart this. and 
amer~ 
repay with cash or with rice. other crops. or palm oll. 
A: That is so, but poor people have to get a stronger person to vouch for them. 
05: What about poor people with no farms or children or family? 
A: We must tell the truth [refers to a situation where a poor woman hasn't enough for new robes. ] 
A: No. there is nobody except for relatives who can help a poor person. 
A. We can borrow money on interesk but we may pay back double In six months. Some villagers, 
espedaiy the Temnes from Kenema. prefer to borrow from buying agents rather than from other 
viagers. They loan money and collect cash crops If people don't repay with cash. They will 
tale It bush of coffee fora loan of Le 40. The bushel is worth le 1000, but N someone is sick 
they have no chobe. 
A: Relatives can lend money ff they have some to spare 
A: If someone Is desperate he will take a sm of money and pledge his plantation. Until the money 
Is repaid all the harvest goes to the lender. and after the time Is expired the lender gets the entire 
farm. 
06: Are there any tamales do can loan without pledgN or interest, lust on trust? 
A: Only by ailing crops -I get some is 5000 you can menage tr*N the next begs are reedy. 
A: Even with a brother you here to promise to repay. Even for Le 20 you may have to weed a farm 
(at Le 30 per day plus food). For Le 1000-2000 you must give something for a guarantee. 
Everyone In ehe , raper poor, d we is nobody rich enough to lend this much wkhout a 
07: How can you tel N someone has money? 
A; It Is dMkxA because people don't like to tell business to each other. 
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A: You can tell by the quality of the house. 
A: They dress In dean doths* every day. A rich man Is not hard to recognize. 
A: If someone will stand for you (to repay a loan). you are probably a rich person. 
A: Rich people will buy rice from poor farmers after harrest, and then resell it to the poor at higher 
prim during the rahm 
(People who can pay money outright are considered wealthy) 
08: Is native medicine used here? 
A. Yes, we bog Leaves to make us sweat, or feet better M we have colds, fever, or stomach ache. 
09: How much should a rich person pay in hospital? 
A: It's the government's business because people get different treatments depending on whether 
they are rich or poor. 
A: 5 Ieones Is fair. 
010: What about the poor? 
A: I'd wan* free treatmert The poor simply have no money. It's not a question of paying Le 2 out 
of 60 which he might have In his pocket, because he hasn't got any. 
011: Can any rich people afford to pay more than Le 5? 
A: Yes, there are some, if they want good treatment. If I were rich. I wouldn't care if my relatives 
sperrt my last cent as long as I got well. 
A: I'd tell my fawtff" wife to get some money from the hiding place, to give 200300 leones to a 
friend or to the hospital to take care of me. 
A: Rich or poor. you will do anything to cure yourself. 
012: How much would you pay to cure a child? 
A. Babies are diterent - they can't talk and are innocent so need to be treated and cured. But 
treatment for children Is different than for adults so should cost less. 
A: If It were my decision, all medicine and treatment should be free because It's hard to replace the 
money once Ira spent. 
013: Has anyone ever died because of not having any mores 
A: Plenty - . sPeCIONy this year too many poor people died because of high transport costs. 
Transport Is a threat to health - it costs Le 660 to go to Kenema for just one person. 
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A: PR Onent women can become sick suddenly. Now ttwe's no transport and it's Impossible to 
carry the woman on our backs. A rich man might have an old car and petrol, so could get the 
person to town. If you don't have this, you're finished. [There Is no vehicle here because there's 
no rich person that could buy one. j 
A: My son died three months ago because I waked days for transport but none came. 
014: Has anyone had to ad th* plantations because they had no money? 
A. It happens often - all that people can offer a sick person Is sympathy) 
A: I'd give someone this lamp to keep I they'd lend me money. 
A: I needed to take my we to Segbwema but had only a Uttle money. When I got there I needed 
nmore money. I sold my cassette player rather than borrowing because It Is easier. 
A: I had the same problem and lost my daughter. 
A: If there is transport around you can borrow and get the sick person to the city. 
(Our main problem Is not having vehicles plying this route: if someone is sick he could get a 
loan from friends or relatives. ] 
015: Why do you spend money on celebrations but not on treatment when you are sick, like 
In tiations, where you spend so much money. 
A: Nobody can afford to spend thousands on initiations here. 
A: I lost a girt I wanted for a wife because I couldn't pay for Initiation. 
(Question Is repeated) 
A: We should really be more ready to spend on people who are sick than on the societies. 
A: If it Is possible you should show your appreciation for your child. that she/he has grown to 
maturity. If a girl goes to a husband he will take care of her needs and you won't have to any 
more. 
A: Nowadays the young die more than the old, so we should try to appreciate them more. It used 
to be that the old the and the young live. 
A: (Woman] If I have 100 bags of rice and a friend Is sick. I'd sell as many bags as necessary to 
help them. 
A: Ye% k's true - this woman Is the only one in the village who would do something like that. 
016: Would you cut down on food to pay if someone was sick? 
A: Gladly - I'd seif my rice and even cut our meals down until we were starving. (LAUGHTER) [if 
we NO used to Wing 10 cups we will reduce it to 4 cups per day. ) 
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017: HOW much can you spend on food if you haven't got any rice? 
A: Nod" - women lind bush yams. God has planted them. 
A. We eat bush- yams In the rainy season. My wife was pregnant and ready to deliver but there was 
no food. We carried her on a hammock to where there wotid be food, but she died on the way. 
018: Would you prefer to pay nothing for treatment I you are poor. some small amount, or the same 
for everyone? 
A We'd prefer to pay nothkg. 
A; It would be nice to organize to collect money for sick people. 
A: The medicine costs money so you should expect to pay. (In our minds we have been used to 
free treatment in the past but now that things are tough one should pay some amount) Even 
to pay some small amount like 5-6 leones. 
A: If possible we shouldn't let people die. Life Is worth more than money. 
019: Would you buy medicine from a trader instead of going to hospital? 
A: Yes. but once It's finished you have nothing left. 
A: I can manage 5-101eones but not 100. 
020: If poor people can get free treatment, will many rich people say they are poor? 
A: There are people who will put on old clothes and say they have nothing. If people see a doctor 
curing poor people for free they will want it too. 
021: Is there anyone who can tell who Is pooh [This was not understood properly. ) 
A: If someone feeds a lot of people with no grumbling he is probably weil off. 
A: Or If a person bulls a nice house. 
A: If someone can Pay an the hospital costs without borrowing they are doing well. 
A: If someone can help someone without hesitating. 
A: If-someone has a car or a nice shop. 
022: Whom do you trust to stand for you? 
A. The town chief Is the abongest voice in the town. 
023: Who would you trust other than the Chief? 
A: There Is an old man here who has lived longer than anyone else, who can tell who Is rich and 
who is poor. 
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A: The only rich man here is the one who buys cheap at harvest and sells It back In rainy season. 
A. Only the town chiek who 'owns' the town, would be believed. (AN agree. ) 
024: How much do you have during the rainy season? 
A: It depends on how many people you have to support. In the rainy season Le 2000 will not be 
enough I you have to feed 10 people. But In harvest season Le 2000 will last a long time. 
A: People with large plantations are rich. You can go to them and they will help you. 
A: The only time we have money is at harvest time., 
A: Someone who harvests 2 or 3 bags of coffee is doing well. 
025: Could people afford to pay Le 300 per person as payment for medicines the rest of the year at 
harvest time? 
A: Not everyone could afford It. 
026: What if It were is 100 per person per month, for three months? 
A: Yes, at harvest time. You mean even for the children? (No, not for the children) 
A: Some people have no farms, they can't afford IL [Some would pay, others would not. Within a 
period of time some will be able, others can't. If the poor can't pay and they are our relatives, 
it won't hurt us If they are given free treatment] 
Concluding comment: Transportation is our biggest problem.. We need a dnlc In the 
area. 
#3 BARMOI, 15 January 1990 Port Loko District, Bureh Maconteh Kasseh Chiefdom: 
Translated by M. I. Sesay from Temne 
Occupations: farmer, farmer, farmer, farmer/Arabic teacher, farmer, farmer, farmer 
01: Are there any other oaxupadons here? 
A Yes. there are traders. We go to our farms and don't mind peoples' business. 
02: How many bushels do you have to cultivate to sustain your families the whde year? 
A: We dont measure it, Some cultivate just 1 /2 bushel. It depends on what God gives us. 
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A: We cultivate as much as we can, maybe 4 or 5 bushels, but sometimes at harvest we don't get 
enough. I plant 5 bushels of rice, 3 pans of millet, some cassava -R will be enough for my 
family, but at times animals eat the grain. 
A: At times we can get. as much as 5: 1, other times only 1: 1 (harvested grain to planted seed). 
03: What causes the fluctuation? 
A: Rodents, and the work of nature. There's nothing we can do about it. 
04: How much do you sell after harvest? 
A: We don't sell, since we don't get enough for our own use. 
[Some sell rice after harvest, others don't 9 the harvest is poor] 
05: Why do other people sell their rice before the hungry season? 
A: When we have an emergency we have to sell something, and all we have is rice. We have many 
debts and other needs. 
A: If there is an emergency we have to borrow money from others, then we sett rice to repay the 
debt. 
A: When there Is no more rice in the rainy season, we start all over by borrowing again. 
06: When you've sold all your rice and need more, where do you get the money? 
A: We borrow money from others to buy rice, then repay it in rice after the harvest. [People borrow 
from others or pledge their crops or land. At times they sell their crops. Some pledge their 
gardens. ) 
07: How do you repay the money you borrow during the rainy season? 
A: One way Is to work a part of the lender's farm to repay the debt. 
A: When we borrow we have to pay interest. 
[Others sell their crops again or they finally go into exile from that chiefdom because of fear. ] 
08: Do you mean Interest in kind or on money? 
P. We borrow money and repay In rice. We yet Le 180-200 fora bushel. That's why it Is interest - 
the cost of the rice is far more than that. 
A If you don't pay the rice back, they (lenders) will take you to court. 
09: When there Is an emergency such as an illness or a dispute, where do you get the money to 
settle your problems? 
A: If your wife's father dies you have a lot of funeral expenses - Le 1000 for a w1ndM9 Both, and 
then the 40th day ceremony. On this occasion you must borrow since the expenses are great. 
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A. Some will pledge their farm land (not land for building), some will pledge their garden or 
oranges. There Is no stipulated time - the lender keeps the harvest until you repay him. 
010: Where do you get money to redeem your pledge? 
A: We either pay back In rice or else we have to leave the areal 
A: If we pledge land and can't get the rice to redeem it. you can ask the person to give you back 
your land so you can work the land to pay him back with rice. 
A: But you'll have to pay much more. First a partial cash payment, then Interest in the form of rice 
since you are working for yourself and not for him. 
011: Can poor people borrow money? 
A: Yes, but it has to be from a relative. 
A: They will need a guarantor If they borrow from a non-relative. Poor people aren't trusted. When 
they can't repay the loan they prefer to go to court, which will grant them ample time to repay. 
012: If poor people borrow money how do they manage to repay it? 
A: They do manual labour. Some do cassava farming, some get palm kernels to make palm 
and other jobs. They must be trusted to repay or else nobody will loan. 
013: Which yields more, farming or trading? 
A: If you have livestock or fowl you'll have money very soon. 
A: The next Is a garden. for cassava, peppers, potatoes. From these you can get a quick return 
A: They will not make you rich but they will assist you very quickly. 
A: Farming rice will now get us rich. There isn't enough for our own consumption after harvest. 
A: Most of the money we borrow comes from traders. 
A: (Referring to 012) There are no truly poor people here. Only the ones who can't work are poor. 
As long as you can work and get some money you may be broke at times, but you're not a poor 
man. 
014: Why do most people prefer Injections to tablets? 
A: We need to recover as quickly as possible. 
A. The 'doctors' give their opinion that we should have an injection. 
A. When you get an Injection you can feel better by the time you get back horte. 
A: Some people find it difficult to swallow tablets. 
A: I only prefer them when I have severe pain. I prefer tablets when I just have fever. 
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015: Do people get Injections for malaria? 
A: There are tablets which they give you If you say you are feeling cold. 
A: We usually don't ask for Injections for malaria. The doctor (at PHU) can tell us if we need one. 
016: If tablets and injections cure equally well, and the injections cost a bit more, which would you 
prefer? 
A: Tablets. 
A: Most people would prefer the Injection because If you go to the PHU and only get tablets you 
don't think they are treating you seriously. I prefer Injections. 
A: In order to get a good reputation the dispensers give Injections to satisfy patients' desire to be 
cured quickly. 
A: Even if you have a sickness which doesn't require an Injection, you will recover faster If you 
receive one. 
A: It depends on what you are used to - if your body Is used to getting Injections you should have 
them. If it's tablets then that's what you need. 
017: When you buy drugs from peddlers, how do you know they are good for your particular Illness? 
A: if you see the peddler has the same drug you received at the hospital the last time you had the 
same attack, you can buy It. 
A: As soon as the peddler comes Into town he shouts 9 have medicine for headaches', and so on, 
so if you have these problems you buy. 
A: When you ask him he will show you the bottle of tablets which has a picture of a person holding 
their waist, head, etc., so you know that's the right medicine. 
A: All this Is due to ignorance. If the government has a qualified dispenser, that Is where you 
should go. Anyone who buys from a peddler does it out of Ignorance in that case. 
018: Is there a difference in price? 
A: Yes, the peddlers are more costly than the PHU. 
019: Then why do you buy from them? 
A: Sometimes we go to the PHU and he gives a diagnosis but doesn't have the drug, so he sends 
us out to buy the medicine. Then next time we won't bother going to the PHU first - we'll just buy the same drug from the peddler. 
A: Some people are far off from the PHU so have to buy from peddlers. 
A: Some people are afraid to go to the PHU because of the price they are charged. So If they have 
only Le 2 or le 10 they go to the peddlers. 
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020: Do you know anyone who got sick and died because of lack of money to go to hospital? 
A: Pa Samba had asthma. He was sick for a long time because he never went to the hospital. 
A: He was a farmer and also produced palm oil. But when he fell NI he couldn't farts or produce 
palm of any more. 
021: Do you have any sort of mutual aid? 
A: Now we do but at that time we didn't. 
022: Do you know anyone who sold any of their property in order to go to hospital? 
A: I was a victim of this: I had to sell my wife's groundnuts because of the pain I was 
having. 
A: I sold some of my clothes to go to the Eye Hospital. 1 sold some for 10,30.50 leones but 
don't remember the total I spent. 
A: I also sold a bushel of groundnuts before the time when I could get a good price. 
023: If you are sick and go to a PHU and are asked to pay Le 60, how can you manage to pay it? . 
A: (The crowd aN said that they wouldn't have Le 60, so it was put to a vote. 4 said they would 
have it, the rest, about 50 people, said they wouldn't) 
024: You who don't have the money - what would you do to flat k? 
A: 1'd go to a relative and be given some money, then I would borrow the balance. 
A: I'd borrow from other people. 
025: Why do people spend money on feasts like bundu, but can't afford to go to hospital? 
A: " Only those that can afford to do that do It. The others don't do it. 
" 
A: (Further support) All of us are not equal. 
026: Are there any people who have [cash crops like] oranges, potatoes, etc.? 
A. (Oranges, cassava, pepper, and tomatoes were named. Only 2 out of 6 did not have any cash 
crops) 
A: I just plated and haven't harvested any yet. 
027: Are there any other comments before we finish? 
A: If you see someone making a feast, he's not making it on his own. He will send to his other 
relatives. Everyone will contribute something . money, rice, fowl, floats. But when It happens 
to other people you must contribute too, or nobody will give to yours. 
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#4 ROBIS 20 January 1990, Port Loko District, Buys Romende Chiefdom: 
(Outdoors. Into afternoon. discussion held after household interviews) 
Discussants: 5 male farmers, 2 female farmers, 1 female trader 
Sorte Beah. farmer, - rice. cash crops 
Santigte Kamara. farmer 
Kapr Fallah, farmer 
Fatmata Mansaray, petty trader living In Makeni 
Same Karamk farmer 
Marlatu Kanu. farmer 
Translated Tom Temne by. M. I. Sway 
01: Where do you get cash for such activities as school fees. Bothes, etc.? 
-A: We have no other way than selling rice to cover debts, or arrange for a funeral. 
A: Our farms include groundnuts. peppers, com, etc. 
02: (fo trader) How much profit do you make per day? 
A: I can make Le 100-150 (but she trades in Makeni - she was just In Robis visiting her parents. ) 
Female: When you came this morning, you interviewed only a few houses, and only the men! 
(Explanation given) 
03: What kind of Illness will lead people to hospital, to use native herbs, or to use drugs from the 
market? 
(Cough and hernia] 
A: Cough -11 feel my sides, then Ill go to hospital. 
A: When we do our fammwork we get general bone aches. This makes us go to hospital. 
A: It's only when it Is serious, - when you can't move on your own. But for minor things we won't 
go. (Any ailment that gets worse and prevents you from doing work. ] 
04: If'you have to borrow money to go to hospital, how will you repay it? 
A: When we get better we have to sell our rice to pay the debt. 
A: Either we sell the rice, or before (If It isn't too serlota and one can still move) we go to the 
hospital we pledge property to yet cash. 
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05: What will you do first in an emergency at a time dose to the rains, If you have rice at that 
moment - sell the rice or try to borrow money? 
A: Wel try first to Sell the rice, but if there are no buyers we'll borrow. Then later sell the rice to 
repay It. 
A: Well first try to borrow money and if we don't succeed we'll come back and sell the rice. 
06: Towards the hungry season and you know your stock of rice Is very low, so you borrow money - 
where do you get money In an emergency? 
A. I'll tall you how. I had ä $mla attack while working on my farm. There was no money. I was 
put Into a hammock. The 'family had to borrow Le 100 and I was taken to Mabesseneh. I went 
back to the farm, harvested the rice, and repaid the debt. [Le 100 two years previously Is 
equivalent to about Le 400 currently. ] 
07: How much can you borrow for a bushel of rice? 
A: Le 200, but if we sell It we get Le 400. 
A: If we have an emergency we borrow money, then after harvest we sell the rice to the lender. 
a8: Does everyone in the village have the opportunity to borrow money? 
A: There are people who can't get anyone to lend them money. 
A: It's because they don't repay you and give excuses. After a while everyone In the village knows 
about It and won't lend. 
A: Some will come to you In secret to borrow money and then not repay it. Then they start arguing 
with you and It will take a long time for you to get the money. So the next time you don't lend 
them. 
A: Others who don't borrow money are sick people. Nobody will lend them because they know 
they can't work and can't pay them back. 
09: How much will you be able to pay for fever In a PHU of hospital? 
A: We can't know the amount except it the doctor tells the amount. 
A: You night have Le 20 with you so you'd ask the dispenser to do something for you. If he says 
it's too little you have no choice but to go back home and get more. But if he asks only for the 
Le 20 it would be convenient for us. 
A: If It would cost more than Ls 20 we'd have to borrow. 
010: What If malaria treatment cost La 40? 
A: We'd have to borrow. 
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011: Apart from borrowing or pledging. are there other ways to get money for these purposes? 
A. No, only to sell rice. pledge other properties, or sell belongings. 
012: Then It you've sold all your rice by hungry season, where will you get money to buy more rice? 
A. We go to other people again, then after harvest we pay them back in cash or in kind. 
013: Do you pay Interest In that case? 
A No. mor now, people don't loan on Interesr - previously described pledging Is not considered 
usurious. ] 
014: How much rice do you have to cultivate to last your family through the year? 
A: It depends on the size of the family and If the harvest Is good. 3 bushels could last In a good 
year, sometimes you need 6. 
015: What ff malaria treatment cost Le 40? 
A: We'd have to borrow. 
016: How would you repay It? 
A: Walt unti after the harvest, then we'd pay R back. 
017: Are there people who didn't eat for 1 or 2 days during the rainy season? 
A. Yes - many. Some will only eat cassava fora 1 or 2 day period. 
018: Were they able to provide the cassava during that time? 
A Yes. we plant enough. We are cultivating it so it Is ready when the rice Is finished. 
019: Why do people prefer to spend a lot of money on feasts but can't a" to go to the hospital? 
(laughter) 
A: [Older man] Whoever does that Is a fooll For me. 1 will just call my family and do the 
circumcision. and' eat what we have around. I won't call a lot of people and have to buy food. 
Only those who are wealthy enough can have the chance to do that. 
A: [Younger. well-dressed man] The people are not fools. All our ancestors did It. so we must also. 
We have to do It to our children, so it has become a sort of law that we have to do It. We're 
trying to follow a tradition. 
A: (Woman] It depends how you stand - If you have money you do it (go along with your cult). Those without a lot don't have to do it (do It secretly without making any feast). 
A: It's only wealthy people who do it. They spend as much as possible and still have something 
left afterwards. 
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A: (Woman) If I have less than enough rice I'll talk to the child to leave it for next year, so we won't 
be too pressed. 
020: Does anyone else have anything to say about paying for Illness? 
A: For hernia, we could manage La 200 without borrowing money. We can save that much from 
farming. But for body pains and fever Le 20 would be convenient. If they ask for Le 2000 we 
have to go Into debt and won't even be able to maintain our houses (and many people die). 
021: If poor people can pay less than the actual cost of the operation. the rich will have to pay more 
than the cost price. Is that fair to them? 
A: It Is U they agree to pay. 
A: It's a good Idea but the rich man will not agree to pay more than the cost price [the poor man 
pays less]. They should make a reduction for the rich also, as well as the poor. The poor man's 
reduction must be more than the rich man's. [Wealthy people should pay more actually but 
unless the charges are done in secret the wealthy won't agree to this. ] 
A: The rich man must not be informed that he is paying more than the cost price or he won't 
accept it. 
A: There are many Illnesses In this area, and many people are so poor that they can't go to 
hospital. We depend only on farm work so ff the harvest Is bad we're In trouble. 
A: Also our water is bad, especially In the dry season. 
022: How much would everyone be able to contribute to Improve the water? 
A: Since there are many of us, everyone who drinks water will be able to contribute Le 20 each. 
A: If we could borrow seeds, that would be another great help to us. 
A. We don't have any good toilets or roads and no water. So we'd be pleased If you could get 
these things for us. 
023: Do you have enough labour to do the farm work? 
A: Yes, we have many wives and children. I have 3 wives and 6 children. If I could borrow the 
seed we could do the work. 
A: Because of poverty we can't pay school fees - now the children are all doing farm work. 
A: Even our livestock get sick and eventually die because we have no assistance. 
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Appendix 5: 
Maps and photos 
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Appendix 6: 
Questionnaires and Other Survey Instruments 
Dry season household questionnaire with some reinterview data 
Rainy season followup household questionnaire 
Village data form 
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AC TI Ott ACTION 
! WEUC! EITM0ý 
110 TIEITUI 
!! MIT X101'1 LU 
RESULT ii 
(4) i*i:.,. 
_: 
i 
t LOT IETIE1 t 011 111UTLT ETUI 1601 IOS E AEMIIEn TIE 3AME 5 PILL NO 11EITIIM 1 IIEI 1! 101'T U01 
IF PAYMENTS WERE MADE, COMPLETE THE NEXT PART (do. 't tnoi = N! ) 
AMOUNT CHARGED 
PAID/OWED PROVIDER 
PAID MEDICINES 
PAID TRAVEL FOR ALL 
PAID OTHER COSTS 
Qa TOTAL 
RECEIVED AN INJECTION? (Y/N) 
Le 000 14"$Jl 
.p1 --e ý. 
-too 2ý 1,1rw¢ 
1 
ENOUGH MONEY AVAILABLE (YIN) I. N. " rJ 
In hot1SA/Save $? 
1 La ! 1 
1 
( Le 
1 1 
.t 
1 
Lý 
1 
1 
1 
. LO 1 1 
1 
s 
S 
1 
Le r 1 Le' 
t 
* S Le, i $ La, 
1 Le, , 1 
$ 
s Lei ! 1 Lc1 1 1 
s i 
1 1 
» I1 1 1 
if abcve answer was NO. 
HOW WAS MONEY OBTAINED 
1 *1 IIC I1C c 11 MWRM is OM SIMS IIKUiE! 
2 *I/IlfliEI Calf tEP 11ä/IEl, IIRT/$1C$IPTIA 14 It CIO FU 2K11Y 
> >OLI ! O23EÜ101$ 1 som. EIRTIIE! FVEI 1S 01 TNST-Hll t11 IRR 
4 3911 II1f F9Y TOOU (see 11) 11 MAICIiIcE PJI Of TAEATU? is to. wo 
S 1111111 ITS Fwal1. U VIA UVE$IOCS L 1$ NI ]a me AT m 
11 win m 11 1(1 1 FM R3 11 10 31511(33 Wilk 
1 II 1/ 1// 'I II 1 
1_1 /ý. ý/ "ß. I1 1__11_s 1. __, I 
IA "is IM [in 
it REIZ mmillOA/FMI 
iso onuu 
"c m (w : n) 
n NVT WIMMIT ca 
IF THE ACTION TAKEN WAS 4. S. 7. OR 10. COMPLETE THE NEXT PART 
MAIN REASON FOR THIS CHOICE 
1 WIN III OUION! I ON IETTEL IOOI Ann 1EIN $1U! I MI UIY NT IO Tm121UT AMILMIF, OR Too FAR PO TYIEy 4 IN ERIN WI 
IXTRR. MN. 111IClrts! s a'T LIKE 401! 1 TO nr. IT .I MIT*t i T1TU EIICH(: RI 1IUIU it POW I *101 Or EFEWI (Twl 
Tlot 41U1*I113 UI EFMTM FOR hTS'PNna)1 1 u0 W-41AM11 r 00 (SMIFT)1 It MI Ms aaM31 n ýa'T 1101 
if a ve snawer wj, " 
AMOUNT THOUGHT would have Le ;;;.. ;" Le t; 
cost for TREATMENT & TRANSPORT (999 = don't know) 
NEXT ACTION? 4 NEXT ACTION? 
ei 
ýi _: 1ýrvisor 
tr 
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; VILL ýý''ýý1výt. 
_ 
e3rýý VTLL NR' ýýý HP M. ; ý"_ý E CHF: 6!! U1'; 
"Has an, member of t" x 'rýý"_s<:, ý: id c _j i==t 12 nonth3.3c11! L; .1 0r 
and . nfanýs? "(Y/N) ; CAUSE(S) OF DEATH "tr. l O Nr. 2 cods 
was the person sick before " dYirKl? (Y`N ý1 IF yes, CONTINUE: 
; t$$$**i**! t*t***ais: 's* **. ** ***t*t$**$**t, W#*, $t****, *t$*X*#tü 
OZCEA: Er. Hr 1 Age; 
_&; 
3ex;. M; ; DECEASED Nr 2 Aqe; 
''+', ý' . =t': ? "'ýD ' FIRST ; SECOND 
ACT: C+ºH XT _"V4 * ACTION ACTION 
ACTION TAKEN 
I VElIflT Whit 
tfý 
i' 3 msiA Wtlll 
TOTAL ALL COSTS 
4 IM6$ FI MALET/LEIME! 7 Yf IfE NF1S, SALT, ETC 
S IWIT10Nl IEHEI/IEUAUST F R: w*T SXIOA/1ß$111M 
s oil PIJspt (MVAMV) 1 JMQ NEOECUE 11 Aals 
11 n TAEAP. Ni 
U im S*NFIU' 
a-i ß'101'T U 
lF W -M MACE, CC? 1 LETS 'i C r? XT Pd 
L e 
f t 1 i 
1 .. . ý, t s 
t t t 
s 
1 
{ t: li 111 t, {1 T 1 It f. tl 
1_.., i. ß. 1 ta i 11. E 1 ..... ýi 1_.... ýi 
ENOUGH MONEY AVAILABLE 
IN HOUSE OR SAVINGS? 
If above answer wd"S NC', 
HOW WAS HONEY OBTAINED 
i sou UWFU c 
2 %WnfNO cm aor 
so pow"m 
soy MOW roxs 
s em PM" 
I ýoaýol FAS NOEYUIa 
i K/at-Btft/utta 
9 um INTIMEM 
10 nýo*EI(U F1 $ 
11 70U LI1t$Y0[I/FOK 
12 IEWN FO P 1MS; S 
is REM DINER PMSES 
14 P(WTfl FO SAM 
15 MIA11! f9 01 110! 1 
ltwmw1TI* 
11 r1E$ RUDI CII'1TAL 
11"to11III 
111LO I RII1A1la/FMI 
'a ants (mm) 
IF THE ACTIC! TAKEN WAS 4. S. 7_ or 10.1 COMPLETE THE NEXT PART 
REASON FOR THIS CHOICE 
I MW A1T SWW 2 on KTM Toa. VIM KIM SICK/ 3 10-1116 MT M TAMUORI A, A! LMU, 2 100 FM TI 1181' A MT 
EMM! 1EV 1I 10äd. lw, er IPICtIltj $ IM'T ILKE SIN to Pi, 11'1POSEt; AOSIITN/ I tE: $ EIICIM3 MA/Aültli if lw/ I 
IaTQ MT EFMIM-MAK141ll IIE ivT 13 Az Ervtci[TE FM TIN MW)j 1 SKI 3ELF-1AHTIERI/ I 3TAI (PRIWY)! ll FM 
rs umýý » NI'I uar 
A" '" `!? 
_'ýilý ,k auch 
. `s:: ur!, It it 
AMOUNT THOUGHT would have s; 
c: st TAEATMENT & TR. Ati-"Ft. nT 
- 
: 'EM F. CTI . t"EXT . CT ! Ii 
! tt" *s+tr++*: t*: "ý »ýxxxýstýr* ý*ý" t#tx+wss*sxttr err*#tetss*ssstssreý 
PERYISOR: IF IT SEEMS LIKE A DEATH OCCURrEO BECAUSE NOT ENOUGH MONEY WAS AVAILABLE TO 
00 TO HOSPITAL. GO BACK TO ! HTERVIEW THE FAMILY AGAIN AND WRITE A BRIEF REPORT 
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IRi 
Le, ' - 11 
,,.: i 
,., ,.. ý" , ter, 
t} "" SMIKý,,,,, ýi 
i 
.J 
Y1LL11ßE%1. CY -. 
FAA, In bidAM going an--- 
1. CONSTRUCTION OF MOUSE(S) 
HNNk 11-t -IdR- 
UAW 
a. " Number of rooms co ied by household, including p*rlor and 
any sxterri s or outbui ldings .. fr. 
b. Mall construction 
1 mid rd mttbe. 2 rM loot. i dw or bss, ,5 ad brill or Mtt e dt1 Plata, 
oeýecýb 
c. Enter "2" if Fresh Paint on Malls 
d. Roof material 
1= tlltd. ä= tire. 4= amte 
0. Floor material 
f 1. y, 3: tin er I'm C to 
f. Enter "3" for Private well or Tap 
I way the houses is arranged, is this household: : _A.,, 
1 Mror #0 101 1 Gort rnr* I btu -ett tW mnp I ft" to my 
__.. -----------ý-_ . _.. _ý 
pa (sassy) as ah bin say, all waytin you tell as today nar between irr on you.. 
= Even 
di people des way go read dis paper nor go know say nsr you particular tell as 
aytin. So no traid for tell a do true. Mek we talk lilibit but the sonny 
Supervisor Tonal ;,; 
S. Judging 4! ]ly from the appearance of the houss the way people are dressed. and the 
way the houses is arranged, is this household: : 
A; 
1 Mnr #0 - @I 2 Gort enr* I bttr-Off tW mop I ft" to my 
"Pa (sassy) as ah bin say, all waytin you tell as today nar between irr on you.. 
Even di people des way go read dis paper nor go know say nar you particular tell as 
actin. So no traid for tell a do true. hek we talk lilibit but the sonny 
situation nar you ass. " 
("As I st; d. al'. of t hi" : n`ormation is : rfidentia1. Now I want to ask you aase 
gore Q: stiors about, your r: cu34ho1d'e money situation. ") 
b, "De big man (big cosan) nar die ose, watin rar do sain woke way ht depend pen 
for ins living en for feed dis r (What is the major occupation of the 
h Jseholy toad? ) 11 
171, 
(USE THESE CODES FOR ALL OCCUPATION QUESTIONS) 
1 w®. 2 oft 1 PETIT T fl 4 u11aa. 3 FI M/ mit CML M1.1 i u.. I an 
j umt4m. u 1uß n uIa wr r* raur. vC 1EL va ACME, u atr[ mss. a gas ( yL 
is In. MEIUOM. a KIM, u NTIPEOI s Chi OFflCIll. 11 It! l1111. IMMß. M On lA 
b. Tell me dc odsr woke des way ycu day do 
(Side occuPatia1 a` household head) 
c. "Oodet on oat again rar dis M lek you wt day tradin. qr odsrporson MW 
day woks or tradin day bring spy ca* nar dis me? "OonSY ptt any, odsr parson 
ray nor day nor dis 0", sen money eae nar dis ase (ah sin laic. ocnsr art parson nef 
En land or America or even Nigeria or Salons or any oder sie, kin bring or sen 
y nor dis ose? (Which other household members or other family members usually 
2 tribe M-Lt* the household-. ) 
ENTER THE OF OTHER PEOPLE MHO CONTRIBUTE '(shauld tally with number 
I of boxes filled b. lON) 
ENTER" THE OCCUPATIONS OF EACH ; so iý: : ý. Li .iiiI.. ý. 
1 11.1 
7 supervisor 
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CHF: I. A! ý, ýirýMýt: 
__ýýrý_ 
1RILý. NFt: HU HR'; 
^ý 
'. It t his. heaý'. ý: =ply 7Liýitýf 'iLýblOCT"=! 'i ti"E 3'driold' is 3ri , e, coffee, Ct cacao faroer 
sek the following: 
FOR RICE: now %any bushel: plantet AI& l '. L: _ibushela 
:.. FOR COCOA: Hat's uh was lest year? 
O4ty Cost C. r P 
c. FOR CQFFEE. How auch was 
wd 
last year? ; }sage Ok le; ; 
d. FOR PALM OIL: Produced for own use only (Y/N); 
1; 
" 
Produced f; r sale OR Le g=_ 
(999 - don't know or did , tot answer) 
8. Any large livestock owner! (Y/N) ; 
..; 
Any fowl., 
9. If the- head of hauweh=1d is zra farrier: 
For how many , oaths do you have to buy "-ics to feed the lcusehcld? '3 
1^. Doe_ anyone ". in " the household own; (w rking cr"nd: ti:, n or rot) 
(FILL IN NUMBERS OWNED) 
3upolied free job? 
a. Bicycle LL (U . b. Motorbike (3) (-2) 
,.. 
" e. . Radio/cassetýeýý"`'. 
(lj 
, d. cart' or whstiba4r s: -: (1) 
a. watches/clock `"` x1) 
f. Sewing machine (2) 
0. Motorcar/lorry .. (6) 
Ask in urban or mining areas; 
h. Television/video (2) Supervisor Total 
i. Generator ý.. 
_. 
ý (2) 
Refrigytroezer (2). 
k. Machinery (6) 
11. IF'A WIFE, COOK OR OTHER"RESPONSIBLE PERSON CAN 8E, INTERVIEWEO. ASK HER IF SHE BUYS 
F00D EVERY DAY "IFY ASK : 
Mow auch did you spend yes to rda an.: (Eilet ! 1M tot adou't koW) 
C't os%$L 
Flit. Rice 1. e'_ý' ..., r; 
Z 
y. 
Cas. eava, darri/pötatees/otir_r topers ./: 
0QIº+ oft M0 
$, it Z 
: k3AEDtENT4 FCC SO'J? /ýAVCE LE ;au 'e'"4 %i. 
12.4ow lacy me. ls were oaten by the hcuaahold yesterday? (adulta, i; 
$ý 
1; Suporvisor 
322 
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i 
F 
} 
i 
CHF: BHt:; 
`; 
BUY; ; YILL4GE; 1ý±Wl1F"ý'1ý 
ý 
ViLL. ttR;; 
2; 
HH NR-,. ýl'; '%b- 
HOWLE 4. 
16. "Nar plenty sie, en plenty country sane people so po dat den no able pay anytin 
for men densef when den sick. You tink say people lek day wan day for yet free 
"erecin nar hospital, or des for pay any small tin way den able, or dear pa o pa, 
for pay do bass lek oder people? " 
(in most olaces there are soars people who sire poorer than others. and who may not 
be able to pay anything at all when they are sick. Do you think those people 
should get free medicines. o, - have to pay s. _me small snraunt, or pay as much as 
everyone else? ) ; _. 
I_ 
1= hl son mall mm of t= ht . otti, s =1y a mcr m mrie elm 4 -- da't loot 
IF I or 2. ASK QUESTION 17 IF 3, SKIP QUESTION 17: 
il. "Her buy we ministry for wellbody business day buy esrecin an nar wit de coney 
way people pay for eerecin. So if po people pay money way nor equal to the cost of 
the aerecin way des buy dean other people way able manage for pay lilibit sore don 
way tin do aerecin. cost. You Link dat right? " USE EXAMPLE: 
(The Ministry of 'health has to buys '. edicine Wi-Jh `'the 'lrýy that is collected from 
the people. If poor people piy%11 than the cos L- of " 
j, he medicine it . 
üeans that 
PEOPLE WHO ARE AVERAGE have td Oay -ä little more. Co , you still think-tl at this is 
right and fair") 
(Y/N) ; ); 
18. "Tea kin day nor de year way people kin get plenty money; oder too nor de year 
den saes peopli yar des hen kin dry. Mus month you kin bill up way oonar kin get 
plenty for eat? Mus month you hon kin dry? " 
(Many people only have coney at pertain parts c` the year, like after the crops are 
sold. Do you know which Months you have the most money or the most to eat, and 
when you have the least? ) 
CAN GIVE ANSWER? (Y/N) ; Y_; Not Applicable 
- Most: to 
Least to ; OCI( 
a. "You know lek ors so di bigaan (big oosan) nar dis ose kin got when he bill 
up true true wan? Lek ors so? " (How much money does the household head 
usually have in the pocket during the (eost plentiful) months? ) 
Le i. 4" l don't know I 
_r, _ 
b. "Whsn is han dry ormos so you go say kin day nar is han? " (How much money 
does the household head usually have in the pctýket in the hungry season? ) 
L 'IU ' dort know ; __; 
321c 3uoeriia:. r 
VILLAGM RAM HOUS!. MR. PAam 1 
Sierra Leone Health Economics Survey 
MOH/PMISU - UIIICiir - LSHZ71 
Rainy Sdom n lbllomW 
enumerator (tio. 1-1) Date 
----/----/1,990 
"We went to ask you same questions which will help us learn about what 
people here do when they get sick. The information will only be used to help us 
learn mere about the health problem in this chiefdom, and all your answers will 
be confidential. I will not even write your narue on this paper if you prefer. 
.. Will You ° help as' by wing to gtfe an only correct arwmrs? '* 
status in household of the pereow- intýrlacreö 1 1__i* Sex 1. _. 
1 
teem: 1-kN 2-spent 1-cu11 4-Wett of Ital S-adac tektite 4-etbn 
/sutbll stnctuix ! ee IN/! IM ! B, If B#t li il). M !! )ls UM /i ºwl m 
i NOMU 2 
_. ý- IM-Lagm-Op" 
F trat Names of All 
household waffberß 
Age Sax Oo '! b t xum I11Mss 
9c*iool?! last 2 je" 
am am 
LW 
R 
0 
w 
" 
0 
0 
2 
i 
.3 
t 
.4 
0 
LS 
1 
" 
L7 
I 
l8 
0 
ý_ý 
0 
I 
I 
1 
e 
1 
J 
Y'0T1ºL 1 
0-is 1-1 
Schl tt 
8.111 t__. t 
$8. I111- 
UI YMM1_ 
115 YUR I 
1110 Yen1 
eusebet thron ic- 
ally ill 
untreated 
working adults 
1-1 
CHECKED BY SUPERVISOR 
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VILLAGS NANN f0U819 NQ. PMNZ 2 
1geI_ISexI_I I111_ 18r1_I *A9eI_ISexI _I 
I111_. 1Sr t_-__I 
* 
p 'iU? r ttc .1 Name *PX'IIIR Kr .2 liame 
FIRST SE HD * FIRST amm 
ACTION ACFIali * ACTION AcricH 
* 
»cliat tlna4t: 1 __I 
I 
. __I 
*1 
_I 
I 
_I * 
It swim 4 ME f ll 1läl1Ra&N t tat" Nlu, IM?, mC Is N INtlff- 
!Ms "Almalt Nöß/m1MHT I $1 NCMAS1t1L SS WI'T mm! /Mit n10 
I little owns c II IN/INA (! BAIL! ) S Ir OIAN !R-. 
* 
ý- i _I 1 __I 
*I 
_I 
1 
_I !W I11*1i 11!! 0 1 11'! am 1 "Ulm 1! üN 5 MU 1mm ll 1? 1 DID SS MIT n* 
js- two? WI = lii) 
now Mom Let__ 1 Le II* Le I I fiel__ 1 
PAID/otOD PR0YlOl Le 1I Le l1* fiel I [. e (1 
PAID NEDiC! NRS Le I$ fiel____ * Le I I Le 
* 
PAID ALL TRAVBI. fiel I Le 1* Li I I fiel__ 
Ofl MOTS Lei 1 Le( I* Let I 1101 1 
* 
lovm Let I LeI Let I Let 1 
sýM M- MM IJI? (VU) 1-1 P 1-1 * 1-1 11 
Iiý6 .i Jmi MM gagm 11 1* 1--1 1 1----1 
in noose or aevangsr (am) 
, --- * 
1 * 
1>I! u, which banghWd 
I MOM prÖ' tdeä the money? 1_1 1_1 1-1 1-1 * 1-1 1- 1 1-I 1, _1 1N ý ! AIWIISWI 3negMN1 trill 
>If änswer MW no, * 
ME UNS 1401117 (1111om? 1-11-11-1 1 _I I_I 1_I 
* 1_I I_I I _I 1_11_t 1_1 
1 NU IINIP* WI 1 IN1N WE I*1I U 13 uNEl1 OWN 1 11111111 1110 
! IN1NN, NM dN WI It 1 Monk OI! lNNiilflIN 11 inectis 1! N MW 11L11110 MMMGLOW 
3 NU lliNp mS ININ Nuffm tins is N llm"Lt in Alm ism mu Lina 
1 as L flhiU (see Hl 11 l11nwAt M IM* UNION 11 0l1AD SI IRA (we'll 
S KENN HER ! fohl! U NU &111111 KM K lm IKNNt 1t int SS NI'? tmmo! /IN'? till 
f Win 1*/N M 12 ONCE ! IN PR i 11 flli IIIINU lrnlL 
* 
** IF A NZ!! Q IAA 1418 imc2iV®, 
SPUCIFY IOI 111 1* I III 
IF '14N ALTIC 1 TAKHI W RS 4,5,7, Qt 10, aQrpIZR3 'rim NleXT PART 
* 
"M ____ rat ras cnoiQ 1 I I*I. 1 1 1__I _ t ffNNI NR *1101/ ! II? ll1'! N ISIS YM NlN ! tß/ __ 1Wt MI N UMRIST 111iUil, N Ill IAN 111t1ß/ . 
I Of NNN NOW! M "MME, M, it M1QNf/ S Mtl SRI . ms N ! w, NNN/N, 11Nn1L/ 1 1118 MIl1N1 
NýII. W 0 ! N/ 1091111 111 Ntwig (imI IAIi N! r! np 11 an umeiu1t M M! MUM/ I En IW 
1lllfý/ 91M (111a ll It 11 ell M aim! 1S Nl't dN 
* 
If above ansvar wse 4. * 
ANO Jfl' '17101.1 ! would hive Le 11 tat 1* fiel 1 EA 1 
cast for & 'IRMI PORT (SSS it 1w't tu, ) 
HEM ALPION? * tIB1(T AMCN? 
CHECKED BY SUPERVISOR 
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VILLAGE NAME HOUSE NR. PAGE 3 
Age I _I 
S. x I _I 
I11 1 
_13r 
1_1 *Age 1 
_I 
Sex I 
_I I 
ll 1 __18r 
I 
_i * 
PMI WR Mr. 3 flame *PATI I fl Mr. 4 Nance 
FIRST SEND * FIRST Sea= 
AMOK ACTIN * ACTION AMC" 
* 
* 
1 a1ý1 USPIUi 4 ISIS PIUS 1 1T/RI/i* 1 lmR ! M, 1111, RC 11 n "tifvt 
2ms TWllllfli ni&aa uii nI mini N6711/MRIT? L 1! MIT 11 1/1I 
I 110101 NVIT& 1 II>l /IItN Ilt umv )Iw mein 1T E 
W 
ltssltt: 1_t 1__I * i_I I_. 1 
2 at ILIUM 1ltl! 3W OW 1 tRum t : 1S S mii 1M1 nt1? AR i Illy !i MIT IDN 
* 
(MI'? NN " m1 
Let I Lei * Let I LeI 
PAID/owm PROVIDER Let I Let 1* LeI I Le 
* 
PAID MEDICINES Le 11 Let I* Le II Le t 
* 
PAID ML TRAVFS. Le II Le I* Le II Le I _I O'ItO MOTS Let I Lei * Le II Le 1 
* 
TOM Let I Let I* Let 1 1,81 -1 * 
2amUr4 It1Jl cr e (? /M) (_) *1 _) 
I 
___I 
1-1 
wes SIC t to bzyo tit 1-1 *I __I I __, 
I 11 
l In i. oz savings? l sIN) * 
* 
1>If ]tSSi, which bommbM 
1 mober provided the money? 1 I1 I I* I_I 1 II I II II I _ _ _ __ _ __ _ I1 IIN1IIIIi sY 2 011091 NUl" 3 1101 MM I 0t 
mf ansv+u wes ND 
How we Molsr CMTAIMD? 1 _i I _I I _t I_I I, _I 
1 _I 
*I _I 
I _I I _I I_I I _. 1 I _I 
I tY 11cWW cm 1 lORI11M 1U1tiU 13 uhI ME PUý 11 IUt 1/ Ito 
2 lli$1UNIS cm QIf 1 mm UP? /mlE imm 11 NIICTI/ IIN IUT 11 10111/ K1R1t1M//W 
3 1011 "Um mS ILIA K? 10/1111w 1S N 11"11-ma PH UM 26 DID unk ume 
4 WA 6Y11WIL! (see 191 11 111111S1cm !I 1*1 1df1Nit 11 ErLl1R to M (l1Cinl 
S K1 no ! 11! 10!! 11 11$ t1111IIR/1I 1$mm 100111! MS » MIT tl 1W1't 1311 
I SIRS! IWS m 12 tlit PR "a 11K11 11 - ukIliU g11TL 
* 
** I/ A Gin GE I= 1118 13lIcm' , SPWILFY 1'O iIII _I*I 
I 
IF THE ALMO 1 TM I GAS 4,5,7, OR 10, OOMSIE THE NEXT PAItT 
* 
mm ýNi Fm ThIS amRR 1 I I*i Ii I 1 _ 1 "Now W mew ! iR mm ! ON IIn w $1011 __ _ ._ IW ION! IR N 10111101? 0111ßi, N 1N /r 21U/d/ 
4 Mt 111111 1 tt "CM, Met UIICt=l S N! '? 1111 ! 5111 VIP MI, K "M /11111! 1/ i t11* 10511110! 
wummu if m1 mm MR mom * 11NIf14m IR es 1011 1110111 NI ml MOW/ 1 Ili IV- 
RIºifý/ f /fW ($PWIT)/ 11 NI Id 01111/ SS Ni'? IIN 
* 
If above answer win 4_ * 
ANMW THOUGHT would have fe1 I Let-1 Let I LeI 
cost for TREº11ORfP & TRANSPORT (199 a in 't tu") * 
NEXT AcrION7 * NP (T ACPIa4? 
CHECKED BY SUPERVISOR 
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VILLA CM HAM HOUSE NR . PAGE 6 
DEATH RDOCRD 
Eias any member of this household DIED in the last 12 months, including newborns and 
infants? (Y/N)I_I 
* 
* 
D ºSID Nr. 1 Age I_ I Sex 1 
_1 
*DECEASED Nr .2 Age I _1 
Sex I 
__I It 
CAUSE OF DEATH : 1_1 *CAUSE of DEATH : 1-1 
* 
FIRST SE 1ID * FIRST SECOND 
ACTION ACTION * ACTION ACTION 
* 
ACTION TNcffi:: 1-1 1 1*1 11 1 - - * - 
1 01YUII T IOAINB 4 N- 110r WRLTRWW 7 oil" WYi lilt, RC is Is ma, w 
1 !AS 11YIt1011t Q1N! /W1BI!! I "ITN! W1 ITIL 19 MIT 11111111111/1401? 1M 
1 1111101 I1l1I? B i 51 /IAft (PililTI.! ) I in WICIR it IW 
* 
pMMM S: (DON'T IQNOO - 999) 
* 
TOTAL ALL OSTS Lel I LeI 1* LeI I Le I 
* 
ENOUGH P1 4E'Y AVAILABLE (Y/N) I I )*( I 1 ( I 
_ in house or savings? _ _ * ___ 
* 
If above answer was NO, * 
HOW WAS NORM OWMNED? 1_I I_I I_I 1 
-11-11-1 
* 
1 1%) IICtlr"M cW 7 10110 1l01 IORfLOORI 13 IINCY am PANUq 11 Pus Is 111110 
I Ni/Pf11 em WI ! M/n? IIRHIYelI!! ia 14 IORIO RM 1N4T 19 P111 1LYtltIa/Imm 
I IOU "MIM 9 111101 ONt11yR111$ is a t1AT-WILL fu RID It I19 W LIWI 
I s1Y LW/lSUU i$ 111 10 12111( 111? tN Iii! l1t111R IS coram is ma (EMR) 
S P1ý of IIOIRfl 11 nu 11110mt/5* 11 Wm ISIS! it 1011 99 IOM't 1W0/IOi't *101 
115101 mat _- 12 l11011$ il ! SSCIiß1 17 = mim Cella 
It 
IF 'lilt A=10111 TAIWI W 4. ß_ 7. OR 10. COVIZis ¶111 1IT PJW 
rwib ire ras a1DIQ I_I 1 
__I 
*1 
_I I _I 
t 1101111 N? Ultmi : N! lrta $11111111 NIN : tal )w mm ul N "mm Intwu, a rN rY t1 Tuaw 
4I ff DONS M 1! t NCTSI, PM, st YIIC1NS S MIT im MIM " M, sioum, 1mm i! 6 ME Ual1 
winglSI R PW 7 1OC1w W RMI1 t7WitlhU VMTOt 11 WI [NILYIN iii litt t'1NL/)I IW NU- 
"Ulm! / I MN! ($wICUT)/ to m Yf CIAO/ fI MIT till 
If above annar w= 4 (Not enough money); s 
A "MW THO If? imu1ä hmn Lei 
-I Le 
I1 
cast fcc 1iWMMr? i TRNMKW (999 - don't know) 
MOLT IICYIQ? 
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VILLAGE "AM HOUSE MR. PAC! 7 
Module 3 
O]ISTRUC1't(N (W HOLME(S) 
a. Nu ber of rooms occupied by household, including parlor and any extensions or 
outbuildings 1 _1 
b. %ll construction. 
1 nd eM wattle 2 of lcict l time ei beecds 5 NI ºcict it wattle rill plutec 1 cooccete 
c. Enter "2" if there is fresh paint on the walla 1_) 5k arv1aar 
Tow 
d. Roof Material 1_1 
1 tbatc1 l tic I coec=ete 
e. Floor material (_I 
I nd 1 tiles at cooctete 
f. Enter "3" for private well or tap i_1 
sn Dow this horaaold lore Its coin latrine? (Y/ 7) 1-1 
sus m own or rent this house? If rented, how u i? 
Juäging gdy fray the appearance of the hasse, the wsy people are dressed, and the way 
the hause is arranged, is this household: 1_1 
I Maec tfaa avua, e 2 lüeet average 7 letter-eft riae annhe I ha11e to say 
------"Pes 
(sm=V) as ah bin say, all wwytin you tell s: today nar betaae - s+e en you. 
Even di people ds tiay go red dis papal nor go know say nsr you particular tell = 
anytin. So no fraid fac tell sie de true. ) to talk lilibit but the money situation 
rmw you os. w ("M I said, all of this information is confidential. Now I went to ask 
you some more questions about your household's money situation. ") 
"De big mit (big oven) nar dis oee, tin now de main Hoke asy be depend pan for 
Ina living an for feed dis me? * (t*tat is the prior occupation of the household head? ) 
(GtM s a, Yý PUR AM aIRMAMW QUMM7 =) 
I rinn, 1 lIe, s rem nua, 4i nwe, s rl: onunwls, I MIN am MINI, 
1 me C. f., I *n&D a m, s Luvs , is N1mm, 11 LIIU 
HU YI SRI /st, 
it Co was 1! LSIU a 1I1C, 11 UIICRTU/ONL 1w1ß, 14 Ot111 (tpcUy), IS NR, 
ýD, " IRWI, it CIlUIN aew Ifr1CI , 17 li11YY, t0551WR, 
SS DI'? SIN 
Tell me de oder woke dem way you day do 111111 
(Side occupations of household head) 
"Oodat an ondat again na dis ase Ink you vag &W traäin, ac oder Pozeaf weY day woke 
or traäin day bring erney cm nez dis are? "oonar get any oder parson "IV i day i 
dis cse, sen enney cs net die one (ah sin lek oanet yet potaon noz "Ind ac A ezica 
or even Migeria ac Salon. or 'mW oder sie, kin bring ac men money nor die ase? (Which 
other household imubers or other family nenüers usually contribute cash to the 
household? ) 
Erm 'lid ýý or Q EwRý HID (rmI3RB 1_1 (should tally with 11 1, , 
of bootee tilled below) 
F rr "M OCELWJ CM ar MCH 1-1 1_1 1_1 1-1 1I 1_1 1 
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VILLAGE NAME HOUSE NR. PAGE a 
If the head or any other aeeaber of the household is a rice, coffee, or cacao farmer, 
ask the following: (999 = don't know or did not answer) 
ICR Face: How many bushels planted by all household menbers? I (bushels 
pM COCOA: How Huch was sold last year? I (bags Qg Let 
ICR : How much was sold last year? I1 bags M Let______ i 
Any other CJS14 CROS grown (whether for sale or not) (Y/N) I_1 
If any ass sold, how auch money was earned? Let 1 
ICR PALM OIL: Produced for own use only (Y/N) 
Produced for sale I 1tins GE Lel 
Any large livestock owned (Y/N) 1_I Any fowl? 1_I 
sesidas Un tuck and the crops you harne already mentioned, how elm do pappte in 
this hasshold get money to buy foal, clothes, are other thLgr like mwtdiw, soap.. and 
so on? 
If the head of household is a rice farmer: 
For how many months do you have to buy rice to feed the household? I__I 
Does anyone in the household own: (working condition or not) 
(FILL In !US am=) 
Supplied from job? 
A. Bicycle 1 (1) 
B. Motatbtke 11 (3) I. 
_I 
(-2) 
C. Radio/cassette 11 (1) 
D. Cart ew (2) 
2. Ift"- m/cleric 1 1(x1) 
F. sm+inq machine 1_1 (2) 
ß. ýbtaccar/laýry 1_1 (6) 
Mk in urban cc wining areas: 
H. 'Pelevisicn/'vtdeo 1_I (2) 84perviaac Total: $1 
1. tketmeratot $I (2) 
J. Refrtq/freezer 1__j (2) 
k. liine: y I__I (6) 
IP A ums mm m1 at OlM I PmkBrl Cif IItlýViýýý 71ý Elft I1 SE! ßh8 
FOOD ZUM DAT. 17 $ML ]IM: 
How auch did you speed yesterday on: pester 2 tae "don't knoP1 
Rice Gel 1 
Caaaava/garri/potatoes/other tubera Le) 
INGMIEM FM -q"/sN Lei -i 
(f zero, explain Pay 
How many meals were eaten by the household yesterday? (adults) 
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VILLAGE NAME HOUSE In. PAGE 9 
Has this household had any feasts or ceremonies (including special festivals) in the 
last 12 months? (Y/N) 1_1 p Yes, 
How such did p gole in this haaetwld spend on it (them)? 
Cash Le 
Quantity rice supplied 
Other II Supervisor Total Lel 1 
Now did you manage to get money for the feast (s) /cereirony? 
t nu tI /PKS cm 
t 1ow/tmm cm as 
1 secs eesmsroa 
4 ! Ow un/TId mu 
cý wUa MR 
te+ 7 iti/M tilt 
ýofSI na ýcumune 
I PLOW 0! R! naaft 
it noeo/at ra NU 
11 I%I LITH" /TOR 
12 to= 1001 PILCIU1S 
11 u"m O? IIi PDCtW 
11 Ilil TU nil Want 
is mum a TUfl 
1i /1n10RIOU! 1? PoU 
19 PLDUI INSIn RIn01 
If III I= L11011 
1$ oldt 1t11CTR1 
nNI'? noun 
ttt p1 OUT, lt1CIR 1000 
(us to : ice C$IS [a T an TU QUSTICU) 
Besides the illnesses or deaths already mentioned, In the last 12 month:, has 
anyone in the household had to pay for some emergency, such as a FU MAL (1), 
: A' lT FOR ANY ILLNESS (2), AOCIDßW (3), or VILLAGE DISPt7PB (4), or any On 
Ex 11 M ICY (5)? IF IRS, 
G-at was the emergency? I_1 
How much did it coat? LeI 1 
How did you manage to get the money to pay? I_I I. 1 I__I 
If borrowed, was it on an interest basis or repaid in kind? Y/NI_$ 
Did any a era of this household buy clothing or shoes in the last yea=? (Y/M) 1_I 
m acts Iiv ter rent wtýalý 
lathing/ahn foc homehold head Lel_.. 1 1 
_i 
1 
clothinq/shom for spouse(s) X1_-_I 1_I 1ý 
Clothing/shoes fcc all children Lei 1 1_I 11 
If the respondent is head of household, ask the following: 
How Huch do you owe other people? Le: ) 1 In-kind: (estimaite value)Le: 1 
How much do other oeonle owe You? Le: I 1 In-kind: (estimate value) Let 
If (God forbid) there was a serious illness or amergency in this house toiorrow 
which would cost 500 Leones, what would you do to get the money? 
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VILLAGE NAME HOUSE NR. PAGE 10 
MOD= 4: ASR FOR HOUSE NUMBERS ENDING IN 1.2.3. AML 
.4 
wMar, plenty sie, an plenty covnbcy some people so po dat den no able pay anytin 
for men densef vim den sick. You tink say people lek day wen day for get free ssrecin 
nar hospital, or des for pay any small tin way den able, or den, pa o pa, for pay de 
sale lek oder people? ' 
(In most places there are some people who are poorer than others, and wt*o may not 
be able to pay anything at all when they are sick. Do you think those people should 
get free medicines, or have to pay some small amount, or pay as noch as everyone else? ) 
11 
I= pay : Ne $n1l mod of e er I= pay Betºiy 3= ! Mt is sWº a eealne ehe I= IN't new 
IF 1 or 2, AN QUEMCI 17 IF 3,9RIP QMMI 1 17: 
"Uar buy we sinistiy for wellbody business day buy serecin an nar wit de money 
way people pay for marecin. So if po people pay money wry r mw egeal to the cost of the 
serecin e+ay dem buy den other people way able manage for pay lilibit s>ore den way tin 
de eesrecin cost. You tink dat right? " USE EXAMPLE: 
(The Ministry of Health has to buy medicine with the money that is collected from 
the people. If poor people pay less than the cost of the medicine, it means that 
PEWS WHO ME AVERAGE have to pay a little more. Do you still think that this is 
right and fair? ) 
(Y/t1) II 
'"Pea kin day as de year way people kin get plenty stony; oder tem naz de year 
den same people yar den hen kin dry. TA= month you kin bill up by oon r kin get 
plenty for eat? * ninth you ban kin dry? " 
(Many people only have money at certain parts of the year, like after the crops 
are sold. Do you know which months you have the most money of the most to eat, and 
when you have the least? ) 
Moat: 1-1 to 1I DON'T KNOW 1_I 
Legat 1-1 to I1 DON'T KNOW 1__1 4 
"You know lek moos so di bigman (big omen) narr dis ase kin get whm he bill up 
true true vim? Lek azwo so? " (How much money does the household head usually have 
in the pocket during the (moat plentiful) nunths? ) 
Lei don't know I_I 
the hou"Um 
la han 
sehold head 
thy s say kin days ham 
ason(How 
much uney does 
usually have in the in the h 
Lei I don't know 1_I 
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3isrrs Loons Health Econics survey 
1-1/ILI 
BKK_ BUY___ LANZMMAL 
_ 
Distance to PHSJ(s; miles 
R 
,;, 
ýy (Wiest ; 0% to-iuz eta 
jý°("ý 
Walkin; tine to PHUks; Mýhc - Iý+A' 
k kr' Wm k 
hM4n 
Cost of transport to Ptiit: 
Le 3.0. vo 
Distance to all `on"ttals s tioned as used 
Rik. ß41S1 serifs 
Cost of tra s ul ' to hospi9.00 at 
4v aLa 
//. 
aoo. r, c 
4e ttdef 
WaiLinrg tine to hcs itnl 
k- t hN Oft1k 10 ", ", w/ 06-o IhK Ou"I" 
to 
as"r: jalists/traditional practitioners working in village? 
i6 444#ft 
I T1ilý . 
kelL, f1 t/" 
Drug peddlars working in ýý; llr_ge or nearby? 
i OW h'ýe ýý 
Distance to i: ýar"_3t market whtrt farm product ;; un be sold :; r bough. 
31 rnsk4 'lv d 
: rar. sport available in village for pmduc3 tY/\; 
.... 1 6eck, Other transport avPiaable' 8 *, A A+ "Q . 
Any ritual aid' 
tÜO 
y 
Dispenser's statement of b. verage treatzsnl costs, or by most common problems _ " 7S 
Daily agricultural labour wag 
'_ 
cº ý° " . 
a'"O"'ýg °" 'f c ý^' ºý. t" 
-"7s ''O=13 
Sch co 
l- gel. '' ,pxg cal l»ll\ 
ft rM, toýgt 
ýbtäe. ý' L ýh Cýö 'ýº rl - 
.' VA o 
C-6 
ý, &. 
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Appendix 7: 
Official PHC Drug Price List, September 1989 
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